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ABSTRACT 
 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT PATTERNS OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: THE 
CASE OF THE NİZAM/SELAMET MOVEMENT 
Gencel Sezgin, İpek 
Ph.D., Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper 
Co-Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hamit Bozarslan  
 
 
September 2011 
 
 
 
Focusing on the Nizam/Selamet Movement, this dissertation studies why and 
how there are variations in the political engagement patterns of “moderate” Islamist 
movements operating within the same institutional/political context.  
Specifically, covering a period from the 1960s through the 1970s, this study 
examines why and how the Nizam/Selamet Movement emerged and established a 
political party; produced goals and ideational elements distinct from contemporary 
and past Islamist movements in Turkey and showed considerable flexibility in its 
choice of allies, strategies and policies, including formation of a coalition 
government with the archenemy of the Islamists, the Republican People’s Party.   
Drawing on the Nizam/Selamet case, this study argues that Islamist movements 
are complex social phenomena that emerge and survive through an incremental 
process entailing interacting, complex and even undetermined sets of cognitive, 
relational and environmental factors. The answer to the research question thus lies 
in unearthing these configurations through descending up and down the macro 
iv 
 
(political field), meso (network and organization) and micro (properties and 
trajectories of the movement elites and activists) echelons at both national and local 
levels of the political field and the movement.  A historical dimension is also 
necessary to highlight intra- and extra-movement factors at different life phases of 
the movement (accumulated resources and inherited constraints), which shape the 
form and substance of its political engagement; and to take into consideration the 
influence of one stage over the other. 
Keywords: Social Movements, Political Parties, Religion and Politics, Islamist 
Movements, Political Participation, National Vision Movement, National Order 
Party, National Salvation Party, Kayseri 
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ÖZET 
 
İSLAMCI HAREKETLERİN SİYASETE KATILMA ÖRÜNTÜLERİ: 
NİZAM/SELAMET HAREKETİ ÖRNEĞİ 
Gencel Sezgin, İpek 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper 
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Hamit Bozarslan 
 
Eylül 2011 
 
 
Bu tez, Nizam/Selamet Hareketine odaklanarak, aynı kurumsal/siyasal 
bağlamda aktif olan “ılımlı” İslamcı hareketlerin siyasi katılım örüntülerinde neden 
ve nasıl farklılıklar oldugu sorusunu soruyor.  
Bu çalışma, spesifik olarak 1960-1980 arası dönemi ele alarak, Nizam/Selamet 
Hareketinin neden ve nasıl ortaya çıktığını; siyasi bir parti kurduğunu, çağdaşı ve 
önceki İslamcı hareketlerden farklı amaçlar ve ideolojik ürünler oluşturabildiğini ve 
siyasal strateji ve ittifak seçimlerini (ki aralarında o zamana kadar İslamcıların 
başdüşman olarak algıladıkları CHP’de vardı) dikkat çekici bir esneklikle 
yapabildiğini araştırıyor. 
Tez, Nizam/Selamet örneğinden yola çıkılarak, İslamcı hareketlerin kompleks 
sosyal fenomenler olduklarını, ortaya çıkışlarının ve hayatta kalmalarının birbirleri 
ile etkileşim halinde, çok katmanlı ve hatta belirlenemez, etmenlerin içinde 
bulunduğu, artımlı bir süreçde gerçekleştiğini savunuyor. Araştırma sorusunun 
cevabının bu etmenler konfigurasyonunun, makro (siyasi alan), mezo (ağlar ve 
 vi 
 
organizasyonlar) ve mikro (aktivistlerin özellikleri ve geçmişleri) düzeyler arasında 
hem ulusal hem yerel seviyede inip çıkarak ortaya çıkarılabileceği gösteriliyor. 
Buna ek olarak, tarihsel bir boyutun da gerekli olduğu tartışılıyor: ancak bu şekilde 
hareketin (biri diğerini etkileyen) çeşitli aşamalarındaki,  siyasi katılımın içerik ve 
formuna şekil veren, hareket içi ve dışı etmenler (biriktirilen kaynaklar ve miras 
alınan engeller) tespit edilebilir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Hareketler, Siyasi Partiler, Siyasi Katılma, Din-
Siyaset İlişkileri, Milli Görüş Hareketi, Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi,  
Kayseri 
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RÉSUMÉ 
SCHEMA DE L’ENGAGEMENT POLITIQUE DES MOUVEMENTS 
ISLAMISTES: LE CAS DU MOUVEMENT NIZAM/SELAMET  
 
Gencel Sezgin, İpek 
Doctorat, Science Politique 
Directeur : Prof. Dr. Metin Heper 
Co-Directeur : Prof, Dr. Hamit Bozarslan 
 
Septembre 2011 
 
 
A partir du Mouvement Nizam/Selamet, cette thèse essaie d’éclairer les 
logiques qui sous tendent les différences observées entre les schémas de 
l’engagement politique des Islamistes « modérés » œuvrant dans le même contexte 
institutionnel/politique.  
Plus précisément, cette étude couvre la période 1960-1980 et examine la genèse 
du Mouvement Nizam/Selamet ainsi que son organisation en tant qu’un parti 
politique. En outre, a travers ce travail sont mis en évidence ses objectifs et 
particularités idéationnelles par rapport aux autres Islamistes passés et 
contemporains en Turquie, ainsi que sa souplesse considérable dans le choix de ses 
stratégies et alliés, à l’instar du  Parti du Peuple Républicain, considéré comme le 
plus grand ennemi des Islamistes. 
En faisant usage du cas du Mouvement Nizam/Selamet, cette thèse soutient que 
les Mouvements Islamistes sont des phénomènes sociaux complexes qui émergent 
et survivent à travers un processus incrémental faisant interagir des ensembles 
complexes voire même indéterminés de facteurs cognitifs, relationnels et 
 viii 
 
environnementaux. La réponse à la question réside donc dans ces configurations de 
facteurs qui doivent être découverts en effectuant des allers retours entre des 
échelles macro (le champ politique), méso (l’organisation et les réseaux sociaux) et 
micro (les acteurs) aux niveaux à la fois national et local du champ politique et du 
mouvement. Une dimension historique est aussi nécessaire qui permet d’étudier les 
facteurs interagissant au sein de chaque phase du mouvement qui lui donnent la 
forme et la substance de son engagement politique ; et de prendre en compte de 
l’influence d’une phase sur l’autre.   
Mots-clés : Mouvements Sociaux, Partis Politiques, Engagement Politique, 
Relations entre politique et religion, Mouvement de Vision Nationale, Parti de 
l’Ordre National, Parti du Salut National, Kayseri/ 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay examines the political engagement patterns of Islamist 
movements focusing on the Nizam/Selamet movement (the NSM)1 in Turkey. The 
NSM was a “moderate/pragmatic”2 Islamist movement, in the sense that it invested 
in the existing system and “all[ied] [itself] with distinctly non-Islamist ruling 
elites.”3 Covering a time period from the mid-1960s through the 1970s, this study 
seeks to understand how and why the NSM differed in its patterns of political 
engagement from other moderate/pragmatic Islamist movements of the period 
operating within the same environmental context and from its predecessors. 
Specifically, through examining the emergence of its entrepreneurs, the formation 
of its networks, ideational elements and organization and finally its 
                                                            
1 The names refer to the names of the political parties that Milli Görüş Hareketi (The National 
Vision Movement) established with short intervals in 1970 and 1972: National Order Party/the 
National Salvation Party (the NOP/the NSP). The name Milli Görüş Hareketi was adopted later in 
the history of the movement by the mid 1970s. As the activists of the movement mostly referred to 
the movement during the years under consideration as “Nizam Hareketi” or “Selamet Hareketi” 
depending on the period of their involvement, here it will also be referred by that name. The NOP 
was closed down by the Constitutional Court with the claim that its activities were against the 
Constitution and the secular character of the state and the NSP was established shortly after with the 
same cadres and drawing on a similar program. As shall be seen, in the first general elections 
following its establishment, the NSP entered the Grand National Assembly and became a partner to 
the coalition government with the (by then) the center-left the Republican People’s Party (the RPP), 
the archenemy of the Islamists since the 1920s.  
2 The term moderate/pragmatic does not attribute an essence to the movement. It is rather a practical 
way to point out that these types of movements shunned from violent challenges to the existing 
social and political systems in their respective countries during the period that a research covers. 
Hence, the term does not exclude the possibility that with the changing circumstances in the political 
field, movement networks, international arena etc. and changes in the movement’s ideational and 
organizational properties, a movement, its offshoots, or some of its members may engage in political 
violence. 
3 Jillian Schwedler,  "The Islah Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a 
Transitional Polity," in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan 
Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 205.   
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ordinary/routine political activities, this dissertation asks why and how the NSM 
emerged; targeted the political field as its primary area of movement activity 
establishing a political party; produced its ideational elements distinct from 
contemporary and past Islamist activists in Turkey and showed considerable 
flexibility in its choice of allies among non-Islamist ruling elites that included the 
archenemy of the Islamists, the Republican People’s Party4.  
For at least three decades Islamist activism has attracted considerable 
scholarly, journalistic and political attention. While from the 1980s through the 
1990s, efforts have been made to analyze and define the factors behind the 
successful rise and challenge of Islamist movements in different country settings, 
by the 2000s, particularly following September 11, the focus has become the 
Islamist political behavior and the activities of the local and global Islamist 
networks.  
Notwithstanding the respective subject matters and theoretical approaches 
of these academic works, the literature since the 1980s has a common strength.5 
Many of these studies lay the epistemological ground for treating the Islamist 
movements and their activists in relation to specific social, economic, political and 
cultural factors. They thus successfully challenge the approaches that see an 
irrational reaction to modernity in these movements and treat “Islam” as a major 
variable, if not the variable, to explain the actions of socio-political actors.  
However, among them, the earlier studies, which focus on overlapping 
social, cultural or economic exclusion and frustration of the periphery, as major 
explanatory variables6  tend to neglect the political engagement patterns of the 
Islamist movements. In these studies, while the movements appear as a “black box” 
engaged in contentious politics with the state, the political field is reduced to a 
homogenous entity, the state.7 Recent studies on Islamist movements adopting 
                                                            
4 From 1923 to 1945, when Turkey transitioned from single party rule to multi-party politics, the 
RPP had governed the country with a heavy hand, introducing massive secular reforms that 
effectively reduced (not totally removed) the influence of religious rules and traditions in state and 
social affairs. 
5 Detailed bibliographic and content information on these works will be provided in Chapter 2 that 
discusses the analytical framework and methodology of the dissertation. 
6 There have been some notable exceptions that paved the way for the present study. These studies 
will also be referred to in Chapter 2. 
7 It should be noted that this approach to Islamist movements shows a striking difference with the 
developments in the study of politics in Turkey, which built the ground for this research. For a 
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social movement and other theories combining institutionalist and constructivist 
approaches, on the other hand, undertake the task of dissecting not only the Islamist 
movements but also the formal and informal political opportunities for and 
constraints to Islamist collective action in order to discover the mechanisms which 
enabled these movements to emerge, mobilize their resources and engage in 
sustained interactions with the state and political elites.   
By drawing attention to the existence of variations in types of political 
engagement (formal and informal, radical or moderate/pragmatic) and organization 
(political party, informal networks, association, charity organization, a tabligh8 
organization) and to the importance of existing political structures in shaping them, 
the latter studies paved the way to new questions and new areas of research. 
One such area is the question of why there are variations in the political 
participation patterns of moderate Islamist movements mobilizing within the same 
institutional context. In other words, why and how Islamist activists invest 
differently in the system when they do? Why and how do they create a particular 
type of organization and differ not only in their goals but also areas, subjects and 
partners of contestation and cooperation in the political field? 9  
Answering this question through a case study would help to gain further 
insight into the interplay of extra- and intra-movement factors and dynamics in 
shaping a movement’s political involvement patterns. Further research on Islamist 
moderate/pragmatic Islamist movements in Turkey and other Muslim majority 
countries can be built upon the analytical framework and empirical data produced 
through the study of the NSM case. Focusing on the particular goals, identity, 
networks and organization (in this case a political party) of a moderate/pragmatic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
pioneer study, which focuses on the action and interaction of cooperating and contesting players and 
institutions within the political field see Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, 
England: The Eothen Press, 1985). For a work that studies the complexities of the political field and 
political engagement patterns of a mainstream right wing political party see Ümit Cizre, AP-Ordu 
İlişkileri: Bir ikilemin Anatomisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993).  
8 The name given to proselytizing in Islamic tradition. 
9 Schwedler studies political practices of two moderate movements in Jordan and Yemen. However 
she focuses on elite level movement activity and on two different country settings in order to 
discover the mechanisms of further moderation (or the lack there of). As such she does not dwell on 
these questions. Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
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Islamist movement, which reflect its engagement patterns, would constitute a step 
forward to conduct comparative work on different Islamist movements later.  
The first argument of this essay is that Islamist movements are complex 
social phenomena that come into being through an incremental process entailing 
interacting, complex and even undetermined sets of “causal configurations” rather 
than a simple causal line (especially important for countries without stable regimes 
such as Turkey).10 The study of political participation patterns of an Islamist 
movement thus necessitates a historical dimension, which would highlight different 
phases of its lifespan: crystallization of the movement innovators as a group; 
activist recruitment/conversion and mobilization; formation of ideational and 
organizational boundaries, movement maintenance through action and interaction 
with extra- and intra-movement actors. The clusters of action in each phase may 
appear in different sequential orders and some similtaneously with each other. The 
sets of factors in each phase include “the usual suspects” of formal and informal 
power relations and institutions, the agency of the movement activists and impacts 
of unforeseen historical and political events (contingency); but also earlier 
outcomes produced in the preceding stages. The structures and dynamics external 
and internal to the movement need to be specified in each stage in order to assess 
the available material and symbolic resources and opportunities and constraints in 
each phase and accumulated across the phases.   
The second and interrelated argument of this essay is that in addition to the 
historical dimension, there is a need to focus at both the national and local levels of 
movement activity to understand the internal dynamics of the movement, 
particularly the social networks from which the movement recruits its activists, 
organizational activities and ideational products. These aspects of the movements at 
local and national levels do not only constitute a blueprint of political involvement 
patterns of the movements in and off themselves, but also through creating path 
dependencies they affect the everyday political engagements of the movements. 
                                                            
10 For similar dynamics in the case of left-libertarian political parties, see Kent Redding and Jocelyn 
S. Viterna, “Political Demands, Political Opportunities: Explaining the Differential Success of Left-
Libertarian Parties,” Social Forces 78 (1999): 503. In studying the formation and relative success of 
left-libertarian parties in Europe, Redding and Viterna adopt a qualitative comparative analysis and 
use the term “cluster of causal configurations” to designate combinations of variables.    
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This essay, then, emphasizes the role of internal dynamics as much as 
external structures for the patterns of Islamist political involvement.  Accordingly, 
it adopts a qualitative research design that allows a multilayered study of a 
movement. 
The NSM is covered longitudinally (trajectory of the movement over time to 
capture developmental and incremental processes), vertically (center-periphery 
relations, organizational hierarchy, clientelism) and horizontally (recruitment, 
competition and solidarity among the actors of the movement and across the 
political groups in general) in the changing contexts of formal and informal 
institutions and political opportunities and constraints. A comparative look, which 
brings into focus other political parties, Islamist movements and/or their members, 
is also provided to highlight the NSM’s properties and differences. In fact, since the 
fieldwork research leading to the present essay had originally covered two 
movements comparatively, both the NSM and the Yeni Asya11  (the New Asia), not 
only a branch of the Risale-i Nur Talebeleri (Students of the Epistles of Light12), 
but also a movement in its own right. However, the comparative insights will not be 
delivered through separate chapters, but will be incorporated when necessary in the 
analyses covering the NSM.13  
 The data is gathered during a fieldwork that lasted with intervals from 2006 
to 2009 in three cities, İstanbul, Ankara and Kayseri. In order to examine the 
movement’s internal dynamics and relations with its environment(s), archival 
research on local and national newspapers, in-depth interviews (and oral histories), 
movement publications and memoirs of various political actors were used 
                                                            
11 From the early 1960s to the 1970, when their newspaper Yeni Asya was established, the Yeni 
Asya movement was previously called the “Kirazlımescit” branch, referring to the address of their 
“hub”.    
12 The Nur students was a “new religious movement” with an Islamist outlook. As this issue will be 
discussed in the following chapters, suffice it to say here that it was organized around the writings 
and persona of its leader Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1873-1960). Incidentally, the term new religious 
movement refers to those religious, or spiritual collectivities that display novel and mostly 
unorthodox teachings and behaviors that may or may not draw upon an established religious 
institution. The term does not have the baggage of negative connotations that the term “cult” carries. 
13 This is mostly due to time restrictions related to the nature of the field, which will be explained in 
detail in the methodology section of the next chapter.  
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complementarily. When needed, court files and parliamentary records were also 
consulted. 14 
In-depth and oral history interviews were conducted with national and local 
movement entrepreneurs and activists and local leaders and activists of other 
groups (alongside the above mentioned Yeni Asya branch of the Nur students, 
Akıncılar, Büyük Doğu, Milli Mücadele Birliği15) and non-Islamist parties 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Adalet Partisi, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi16).17 
1.1 The case of the Nizam/Selamet Movement  
In addition to its focus on explaining the differences of the political 
involvement patterns of a moderate/pragmatic Islamist movement, this research 
also aims at filling a gap in the body of work on Islamist activism in Turkey by 
examining a relatively less known and studied period from the military intervention 
of 1960 to the coup of 1980. During this period, the NSM quickly became one of 
the two leading mass based and nationwide Islamist movements (the other being 
the Yeni Asya) in the 1970s. The NSM sustained regular interaction with the 
political and state elites through contestation and cooperation at the national level 
of politics and actively engaged in activist recruitment and consensus mobilization 
at the local level.  
Not only the Nizam/ Selamet movement still survives today known as and 
referred by the name the National View Movement (its political party being the 
Saadet Partisi, the Felicity Party) but it also gave rise to the most powerful political 
actor of contemporary Turkey: the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (the Justice and 
Development Party, the JDP). The legacy of the NSM is thus equally relevant for 
future research to understand the reasons behind its most recent party’s relative 
failure compared to its spin off and to assess the differences and similarities 
between them. 
                                                            
14 It should be added that the author traveled also to Isparta for interviews and conducted several 
telephone interviews with members of the Nizam/Selamet Movement and the Justice Party in Konya 
and Kayseri. Local newpapers of Konya are also examined.  
15 The Raiders, the Great East and the Union of National Struggle respectively. 
16 The Republican People Party (the RPP), the Justice Party (the JP) and Nationalist Action Party 
(the NAP) respectively.  
17 Lists of political parties, social movements and civil organizations that are either mentioned or 
extensively studied in the essay can be found in Appendix E, Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
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1.1.1 Putting the research question in its empirical context 
The NSM, which formally established its first party organization, the 
National Order Party, in January 1970, had begun to emerge in the mid-1960s when 
a group of Islamist elites crystallized as entrepreneurs of a movement that sought to 
establish a new party.  Since the NSM emergence, mobilization and engagement in 
formal politics took place in an institutional environment and at a period that 
accommodated other informal pragmatic/moderate Islamist movement 
organizations, (particularly, the Yeni Asya, or Kirazlımescit branch of the Nur 
students that began its separate informal and formal institutionalization by the mid 
1960s, but also the Süleymancılar and Işıkcılar18), pursuing the line of analytical 
inquiry and theoretical backdrop introduced above, the following set of questions 
can be raised:  
Why did the NSM party entrepreneurs, who had been previously members 
of various mukaddesatçı19, nationalist and conservative political parties, 
organizations, networks, associations, or brotherhoods ranging from Komünizmle 
Mücadele Derneği20  to some non-Yeni Asya Nur student movements21; from 
student associations to the JP itself, engage in party building activities? Why did 
they refuse to satisfy themselves working through the existing formal institutions 
including the center-right political parties, particularly the JP, following the suit of 
Yeni Asya or Süleymancılar? Why did they prioritize institutional politics over 
                                                            
18 Süleymancılar was a new religious movement established around the persona and teachings of 
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan and specialized in the establishment of (during the single party regime, 
underground) Koranic courses. Işıkcılar was the movement that was formed around the persona and 
teachings Hüseyin Hilmi Işık. While the former emerged in the 1950s, the latter appeared in the 
1960s. 
19 During the period under consideration, the groups referred themselves mostly as “Mukaddesatçı,” 
which roughly means those who defend and respect “sacred values” of religion. In addition, 
different subgroups used the term “İslamcı” or “ümmetçi” which can be translated as Islamist and 
pan- Islamist (here ümmet refers to all Muslims on earth) respectively. A working definition of 
Islamism will be provided below in the section that discusses the theoretical framework and the 
blurring boundaries of nationalist and Mukaddesatçı activism will be analyzed in chapters 3, 4 and 
5. Other Mukaddesatçı groups included simple groupings around daily and monthly newspapers, 
various professional and student associations and semi-clandestine sufi brotherhoods. It should be 
noted that not all religious communities or brotherhoods were necessarily Islamist.   
20 The Association for Fighting Against Communism.  
21 These were the groups formed around some “Ağabey”s in some Anatolian towns.  In Turkish 
ağabey literally means “elder brother.” However, a better translation with religious connotations 
would be “elder” as it was used to refer to leading Nur students). The elders will be discussed 
further in the following chapters.   
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grassroots activities and set out to work for the dava22 through a political party 
despite strong opposition from these Islamist movements in particular and non-
Islamist actors of the political arena in general? Did its conditions of emergence 
and having a political party as an organization influence the NSM goals, identity, 
allies, policy positions and strategies in day-to-day movement activism?  
The answers to these questions lay in the interaction between the 
institutional context and movement’s internal dynamics, which require a 
periodization of the movement’s lifespan and a dual focus on local and national 
movement activities.  
1.1.2 The NSM: born in the political, born to be political  
As suggested above, Islamist collective endeavors, as other social 
movements, are not direct or aggregated results of pre-conceived ideas and beliefs 
or some macro social and economic phenomena.23 They emerge and consolidate 
their institutional and ideational boundaries within the opportunities and constraints 
that existing political regime presents. From this perspective, the NSM was 
different from its contemporaries in Turkey. All of its constituents, that is its 
entrepreneurs, activist networks, ideational elements and its organization, though in 
an incremental fashion, emerged during a period marked by a relative liberalization 
of the polity introduced by the Constitution of 1961. The NSM elites and activists 
sought “power in the movement”24 and established their movement organization 
within a relatively open and extremely competitive political field, specifically for 
political action and through political action. The emergence of its entrepreneurs, the 
recruitment of its activists, ideational and organizational institutions and everyday 
practices thus reflected mainly the power relations and formal and informal 
                                                            
22 The basic meaning of “dava” (Turkish version of da’wa in Arabic) is invitation to Islam which is 
interpreted and deployed by both Muslims and Islamists for different purposes. It may mean the call 
of the god to individuals, political struggle, armed conflict, or religious proselytizing depending on 
the context. However, it should also be remembered that dava has also two secular meanings and 
used frequently as such: legal proceeding and (a just) cause. As shall be seen, Yeni Asya and the 
NOP attributed additional meanings to the word specific to their own version of activisms as well. 
For a detailed discussion on the concept see Hamit Bozarslan, Cent Mots pour Dire la Violence dans 
Le Monde Musulman (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2005), 11-12. 
23 Discussion on the emergence of the NSM in particular and social movements in general and the 
role of macro phenomena and ideational elements will be provided in Chapters 3 and 4 and 5.  
24 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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institutions of the political field both at the national and local levels.25 It should also 
be added that the NSM was also different from most other Islamist movements 
elsewhere in the Muslim world, such as the Jordanian and Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, which founded (and supported) political parties later in their lifespan 
and parallel to their already established grassroots organizations focusing on charity 
and education.26  
First, the NSM elites appeared within a lively social movement sector, 
including other mukaddesatçıs, nationalists, ultranationalists, conservatives and 
leftists of different persuasions. They were incrementally constrained by a specific 
constellation of political institutions, power relations and contingent events to 
establish a political party and to compete in the electoral arena.  
Specifically, the NSM elites crystallized as party innovators amidst the rise 
and failure (not necessarily fall as the collective actions continued) of the right 
wing mobilizations in the mid-1960s that targeted to introduce policy changes on 
various issues and at the same time to weaken the “liberals”27 dominating the 
incumbent mainstream right wing party, the JP. On the one hand, the right wing 
collective actions had inadvertently connected and brought together the previously 
dispersed Islamist elites from various right wing organizations  (political parties, 
business, professional, religious and political associations, brotherhoods, the Nur 
Student branches) and helped them to recruit a new generation of Islamists.  On the 
other hand, the collective actions proved to be extremely inefficient and 
disappointing for the Islamist elites leading them to seek new channels to influence 
polity. Thanks to the JP’s centralized structure and complex clientelistic relations, 
the JP liberals had proved to be quite intransient to the encroachments and 
                                                            
25 In contrast, while the Yeni Asya emerged as a distinct Nur student and Islamist movement with its 
formal and informal organization(s) and networks during the same period; its founders, ideational 
elements and some basic aspects of its informal institutionalization originated in the pre-1960 
period. This was a time when, under the leadership of Said Nursi, the Nur students, had, first, 
emerged under the heavy handed single party rule and then further developed during the initial stage 
of multi-party politics, in the 1950s. The implications of these differences will be discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3.   
26 The NSM was also different from such organizations as the Gama’ at al-Islamiyyah, engaging in 
political violence. The Gama’at had emerged by the 1970s and 1980s in university campuses and 
grew in peripheral towns as underground organization and thus outside the national level of political 
field proper. One of the closest examples to the NSM experience was the Front Islamique du Salut 
(Islamic Salvation Front), which had emerged within the political field in 1988 when the Algerian 
Constitution allowed the establishment of the political parties.   
27 They were more pragmatic and economic liberals than principled political liberals. However, as 
their friends and rivals perceived them as such, this dissertation will also call them liberals. 
 10 
 
influences of extra- and intra-party opposition. Moreover, the NSM entrepreneurs 
realized that their allies in opposition had their own agendas: while the 
conservative-nationalists were cutting deals with the liberals at the expense of the 
Islamists; the ultranationalists were rapidly organizing within the Republican 
Peasant Nation Party, the RPNP28, thereby increasing their power vis-à-vis the 
Islamists. Consequently, having failed to tap into symbolic and material resources 
generated in and through the political arena, and been disappointed by their allies, 
the Islamist elites first joined forces with each other to unite under a party 
organization and then engaged in activist mobilization. 
Second, in order to establish their political party, the NSM entrepreneurs 
sought to tap into the discontents prevalent in the “periphery”, particularly within 
the right wing networks. However, they could attract as their activists only “the 
periphery of the periphery.” The “periphery of the periphery” constituted those 
social actors marginalized within the local/peripheral political, economic and social 
networks and institutions, and thus had been excluded from the ties that connected 
the local (the peripheral towns) with the national/central political field (the political, 
administrative, economic and cultural center(s) such as Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir). 
In other words, it was not the exclusion of the periphery from the center per se, but 
the degree and the way in which the peripheral actors were marginalized from the 
center played a role in the establishment of the NSM networks.   
The periphery of the periphery constituted young men of mostly technical 
professions, (i.e. engineers, workshop owners, small-shop owners, factory 
foremen,) at the beginning of their careers with no prior political party or informal 
Islamist organization engagements. JP’s internal structure and clientelistic relations 
that frustrated the party entrepreneurs, had also prevented these young men with 
limited means to exert influence in the right wing networks in their localities. The 
NSM provided them a new venue of action, through and within which they could 
aggregate their limited resources and generate new ones to challenge veteran local 
politicians and power holders. 
                                                            
28 In 1969, the party changed its name as Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, the Nationalist Action Party (the 
NAP) following the change of leadership in 1965 and an evolution from a conservative-nationalist 
outlook to an ultranationalist one.  
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Third, the ideational features of the NSM also emerged in action and 
interaction with both the extra-movement actors and potential activists at the 
national and local levels of politics. They were constructed not only through 
conscious efforts of the NSM entrepreneurs, but also reflected the ongoing political 
process and the habitus (pre-and post-NSM social trajectories) of both the NSM 
elites and potential activists. Aiming at establishing and sustaining a political party, 
the ideational products of the NSM were both differentiating and articulating. They 
also reflected the existing political context where the elections were free and just 
but political representation and public discussion was carried “in the name of the 
nation” which was defined above all as Turkish and Muslim.  The NSM defined the 
nation as primarily Muslim, without discarding Turkishness and demanded political 
action for its material and moral development. The NSM cadres were juxtaposed 
with the very essence of this nation and doted with altruism, solidarity and religious 
stringency.  
On the one hand, while acting in the name of such a narrowly defined nation 
converged the NSM with the orthodoxies of the political field, the emphasis on 
Muslimness differentiated it from other political parties.  On the other hand, while 
the emphasis on Muslimness of the nation and individual religious stringency put 
the NSM squarely within the Islamist tradition, its reconstruction and promotion of 
the Muslim subject as a politically responsible and active individual constituted a 
divergence not only from the non-Islamist Muslims of the right wing networks, but 
also the contemporary moderate/pragmatic Islamists.  
Consequently, at the national level, the NSM as a whole was able to 
challenge its rivals and legitimately lay claim on the state controlled material and 
symbolic resources. At the local level, the goals and identity of the movement 
facilitated the recruitment of its activists, rendering new meanings to their 
marginalization and reinvigorating their religious, professional and business 
identities. Finally, through such an ideational production, the NSM connected its 
members and constituencies with the national political arena, through reframing 
their particular interests and demands into a noble cause, and empowering them vis-
à-vis their rivals.  
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Finally, as far as the practical aspects of political engagement is concerned, 
the question of the coalition with the RPP that emerged following the NSP’s entry 
into the parliament in 1973, reveals how the intra-movement dynamics interacted 
with the changing environmental factors and influenced the policy choices, 
strategies, and allies of an Islamist movement. Behind the appearance of a unified 
actor, the micro-properties of the movement elites and activists, the establishment 
of specific type of movement organization, the ideational elements that are formed 
during the initial mobilization period and finally vertical and horizontal intra-
movement power dynamics, all came into play in the particular decisions and 
behaviors of the NSM. 
 The NSM coalition with the RPP in the face of intra-party disputes, heavy 
attacks from fellow Islamist groups and immense pressure from right wing parties, 
demonstrates how the NSM both remained a social movement pooling meager 
resources together to contest the existing distribution of power in the political 
center and survived as a political party, which had to follow the imperatives of 
electoral and parliamentary politics. Most important, it illustrates how the NSM 
ripped the benefits of its double nature and identity. 
 Over the question of the coalition with the RPP, the NSM founding fathers 
were divided into two groups; the anti-coalitionist elites eventually left the party 
and the NSM suffered some electoral loss in 1977, which may or may not be related 
to the coalition and internal disputes29. However, the pro-coalitionist elites managed 
to sustain the loyalty of majority of the activists, adherents, and voters thanks to the 
ideational elements and organizational features of the NSM, which had emerged in 
the early phases of mobilization.  First, the NSM collective goals and identity that 
emphasized solidarity and altruism in the name of the material and moral 
development of the nation facilitated to portray and see the coalition with the RPP 
as a responsible behavior that would both put an end to a government crisis and a 
strategy to introduce targeted changes in the polity. Second, the centralized decision 
making structure and the ideational elements that was reproduced at the local level 
empowered the pro-coalitionist elites and helped them pursue their line of action 
                                                            
29 The NSP maintained the number of votes it had acquired in the previous general elections, but 
since its votes were proportionally less than major mainstream political parties, it lost half of its 
parliamentary seats. Why it is difficult to determine whether or not these factors played a role in this 
relative failure will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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despite internal opposition and external attacks. The local activists did embrace 
these institutions, since they prevented the institutionalization of intraparty 
competition, thereby cutting the cost of mobilization and allowing them to 
concentrate their efforts in electoral and further activist mobilization. Finally, 
immersing in the political field through a political party organization had rendered 
the symbolic and material goods attainable through party politics visible and 
attractive for the individual activists, particularly local party elites. A coalition with 
the RPP would symbolically connect them to the center and show that the NSM 
activists were not “reactionaries” but political actors competent enough to govern 
the country. Materially, it would allow the NSM to tap into resources controlled 
and generated through politics and redistribute them as selective incentives to its 
activists in various forms (status, seats in the national and local governmental 
bodies, bank credits, jobs, import quotas etc.) to strengthen their loyalties.  
1.1.3 The legacy and implications of the pre-1980 period 
The coalition with the RPP that was pursued by the pro-coalitionist NSM 
elites and supported by the majority of the activists would prove to be the first step 
towards not only the consolidation of the NSM’s place in the polity, but also the 
homogenization and growth of the NSM networks and organization. From the 
1970s through the 1980s and 1990s, the NSM would constantly oscillate but remain 
balanced between being a social movement and a political party without anchoring 
to one or the other. Not only because the doxa, or “…the entire set of cognitive and 
evaluative presuppositions”30 and the main actors of the political field remained 
almost intact up until the 2000s, but also because the NSM in general and the 
incumbent NSM elites in particular continued to harvest the benefits of this dual 
existence. The NSM was able to regenerate itself to the extent that it could both tap 
into state controlled material and symbolic resources as a political party and create 
those of its own as a social movement to survive31, to satisfy its growing number of 
activists, and to shape and achieve its long- and short-term objectives within the 
                                                            
30 Pierre Bourdieu, Méditations Pascaliennes (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2003), 145. 
31 Moreover, in Verta Taylor’s terminology, being a social movement helped the NSM networks to 
remain intact in “abeyance” during periods of heavy state pressure. See “Social Movement 
Continuity: The Women’s Movement in Abeyance,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 761-
775.  
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political field. As a matter of fact, the political field and the NSM contributed to the 
reproduction of each other.  
By the 2000s, however, over time and thanks to the advent of neo-liberal 
economy and the NSM itself, the young provincial men of the 1960s and the 1970s 
had accumulated enough social, political and economic capital to take over the 
center of the “periphery.” No longer members of the periphery of the periphery, 
they did not need the limited and unstable resources contingent upon the NSM’s 
oscillating politics. The military and juridical intervention of February 28, which 
banned two parties of the movement32 in a short time span ironically constituted an 
opportunity window for the aspiring young elites and activists of the NSM 
networks to change their ideational and organizational institutions. With the 
prospect of the EU candidacy; the demise of the center right parties, whose local 
branches were still populated by names dating back to the 1950s and 1960s and 
thus closed to the new comers and with fewer ties to the constituency; and finally a 
now capital-rich local network seeking stability provided further opportunities for a 
group of ascendant NSM elites. Having found a fertile ground they were thus able 
to firmly anchor the new party to being a political party qua political party not a 
political party qua movement organization.  
1.2 The structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical approach and methodology of the essay. 
On the one hand, the theoretical section instead of offering a single theoretical tool, 
argues for a multi-variant and complex analytical framework to study such 
multilayered and complex socio-political phenomena as Islamist movements. 
On the other hand, the section on methodology discusses the research 
strategy based on the insights and problems raised in the analytical section. It 
presents the way in which the data for the essay is gathered and the difficulties and 
opportunities the fieldwork created for the research. 
                                                            
32 The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and its successor the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi). The former 
was established in 1983 and was banned in 1998. The latter, which was established the very same 
year its predecessor was closed down was also banned following a crisis over the veil of a 
parliamentarian Merve Kavakçı.  
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The sequence of the remaining chapters aims at following at least a rough 
chronology that would ease the reading process, help to avoid repetitions and most 
important, show how one stage and/or aspect of the movement influence the 
others.33 The unorthodox length of certain chapters (particularly 3, 5&6), in turn, 
results from two difficulties that examining the NSM case from its different angles 
presents in each chapter. First, studying different aspects and components of the 
political engagement patterns of an Islamist movement necessitates engaging with 
and elucidating interrelated but nevertheless distinct meso-level political and 
sociological theories and perspectives in each chapter. Among them are political 
process, resource mobilization, network, identity, framing, organization, field and 
political party theories. The multilayered and complex nature of an Islamist 
movement, as other collective actors, requires the adoption of these theoretical 
insights (and analytical grills) to understand the emergence of the movement 
entrepreneurs, mobilization of the activists for party building purposes, formation 
of the symbolic boundaries and finally the mundane political practices.  The 
relevant literature review on the Islamist movements and the NSM that needs to 
accompany the analytical discussion adds to the bulk of the chapters. 
Second, since much has been produced on Islamist activism in Turkey in 
general and the NSM in particular without proper fieldwork research the chapters 
need to advance enough empirical evidence to refute the established “facts.” 
Ranging from the question of who were the NSM party innovators to the nature of 
the activist networks of the party; from the formation of NSM ideational products 
to the NSM’s political practices, each chapter not only provides new information 
based on primary sources but also reinterprets certain events, processes and facts 
under the light of new data.  
Chapter 3 asks why and how a group of Islamist elites emerged as the 
leaders of a new movement seeking to establish a political party by the mid-1960s. 
It thus unpacks the initial phase in the lifespan of the NSM and shows that the NSM 
innovators crystallized within a relatively liberal atmosphere in interaction with the 
JP, and various other political actors in the national level of the political field and in 
the religious, social and politico-cultural networks, rather than with the state per se 
                                                            
33 A chronology of major events and developments between 1960-1980, prepared by the researcher, 
can be found in Appendix A. 
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or as a direct result of some macro socio-economic phenomena. Specifically, the 
chapter discusses the formation of a nationwide loosely connected Islamist network 
and the subsequent crystallization of a group of Islamist elites amidst the 
mobilizations of a right wing coalition (conservative-nationalists, Islamists, 
ultranationalist) against the JP liberals. The failure to introduce policy changes 
through right wing collective actions would lead the Islamist elites active in the 
political center to initiate a party of their own.  Historical data for these chapters 
were gathered from movement publications, nationally distributed Islamist 
newspapers, also in-depth interviews, memoirs and oral histories.  
Chapter 4 and 5 inquire as to how and why the NSM elites’ initiative 
succeeded. In other words, they focus on the questions of how and why the NSM 
could recruit its activists, establish party branches throughout the country and 
engage in electoral campaigns and further activist recruitment and network 
building. They tackle the consensus and activist mobilization and formation of the 
NSM’s organizational and symbolic boundaries during the late 1960s and the early 
1970s. Consequently, not only the chapters draw attention to complexity of the 
material and symbolic formation of an Islamist movement but also show the 
contingent (dependent) nature of the macro phenomena themselves on meso- and 
micro-level factors. The chapters drew their data from the local newspapers of 
different persuasions, as well as national newspapers, oral histories, in-depth 
interviews and movement publications.  
Chapter 4 studies the formation of the NSM’s institutional boundaries 
through analyzing the activist recruitment efforts and the networks in which the 
NSM found its activists. Drawing attention to “differential recruitment”34, or entry 
to the NSM, this chapter shows that the participation to the NSM as activists was 
                                                            
34 The term “differential recruitment” has been advanced by Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson and 
refers to the recruitment and entry of some individuals into a movement but not to others. Both 
groups of individuals may be within the same social-networks and may experience some common 
grievances that a movement tries to tap into. The authors ask the following questions to draw the 
line of analytical inquiry: “Why are some people rather than others recruited into a particular social 
movement organization? Given the number of competing and functionally equivalent movement 
organizations frequently on the market at the same time, how is it that people come to participate in 
one rather than another? Why do some movement organizations attract a larger following and grow 
at a more rapid rate than others?” David. A Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, 
"Social Networks and Social Movements: A Microstructural Approach to Differential Recruitment," 
American Sociological Review 45 (1980): 787.   
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not a direct and aggregate consequence of some macro phenomena or an a priori 
Muslim identity. The formal and informal relations of power and institutions of the 
local politics, particularly the JP, had marginalized the relatively young members of 
the right wing networks who were then at the beginning of their professional lives. 
Having limited or no social, political and economic capital to exert influence in 
local political scene and thus lacking connection with the national political arena 
the potential activists were attracted by a new venue of politics that empowered 
them. In other words, the chapter presents various generational, meso-level 
institutional (right wing networks and local political field and political parties) and 
ideational factors that played a role in the successful institutionalization of the NSM 
organization at the local level. 
Chapter 5 studies the formation of the NSM’s symbolic boundaries through 
action and interaction at the national and local levels focusing on its ideational 
products. It is argued that the local activists’ involvement into the NSM was not an 
outcome of a preconceived ideological position or belief. While previous identities, 
beliefs and ideas did provide a fertile ground for recruitment, the NSM ideational 
production was a process in and off itself. The ideational production and 
communication did not only help potential activists’ participation into the NSM. 
They also served both to differentiate the NSM organization and activists from 
other national and local players and articulate the local activists to the national and 
local politics.  
Chapter 6 elucidates the question of the NSM’s coalition with the RPP to 
understand the dynamics and mechanisms of mundane political practices and 
decision-making in Islamist movements. It reopens the black box of the NSM in the 
context of daily politics and shows that behind the appearance of a unified actor 
acting in accordance with some pre-established set of goals, ideational elements and 
rationally made strategic moves, the NSM’s mundane political practices reflected 
and shaped by complex interactions between environmental factors and the intra-
movement dynamics. Through a study of the question of the coalition with the RPP, 
it is claimed that the environmental factors were interpreted by party elites 
depending on their structural position within the party, their ideational background 
and needs of the internal power struggles. Which one of the opposing 
interpretations would be adopted by the NSM, as a whole, was in turn dependent on 
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(the reproduction of) organizational and ideational features of the collectivity and 
the micro properties of the local activists. 
 The conclusion, the Chapter 7, provides a summary of the research and 
discusses first its findings in the light of the questions raised in the introduction. 
Why and how the NSM differed from other moderate-pragmatic Islamist 
movements in its engagement in the political arena? The dissertation argues that 
understanding this divergence requires a multilayered and longitudinal look at intra-
movement dynamics and the action and interaction among the movement actors and 
between them and their social and political environment. Second, the last chapter 
introduces future research questions, or prospects of research that could be 
developed based on the analytical frames and empirical findings of the present 
essay. 
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CHAPTER II 
ANALYTICAL FRAMETWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the analytical approach and research design of the 
essay. The first section will provide first an overview of the analytical framework 
and working definitions of “political engagement” and Islamism, or Islamist 
activism. Then, it will build the analytical axes of the essay through a review of the 
literature on Islamist movements in Turkey in particular and recent scholarly 
studies on Islamist activism in general, highlighting their respective problems and 
contributions.  
The second section states the research strategy, which is based on the 
insights and problems raised in the analytical discussion. It first offers a detailed 
review of the empirical research design; second, considers the logic behind the 
choice of Kayseri as a case for examining peripheral movement activity; third, 
discusses the research on the NSM (as well as on Yeni Asya) as a case of moderate 
Islamist movement. Finally it presents the methodological tools and the difficulties 
and opportunities the fieldwork created for the research. 
2.1 Analytical framework: opening the black box of the Islamist 
movements 
Rather than offering a single meta-theoretical perspective or a theoretical 
model, this dissertation adopts two intersecting analytical axes to answer the 
research question. First axe is opening the “black box” of the movement from both 
diachronic and synchronic perspectives. Opening the black box reveals that an 
Islamist movement, similar to other social movements, a product of an incremental 
process, involving such stages and/or tasks as activist recruitment and/or 
conversion, mobilization, institutionalization (organization building) and movement 
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maintenance that take place at the national and local levels of movement activism 
and between the two.  
The second axe is adopting a multiplicity of theoretical tools necessary to 
open and study these stages themselves, on the one hand, and the impacts of one 
stage on the subsequent stages, on the other. Diverse theoretical tools are necessary 
not only because “all methodologies, even the most obvious ones have their limits” 
35 but also because each type and level of movement activity entails interacting and 
complex sets of cognitive, relational and environmental factors which calls for 
specific meso-level theories specialized in such areas as cognitive/cultural studies, 
organizations and networks and macro political and social institutions.  
Highlighting the life phase of the movement through opening the black box 
and studying it deploying diverse theoretical and methodological tools help to see 
that both external and movement-generated cognitive and organizational structures, 
and contingent factors affected the political engagement patterns of the NSM. As 
Giddens puts it a “structure is both constituted by human agency and yet it is at the 
same time the very medium of constitution.”36 The organizational and ideational 
products of the Islamist movements created in action and interaction with intra- and 
extra movement individual and institutional actors draw the symbolic and material 
boundaries of the movements, give a pattern to intra-movement dynamics and 
incite changes in their environments. In turn, the organizational and ideational 
features and the way in which these interact with external institutions and actors 
limit and enable the movements and their participants to act the way they do 
politically. 
The study of the political engagement patterns of an Islamist movement 
necessitates first defining political engagement (or participation, involvement) and 
Islamism (i.e. Islamist activism). Thus, first subsection provides working 
definitions of these terms used throughout the essay. Second subsection will discuss 
                                                            
35 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London and New York: Verso, 1993), 23. Italic is used in the 
original. 
36 Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative 
Sociologies, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 128-129. Giddens’ structuration theory is 
but one theoretical guide among others deployed to understand how action and interaction among 
the actors and institutions constructed the NSM’s and the Yeni Asya’s organizational and ideational 
patterns, which in turn influenced their political involvement.  
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the previous body of work on Islamist movements and the analytical framework of 
the essay in an intertwined fashion. 
2.1.1 The question of political engagement and Islamism 
This essay defines political engagement as follows: the activities bearing 
direct or indirect influence on the power relations and institutions of the political 
arena and the distribution of the material and symbolic resources controlled by the 
state institutions. Islamism, or Islamist activism, in turn, can be defined as political 
engagement through the deployment, articulation and interpretation of Islamic 
sources, traditions, signs and symbols in innovative ways in order to form and/or 
sustain a collective actor in a given context.37  Since the main dependent variable of 
the essay is the difference in the political involvement patterns of an Islamist 
movement, which created its distinct path but was still part of a single field, that is 
Islamist activism/arena in general, the definition of political engagement 
necessarily requires a categorization. This categorization also constitutes an 
epistemological tool to abandon the label  “political Islam” often used in 
differentiating Islamist groups emphasizing formal and informal political activities 
and seeking change in state institutions from those Islamists undertaking mainly 
grassroots activities.  The term political Islam, which assumes the existence of two 
mutually exclusive behavioral and ideational lines of Islamist action, is an 
impediment to observe the multilayered, multidimensional and complex ways 
Islamists engage in politics. It not only denies the political nature of grassroots 
activities but also leads one to overlook the fact that those movements whose 
primary area of activity are at the societal level may also engage in and with 
institutional politics.  
To begin with, while political activism ranges from such conventional and 
peaceful activities as electoral politics to unconventional ones such as guerilla 
warfare, since the NSM (and its contemporaries) studied in this essay are 
                                                            
37 It should be added that most of the Islamist interviewees initially opposed the term “Islamcı,” or 
Islamist. They usually preferred the term “mukaddesatçı,” even “nationalist-mukaddesatçı” but most 
of all they identified themselves with the movement (Nizamcı/Selametçi or Nur talebesi/Nurcu). 
When the researcher explained them she was exploring the term Islamism as well and offered them 
a tentative definition, they usually aggreed with the definition and even later used the term during 
the interview.  
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characterized by an investment in the existing system and playing by the rules of 
“the game in town,” here the focus is on conventional engagement types. This essay 
adopts the categories offered by a research project on Britain’s democracy38, which 
brings together various interdependent forms of direct and indirect political 
activism: 1)  “electoral activity” which includes electoral campaigns, party 
membership, party activism, candidacy for posts in local and national governing 
bodies. 2) “pressure activity” which covers such political actions as protests, 
petitions and lobbying by organized social and political groups; 3) “consultation 
activity” which is undertaken by governments such as citizens' panels, surveys, 
focus groups, public forums etc.;” 4) “do-it-yourself  political activity” which refers 
to those activities that seek “social, political or economic change without  
recourse to methods or processes which aim to influence decision-makers.”  These 
activities range from co-operatives and unions to movements aiming at influencing 
individuals’ behavior as in “vegetarianism or anti-racism”.39 As such, even though 
the original categorization does not explicitly mention, they include those social 
movements that put emphasis on identity construction processes at the grassroots 
level.40 
These categories of political action introduced above are not exclusive in 
the sense that political actors may engage in any form of activism at the same time 
or in different time periods. Since the third category is a relatively recent one both 
in Turkey and elsewhere, it does not apply to the cases at hand. The first, second 
and fourth categories however, help to underline the difference of the NSM from its 
rivals in the Islamist field, particularly the Yeni Asya branch of the Risale-i Nur 
Students Movement.  
Comparing briefly the NSM political engagement patterns with those of the 
Yeni Asya here would help to highlight the peculiarities of the NSM as an Islamist 
movement organized in and through a political party. Both the Yeni Asya and the 
NSM engaged in and with the political arena. However, the NSM built its own 
                                                            
38"Commission Research Paper: The Decline in Political Participation and Involvement in Britain: 
An Introduction," Power: An Independent Inquiry into Britain’s Democracy: 1-15. (Accessed July 4, 
2011). http://www.powerinquiry.org/publications/documents/Intro.pdf  
39Ibid.,12. 
40 Incidentally, the latter type of activity corresponds to the definition and conceptualization of 
social movements in “New Social Movements” branch (as is called today) of Social Movement 
studies. See for instance, Alain Touraine, “Les mouvements sociaux: objet particulier ou problème 
central de l’analyse sociologique?” Revue Française de Sociologie 25 (1984): 3-19.  
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party organization(s), created its own political networks, auxiliary organizations 
and ideational elements. Its leaders and activists sought to influence political 
decision-making processes through enlarging and consolidating the party and the 
movement networks, electoral campaigning and coalition building with other 
parties.  
The Yeni Asya’s main and actual avenues of political involvement in turn 
(as was the case for the Süleymancıs as well) were a) “pressure activism,” through 
petitions, lobbying and newspaper publications and b) “do-it-yourself” through 
proselytizing, conversion and campaigning. The latter form of activity would be 
consciously adopted by the NSM by the mid-1970s, without however ever taking 
the form of proselytizing and conversion that is observed in the Yeni Asya’s case. 
Since its substantial development would have to wait the 1980s, it is not considered 
as a major NSM activity in this essay. 
Although the Yeni Asya refused to establish its own party, or to join into the 
ranks of the NSM, its leaders and activists worked actively within and through the 
Justice Party (the JP), the major right wing party of the period. Several Yeni Asya 
members and local leaders, with the encouragement and/or orders from the “elder 
brothers,” or “elders” (Ağabeyler) of the movement, joined the ranks of the JP and 
occupied posts at the national and local governing bodies under the JP banner. 
Through providing manpower and movement publications, the Yeni Asya also 
engaged nationwide in the electoral campaigns of the JP. Although the Yeni Asya 
activists, who worked either temporarily or as registered members within the JP, 
did not hide their memberships to the Yeni Asya; they were careful in emphasizing 
that the Risale-i Nur students41 were not a political collectivity and that they were 
involved in the JP as autonomous individuals, not as representatives of the 
movement. Needless to say, they were in fact representing the latter’s interests and 
demands as much as those of the local circles with which they entertained close 
relations. For the Yeni Asya local and national leaders, this semi-public 
                                                            
41 It should be noted here that throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s as the Yeni Asya increased its 
dominance within the Risale-i Nur networks through incorporating various branches into its own, 
creating new ones in various localities and finally establishing an informal hierarchical organization 
with division of labor and various formal “front” organizations such as newspapers, endowments 
and associations, by the 1970s the Yeni Asya began to be often juxtaposed with the Risale-i Nur 
movement by not only the movement activists, but also their allies and adversaries. 
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involvement was a means to support and protect the Yeni Asya’s above-mentioned 
grassroots activities.  
The main line of inquiry of the essay on political participation patterns of 
Islamist movements relates thus to both form and content: a) why and how the 
NSM engaged in politics under a different organizational form and through 
different institutions than other Islamist movements; and b) why and how its 
ideational elements and practices (from identity building to recruitment, from 
choice of allies to organizational strategies) differed from others. Following is a 
discussion of previous works, which helped the essay to raise these new questions 
and the analytical framework that helps to answer them.  
2.1.2 Literature Review and Analytical axes   
Islamist movements have received considerable scholarly attention for the 
last four decades both in Turkey and elsewhere. While not providing direct answers 
to the questions at hand, through the contributions and limitations they presented 
they helped to formulate the questions themselves. Most important, wittingly or 
unwittingly, they showed that opening the black boxes of the Islamist movements 
through time and space and deploying multiple theoretical tools are necessary to 
address the research question.  
Earlier, -now- traditional literature on Islamist movements emerged as an 
opposition to the treatment of Islamist movements as deviant and unique 
sociological and political phenomena. These works challenged the previous body of 
work that had essentialized Islam as the main source of political action for Muslims 
in general and treated Islamist movements either as transhistorical phenomena, or 
as embodiments of an irrational reaction to modernity.42 The traditional corpus, in 
contrast, argued that such factors as modernization, cultural, social, economic and 
political frustrations and/or aspirations informed and shaped their emergence and 
challenge to the existing regimes.43 As such they contributed to the “banalization” 
                                                            
42 For a critique see Salwa Ismail, “The Study of Islamism Revisited,” in Rethinking Islamist 
Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism (London: I. B Tauris, 2003), 2-11. 
43 For examples of such work on other Muslim-majority countries see Eric Davis, “Ideology, Social 
Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt,” in From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, ed. 
Said Amir Arjomand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 134- 157; Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s  Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary 
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of Islamist movements in the sense that they put the Islamist movements in their 
proper place among other social, political and cultural phenomena that could be 
studied through social scientific methods; not an easy task given the heated debates 
and vested interests formed around the subject in the national and international 
political arenas.44 
New bodywork followed the lead and produced a number of empirically 
grounded analyses focusing on “mundane” political questions. However, this recent 
body of literature criticized in turn its predecessors (the traditional work) as well for 
their excessive preoccupation with societal cleavages, or macro factors45 and for 
“tak[ing] material and cultural factors as additive”, neglecting “how they are 
intertwined and articulated.”46 Drawing mainly on Social Movement Theories47 but 
also other institutionalist, interactionist and constructivist perspectives, recent 
works demonstrated that rather than being direct and aggregate products of societal 
cleavages, aspirations or frustrations, Islamist movements were the outcome of 
material and symbolic action and interaction of socio-political actors. Unlike earlier 
studies, bringing into focus action and interaction that constructed the Islamist 
movements helped these studies to address many movement related issues such as 
ideational production and/or moderation, resource mobilization, activist 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Findings,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980):423-453; Nazih Ayubi, Political 
Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). For 
examples focusing on Turkey see Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, L'Islam dans la Vie Politique de la 
Turquie, Publication de la Faculté de l’Université d’Ankara 517 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi 
Yayınevi, 1982); Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey," in Islam and Politics in 
the Modern Middle East, ed. Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 
1984), 79-102; Şerif Mardin, Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Ali 
Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye'de Din ve Parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olayı (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 
1985); Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981). 
44 Consider for instance the debates that still revolves around Samuel P. Huntington’s (in)famous 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster 
Paperbacks, 2003). 
45 For a critique of traditional literature from an early paradigm shifter see Ismail, “The Study of 
Islamism Revisited.” See also Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” The Sociological Quarterly 42 (2001): 487-510; Cihan Tuğal, 
“Islamism in Turkey: Beyond Instrument and Meaning” Economy and Society 31 (2002): 85-111 
and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction: Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory,” in 
Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), 1-33. 
46 Tuğal, “Islamism in Turkey,” 90.   
47 For examples from and a review of the social movement literature, which includes resource 
mobilization, culturalist/constructivist and political process/institutionalist theories, see David A. 
Snow, Sarah Anne Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements 
(Malden, Oxford, and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 
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recruitment, and/or movement impacts on political institutions (and power 
relations) and vice versa. 48   
This essay follows the footsteps of the recent body of work49  and also 
argues that the traditional corpus’ emphasis on macro-level phenomena prevents 
the study of those factors, which cumulatively influence the political participation 
patterns of a moderate Islamist movement. These are the micro- and meso- level 
sociological, historical and political processes, which bring the individuals to 
initiate and/or participate/enter into an Islamist movement; formal and informal 
institutionalization and power relations within movement organizations, that is 
intra-movement dynamics and finally the process of ideational production, which 
draws the symbolic boundaries of a movement organization and support it.  
With some notable exceptions,50 which study political action and interaction 
between the Islamists and the institutions and players of the political field at the 
national level, the traditional literature on Islamist movements in Turkey analyzes 
Islamist movements from the perspective of center-periphery dichotomy. 
                                                            
48 Janine A. Clark, Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle Class Networks and Social Welfare in 
Egypt, Jordan and Yemen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Schwedler, Faith in 
Moderation; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change 
in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic 
Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); 
Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
the State Power in Jordan (Albany: State University of New York, 2001). 
For examples of studies on Turkey see Banu Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Cihan Tuğal, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the 
Islamic Challenge to Capitalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Berna Turam, Between 
Islam and the State: the Politics of Engagement (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2007), Jenny 
B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: a Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press: 2002). For an early review and critique of works on Islamist 
activism that adopt social movement theories see Roel Meijer, “Taking the Islamist movement 
seriously: Social Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement,” IRSH 50 (2005): 279- 291). 
49 Since the critique of the tradition literature on Islamist movements in other Muslim majority 
countries have been thoroughly examined elsewhere (as mentioned above), here only those 
publications studying the cases in Turkey will be tackled.  
50 See, for instance, Hamit Bozarslan, “Boire la coupe jusqu’à la lie: le Parti de la Prospérité au 
pouvoir en Turquie,” Les Travaux du Centre Marc Bloch 8 (1996): 5-46; Ümit Cizre, “Parameters 
and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 28 (1996): 231-251; Menderes Çınar, Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslamcılık (Ankara: 
Dipnot Yayınları, 2005); Metin Heper, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a 
Reconciliation?” Middle East Journal 51(1997): 32-45; Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy 
in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 6 (2005): 167-186.  
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Notwithstanding their respective emphasis, socio-economic51 or cultural/religious52 
cleavages; objects of study, the NSM or the Risale-i Nur Movement(s)53, or the 
period they focus, the 1950s, 1970s or 1980s, even the 1990s; these works maintain 
that they are the outcomes of a struggle between a hegemonic secular center (the 
state) and a religious periphery (society) and that Islamist movements emerged 
because “the periphery” was politically, culturally and economically excluded from 
the “center.”  
As far as the question of political involvement patterns of Islamist 
movements are concerned center-periphery perspective has limited analytical 
utility. First, since this perspective treats a) the “center” as a corporate entity or 
closed political field with no or little historical change since its inception in the 
1920s and b) Islamist movements as unitary actors, the question of variation in the 
political participation patterns of two Islamist movements cannot be even raised54. 
Since the changing and ever dynamic properties of the political arena and those of 
the Islamist movements were overlooked there was no room for inquiring how the 
political field and the movements interact, and mutually influence each other in 
time and space.  Consequently, the historical specificities of the political context in 
which a movement is born and developed; how and why a new group of movement 
innovators emerge and capitalize on the existing social networks; and finally, intra-
movement power relations, institutions and activities that subsequently develop, 
that is those questions pertaining to political engagement, are left unaddressed.  
                                                            
51 Ağaoğullari, L'Islam dans la vie politique; Alkan, "The National Salvation Party"; Sarıbay, 
Türkiye'de Din ve Parti Politikasi. 
52 See for instance Şerif Mardin, “The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey,” in Fundamentalisms and the 
State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 204-232; Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in 
Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Nilüfer Göle, “Secularism and Islamism in 
Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-elites,” Middle East Journal 51 (1997): 46-58.     
53 There are very few academic publications treating the Nur movement. Among them, Şerif Mardin, 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Olayı: Türkiye’de Din ve Toplumsal Değişme (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1989) (published first in English as Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)); Yavuz, Islamic 
Political Identity in Turkey; Zeynep Akbulut Kuru and Ahmet T. Kuru, "Apolitical Interpretation of 
Islam: Said Nursi's Faith-Based Activism in Comparison with Political Islam and Sufism" Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations 1 (2008): 99-111; Paul Dumont, “Les “Disciples de la Lumière”: Le 
Mouvement Nourdjou en Turquie,” in Radicalismes Islamiques vol. I: Iran, Liban Turquie, ed. 
Olivier Carré and Paul Dumont (Paris: Editions Harmattan, 1985), 215-256. 
54 Some even lump diverse movements together as if they are a single entity. While such treatments 
were usually the result of a chosen level of abstraction, which was no doubt necessary to discern 
some specific macro-level and enduring historical factors, they nevertheless contributed to 
overshadowing the variations among the Islamist movements and hence their elites and activists. For 
instance see, Göle, “The Making of Elites and Counter-elites.”   
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The second and interrelated major analytical problem that center-periphery 
approach presents is how the ideational properties of the Islamist movements are 
studied. Melucci’s critique regarding “discontent (frustration)=mobilization 
(aggression)” paradigm55 can be advanced for the center-periphery approach as 
well. Similar to other “discontent=mobilization” studies, the traditional literature on 
the Islamist activism in Turkey assumes, either by implication or directly, the 
existence of an a priori collective identity to the Islamist actors. In these studies, 
notwithstanding the focus of analysis, economic or cultural cleavages, this identity 
is “Muslimness,” or the collective identity of the periphery, or society. Islamist 
activism is thus reduced to embodiment or enactments of a pre-conceived identity, 
which incorporates views, beliefs, ideas and a value system that is “naturally” 
activated in opposition to the center and/or as a response to some macro 
phenomena. As such, there is little room for movement level and micro-level 
studies. Even when these works bring into attention the properties of ideational 
elements (or the movement activists in general), they use them as evidence to 
macro-level structures/cleavages, ignoring the meso-level processes, features and 
functions specific to a movement.  As a whole, then, the center-periphery approach 
potentially nurtures structural determinisms and ideational essentialisms with 
regard to Islamist movements and their political activities. 
In contrast, recent research on Islamist movements in Turkey and other 
Muslim-majority countries opened the black box of both the political field and 
Islamist movements. First, it has been revealed that depending on the opportunities 
and constraints of the political field at any given period (e.g. relative openness of 
legal structure, the advent of a comparatively liberal ethos in the polity, the changes 
in the level of state pressure, existence or absence of potential allies among the 
elites, etc.), Islamist movements have been able to not only enter and/or emerge 
within the political field, but also introduce policy changes, challenge their political 
rivals, establish alliances and tap into state controlled resources. The recent works 
thus demonstrated that the political institutions (formal and informal) and various 
forms of interactions (material and symbolic) within and with the political field; 
and the incentives and disincentives that these institutions and relations present; 
                                                            
55Alberto Melucci, "Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in Social Movements," in 
International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action, ed. Bert Klandermans, 
Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI-Press, 1988), 341. 
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influence the movements’ emergence, recruitment models, organizational and 
ideational attributes and changes, in short, their political engagement patterns.  
Second, the recent body of work opens the black box of Islamist movements 
through the deployment of various strains of theories, particularly those produced 
under the social movement research.  They discern how the Islamist actors establish 
relations with each other and their environment and sustain their movements. Most 
important, they have revealed the agency of Islamist actors focusing on ideational 
production, activist recruitment, organization building and resource mobilization 
within the context of existing opportunities and constraints. As a whole, they bring 
to the fore how the Islamist actors reacted to and creatively dealt with the changes 
in the political environment; tapped into the existing social networks and 
discontents, and the available ideational and organizational resources influenced the 
Islamist movements’ engagement patterns. 
Finally, and specifically, as far as the ideational elements of the Islamist 
movements are concerned, the new body of work treats Islam, or Muslimness, not 
as a preconceived identity of the movements but as a pool of symbolic resources. 
Drawing on this pool, the Islamists reinterpret creatively Islamic signs, symbols and 
traditions to construct their identities and action frames. Moreover, these studies 
show that the latter are not immutable, but prone to changes and renovations 
depending on the intra- and extra-movement opportunities and constraints.  
While this study also follows the perspective of the recent studies on the 
political field and Islamist movements, it also diverges in; first, introducing a 
diachronic and multi-level look at both the movement and the fields of political 
action. della Porta’s two interrelated arguments regarding the social movement 
studies focusing on collective actors engaged in violence also holds true for the 
works that deploy social movement perspective in analyzing the Islamist 
movements.56 On the one hand, macro, meso and micro levels are studied but the 
interaction between the three are not properly paid attention.57 In other words, 
                                                            
56 For a notable exception Tuğal, Passive Revolution. 
57 Donatella della Porta, Social Movement Studies and Political Violence (Aarhus: Center for 
Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, 2009), 
8. (Accessed July 6, 2011.) 
 http://ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-
filer/H%C3%A6fte_4_Donatella.pdf  
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emphasis is put either on macro and meso levels, or meso and micro levels not on 
the interaction between the three levels. Moreover, and consequently, the relation 
between the national and local levels of the political field and movement activity is 
also overlooked. On the other hand, although the organizational and ideational 
features of the movements are brought into the picture they appear as “a causal 
dimension, an explanation” rather than as processes58 in and off themselves and/or 
as elements of larger sets causal of configurations.  
This dissertation argues that a) initial mobilization stage as constrained and 
enabled by available material and symbolic resources and existing political context 
informs the organizational and ideational elements of the movements;59 b) during 
the following phases of movement development, the intra-movement dynamics 
within and across national and local levels, that is power relations, solidarity and 
competition are shaped partly by the organizational and ideational elements 
introduced at the beginning of the movement enterprise,60  and partly by the 
political context, which may or may not have changed since the initial stage, 
finally, c) organizational and ideational properties, intra-movement dynamics and 
contingent factors as a set of causal configuration affect movements’ interactions 
with their surrounding environment. As far as the variances of political engagement 
patterns of the Islamist movements are concerned, without a proper treatment of 
these configurations and stages the assessment of the goals, practices, policy 
choices and alliances of social movements could give a partial analysis at best and a 
description rather than analysis at worst.61  
                                                            
58Ibid., 15. 
59 For a study which shows how initial stages of a movement shapes its characteristics see Kathleen 
M. Blee and Ashley Currier, “Character Building: The Dynamics of Emerging Social Movement 
Groups” Mobilization 10 (2005): 129-144. 
60 In other words established paths within particular conjunctures condition (not determine) the latter 
developments. Paul Pierson says that “..path dependent processes involve three distinct phases – 
three stages in a temporal sequence: (1) the initial “critical” juncture, when events trigger movement 
toward a particular “path” or trajectory out of two or more possible ones; (2) the period of 
reproduction, in which positive feedback reinforces the trajectory initiated in phase one; and (3) the 
end of the path, in which new events dislodge a long-lasting equilibrium.”  “Not Just What, but 
When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes” Studies in American Political Development 14 
(2000): 76. 
61 For instance see M. Hakan Yavuz, “Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in 
Turkey” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University, 2004), 270-288. 
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Second, this essay also aims at filling what appears to be a lacuna in both 
the traditional and recent literatures approaches to Islamist ideational production. 
As mentioned above, the former sees “Muslimness” as the preconceived identity of 
the Islamists. As Melucci shows studying collective identity (or ideational 
products), is in fact an essential component of collective action. Collective identity 
involves having “a unity and consistency” that helps the political actors a) to 
compare and contrast their “expectations and rewards at different times” b) to 
render meaning to their frustration in order to direct their mobilization and c) “to 
recognize the expected benefit as not only desirable but due”.62  However, taking 
Muslimness as the collective identity of the Islamists is problematic mainly for the 
following reasons: within a Muslim dominated society, activation of Muslimness 
would not be enough to create unity and consistency required for collective action. 
The Islamists need to differentiate themselves from other Muslims through new 
interpretations and innovations since Muslimness as a collectively shared identity 
blurs the boundaries between the incipient collectivity and the rest.63 Through 
juxtaposing Muslimness, or being a pious Muslim with Islamist activism, the 
traditional, or center-periphery approach, particularly its culturalist variant, curtails 
what this dissertation will call “differential entry” (or recruitment) to the Islamist 
movements at the “Muslim periphery”: not only majority of the Muslims do not 
join the ranks of the Islamists, but also those who do are dispersed in different 
Islamist movements.64 Taking collective identity as a process that is formed in 
action and interaction is thus a necessary epistemological device to inquire about 
the differential entry of Muslims to Islamist movements. Studying where and how 
                                                            
62 Melucci, 341-342. While Melucci attributes these functions to collective identity, or identity-
oriented frames, they perfectly define the role of the action-oriented frames, or collective action 
frames as well. See Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social 
Movements: An Overview and Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 614. 
63A similar problem occurs for right extremist movements as well. As Kathleen M. Blee argues 
since “whiteness” is an ambiguous, “unmarked”, even an “invisible” category in a white-dominated 
society where existing policies and goods that benefit the whites “are seldom acknowledged as 
racial in their intent or consequences” and only “non-whites” are remarked through “otherness, a 
stigma of difference,” the racist groups have difficulties in trying to draw and justify the boundaries 
of their collectivities in particular and whiteness in general. Inside Organized Racism: Women in the 
Hate Movement (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 56.  
64 Inversely, not all Muslims who join the networks of, or support an Islamist movement and 
participate to its activities at differing degrees, necessarily acquire an Islamist identity.  
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Islamist movements recruit their activists in turn throws further light to ideational 
and organizational properties of the movements.65  
While the recent works pay more attention to the agency of the Islamist 
actors in the ideational production, Islam, or Muslimness is seen merely as a 
resource. With some exceptions, they limit the endeavor of studying collective 
identity formation to a) a synchronic analysis, b) single level of movement activity 
(political arena or network level) and/or c) Islamist field/sector in general, 
overlooking the differences between different Islamist groups and organizations.66 
As Ismail demonstrates neither Islam is ahistorical, nor Muslim society is a 
homogenous entity.67 Ismail draws upon Sami Zubaida’s analyses that reject the 
view of Islam as a coherent sociological or political entity and of Islamic cultural 
products as constants in Muslim majority societies.68 Zubaida argues that  
…there are certain cultural themes common to most 
Muslim lands and epochs which derive from religion and 
common historical reference, but that it would be a mistake to 
think that the concepts and entities specified by these themes, are 
sociological and political constants: they are assigned different 
meanings and roles by socio-political contexts.69 
In other words, under an apparent unity, which blurs the boundaries, Islam 
is subject to various rival interpretations at any time and place (across Muslim 
majority countries and within a single society), and Muslimness while being shared 
by other members of the society is also a subjectively defined individual identity. 
Plurality of Islams and Muslimness in turn implies that any redefinition of 
Muslimness through differentiation process entails a “dynamic process of power 
                                                            
65 While socio-political and historical-institutionalist perspectives attribute differential entry to 
social-economic frustrations and/or aspirations of particular classes having adopted macro 
perspectives they also forego micromobilization processes and ignore political, institutional, 
generational, ideational (the saliency of other subidentities) and organizational factors at play. 
66 In rare cases of comparison between two groups, the differences between their ideational elements 
are not treated as explanandum, or something to be explained, but as explanatory factors for other 
socio-political phenomena.  See for instance, Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism, 
112-146. For an excellent recent study that shows how ideational elements and organizational 
structures are intertwined see Munson, “Islamic mobilization.” 
67Ismail, 15-26.  
68 Ibid, 16.  
69 Sami Zubaida, “Is there a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner’s Sociology of Islam,” Economy and 
Society 24 (1995): 151. 
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and resistance.”70 Consequently, it can be argued that Muslimness, or Islam, should 
be treated not only as a resource but also as a constraint. Treating Muslimness as a 
“ready-to-use” tool kit produces similar results with taking it as a priori identity. It 
leads to neglect the differentiation processes of particular Islamist movements; the 
constraints and opportunities that Muslimness and the existence of other Islamist 
collectivities present for differentiation; and finally a variety of other contextual 
and contingent social and political factors that influence the way in which the 
Islamist differentiate themselves. Considering the Melucci’s enumerated functions 
of the collective identity, or ideational products in general, organization- and 
temporality-blind approach of the recent work is thus as much a hindrance as the 
reductionisms of the earlier works.  Since ideational elements heavily informs intra-
movement dynamics and the way in which the movement activists establish 
relations with “the others”, the failure to recognize the existence of a separate 
Islamist identity and its entanglement with the specific organizational form, in short 
its peculiarity, would prevent to explain the variances in strategies, policy choices, 
allies and organizations of the Islamist movements. 
 In contrast, the present research attempts to reveal how Islamist ideational 
resources “[are] constructed and negotiated through a repeated activation of the 
relationships that link individuals”71 within the movement and with the “others” 
through time and space. Highlighting this process will show the distinct ways the 
NSM entrepreneurs and activists (re)interpreted Islamic resources and introduced 
innovations to Muslimness in order to recruit and maintain their activists and 
sustain their movement. 
As this discussion of the literature demonstrates Islamist movements are 
complex entities. As dynamic and multi level collectivities Islamist movements 
emerge and subsist through their diverse components: organizational structure, 
collective identity, activists, networks and finally various material and symbolic 
resources. Moreover, they interact with diverse milieus: networks of potential 
activists, constituents, bystanders, religious networks, rival Islamists, media, civil 
associations etc. Finally, they operate within and in relation to various forms of 
formal (and informal) institutions: laws, political parties, various state branches.  
                                                            
70 Ismail, 17. 
71 Melucci, 342. 
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Consequently, a study of Islamist movements and the way in which they involve in 
politics require attention from multiplicity of angles. This is all the more necessary 
as Islamist movements have one of those “identities (ethnical or religious) which 
retrospectively appears as the most “natural” …[exactly] because [these types of 
identities are] the most naturalized and the most all-encompassing.”72 
To be able to study the complex structure and processes that make an 
Islamist movement this essay proposes two axes. First axe is to open the black box 
of the movements through climbing up and down the ladder of abstraction and 
focusing on the dynamics between and among the national and local levels of intra- 
and extra-movement activity. On the one hand, such an approach would reveal 
different aspects and components of the movement and its environment. On the 
other hand, multi-level analysis puts the economic, social, political and cultural 
macro-phenomena under a different light whereby their “objective” properties are 
“treated as differential resources, the importance and meaning of which must be 
evaluated by the social usages that they are subjected to- that is in their 
realization.”73 It thus brings to fore the agency of the Islamist actors as well as 
formal and informal institutions, and the role of action and interaction, in shaping 
an Islamist movement and its political engagement pattern(s).  Moreover, this 
perspective would prevent recourse to determinism since it construes an Islamist 
movement and its political engagement through unearthing contingencies as well: 
“indeterminacy (possible worlds), conditionality (causal justifications), and 
uncertainty (open futures).”74   
Second axe is to use available methodological and theoretical tools to 
understand the complex movement phenomena horizontally, vertically and 
longitudinally. The corpus of social movement, political party and religious 
movements researches, are resourceful pools to examine Islamist movements that 
produce diverse organizational and ideational outcomes.  Since social movement, 
political party and religious movement literatures dwell on such shared questions of 
                                                            
72  Michel Offerlé, Les Partis Politiques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), 32-33. This 
remark for religious political parties can be extended to Islamist movements in general.   
73 Jacques Revel,  “Microanalyse et construction social,” in Jeux D’échelles: La Micro-analyse à 
l’expérience, ed. Jacque Revel (Paris : Hautes Etudes/Seuil/Gallimard, 1996), 25. See also Offerlé, 
34. 
74 Andreas Schedler, “Mapping Contingency,” in Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, 
the Accidental, and the Unforeseen, ed. Ian Shapiro and Sonu Bedi (New York: New York 
University Press, 2007), 54. 
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organization, recruitment, political context, and finally mobilization they help to 
discern convergent and divergent aspects of the NSM from those of other Islamist 
activisms in Turkey in the late 1960s and 1970s.  
These areas of research, particularly, social movement research, bring 
together diverse perspectives and disciplines which focus on above mentioned 
movement components, milieus and contexts and help to open the black box of the 
NSM. For instance, social movement theories involve three major perspectives: 
resource mobilization, cultural/cognitive and  political process theories which all 
have their roots in different disciplinary and epistemological traditions. Resource 
mobilization theory has developed within sociology drawing on Rational Choice 
theory; cultural/cognitive studies have their roots in anthropological studies and 
new social movement literature, which is itself rooted in “Frankfurt school [and] 
structural Marxism”75; finally political process theory has emerged within the 
discipline of political science and bring together Rational Choice and historical 
institutionalist approaches. To these approaches, one may also add the “Theory of 
Practice” of Pierre Bourdieu that is occasionally deployed by scholars to study 
field-level dynamics (political field, social movement sector or social movement 
organization as a field).  
Various studies in social movement literature have empirically and 
theoretically showed that these perspectives and traditions can be complementarily 
used to understand various levels, contexts and aspects of movement activity.76 
Considering how Rational Choice theory and Theory of Practice can be used 
complementarily would be illuminating on how this dissertation will proceed with 
theoretical multiplicity.77 Ivan Ermakoff provides a useful discussion on the 
subject. He argues that the epistemological conflict between two theories loses 
from its power when one moves away from “paper” and tackles “specific objects 
                                                            
75  Christian Fuchs, “The Self-Organization of Social Movements” Systemic Practice and Action 
Research 19 (2006): 104, 103-106. 
76 For instance, Beth Schaefer Caniglia and JoAnn Carmin, “Scholarship on Social Movement 
Organizations: Classic Views and Emerging Trends,” Mobilization: An International Journal 10 
(2005): 201-212; Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, “ Collective Identity and Social 
Movements” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001):283-305; Bert Klandermans and Conny 
Roggeband, ed., Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines (New York: Springer, 2010).  
77 This choice is not arbitrary since traces and influences of both perspectives can be observed in 
various political process and cultural/cognitive strains respectively.  
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constructed as research problems.”78  In discussing the two theories regarding the 
question of social change he asserts that while the Theory of Practice focuses on the 
“logic inherent to structural relations at a societal level,” to explain change, the 
Rational Choice deploys “the conjoint effect of multiple strategic actions.”79 He 
says that these two approaches should be used together if one sets to understand 
change, say, in the long run.80 Accordingly, 
The conceptual tools provided by Rational Choice allow 
us to tackle different moments of this process. These tools 
highlight incentives to step out from dispositional structures and 
they highlight the strategic processes contributing to the 
emergence of normative dispositions. Conversely, the analytical 
injunctions specific to the Theory of Practice draw attention to the 
relational patterns from which these strategies emerge, and to the 
categories of perception making these strategies significant from 
actors’ own viewpoint. Rational Choice complements the Theory 
of Practice and vice versa.81  
Taken this discussion as a clue this dissertation will use resource 
mobilization, identity, political process, institutionalist and Theory of Practice 
perspectives complementarily to understand how social and political actors and 
institutions act and interact in complex ways so as to give the NSM both an Islamist 
identity that it shared with others and its divergent goals, organizations, ideational 
elements, activists, strategies, alliances and policy choices.  
2.2 Methodology 
This essay is based on qualitative research, which allows a multilayered 
study of the NSM. Following is a presentation of the research design focusing on 
units of analysis, Kayseri as a case for local movement activity, the research on the 
                                                            
78 Ivan Ermakoff, “Theory of Practice, Rational Choice and Historical Change” Theory and Society 
39 (2010): 529. 
79 Ibid, 549. 
80 He also explains how these two theories can be combined to explain short run, or abrupt changes. 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation one example would suffice to make the point.  
81 Ibid, 529-530. 
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NSM as well the Yeni Asya case and a detailed examination of research tools and 
data. The research on Yeni Asya is provided since as an Islamist movement whose 
basic intra-movement  institutions had first emerged in the single party period, it 
highlights the properties of the NSM further. Moreover, the difficulties and 
opportunities that research faced within both movement fields attest further to the 
importance of ideational and organizational products of the movements in 
understanding the behavior of the Islamist activists in general and the NSM in 
particular. 
2.2.1 Units of Analysis  
The Movement and the Dimensions of Analysis 
Since the essay studies the political engagement of the NSM focusing on 
both intra-movement dynamics and structures and political context, the fieldwork 
research was carried out at both the national and local fields of movement activity. 
It thus examined the NSM both horizontally and vertically within its environmental 
contexts. In addition, since the outcomes of the different phases of a movement 
activity become factors in other phases the movement is examined longitudinally.  
The horizontal dimension highlights the formation of movement networks 
and organizational and ideational features and political practices. The vertical 
dimension demonstrates how the NSM harvested the organizational and ideological 
resources tapped and generated at the two levels in order to sustain the movement 
to engage in and with the political arena. The longitudinal dimension puts the 
vertical and horizontal aspects of the movement in its particular intra- and extra-
movement historical contexts and thereby shows the continuities and ruptures. It 
shows that the movement outcomes (e.g. intramovement products such as 
organizational and ideational features) generated in earlier phases of the 
movement’s lifespan becomes in turn a factor influencing the political behavior of 
the movement within a formal and informal institutional context at another time in 
history. Finally, the comparative approach, which brings to the picture the Yeni 
Asya and other Risale-i Nur movements/branches when necessary, allows seeing 
how the internal dynamics of the movements, particularly their organizational 
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forms may generate different political practices in terms of participating into a 
political party project, the choice of allies, strategies etc. 
The form and content of political engagement as units of analysis 
As discussed in the analytical section, political engagement is about both 
form and content. Accordingly, to understand the political involvement of an 
Islamist movement requires, on the one hand, the study of its institutionalization, or 
materialization through consensus and activist mobilizations and organization 
building activities. In other words, it necessitates a focus on the networks from 
which the elites and activists originate, the recruitment efforts, and finally the 
networks and organization type that a movement creates. These aspects of an 
Islamist movement, which relate to its environment and the activities of its elites 
and activists, reveal not only complex configuration of factors that give rise to its 
emergence but also available and perceived material and symbolic avenues and 
means of political involvement.  
The crystallization of the NSM entrepreneurs within and through the rise 
and failure of the right wing mobilizations of the 1960s, the micro-properties of 
their potential activists who had been entrenched but marginal in various right-wing 
networks show the inherently political character of the circumstances in which the 
NSM was born. The NSM was neither an aggregation of some macro social, 
political, cultural cleavages nor was a political branch of a previously established 
Islamist or religious organization. The NSM emerged through action and 
interaction of its entrepreneurs and activists within the political arena. They brought 
their forces together to tap into material and symbolic resources that could not be 
reached individually or through existing political parties, associations, informal 
religious networks etc. (formal and informal institutions) and collective action 
methods such as street protests, petitions, conferences, lobbying. The NSM in itself 
was not necessarily the goal, though the organizational survival later became 
important, but a tool which could be used to initiate changes in the actors’ 
environments which had disempowered them and prevented their access to goods 
that could only be reached and/or generated through a political party (a novel 
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institution) and direct/formal electoral and activist mobilization (a novel collective 
action). 
On the other hand, analyzing the ideational elements and political practices 
of the movement activists as substances of their political engagement, unearths how 
these features of a movement both influence and are influenced by internal power 
relations, the form of the networks of recruitment and organization; and finally, 
interactions with other social and political actors and institutions through time and 
space.  
Analyzing the construction of the NSM ideational elements in relation to 
environmental and intra-movement factors, demonstrates that movements do not 
emerge or act politically in a certain way based on preconceived and/or hidden 
agendas and ideas. The NSM collective action frames and identity called for 
“Muslim political action,” solidarity and altruism in the name of a “Muslim and 
Turkish” nation, not necessarily Islam as an abstract entity and emphasized material 
development as well as a moral one. All testify to the contingent nature of the 
Islamist symbolic production on both the national political arena and the local 
networks as the activists, as shall be seen in Chapter 5, not only through conscious 
efforts but also inadvertently responded to the contexts in which they operated. As 
for studying the political practices of the NSM, in other words, its choice of 
strategies, allies, policies etc, it reveals that a particular political behavior of an 
Islamist movement is a product of not only existing external opportunities and 
constraints82 but also the interacting intra-movement factors and processes such as 
intra-elite power struggles,  (re)alignment of ideational elements and the 
organizational structure. These factors and processes, in turn, are informed by the 
early stages of the movement development.  
The process that led to the RPP-NSP coalition displays how the external 
factors were unfolded at the movement (meso) level. On the one hand, the 
divergent micro properties and intraorganizational structural positions of the two 
groups of movement elites and the power relations between the two led to the 
emergence of pro- and anti-coalition NSM elite groups. On the other hand, the 
                                                            
82 For instance a new and more liberal constitution as an opportunity and an increasing 
marginalization from decision making processes as a constraint. 
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organizational and ideational elements that had been produced during the early 
years of the movement enabled the pro-coalitionist elites to pursue their line of 
action at the expense of anti-coalitionists. The organizational and ideational 
features that centralized decision-making processes and helped (or promised to) 
redistribute collective and selective incentives ensured the loyalty of the activists.  
The latter, with limited or no resources for party politics, themselves needed and 
(re)produced them at the local level to sustain their electoral and further activist 
mobilization efforts. 
Kayseri as a case for local movement activity 
The research was conducted primarily in three cities. While Ankara and 
İstanbul were the two centers of the NSM (and also Yeni Asya activity), Kayseri 
was chosen as a case of peripheral town83, which has both its strengths and 
weaknesses.  
On the one hand, Kayseri, during the years under consideration was a town 
where one can observe the naissance and structural development of the two 
moderate/pragmatic Islamist movements, the NSM and Yeni Asya. The initial 
mobilization, articulation and organization of these two rival movements took place 
by the late 1960s, particularly the early 1970s, following the development of the 
Kirazlımescit group into Yeni Asya from 1963 to 196784.  This was in tandem with 
the first consensus and activist mobilization of the NSM in Kayseri during the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  
Moreover, Kayseri while hosting a range of well established right-wing 
political groups and networks, which create sociological and political continuums 
and fluidities (blurring boundaries) with Islamist political activism, was not a town 
where Islamist movements were particularly powerful during the years under 
consideration as it evinced by the dominance of the JP and the RPP in local politics 
                                                            
83 Please see Appendix D for the map of Turkey highlighting Kayseri and a map of Kayseri 
downtown. 
84 From 1967 to 1970, the group was still known as Kirazlımescit, but its basic structure and 
dynamics that were built upon and complemented the original Risale-i Nur Student institutions had 
already been in the making when they began publishing İttihad in 1967, the weekly predecessor of 
the daily Yeni Asya newspaper. The latter would appear in 1970 and gave its name to this new 
Risale-i Nur movement.   
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and the substantial challenge of the ultranationalists. This allows seeing the 
opportunities and difficulties that the NSM faced from its emergence through its 
development. Considering the fact that both the NSM and Yeni Asya and their 
spin-offs began to dominate the local political and economic scenery by the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the early years of the NSM in Kayseri becomes all the more 
interesting as subject of study. It should be added that today Kayseri is one of the 
bastions of both the Islamist movements and the incumbent “Muslim-democrat” 
Justice and Development Party (the JDP).85 The town is also one of the so-called 
Anatolian Tigers, an emerging dynamic industrial center of Anatolia. Most of my 
interviewees in Kayseri were or had been active participants to these political and 
economic changes.86 
 In addition, despite its sizeable Alevi and Kurdish populations living in the 
subdistricts (ilçe), Kayseri has never experienced political polarization or violence 
along the lines of these ethnic and religious cleavages as was the case, for instance, 
in Maraş. While the networks which both movements mobilized and/or created 
were definitely of Sunni persuasion and of Turkish ethnicity, there is no evidence 
that the movements capitalized on any preexisting animosity, if there were any, 
between these different social groups. 
On the other hand, Kayseri has certain limitations as a case. First, the 
findings of the dissertation on the NSM activities in this town cannot be easily 
generalized to metropolitan areas such as Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir where the 
political actors and stakes were different and more complex. In the latter, where the 
population density was high, there were not only well-established local religious 
and ethnic communities and networks, high number of university students, 
overflow of immigrants from different towns who had formed clustered 
neighborhoods but also more visible class cleavages which criss-crossed these 
social groups. The emergence of the local NSM elites and their mobilization and 
interactions in these metropolitan areas surely entailed similar organizational and 
                                                            
85 One of the leaders and founders of the JDP, today the President of the Republic, Abdullah Gül 
was a native of the city. His father and his mother’s uncle were among the local founders and 
leaders of the NSM. During the fieldwork, the researcher conducted interviews with several of his 
close or distant relatives and/or friends and discovered the relationship between the President and 
these interviewees usually during the interviews.  
86 For an excellent study on Islamist politics and local government in Kayseri since 1994, which also 
study Kayseri’s urban history since the establishment of the Republic see Ali Ekber Doğan, Eğreti 
Kamusallık: Kayseri Örneğinde İslamcı Belediyecilik (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).  
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ideational properties. However, their implementation and reception and the praxis 
of the activists reflected the complex nature of these fields of action. Similarly, 
Kayseri cannot be generalized for provinces where ethnic and religious communal 
cleavages were acutely deepened in the 1970s.87 It should be noted that, findings on 
Yeni Asya in this town proved to be much more easy to generalize as the interviews 
and primary sources on Yeni Asya revealed a homogenous and homogenizing 
movement despite its federative structure.  
Be that as it may, studying Kayseri throws light on the inner structure and 
dynamics of the NSM and how the movement generated social, economic, cultural 
and political capital at the local level to collect and use them later also at the center. 
The fact that the nature of capitals and power relations may be different in 
metropolitan and polarized regions do not undermine what Kayseri case shows: it is 
the local activity that sustains a movement through human, social, cultural, 
economic and symbolic capital the local activists produce and aggregate through 
mobilization. 
The Nizam/Selamet Movement as a case 
The case selection 
The reasons behind choosing the Nizam/Selamet as a case of a 
moderate/pragmatic Islamist movement are multiple. First, when the researcher had 
to decide for the case(s)88, the memory of the military intervention of February 28 
was still fresh, and despite the Justice and Development Party’s (the JDP) electoral 
success and apparent legitimacy, the dispute over the issue of secularism had not 
ceased. Given the circumstances, the “retired” and active Islamists would feel safer 
when they talked about past than the recent events. The research experience did not 
prove otherwise, in fact, as the quarrel around the JDP’s “real intentions” 
intensified from 2007 onwards, from time to time, the field became difficult: the 
                                                            
87 Hence, further research needs to be conducted on the local activities of the NSM in metropolitan 
areas such as Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir and in regions where there were deep ethnic and religious 
cleavages in order to see differences and similarities with provincial Anatolian towns. 
88 As mentioned in the introduction, the fieldwork research was carried on two different movements, 
the NSM and Yeni Asya. The logic behind the selection of both cases was the same. At the end of 
this subsection, further information on selecting the NSM over Yeni Asya to include in the 
dissertation will be provided. 
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potential interviewees became reluctant in granting interviews. During these 
periods of intense public debate, the researcher had to wait several weeks or even 
months to pass to be able to carry out the research under more favorable conditions.  
Second, in terms of its organization as a political party, its area and modes 
of political action, the NSM represent one of the two distinct patterns of 
moderate/pragmatic Islamist activism in Turkey. While there were few abortive 
attempts to establish political parties in alliance with conservative-nationalists or 
purely Islamist political parties in the late 1940s89, until the emergence of the NSM, 
since the passage to multiparty system in 1945, Islamist movements engaged in 
politics mainly through the main center-right party (the Democrat Party of the 
1950s or the JP). The NSM became not only the quintessential example of an 
Islamist movement engaging directly in party/institutional politics but also the first 
success story. The NSM, shortly after its emergence, came to power through three 
different coalitions and consolidated its movement through tapping into state 
controlled resources and capitalizing on its new found visibility and power to 
enlarge its networks. Throughout the 1970s, but especially by the mid-1980s, the 
NSM increased its members, activists and auxiliary organizations through the 
establishment of (some being) semi-autonomous youth organizations, women 
branches, various publications, blue and white collar worker associations, 
endowments and finally, its various European branches organized under the name 
Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatı (European National Vision Organization).  
Third, as evinced from the ongoing disputes and a large body of journalistic 
and academic work on the NSM and Islamism in Turkey, it had a tremendous 
impact on the political arena through its activities and spin offs. Despite various 
juridical and military interventions throughout its history, the NSM survived to this 
day under different party names but essentially with the name “National Vision 
movement.” Although no longer a major player of the political field since it had 
                                                            
89 These parties could not establish nation-wide organizations and attract voters. They were established 
by some Islamist literary and intellectual figures of the period when multiparty politics introduced in 
1945. While some have been banned by the courts, most dissolved themselves having failed to enlarge 
their activist networks and attract voters in the then existing majoritarian electoral system with multi-
member district (“winner takes all”) electoral system.  From 1948 to its abolition and reestablishment in 
1953, the Nation Party was a joint endeavor of the Islamists and conservative nationalist. The Islam 
Demokrat Partisi (IDP, Islamic Democratic Party) that survived only a year before its ban in 1952, was 
the first major attempt of an Islamist elite group to establish a political party of their own. 
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lost majority of its activist, member and sympathizer networks to its eventual 
spinoff, the JDP, the movement is still active through its new political party (the 
latest successor to the NOP), the Felicity Party. The NSM had proved to be a 
success story: a collective endeavor that developed from humble origins to a mass 
based organization commanding extensive resources. The analysis of its early years 
would not only help to answer the research question but also give clues for future 
research as to why and how the NSM lost its mobilization power, while Islamist 
movements in general gained strength in Turkey.   
Fourth, the NSM produced rich written material over the years 
(retrospectively as well) that could be used during the research. In addition, there 
are diverse and fruitful academic works focusing on both the NSM and different 
aspects of the political history of the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey, which, through 
their contributions and constraints, provide a fertile ground to carry out research. 
Finally, one should discuss why the NSM was chosen over Yeni Asya as the 
focus of this dissertation, despite the fact that the fieldwork research was equally 
extensively carried out on both movements. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
dissertation research originally aimed at studying two moderate/pragmatic 
movements in detail. The reasons provided above for the selection of the NSM as a 
case also holds true for Yeni Asya. Moreover, if the NSM was the quintessential 
example of an Islamist movement engaged in institutional politics in Turkey, Yeni 
Asya was a typical example of those Islamist movements, which engaged in politics 
through establishing an alliance with a center-right party. During the period under 
consideration, Yeni Asya, through not only its movement-related activities but also 
political actions within the JP networks and branches, enlarged its area of maneuver 
in its target area of activity, increased the number of its converts and sympathizers, 
and accumulated considerable material and symbolic resources.90 Although today 
the name Yeni Asya belongs to a relatively smaller branch, following a breakup 
first in the 1980s and then in the 1990s into various groups, the movement 
networks and organizations still exist, now mostly under the control of the branch 
known as Yeni Nesil. Moreover, as the NSM inadvertently gave birth to the JDP, 
Yeni Asya produced the Fethullah Gülen movement from amidst its rangs. The 
                                                            
90 Further information on the formation and development of Yeni Asya and Risale-i Nur students 
will be provided in the following chapters, particularly in Chapters 3 and. 6.  
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latter seems to have developed and sophisticated the formal and informal 
institutionalization methods it inherited from the Nur Students, even overshadowed 
them and organized in more than 100 countries.91  As such Yeni Asya presents a 
case as good as the NSM to answer the question why and how the political 
engagement pattern of an Islamist movement differ from other models of Islamist 
political engagement when it does.  
The reason for choosing the NSM as focus over Yeni Asya is rather 
technical and methodological. The fieldwork research was conducted on these two 
movements with the purpose of producing a comparative essay focusing on both. 
However, the research revealed the relative abundance of the second hand sources 
on the NSM and an overabundance of primary sources that the Yeni Asya 
produced.92  It is true that previous works on a subject create analytical obstacles as 
much as they facilitate research and writing processes. However, the almost 
complete lack of previous study93 on Yeni Asya in particular and Risale-i Nur 
students in general, required the researcher to rely almost exclusively on the huge 
volume of first hand resources that the movement produced. In other words, 
without any prior analytical and empirical handles, the researcher had to engage 
with such publications as memoirs, novels, newspapers and brochures; but also 
publications on the internet and, finally, the immense corpus “Risale-i Nur”94 
written by both the movement leader Bediüzzaman Nursi and his close circle of 
                                                            
91 It should be added that whether Fethullah Gülen movement, which was first the İzmir branch 
under the control of Yeni Asya, can still be considered a Risale-i Nur movement is open to 
discussion. Most local activists of Yeni Asya (who are now under the “jurisdiction” of Yeni Nesil) 
and most of the elites of the movement, the latter at least formally, see the Gülen movement as 
Risale-i Nur students. However, during the interviews the activists and elites of (historical) Yeni 
Asya defined being a Nur student by reading, producing and disseminating the Risale-i Nur corpus 
and these are no longer Gülen movement members’ priorities. Consequently, the fluidities and 
ruptures between these movements and, in fact, within the Gülen movement need to be further 
studied.    
92 This was initially one of the reasons for choosing Yeni Asya over the Süleymancılar who had not 
produced such documents targeting both the intramovement activists and “the others.” 
93 Please see the footnote 37 of this chapter.  
94 The major volumes where Said Nursi intreprets faith related articles of the Kur’an were Sözler 
(the Words) (1926-1934), Mektubat (the Letters, 1926-1936), Lema’lar  (the Flashes,1926-1936), 
Şualar (the Rays, 1936-1949).  In addition, there are three volumes of compilation of letters written 
by Said Nursi and his followers on their daily movement activities. The volumes, which were called 
Barla Lahikası (the Barla Appendix, 1926-1935), Kastamonu Lahikası (the Kastamonu Appendix, 
1935-1944) and Emirdağ Lahikası I and II (the Emirdağ Appendix I and II, 1944-1947 and 1949-
1953), were later considered as the 27. Letter of the Mektubat. Finally, there is Tarihçe-i Hayat (The 
Life History, 1957) that provides a history of Said Nursi based on above mentioned works. It should 
be added the researcher used the volumes available on the internet and gave here the dates when 
these volumes were written, produced by hand and distributed epistle by epistle (except the Life 
History) through underground Nur Student networks.   
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followers, which constituted hundreds of documents containing highly fragmented 
data. Most of the analysis of the data on the NSM was finished thus earlier, while 
the study of the fragmented data on Yeni Asya was still in progress. At the end of 
the process, although the fragmentary data found in these primary sources have 
been read and analyzed complementarily with the interviews conducted with 
movement activists and leaders, devoting to Yeni Asya separate chapters proved to 
be an impossible mission to accomplish within the available time limits. Instead the 
NSM was chosen as the main subject of the essay to be analyzed in finer detail than 
it would be possible in an essay that has two cases. 
However, although Yeni Asya is not treated in separate chapters in this 
essay, the findings on Yeni Asya as a field of research nevertheless informed the 
analysis of the NSM case. Moreover, analysis on Yeni Asya and other Nur students 
is provided when necessary, particularly in chapters 3 and 6 where the emergence 
of the NSM entrepreneurs and the disputes over the question of the RPP-NSP 
coalition are studied respectively. 
 The fieldwork research and the two movements 
The data produced through interviews with the elites and activists of the 
NSM  was a major source of information to understand the NSM political 
participation patterns. The interviews conducted with other Islamist and non-
Islamist groups were also used in studying the political context and the “Islamist 
field” and in crosschecking the interviews with Yeni Asya and NSM activists. The 
Islamist groups included the adherents and activists of other Islamist movements (to 
be sure, Yeni Asya, but also Akıncılar, Büyük Doğu, Milli Mücadele Birliği95) and 
                                                            
95 The Raiders was the semi-autonomous youth organization of the NSM. The Great East was an 
informal network of young Islamists, mostly members of the National Turkish Student Union (Milli 
Türk Talebe Birliği, known by its famous acronyme the MTTB) who regularly met and discussed 
various political and literary issues around the views of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek published in Büyük 
Doğu (the Great East) Magazine. The Union of National Struggle was an Islamist organization 
established in the late 1960s in Konya and Afyon, which allegedly became an ultranationalist-
Islamist arm of the deep state forces by the 1970s. The number of the interviews with the activists of 
these movements/groups are not very high (particularly, from the Union of National Struggle the 
researcher could only conduct one interview as its activists tend to be very secretive and suspected 
the researcher to the extend of a paranoia). Although their uneasy and complicated relationship with 
the NSM has not been addressed within the limits of the essay, their activists, having been in 
overlapping and crisscrossing networks with the local or national elites of the NSM provided 
valuable insights and information on the Islamist field and the NSM. 
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non-Islamist parties (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Adalet Partisi, Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi)96 in Kayseri.97  
Overall 82 face-to-face interviews were conducted98 and all but one is 
recorded in Ankara, İstanbul and Kayseri, in addition to 14 telephone interviews.99 
The list of the 96 interviewees from not only the NSM but also other groups 
includes people from different time periods of the groups’ histories, allowing 
seeing continuities and ruptures in the political context and the intra-movement 
dynamics. The complete list of interviewees categorized according to the locality 
and movement/party/group affiliation can be found in Appendix B.  
The interview data was used complementarily with publications (including 
memoirs, newspapers, books, pamphlets), local newspapers, and also wherever 
necessary court files, and parliamentary records.100 The research also used other 
interviews conducted by journalists or movement activists themselves, which 
appeared in Internet publications, such as movement websites or local newspapers. 
Moreover, if an unknown event or person was mentioned in an interview, the 
researcher would incorporate that in other interviews and search in written sources. 
The interview lists emerged through mainly two ways: a) “snowball” method which 
starts with a “gatekeeper” and lands the researcher from one interview to another 
within the movement and organization networks, b) finding the names from the 
local and national newspapers, party documents, movement publications, 
yearbooks, encyclopedias, books, memoirs; searching for their phone numbers on 
the white and yellow pages, calling the person and asking for an interview.  
While both methods were used for both cases, for the interviews with the 
local activists of the NSM, as there were divisions in the movement following first 
                                                            
96 The Republican People Party (the RPP), the Justice Party (the JP) and Nationalist Action Party 
(the NAP) respectively.  
97 Moreover, telephone interviews are conducted with the JP and the NSM activists in Konya.  
98 The actual number of interview sessions reaches to around 100 since with some activists, 
particularly with those in leadership positions, more than one session was carried out. Moreover 
with some interviewees the researcher conducted additional telephone interviews, which are not 
included in the number of telephone interviews provided above. The longest of the interviews were 
around 10 to 15 hours, only 7 hours of which is recorded.   
99 During the span of three years, the researcher also engaged in various informal but lengthy 
conversations with individuals and groups (more than 30 individuals) from various Islamist and 
religious milieus, which helped to learn some idioms, jargons, traditions, stories, insider gossips and 
jokes, rivalry and cooperation specific to the Islamist field and right wing networks. 
100 Further information is provided below. 
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by 1977 then the military intervention of February 28 and most activists were now 
old and long time retired, the need to arrange interviews through phone calls 
without the help of a gatekeeper frequently emerged. This method involved 
particular difficulties not to mention the fact that sometimes one needed to call 
many people (sometimes as high as 20) with the same name to find the right 
person.101 The major difficulty was to establish a trust relation since the person on 
the other end of the line did not see the face of the researcher and there were no 
references that could be provided. In these cases, the researcher first extensively 
provided information on her research question, on the schools where she studied, 
on herself as a student. She also gave detailed information on how she reached the 
name of the potential interviewee through a study of the archival materials, 
previous interviews etc. If the interviewee demanded the names of the previous 
interviewees from the locality or movement (e.g. Kayseri, or the Nur Students), the 
researcher said that she could not name most of the names as they had wished to 
remain anonymous. She, however, offered the names of the national leaders of the 
movements or the names of those local activists who had no qualms about being 
public. Finally, the researcher gave the phone number of his institution in Turkey so 
that the interviewee could inquire about her. If the person agreed to interview, 
sometimes, a second difficulty emerged. Even if the potential interviewee was 
curious or interested enough to grant a rendezvous, he did not have enough trust to 
invite the researcher to his office or apartment. In that case, the researcher would 
offer to meet with the person in a mosque. A mosque was not only a place where 
the interviewee would feel comfortable, because not only the pious and the 
Islamists see the mosque as theirs, but also being seen alone with a woman in a 
mosque would not incite gossip. Moreover, from the interviewee’s perspective it 
was also a space where a person with “negative” properties and bad intentions 
would not even set foot.  
The same interview questions with slight changes were used for both the 
NSM and other groups. The questions focused on the individuals’ social, economic, 
political, cultural and religious trajectories before and after the participation; 
personal experiences, practices and responsibilities within the movement and in 
relation to other groups and their attitudes; the interviewees’ views on the NSM 
                                                            
101 During the process of interviews further difficulties were present. They are discussed below. 
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parties in particular and political parties in general; their ideas on other movements 
in the Muslim majority countries; the coalition with the RPP and the Nationalist 
Front (Milliyetçi Cephe) coalitions102; the question of the Amnesty for the left wing 
prisoners in 1974 and finally the Kurdish and Armenian “issues.” An exemplary 
interview protocol in Turkish and in English can be found in Appendix C. 
Among the answers on the coalitions and the Amnesty, only the one about 
the coalition with the RPP has been treated extensively in the dissertation as an 
example for illustrating how the NSM decided for interim goals, policy and strategy 
during its mundane political practices. The answers to the questions on the 
“Kurdish question” and the “Armenian Question,” though not dealt with in and off 
themselves in the dissertation, helped to understand further the nature of the NSM 
ideational elements. 
It should be emphasized that a considerable number of interviews with 
movement activists and non-Islamist political party members actually amounted to 
oral and life histories. While the interview parts were not structured at all where 
personal stories or a specific event (the TOBB Affair, the election of Süleyman 
Demirel to the JP’s chairmanship in 1964, the establishment of the NOP or the NSP 
at the local level) was narrated  (except for short facilitating questions), the parts 
regarding movement mechanisms were guided more by specific questions. The 
telephone interviews conducted with the members of the local JP and chambers of 
commerce and industry in Kayseri and Konya, were essentially oral histories 
focusing on the events before and after the TOBB Affair.103  
Oral and life histories, as narratives of personal stories or specific events 
contribute to social sciences and specifically to the present interdisciplinary essay 
weaving together insights from sociology, political science and history, in a number 
of ways. Since oral and life histories are narratives, Shenhav’s discussion on the use 
of political narratives in social sciences is useful to elucidate briefly such 
contributions. Shenhav categorizes the content of the narratives into three major 
                                                            
102 These were the two coalition governments established by the right wing parties in the Grand 
National Assembly in 1975 and 1977.  
103 As shall be discussed in Chapter 4, the TOBB Affair refers to the event in 1969 during which 
“Necmettin Erbakan” and the JP government disputed over the chairmanship of the TOBB (Union 
of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey.) While it is a generally accepted view that 
Erbakan decided to enter politics following his defeat at the hands of his adversaries, as shall be 
seen in Chapters 3 and 4, this is not supported by the data acquired on the subject.  
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groups: a) “events, characters, and background”, b) “events in sequence” and c) 
“causality.”104 He then argues that unless the researcher “denies that political 
narratives possess any capacity to represent “reality””105, he/she can use any or all 
of these elements complementarily with other sources depending on his/her 
evaluation and perception of the capacity of the narrative to reflect “reality” in each 
category.106 Having adopted a perspective, which takes into account the agency and 
subjectivity of the social actors, this research benefited from each of the three 
categories, which were also present in the interviewees’ narratives. The NSM had 
left behind very few personal accounts of their experiences as movement activists. 
Compared to Yeni Asya, there were not even enough official party documents after 
the ban of their first party (because of the coup d’états in general and court cases 
against the party in particular). However, the interviewees were more than willing 
to tell their stories, activities and the difficulties and opportunities they faced as 
individuals and as a movement.  
 First, “the events, characters and background” helped to establish 
individual trajectories of the actors and revealed certain contingent factors or issues 
that cannot be found in written resources but well known and corroborated by the 
interviewees from different groups. Second, “events in sequence” told by the 
interviewees (even those that carried inconsistencies) helped to follow the 
trajectory of the movement when used together with the newspaper archival 
research. Finally, both “events in sequence” and “causality” provided by the 
narrators reflected the subjectivity of the actors, that is the way in which they 
constructed their mobilization frames, individual and collective identities in relation 
to their environment.  
As shall be explained in detail below, other movement publications, such as 
newspapers, pamphlets, books and national Islamist publications without particular 
attachment to an Islamist movement, a center-left daily that most of the 
interviewees from the NSM networks reported to have followed and finally local 
newspapers of different persuasions from Kayseri and Konya were employed to 
study the local and national political contexts in general and the practices and 
                                                            
104Shaul R. Shenhav, “Political Narratives and Political Reality,” International Political Science 
Review 27 (2006): 251. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid, 251-254. 
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attitudes of the NSM (and Yeni Asya) activists in particular. Finally, participant 
observation though limited helped to concretize and visualize some aspects of the 
internal movement dynamics, interactions and practices, which were mentioned 
during the interviews and in written sources. 
2.2.2 Data 
The fieldwork lasted with intervals from the summer of 2006 to spring 2009 
in three cities, Ankara, İstanbul, and Kayseri. In addition, the author traveled also to 
Isparta for two interviews and conducted twelve telephone interviews with 
members of the Nizam/Selamet Movement, the Justice Party and Yeni Asya in both 
Kayseri and Konya. Main sources of the data were: 1) in-depth interviews 
(comprising also life/oral histories); 2) participant observation; 3) newspapers; 4) 
movement publications. The following is a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of these data sources and a review of opportunities and difficulties the 
fieldwork presented for the research. 
In-depth Interviews  
As mentioned above, the most fruitful and valuable data source for the 
dissertation was the in-depth interviews, some parts of which amounted to oral/life 
histories. The majority of the face-to-face interviews were recorded. For the phone 
interviews notes are taken. Despite the fact that most of the interviewees did not 
wish to remain anonymous, the names of the interviewees will not be disclosed in 
the essay, except for the national leaders of the movements. The interviewees were 
selected from those whose experiences and comments could shed light on different 
periods and different levels of movement activity. Consequently, while the same 
questions were used, they were adapted to the interviewee’s movement/group/party, 
role in the organization and age.  
Before the fieldwork, a research was conducted on the first and second hand 
written resources on the general history of the period, the NSM (and Yeni Asya) 
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and the history of Kayseri.107 Then, before each interview the researcher gathered 
available information on the interviewee from written sources and previous 
interviews. Such information was not always available, especially when the 
respondent was not a high profile activist or when the researcher was sent to a 
person immediately after finishing an interview.  
In Ankara, İstanbul, and Kayseri the difficulties encountered in conducting 
the interviews were twofold: a) those related to the dynamics external to the 
research, b) those related to the dynamics between the researcher and the 
interviewee. First, these problems and their solutions will be discussed than those 
factors that facilitated the research will be presented. 
Kayseri 
To begin with, as mentioned above, in the summer of 2006 the memory of 
the February 28 was still fresh for the Islamists. Those who were convicted during 
this period were recently released and some court cases were still continuing. This 
created a certain suspicion as to the intentions of the research. Thus, initially, 
several activists, especially relatively low profile local NSM activists refused to 
grant an interview. After having conducted interviews with leading local NSM 
activists, the activists and executives of other political parties and the leader of the 
local Yeni Asya branch the researcher had to leave the town. The return to Kayseri 
took place a year later, in the late summer of 2007, when Abdullah Gül, a native of 
Kayseri and a young politician from the NSM tradition, was elected as the 
President of the Republic. His election had created euphoria in the town and 
relaxed the Islamists, which then facilitated the fieldwork. 
 This time however, there occurred another difficulty: the leader of the local 
Yeni Asya, who had been very helpful and encouraging for the research and 
accepted to be the gatekeeper for both Yeni Asya national leadership and the local 
movement network, suddenly passed away only a few months before the second 
trip to Kayseri. Since, the researcher had not known this news before her arrival in 
                                                            
107 For a major source of information on Kayseri’s history and who’s who in Kayseri that does not 
strictly follow a scholarly methodology, style, tone and content see Abdullah Satoğlu, Kayseri 
Ansiklopedisi (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayımları Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2002).  
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Kayseri, no help had been asked from the center for the local research. A third trip, 
then, in spring 2009, imposed itself in order to get the names and references first 
from the central elites of Yeni Asya108 in İstanbul.  
It should be added that the second wave of the Ergenekon Affair109 that 
started in spring 2008 and continued throughout the summer created unfavorable 
conditions for continuing the interviews before 2009. First of all, the tension which 
reigned in the country between the JDP (and allegedly its ally the Fethullah Gülen 
movement) which openly stated its aim to bring down the paramilitary groups, and 
some secularist/Kemalist and left wing groups who accused the former for using 
the Affair to silence the opposition as a whole, would become an additional 
variable that had not existed in prior interviews. Moreover, the researcher had 
already been experiencing stress as a result of the military establishments’ 
declarations on the nature of academic research on the Islamists (in the summer of 
2006 when the researcher was conducting research in Kayseri, the generals accused 
the sociologists of helping the Islamists through their work) on the one hand, and 
the psychological and practical effort she put to ensure the safety and trust of its 
respondents on the other. The stress level augmented further by the polarization 
over the Affair in the political arena. The practice of telephone tapping by different 
rival groups especially worried the researcher. She was making various telephone 
conversations with those names who were not only at the top of the official list of 
“most dangerous” individuals for “national security,” but also top rivals of an 
ascending Islamist group. Interestingly enough, the interviewees seemed to be more 
careful about their rivals than the Kemalist establishment. Be that as it may, while 
the issue was not directly related to the research period or the fieldwork, the author 
decided to work on the written resources and dissertation writing until the dusts 
settled.  
                                                            
108 As mentioned above, Yeni Asya is no longer united. It has been divided into various groups, the 
most powerful ones being Yeni Asya and Yeni Nesil.  Since the local Nur students were connected 
to the latter, the leaders of Yeni Nesil, particularly “Fırıncı Ağabey”, became the gatekeepers for the 
Kayseri Nur students following the death of the local leader. 
109 Ergenekon refers to the alleged name of a paramilitary organization. Prosecutor of the Republic 
claimed that the organization had been developing since the 1980s and had formed branches within 
and outside the state institutions aiming at preventing democratization reforms in general (which 
meant changing state policies and laws regarding the role of religion and ethnicity in the public 
sphere) and putting an end to the JDP government in particular.  
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Another difficulty that posed itself was the age of some of the potential 
interviewees as a result of the period covered. Some earliest local activists had 
passed away or were too old or too sick to grant an interview. Thus, despite their 
low numbers, one could not talk with all of them. Nevertheless, necessary basic 
information on their birth dates, professions and positions in the movement were 
gathered from their fellow activists, their families through phone interviews and 
also court files. The latter was the files of the Constitutional Court case, which 
banned the NOP in 1971 and which contained official application documents of 
local party entrepreneurs for the establishment of the NOP.  However, since the 
majority of the local NSM party entrepreneurs and executives were very young 
during the years under consideration and it was rather a small group, it was possible 
to reach a satisfying number of interviews.  
The years that had passed between the focused period of Islamist activism 
and when the research was carried out did not pose a problem during the 
interviews, not only because the activists were relatively young but also because for 
the respondents their movement activities had taken a great part of their lives that 
they never forgot. They were still entrenched in the same networks and their 
memories were still lively. Rarely did they experience difficulty in remembering 
the events and their sequences. Such easily forgotten matters as dates and names 
were corrected when necessary by crosschecking the information through other 
interviews and written documents. 
Second, creating trust between the researcher and the respondents was an 
important step to be able to reach healthy results. For the external reasons 
mentioned above, the local activists were suspicious of the intentions of the 
researcher even when they agreed to talk. They thought that the researcher could be 
working for the National Intelligence Agency110, or even for the CIA. While those 
Islamists with no formal or informal body of an organization, such as some 
members of the Büyük Doğucular, had difficulty in trusting the researcher up until 
the end of the interview, the NSM activists (especially the high profile ones) and 
the Nur students, having been transformed into “good judges of character” and 
                                                            
110 Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (the MIT) 
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having already experienced various of forms of state pressure, were more willing to 
trust the researcher who was obviously not an Islamist.111  
Several factors played a role in building trust between the interviewer and 
the interviewee. First, the interviewer explained the purposes of the research 
lengthily to the respondents. That is to understand the differences between the 
different movements and the difficulties and opportunities they faced individually 
and as a movement during the period under consideration. Second, the author 
responded lengthily and frankly all the questions asked about her family and 
educational background and political views.  Regarding the religious matters on the 
other hand, with one exception, she did not disclose her beliefs stating that this may 
influence them positively or negatively during the interview. The only exception 
where she gave clue concerning to her belief system was during her short stay in a 
Medrese-i Nuriye in Kayseri, where she felt the need to be more open to establish 
trust.  
Third, the researcher, while not exactly conforming to the dress rules of the 
Islamists, or conservative Muslims, did not dress in a way to distract the 
respondents during the interview. However, the dress code that was needed for both 
groups were different, testifying to the inward looking and totalizing tendencies 
within the Risale-i Nur Students and outward looking and articulating practices and 
ideational elements of the NSM.112  While a skirt on the knees and a shirt with short 
sleeves did not pose a problem with a typical NSM local elite who either employed 
women with similar outfits or had to be in contact with such women during their 
business and political affairs, for the interviews with the Kayseri local Nur leaders 
and activists, a long skirt finishing at the ankles and a long sleeved shirt and 
cardigan proved to be necessary. While the majority of the NSM activists did shake 
hands, some Kayseri Yeni Asya members avoided even looking at the eyes of a 
woman. As a matter of fact, not only several interviews with the latter had to be 
carried through the phone but also some face-to-face interviews were conducted 
almost without any eye contact. While they were certainly among the most difficult 
                                                            
111 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the timing proved to be crucial to get interviews even from 
more experienced Islamist activists.  
112 The observation is based mostly on the national and local elites of the movements.  The term 
local elite refers to those who served as the official and unofficial founders of the local NSM branch, 
the executives and delegates of the NSM parties.  
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interviews, since they were the last ones, the researcher had already gained enough 
experience not to dismay and be disconcerted.  
It should however be added that Yeni Asya, though quite resistant, is not 
immune to the changes that takes place in its environment, especially the rivalry of 
the Fethullah Gülen movement, which attracted most of the available university 
students in metropolitan and provincial areas. One of the most striking observations 
of the Yeni Asya’s change was related to two sites where the interviews were 
conducted. It displayed the changes between the generations that occurred at the 
national level of movement activity.  The sites represented two extremes: while an 
interview with a relatively young Yeni Asya movement leader was conducted in the 
Bilkent University’s pub where alcoholic beverages were served, another interview 
with a very old Nur student leader113 took place in a Medrese-i Nuriye for men in 
Ümraniye, İstanbul where the researcher was politely requested to put a headscarf 
before entering the building. Both were impossible a decade ago and still 
impossible at the periphery, and show not only the importance of generational 
differences between the movement members in particular but also changes in the 
interpretation and execution of the Risale-i Nur teachings in general. The 
willingness of the movement to open itself to cease the fears and to attract a new 
generation of university students seemed to have paved to new interpretations.  
Finally, since the author had done her homework before the interviews, she 
showed particular care not to use language with could be offensive to the 
respondent.  For instance, inquiring the religious education and activities of the 
NSM activists, instead of “tarikata girdiniz mi?” or “tarikat üyesi misiniz?”114, the 
following formula that is prevalent among the religious is employed: “tarikat ehli 
misiniz?” or “bir hocaefendiye intisap ettiniz mi veya sohbetlerine devam ettiniz 
mi?” 115 
 
 
                                                            
113 During the 1960s he was a free floating leader. By the early 1970s he firmly associated himself 
with Yeni Asya. 
114 “Have you entered a sufi brotherhood?” or “Are you a member of a sufi brotherhood?” 
115 “Are you from the sufi brotherhood people?” or “Have you been attached to a sufi leader or 
listened to his conversations?” 
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 Ankara and İstanbul 
Most of the problems that posed at the local level were not an issue for the 
movement leaders at the center. Having been granted hundreds of interviews to the 
researchers and journalists, or having served jail time on various occasions the 
NSM and Yeni Asya leaders were more comfortable in granting interviews. The 
fact that, the interviews actually began at the local level and snow balled to the 
center certainly helped to create the initial trust. There was however other problems 
that needed to be surmounted at the center.  
First, the leaders of the NSM, who had served as ministers or 
parliamentarians, had a tendency to dominate the interviews, and make party 
propaganda. However, they were kind and polite enough to change the subject 
when the researcher reminded them the methodology of the research, which focuses 
on practices as much as the ideas. 
A second difficulty encountered was the busy schedules of the movement 
leaders. Especially during the Ramazan (the holy month of Islam) or elections, the 
movement leaders could not be reached. Nevertheless, waiting sometimes several 
months paid off and quite long and fruitful interviews were conducted.  
Finally, a difficulty peculiar to the Yeni Asya should be mentioned, which 
applies to both the center and the periphery of the movement. The Yeni Asya 
leaders and activists were extremely kind, helpful and enthusiastic for the 
interviews. While this was certainly a blessing, it also related to the fact that the 
movement activists saw the research as an opportunity to legitimize and market 
their movement through the agency of a Ph D student from what they saw as “the 
other camp.”  
The researcher felt to be manipulated in more than one occasion. First, a 
local activist told openly that the author of the dissertation should publish the work, 
after having, of course, corrected by them. If not published there was no use to the 
study. The impossibility of such a correction is politely explained. Second, it has 
been implied several times that if the study does not contain anything that would 
hurt them, their movement would be open for further research: an endless resource 
of publishable articles! Third, a young movement-leader working for the current 
 58 
 
government offered the researcher an advisorship position within the cadres of a 
ministry, which was politely refused. Fourth, the movement activists tried to play to 
the fears that they assumed the author had of the “tarikat,” which is actually 
prevalent among the secular public. They not only compared their community to 
the brotherhoods frequently but also once took her to see the İsmailağa street, 
where she could observe with her very eyes the difference between Yeni Asya 
members’ “modern” attitudes and dresses and those of the İsmailağa Naqshbandi 
(sufi) brotherhood (with baggy trousers, long beards etc) which populated the area. 
During the face to face interviews, however, the researcher, in order to reaffirm and 
protect her academic independence, stated openly in more than one occasion that 
though she would not misuse the quotations for some pre-established agenda that 
would hurt either the individuals or the movement as a whole, there would 
nevertheless be analysis with which the movement activists could be displeased or 
disagree. Such an overt statement was welcomed and even used as an opportunity 
to show the democratic credentials of the movement activists. Their unequivocal 
response was they would welcome any criticism and they would try to find 
solutions. That, obviously, was not the goal of the research project. 
The behavior of the Yeni Asya activists was strikingly different from that of 
the NSM activists and illustrates the different ways the two movements established 
relations with extra-movement actors. The Yeni Asya activists, except for the 
young Nur student girls with whom the researcher spent a night and two days in a 
Medrese-i Nuriye116 (Medrese), rather then trying to convert, propagate to or 
persuade their interlocutors, wanted to establish cordial and positive relations with 
the researcher and capitalize on whatever resource the researcher was individually 
commanding for the benefit of the movement. To contribute to a movement one 
does not need to be a core activist, a rank and file member or even an occasional 
participant. Any capital of any person who is sympathetic to the movement (called 
dost (friend) in the movement) can be put into the movement’s use. It should be 
added that this accepting attitude, which also doubles as a protective wall for the 
                                                            
116 The school of the Nur, where the core group of Nur students live, sleep, pray, and study Risale-i 
Nur corpus under the supervision of a movement elder. It was also a place where weekly Risale 
reading sessions for movement activists of different degrees and extramovement audience were 
organized. Some of the students who lived in a Mendrese long enough would totally endow their 
lives to the movement. They would earn their livelihood from the movement working in its various 
institutions, including supervising a Medrese, in their turn.  
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movement activists, relaxes the interlocutors and helps them to become “accepting” 
and friendly in return. The NSM activists, on the other hand, while promoting and 
propagating their world views117, did not seem to expect much from the researcher 
except for an “objectively told” story of their movement’s history that interviewees 
from all groups asked and an opportunity to voice their personal histories and 
contributions to this important power in Turkey’s history.  
While the fieldwork presented various difficulties there were also factors 
that facilitated the research both at the center and the periphery. First of all, all 
movement activists having had extremely difficult periods and painful experiences 
during their activist lives were more than willing to share their thoughts, emotions 
and experiences with the researcher once the mutual trust was established. Since the 
questions were structured to understand the movements through the practices and 
experiences of individuals within their environments the interviewees felt the need 
to explain themselves further whenever they deemed necessary. There were in fact 
many instances when an interviewee decided by himself to disclose an information, 
though off the record, that was not offered during the early hours of the interview.  
Second, all activists appreciated the academic profession as opposed to 
journalistic endeavors. The works of Şerif Mardin, Nilüfer Göle and Hakan Yavuz, 
in particular were very well known to the movement leaders and taken as a 
reference point as to the character of the research project.118 In other words, these 
scholars became in a way “gatekeepers” of the Islamist community in general. At 
one level, this implies that a) the leaders, even those with no or without formal 
education, have a high degree of cultural capital that allow them to follow 
intellectual, academic and political debates and b) they prefer non-speculative 
literature to “hot” ones. At another level, these properties reveal the above-
mentioned Nur students’ pattern of establishing relations with the movement’s 
environment. The priority is given to those non-speculative and non-hostile works, 
                                                            
117 It should be added since most local activists were now supporting the JDP, at times they were 
also very critical of certain aspects, centralized-decision making, Erbakan’s authoritarian tendencies, 
nationalist economic policies, “radical” discourses etc. of the NSM. However, they all still kept their 
NSM ideational elements and discourses. 
118 Such critical works on Şerif Mardin, such as Fatih M. Şeker, Cumhuriyet İdeolojisinin 
Nakşibendilik Tasavvuru: Şerif Mardin Örneği (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2007) are either ignored 
or not known by the movement leaders. However, their existence can be considered as signs of a 
new generation Nur students which require further research on the movement’s life after the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
 60 
 
which would credibly help increase the movement’s legitimacy among the non-
Islamist elites of the country even if they contained analysis they are not 
particularly pleased with.  
Third, the JDP’s electoral and political successes, despite frequently rising 
tensions and the memory of the February 28, created a certain relaxation and 
confidence among the Islamists. In addition, they seemed to have put a distance 
between their current political and activist positions and their earlier political 
selves. In fact, it was frequent that they were very critical of some of their previous 
actions, choices and ideas. The interviews, they said, gave them the opportunity for 
self reflection. 
Finally, being a woman, though an obstacle occasionally, in general, helped 
to establish trust. Not only because, their gender views did not allow them to see 
women as threatening as men but also because most had daughters or 
granddaughters. Their affections and sympathy for them reflected in their attitudes 
towards the researcher. Especially at the local level, almost all NSM activists, even 
during the Ramazan119, with the help of their wives, tried to have the researcher eat 
continuously. Even during the interviews in the offices the activists kept offering 
drinks and snacks, if not a full-fledged lunch.120 The researcher in return tried to 
thank for their interest and the time they consecrated for the interview, and 
hospitality by flowers, cookies etc. whenever possible. 
Participant Observation 
Being a historical study the participant observation had not appeared as an 
option at the beginning of the fieldwork. However, as the research developed, 
instances and opportunities of observation revealed themselves. The types, sites, 
strengths and limitations of observation for each case were different and helped to 
gain insights on the NSM (and the Nur Students) dynamics. Following some 
                                                            
119 Ramazan (Ramadan in Arabic) is the holy month of Islamic lunar calendar. During this period 
Muslims fast from sundown to sunset. 
120 It should be added that in one of the earliest interviews, an interviewee, who owned a factory 
operating on food industry, even insisted that the researcher accept a quite big box of his products. 
He finally gave up insisting following a long struggle with the researcher, when she said that she 
would accept the gift only if he would agree to give the box to a charity.  
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general observations, two specific ones related to the NSM and Yeni Asya will be 
mentioned. 
To begin with, while there were locally and generationally different 
interviewees both from the NSM and Yeni Asya, a general observation was that all 
Yeni Asya members were still deeply engaged in movement related activities and 
did not have “retirement” as such, as a core Yeni Asya activist worked, ate, slept, 
married, lived and “played” within the movement.121  In contrast, the NSM activists 
were either disengaged or retired, except for those veterans of the NSM’s central 
administration. They still worked as executives of the new NSM Party. For the 
NSM activists in general, the NSM, though absorbing an important part of their 
times and energy for a long period in their lifespan, was nevertheless only one 
social institution among others in which they had invested. The core NSM activists, 
including those with a Nur student origin (a non-Yeni Asya branch), had their 
individual careers and jobs; diverse networks in which they were embedded; and 
surrounded by close and distant family members who may or may not be NSM 
sympathizers.  
Interrelated, for the NSM activists, since most were no longer politically 
active, the sites of observation were either business offices or houses of the 
respondents depending on age and locality. The younger local movement leaders 
were still working and the interviews were conducted in their business offices, 
which permitted to see their professional activities and environments and to 
compare it with their accounts of their early years in business and political life (and 
with Yeni Asya activists). The older local NSM leaders, on the other hand, invited 
the researcher to their summer houses at the outskirts of Erciyes (bağ) or in their 
apartments in the city if the weather had cooled down. All local activists, 
notwithstanding their age, were middle class businessmen or merchants, the party 
executives being apparently better-off.  Very few were still active in politics. The 
                                                            
121 As shall be discussed in the next chapter Yeni Asya was in fact a total institution for its core (the 
inner circle) members. It is pertinent to provide here the defining aspect of the total institution that 
this dissertation adopts:  “A basic social arrangement in modern society is that the individual tends 
to sleep; play and work in different places, with different co-participants, under different authorities, 
and without an over-all rational plan. The central feature of total institutions can be described as a 
breakdown of the barriers ordinarily separating these three spheres of life.” Erving Goffman, 
Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1961), 5-6. 
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executives and leading members of the NSM at the center, on the other hand, were 
still working in the party premises and received the researcher in their party 
buildings in Ankara, with one exception, who had been using his law office in 
İstanbul.  
The sites of observation of the local and national Yeni Asya members, in 
turn, showed that while for the local members the main site of movement activity 
was the Medrese-i Nuriyes for male that was not accessible for a woman researcher, 
for the national actors there were many organization buildings which served to the 
movement, alongside the Medrese-i Nuriyes in several İstanbul subdistricts. In 
Kayseri, the interviews initially started in a small library that the movement 
established for the youth but continued in the business offices or shops of the 
activists, most of whom had engaged in business activities much later than their 
initial participation to Yeni Asya. Actually, the majority of the interviews were 
conducted through the phone.  The Yeni Asya members at the center, in İstanbul, 
on the other hand, chose in general, such public places as offices in the endowment 
building, cultural centers and publishing houses belonging to the movement.  
Second, unexpected observations on how clientelism worked helped to 
understand further not only the NSM dynamics but also how party politics worked 
in Turkey. On the one hand, since the issue of clientelism prevalent in the political 
arena appeared frequently during the interviews and revealed itself as a variable 
explaining partly both the emergence of the NOP and a part of its internal 
dynamics, the researcher needed to understand how it was actually practiced. Since 
clientelism continues to be an important aspect of political life, the opportunity to 
observe clientelistic exchanges in the making revealed itself on more than one 
occasion. While, as they were no longer active, the clientelistic practices did not 
take place during the interviews with the local NSM leaders, the researcher 
witnessed them while interviewing two veteran politicians, one from the NSM, the 
other from the JP and two young JDP politicians from the Akıncı tradition, who 
were active in Kayseri and Ankara. In all cases, citizens or party members came to 
ask for jobs for either themselves or their relatives after telling their stories and left 
a CV.  
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The case of the retired JP politician, Saadettin Bilgiç, the rival of Süleyman 
Demirel was particularly telling. He was now living in his hometown, a small 
subdistrict of Isparta and his son had become a JDP parliamentarian. In the large 
salon of his house, where he received the researcher, he had placed a large table 
where he sit following the lunch and started to “receive the citizens”. 
Administrators from a nearby faculty who needed the extra land next to their 
campus that belonged to the state, citizens who needed health care or jobs made a 
line in front of the table and communicated their wishes to the parliamentarian’s 
father. He would in turn either take notes or make immediate phone calls to solve 
the problems. This was very reminiscent of what the JP’s Kayseri elites had told 
during the interviews: that dealing with the citizens was almost a full time job. 
They would entrust their jobs to their partners or relatives especially during and 
after the elections. First, they would work in the election campaign and then devote 
their time to deal with the affairs of their “clients.” Sparing such a time and having 
such influence was a luxury that most NSM local leaders could not enjoy in the 
early years of the movement. 
Finally, a note on two observations within the Yeni Asya networks is in 
order. Visiting a male Medrese-i Nuriye and joining a female Risale-i Nur reading 
session in İstanbul and staying overnight and spending two days at a female 
Medrese-i Nuriye helped the researcher not only to visualize the intra-movement 
activities and “rituals”122 and to see how the Medrese-i Nuriye functioned123 but 
also through these observation put finger on above discussed major differences 
between the NSM, the object of study and Yeni Asya.  
 
 
                                                            
122 Here ritual is not necessarily used in religious sense, though such religious rituals as “tesbihat” 
(reciting Allah’s names with the help of a rosary) did exist. Risale reading sessions can also be 
considered a ritual both in its secular and religious sense. 
123 The Medrese-i Nuriye had started to develop during the 1950s and spread during the 1960s and 
1970s following the establishment of Yeni Asya. The visits showed that the accounts of the 
Medreses in the Risale-i Nur, the interviews and the memoirs and the current Medreses showed 
continuity. The novelty was the existence of Medreses for the female members and richer inner 
decoration.  
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Newspapers124 
Because of the time limitations the researcher chose to focus on basically 
two categories of newspapers covering the period from 1960 to 1971: a) nationally 
distributed  Islamist newspapers with no particular attachment to an Islamist group 
(1964-1972) and b) local newspapers of various political persuasions (1965-1972). 
For the 1970s, because of the dissertation’s scope and time limitations, only one 
major local newspaper is used. Since following the coup of 1971, independent 
Islamist newspapers disappeared, for the 1970s, only the publications of Yeni Asya 
and the NSM began to be published in the late 1960s and early 1970s respectively, 
are employed. National newspapers of different political colors are not researched. 
As mentioned above, the researcher consulted only the daily Milliyet, a center-left 
newspaper, that most NSM activists also reported to have read in the 1960s and 
1970s and that provided an electronic archive. Instead, scholarly works that 
extensively discuss the political life of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s based on these 
newspapers are consulted when necessary.  
While the Islamist newspapers of the 1960s helped to understand the 
political context in the center, the local newspapers of Konya and Kayseri revealed 
the key political players and stakes of the local political arena during the period 
when the NSM networks, mobilization and party organization appeared. Except for 
a newspaper in Konya, the NSM  did not have a local newspaper (nor did Yeni 
Asya). Consequently, for understanding local movement activities, as much as the 
movement infrastructure the research relied on the interviews.  
Movement Publications 
The nature and type of movement publications gave clues regarding the 
organization and ideational production of the NSM.  The NSM publications apart 
from nationally distributed newspapers and some short lived local newspapers, 
included mostly the seminars, press conferences, interviews and parliamentary 
speeches of the movement leader, Necmettin Erbakan, attesting to the extremely 
centralized nature of the NSM. The publications, which were intended for both the 
                                                            
124 A complete list of consulted newspapers and magazines can be found in Bibliography. 
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party activists and the general public, on the other hand, revealed the necessarily 
double-faced nature of the movement ideational products, which combined 
conscious efforts with unintended endeavors. While one face sustained inner 
mobilization and recruitment, the other contested (and cooperated) within the 
political arena. These publications were used complementarily with the interviews 
and newspapers. 
The Yeni Asya publications that were previously mentioned, that is both the 
Risale-i Nur themselves, and various novels125, memoirs and compilation of 
memoirs and websites, in turn, except for the newspapers and websites, intended 
mainly for the inner circles of the movement. As such they constituted the main 
resource to understand the Yeni Asya dynamics along with the interviews.  
Finally, it should be added that various memoirs and compilation of 
memoirs written by independent Islamist figures, non-Islamists, and members of 
other Islamist circles such as Büyük Doğu and non-Yeni Asya Risale-i Nur 
movement helped to crosscheck the information found in these movement 
publications and interviews. Moreover, they helped to understand the boundaries, 
fluidities, and internal dynamics of the greater Islamist mobilization, or the Islamist 
sector. 
  
                                                            
125 Novels are actually compilation of memoirs in a narrative form. Their content are similar to those 
found in the memoirs and highly recommended by the movement members to those who want to 
understand the movement’s history and internal dynamics. Memoirs and novels have thus been 
written and published with the approval of the movement elders. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW PARTY INITIATIVE 
AMONG THE ISLAMISTS126 
This chapter studies how and why a group of Islamist party innovators was 
formed during the second half of the 1960s. Through a study of formal political 
institutions and power relations, this section shows that the Islamist party 
entrepreneurs emerged within the political field, amidst the political mobilizations 
against the then Justice Party’s “liberals” led by Süleyman Demirel, the chairman 
of the JP and the prime minister. It is maintained that the party innovators, thus the 
National Order Party and its successor the National Salvation Party, were an 
outcome of a specific configuration of institutional structures, agency of the socio-
political actors, power relations, in short political processes, rather than a natural 
outgrowth of societal dissatisfaction stemmed from center-periphery cleavages.  
The traditional literature on Islamist parties in Turkey suggests that the NOP 
and its offshoots were the outcomes of a struggle between a hegemonic secular 
center (the state) and a religious periphery (society), and that Islamist parties 
emerged because the “periphery” was politically, culturally and economically 
excluded from the “center.” The origin of the NOP is often traced back to an 
economic and cultural struggle between “Muslim” Anatolian small and medium 
businessmen (or the ascending middle classes), on the one hand, and the “secular” 
state, including the JP government, which favored the large commercial and 
industrial enterprises of İstanbul and İzmir, on the other127. Some studies refer 
specifically to a 1969 clash between Necmettin Erbakan, later the leader of the 
NOP, and the JP government over the chairmanship of the Union of Chambers and 
                                                            
126 I would like to thank Elise Massicard and Nicole Watts for their invaluable insights and 
suggestions on the findings and discussions of some sections of this and the next chapter. 
127 See for instance Ağaoğullari, L'Islam dans la vie politique; Alkan, "The National Salvation 
Party"; Sarıbay, Turkiye'de Din ve Parti Politikasi.  
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Commodity Exchanges of Turkey128 (TOBB, in its Turkish acronym).129 These 
accounts suggest that the TOBB Affair – as it came to be known-- and the NOP 
were an aggregation of center-periphery cleavages: the NOP emerged due to 
Erbakan and his supporters’ conviction that the struggle with the state and its allies 
had to be transferred to the political field.  
In some works, the economic dimension is less emphasized and the 
establishment of the NOP is also attributed to the initiative of the İskenderpaşa 
Naqshbandi community in particular and the Naqshbandis in general, to which 
some leading party entrepreneurs, including Necmettin Erbakan, belonged. The 
NOP is thus considered as a tool in the hands of the discontented religious 
periphery against the encroachments of the secular state. 130 
While rightly highlighting the existing tension and power disparities 
between the social, economic and political actors of the “center” and the 
“periphery”, these views reify and homogenize both. Consequently, they ignore the 
action and interaction that took place in the political arena and the micro-histories 
of the party innovators themselves131 and consequently fail to explain why and how 
a new group of party entrepreneurs came into being in the first place, tapped into 
the existing socio-political discontents, mobilized potential activists and established 
an Islamist party. Nor does it inform us as to why there was “differential 
recruitment,” or entry into the NSM from the periphery, a subject that will be 
studied in the next two chapters. 
In contrast, this chapter argues that while the existence of societal cleavages 
between the “center” and the “periphery” needs to be acknowledged, it is important 
not to take them for granted and essentialize them as the "cause" of the creation of 
                                                            
128 The Union was “the highest legal entity in Turkey representing the private sector.” Working 
together with the government, the Union undertook the distribution of state controlled resources in 
the form of credits and assigned the foreign exchange quotas to various sectors of commerce and 
industry. http://www.tobb.org.tr/eng/tobbhakkinda/legalstatus.php. 
129 See for instance Ağaoğulları, L'Islam dans la vie politique; Alkan, "The National Salvation Party 
in Turkey"; Sarıbay, Türkiye'de Din ve Parti Politikasi. 
130 See for instance Mardin, “The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey,”; Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity. 
131 It should be added that Banu Eligür’s otherwise excellent study on the Islamist Mobilization in 
Turkey which brings to fore political factors, when it comes to the emergence of the NSM/NOP 
initiative, which is not the focus of her study, contains empirical inaccuracies and displays certain 
structural determinisms and ideational essentialisms found in the traditional corpus. This is largely 
due to neglecting meso- and micro- levels and relying mainly on secondary sources and party 
documents as primary sources. Eligür, 59-67. 
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the NOP for the following reasons.132 First, the center-periphery dichotomy has 
been used to explain not only the emergence of the NSM, but also other socio-
political actors such as the Risale-i Nur students in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
and the Democratic Party, the DP, the first right wing mainstream party of the 
multiparty regime. As such, it does not explain how and why the NSM emerged as 
a particular Islamist movement aiming at establishing a political party as its 
movement organization. Second, as shall be seen in the following chapter, the 
discontented periphery was by no means homogenous as the party entrepreneurs 
themselves discovered. Finally, the establishment of the NOP was primarily an 
initiative of a group of “political insiders” of the “center” (both in geographic and 
symbolic terms). The new party enterprise was a reaction against a risk of 
marginalization from decision-making processes within the center, not a result of 
actual exclusion. Rather than an objective condition of exclusion, then, it was the 
perception of the political actors that triggered the Islamist movement of party 
innovation. 
The emergence of Islamist party innovators was a product of an incremental 
political process, which consisted of the rise and failure of the right-wing collective 
actions in the 1960s. The first section of the chapter treats the macro changes in the 
political landscape in the early 1960s and the emergence of right-wing mobilization 
that enabled the formation of a new Islamist network. The second section studies 
the intervening meso-level factors (i.e. the nature of power relations within the JP, 
the Law of Political Parties and the clientelism) which contributed to the failure of 
right-wing mobilization thus to the Islamists’ disappointment with right wing 
organizations and collective actions in general and their conservative-nationalist 
and ultranationalist allies133 in particular. Only following their disenchantment with 
the existing right wing political and social organizations and institutions that some 
Islamist elites sought to establish a party of their own. The final section provides an 
                                                            
132 For a recent proposal of paradigm shift in the study of political parties and social divisions see 
Cedric de Leon, Manali Desai and Cihan Tuğal, “Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution 
of Cleavages in the United States, India and Turkey,” Sociological Theory 27 (2009): 193-219.  
133 The conservative-nationalists were economic liberals but conservative in social, political and 
religious matters. They also differed from the ultranationalists who had openly ethnic nationalist, 
even racist tendencies and from the Islamists who expressed the wish to introduce policy and legal 
changes based on their distinct interpretation of religious principles. However as Tanıl Bora 
succinctly demonstrates the lines between these three political identities were quite blurry and each 
involved elements from others. See Tanıl Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 
1998). 
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account of the crystallization of the prospective NOP leaders and their early party 
building activities. It also deals with two formerly unaddressed or misaddressed 
subjects, which further highlight the properties of the NSM innovators and the 
conditions in which they emerged: the Nur students’ division over the question of 
the direct political engagement and the question of the Naqshbandi involvement in 
the new party enterprise.   
3.1 Right wing activism and the emergence of a new Islamist network in 
the early 1960s 
This section tackles the first step towards the emergence of Islamist party 
entrepreneurs, thus the NOP: the establishment of countrywide connected informal 
Islamist networks. During this period, the right wing collective actions created an 
environment in which the Islamist political, bureaucratic, business and academic 
elites of the country,134 dispersed in different right-wing associations and political 
parties, could meet and develop an increasingly distinct network, political syntax 
and identity from their conservative-nationalist and ultranationalist allies and 
generate a new generation of Islamist activists. It is maintained that while it was 
macro changes in the political landscape, which prepared the ground for the 
emergence of right wing organizations and activism in general, the intervening 
factor, which paved the way for the formation of a connected Islamist network was 
the mobilization process itself.  
 The macro changes can be categorized under the concept of “political 
opportunity structure.” The latter involves both relatively durable formal and 
informal political institutions and their perception by the political actors as creating 
incentives and opportunities for collective action.135 The constitution of 1961 and 
the proportional election system can be considered as “general openness” 
                                                            
134 It should be noted that Şerif Mardin, when he treats the emergence of the Democrat Party in the 
late 1940s within the context of center-periphery dichotomy, acknowledges the fact that the 
Democrat Party founders also consisted of the elites of the “center.” “Center-Periphery Relations: A 
Key to Turkish Politics?” Daedalus 102 (1973): 185.    
135 For a definition of the concept see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements 
and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85 quoted in David 
S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity,” Social Forces 82 
(2004): 1459.    
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structures136 that allowed the establishment of right-wing (also the left-wing) 
associations and minor political parties.137 The retreat of the army from daily 
politics and the election of Demirel to the JP’s leadership in 1964 and the 
subsequent victory of the JP in the general elections of 1965, in turn, were 
perceived as opportunities and incentives to act against the JP administration and 
government controlled by the liberals138. The ensuing rise and diversity in right 
wing collective actions enabled the Islamists of various organizations in different 
parts of the country to communicate and establish networks of their own. 
This section introduces first the institutional context, and the right-wing 
organizations and social formations. Second, it discusses the emergence of 
collective actions organized by conservative-nationalist-ultranationalist-Islamist 
alliance and resulting Islamist network formation.  
3.1.1 Institutional context and the right-wing organizations and networks 
The establishment of right wing139 organizations all over the country with 
centers in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir, was crucial for the emergence of right wing 
activism and Islamist network in the 1960s. The formal and informal organizations 
and networks provide the “weak ties,” that serve as bridges for the information 
flow, communication of new frames and diffusion of identities.140  They thus 
                                                            
136 It has been suggested that two different types of structures need to be mapped correctly: the 
factors, which denote “the general openness” in the polity and “issue specific opportunities” and 
constraints. See Meyer and Minkoff, “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity,” 1458. 
137 Technically most of these parties and associations had already been established before the official 
inauguration of the new constitution and the new electoral rules. However, both the elites of the 
political arena, who would become entrepreneurs of these organizations and the general public were 
quite familiar with the content of the new constitution as the deliberations of the Constitutive 
Assembly was public and its members and the members of the military government were in constant 
interaction with the political elites. 
138 The liberals were pejoratively called “Yeminliler” (those who sworn in) by their opponents to 
refer to their unmitigated confidence in and support of Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister and 
chairman of the JP.  
139 In addition to the term “right wing” these organizations and their activists called themselves 
milliyetçi-mukaddesatçı, reflecting the heterogeneity of their members’ identities. 
140  “…the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional 
intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.” 
Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” The American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 
1361. Granovetter argues that weak ties indicate those interpersonal ties outside the closest circle of 
friends and family as such they help the individuals to extend their communication to longer social 
distances. Socio-political and professional organizations and networks and workplaces provide 
avenues for such communication.  
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enabled the right wing collective actions in general and the growth of Islamist 
activism in particular. 
To begin with, the constitution of 1961 enlarged the scope of civil liberties 
such as freedom of association and expression and led to the emergence of a lively 
sector of right wing associations, informal networks, political parties and 
publications alongside their left and Alevi141 counterparts. Among the leading and 
most vocal right wing associations were the Turkish National Student Union, 
Association for Fighting against Communism, the Nationalists’ Association, and 
the Nationalist Teachers’ Association.142 These associations, which were at the 
forefront of all collective actions both in metropolitan areas and in the provinces, 
brought together ultranationalists, Islamists, and conservatives (or conservative-
nationalists).143 
The religious associations, which were composed of students, alumni, 
teachers, professors and benefactors of theology institutes; praying leader and 
preacher schools, Kuranic courses; organizations for the construction of mosques 
and also the short lived Federation of Religious Employees of Turkey,144 should 
also be considered as right wing organizations.145 Not only because they joined 
right wing activities in addition to advancing professional demands, but also 
because they included all colors of the right, not only the Islamists. 
One should also mention the emergence of certain hubs of informal elite 
(i.e. politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, engineers) meetings where individuals 
                                                            
141 The Alevis constitute a sizable religious group living in Turkey. They established a political 
party, Birlik Partisi, or the Union Party, in 1966. 
142 The Turkish names are in the same order: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (the MTTB), Komünizmle 
Mücadele Derneği, Milliyetçiler Derneği, Milliyetçi Öğretmenler Derneği.  
143 The intra-organizational power struggles within the MTTB throughout the 1960s and 1970s are 
illustrative of the contest over the definition of the “right wing” that existed at the time in each right 
wing organization and in the political field. See M. Çağatay Okutan, Bozkurt’tan Kur’an’a Millî 
Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB), 1916-1980 (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), 137-
200. 
144 This was a federation of the Associations for the Employees of the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs, which was a state institution responsible to the prime minister. 
145 Ahmet Yücekök’s study shows that by 1968, there were 8419 associations for construction of 
mosques and 2311 other above mentioned types of religious associations. The total number of 
religious associations (10730) made up the %28.4 of all associations in the country. Among other 
right wing associations numbers are available only for the Association for Fighting against 
Communism. The total number of these associations was 141, which was %0.4 of all associations. 
Yücekök tackles these associations in relation to their socio-economic variables and do not dwell on 
above mentioned connective and socialization mechanisms. Türkiye’de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-
Ekonomik Tabanı (1946-1968), Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları 323 
(Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971), 119, 141.   
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from different regional and right wing political backgrounds politicized and 
socialized. For instance, in Ankara, the store of Saatçi Musa, (Musa the Clock 
Repairer), who was an ex-convict of the Malatya incident;146 in provincial towns 
some bookstores were such meeting points. Incidentally, in the 1950s, in Yıldız 
(close to the Yıldız Technical University), İstanbul, the store of Mehmet Emin 
Alpkan, “Milli Bakkal” (the National Grocery), had served the same purpose. 
During the 1960s even though the grocery was no longer in place, Alpkan became a 
very important “node” for the Islamist elites during the party building episode.147 
In addition to the Constitution of 1961, the proportional election system was 
a major incentive for the establishment of various right-wing minor parties as it 
allowed smaller parties to be represented in the parliament. By 1965, there were 
four right wing parties: the JP, the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, 
NTP)148, the Nation Party (Millet Partisi, NP), the Republican Peasant Nation Party 
(Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi, RPNP, by 1969 it became NAP). As the latter 
three also aspired to be the mass party of the right similar to the JP, they contained 
all colors of the right wing except liberals. Most importantly for the purposes of this 
chapter, all these parties hosted leading Islamist personalities. Scattered in different 
                                                            
146 The incident involves the assassination attempt to the liberal journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman in 
Malatya in 1952. These young Islamists from the Büyük Doğu circles (in the 1950s this magazine 
had established “Thought” clubs, Fikir Klüpleri, in various cities and organized conferences for 
Necip Fazıl Kısakürek) acted following the contemporary Islamist publications’ long campaign 
targeting him as a mastermind of a “masonic-jewish” complot. Not only the perpetrators, but also 
the owners of the Islamist publications, such as Kısakürek and Osman Yüksel (Serdengeçti), had 
also been tried, with no conviction.  
147 Alpkan became the owner of Bizim Anadolu, a daily which appeared in 1969 and supported 
Erbakan and his friends. He also established connections for Erbakan in Konya and Kayseri.   
However, Alpkan himself, a conservative nationalist, would later withdraw his support from the 
NSM and approach further the NAP. It seems his close personal friendship with Alparslan Türke,  
the leader of the NAP  dating back to the 1950s was influential (Türkeş was also a student at a 
military school in Yıldız). The blurred lines between conservative-nationalist, ultranationalist and 
Islamist political frames and the NSM elites’ early cordial relations with Türkeş might have led him 
to believe that the NSM would eventually converge with the NAP. For a history of relationship 
between Türkeş and Alpkan families see 
http://www.yusufiye.net/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=310 It should be noted that he 
was a behind the scenes political figure with a surprisingly long and diverse range of relations. He 
was also financially supporting the magazine of the Association for Fighting against Communism 
and had close relations with Milli Mücadele Birliği (Union of National Struggle). According to an 
ex-member he was a key factor in changing the political direction of the Union from an Islamist one 
to a more nationalist one with close relations with the state. See 
http://yenidenmillimucadele.wordpress.com/2008/04/22/elestiri-3-yeniden-milli-mucadele-
sorgulanmalidir-1-necmettin-erisen/  
148 It should be noted that the New Turkey Party had a peculiar position and role among the right 
wing parties as despite its leaders’ Turkish nationalist rhetoric it included a strong Kurdish 
component and was very powerful, especially until the emergence of the NSP in Kurdish majority 
regions.  
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parties, these Islamists had acquired their political identity during the Islamist 
mobilizations of the 1950s.149 For instance, Süleyman Arif Emre and Abdurrahman 
Şeref Laç had been well known lawyers among the Islamist circles since the early 
1950s. The former had defended Hüseyin Üzmez and his friends following the 
Malatya incident150 and the latter had been defending the Nur students in various 
proceedings. Osman Yüksel (Serdengeçti) was a well known Islamist columnist 
whose nickname coming from the name of his famous magazine Serdengeçti.  
Hasan Aksay, as an avid reader of Islamist magazines in his high school years, had 
been in contact with Islamist circles since his visit to Serdengeçti and Kısakürek in 
prison. All these names but Laç and Serdengeçti would later become official 
founders of the NOP.151 
During the early 1960s, as was the case of the Islamists in the parliament, 
the Islamists in general were mostly dispersed individuals and groups in various 
right wing associations who had been politicized during the Islamist mobilizations 
of the 1950s. The only organized bodies were the Nur students and Süleymancıs 
(though illegal under the existing laws), which had developed in the 1950s and 
Islamist daily, weekly and monthly publications such as, Babıali’de Sabah 
(Morning at Babıali152), Bugün (Today), Büyük Doğu (the Great East), İttihad (the 
Union), Yeni İstanbul (New İstanbul), Yeni İstiklal (New Freedom).153 Thanks to 
collective actions of the 1960s, these Islamists would produce and recruit a new 
                                                            
149 The well known Islamist personalities in the Assembly were Hacı Tevfik Paksu, Hasan Aksay, 
Osman Yüksel (Serdengeçti) in the JP; Fehmi Cumalioğlu and Abdurrahman Şeref Laç in the NP; 
and Süleyman Arif Emre in the NTP.   
150 Malatya incident was the first high-profile and violent Islamist action in the 1950s.   
151 Laç was a conservative nationalist and the Risale-i Nur movement’s lawyer with close relations 
with the Yeni Asya branch. He opposed the establishment of an Islamist party. Serdengeçti though 
being an Islamist had his roots in ultranationalist circles. He had been tried in the same court in 1944 
with Alparaslan Türkeş for Turancılık (Turanism, the name the ultranationalist gave to themselves 
that emphasis their pan-Turkist character). 
152 The name of an İstanbul district that was the center of journalistic activities until the 1990s. 
153 Babıali’de Sabah, Bugün, Büyük Doğu, Yeni İstanbul and Yeni İstiklal were supported by the 
rich religious and/or Islamist notable families of İstanbul, such as the Topbaş family. At first the Nur 
students were buying the newspapers such as Bugün and Yeni İstiklal (and Necip Fazıl’s Büyük 
Doğu) in bulk in return for positive news on the movement such as the release of Nur student 
detainees from the prison. Later, they decided to have a newspaper of their own (first weekly İttihad 
in 1967 and then daily Yeni Asya) to differentiate themselves more clearly from these newspapers 
and Islamist movements, which they found too confrontational vis-à-vis the state and the political 
elites. Moreover, the existing Islamist newspapers “confused” the Nur students who were reading 
them in Anatolia, that is they blurred the boundaries of legitimate Nur student behavior and 
thinking. See Mehmet Kutlular, İşte Hayatım (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 2009), 93-109. 
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generation of Islamists, augmenting their number and influence within the right-
wing associations in particular and in the political arena in general.154 
For the emergence of collective actions, however, the existing legal 
structure was necessary but not sufficient. While the new constitution and the 
election law provided a legal base for the emergence of these right wing 
organizations and an incentive for collective actions as they lowered the cost of 
political action, they did not constitute in and off themselves a variable to explain 
the rise of the right wing mobilization. The political actors engaged in collective 
action when their self-perception and their perception of opportunities and 
constraints changed.  
3.1.2  The collective actions and the emergence of a new Islamist network 
As important as legal and associational change, then, was a broad based 
sense that politics would now be done differently. By 1965, following such a 
change in the political actors’ perceptions of opportunity, Turkey witnessed a rise 
and diversity in collective action. There were at least two contributing factors. First, 
the military’s interest in daily politics seemed to have diminished by 1964155 and 
then the JP came to power with a majority in the parliament in 1965.  
On May 27, 1960, the military had intervened to “dethrone” the Democrat 
Party (the DP) claiming that the latter violated the constitution of 1924.  In 1961, 
the military established a constitutive assembly, which introduced a new and 
relatively liberal constitution. However, having experienced two more coup 
attempts after 1960 (the latest on May 21, 1963), only by 1964, citizens seemed to 
feel secure enough to enjoy the constitution of 1961.  Colonel Talat Aydemir’s first 
attempt on February 22, 1962 had been pardoned. Following his second attempt on 
May 20, 1963, however, he was executed in June 1964. This execution signaled 
that the military definitely wanted to turn to its barracks, at least not to engage in 
                                                            
154 Jacob M. Landau gives a very lively account of the right-wing (particularly Islamist and 
ultranationalist) organizations of the 1960s with ties to the 1950s. He however does not dwell into a 
detailed analysis and present his findings mostly as a historical background to the establishment of 
the NOP and the NAP.  See Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 171-204. 
For a political and institutional history of the 1960s see Ibid., 1-48. 
155 The military has been active in daily politics since May 27, 1960, when it had intervened to 
“dethrone” the Democrat Party (the DP). 
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day-to-day politics. Only, then Turkey witnessed a boost in collective actions, not 
only in right wing activities but also in Alevi and socialist mobilizations. 
 The JP’s electoral victory and forming a majority government in 1965 
appeared to have confirmed the military’s retreat from daily politics as the JP was 
considered as a continuation of the defunct DP. As far as the right-wing 
associations concerned, while they were happy to see “their” party coming to power 
and felt confident enough to engage in various forms of collective action, they had 
been discontented with the election of Demirel to the JP’s leadership instead of 
Said Bilgiç in 1964, following the death of the party’s founding father, ex-army 
commander Ragıp Gümüşpala.  The conservative-nationalist elites within the JP, 
with the help of the mukaddesatçıs had previously made a bid for power in 1961 
when Ali Fuat Başgil (a well known conservative intellectual and university 
professor) put his candidacy to the Presidency of the Republic. The election was 
shortly after the coup and Başgil, a vocal critique of the military intervention, was 
forced to withdraw his candidacy.156 The right wing group considered the election 
of a “liberal” candidate, Demirel, a second usurpation157 despite the fact that he 
received the majority of the delegate votes158. Moreover, they realized that Demirel 
and his companions were moving fast dominating the JP and weakening the 
conservative-nationalist leaders, the main interlocutors of the exraparliamentary 
and parliamentary right wing groups.  
Before 1965, the newly flourishing right wing activities had targeted mostly 
“the left” and “the Greek Cypriots”159 which also pleased the military, which was 
wary of the intentions of the Soviet Union and the Greek Cypriots. By 1965, then, 
supported by their interlocutors in the political parties, the right-wing groups and 
their mobilizations gradually but energetically turned their attention to the JP’s 
                                                            
156 He later resigned from the Senate as well. 
157 For instance, Hasan Aksay argued that Demirel’s election was a Masonic plot. However, similar 
to many other interviewees who believed in such a complot, as the interview progressed, he made 
clear that he did not see leadership qualities in Bilgiç, such as charisma, rhetorical power, and most 
importantly an ambition to win. Interview with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006 and 
February 1, 2007.  In fact, Bilgiç put his candidacy long after he first endorsed Demirel himself. 
Saadettin Bilgiç, Isparta, August 14, 2007. 
158 While Süleyman Demirel took 1239 votes, his rival took 175. Feroz Ahmad, Demokrasi 
Sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-1980 (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1994), 237. 
159 The conflict between the Turks and the Greeks in Cyprus had incited protests on behalf of 
Turkish Cypriots. These protests included not only the right wing but also the Kemalists.  
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leadership160 in order to influence the leading party in the distribution of the state 
controlled spoils and also to curb the increasing power of the liberal faction within 
the JP.  In other words, they were “interested in the appropriation of profits 
guaranteed by,” the political party and “compet[ed] for the production of goods to 
be offered in the political market.”161 The latter, would symbolically and materially 
increase their capital as individuals and groups.  
Accordingly, the right wing associations expanded their activities between 
1965 and 1970. These included petitions to the government, street demonstrations, 
university boycotts, conferences and finally to collective morning prayers of protest 
that thousands attended. They were organized over a number of issues ranging from 
the reinstatement of a discharged president of the Religious Affairs to his post to 
the “communist threat.” 162  The anti-left demonstrations kept their popularity 
because not only the left had also increased its power, but also they served to flex 
muscles against the JP leadership.163 The right wing groups propagated that the 
government needed them to be able to effectively struggle with the left.  
These collective actions were the product of joint efforts of various right 
wing associations in different parts of the country and as such provided venues for 
communication, interrecruitment and further action among geographically and/or 
organizationally separate individuals and groups. For instance, the Elmalı Affair 
was a major mobilization, which brought together the members of the right-wing 
associations and parties and the parliamentarians (including those within the JP) 
                                                            
160 Not only the right but also the left increased their activities and targeted the government. All but 
the Islamists and the Alevis were represented in the Assembly. The Alevi party was founded only in 
1966.   
161 Offerlé, 17. Offerlé reminds that these profits are not necessarily political. It should be also added 
that he refers to individual players and individual interests within a political party, which may 
overlap with but do not necessarily represent the interest of a segment of population. 
162 In 1968, the right wing organized two major anti-left demonstrations in different parts of the 
country: “Rise-up Meetings” (Şahlanış Mitingleri) and collective morning prayers in mosques 
(Toplu Namazlar). By 1968, there were also clashes between the right and left wing activists, the 
most (in)famous being the Bloody Sunday of 1969, when right wing activists attacked the left wing 
during the latter’s demonstration against the American 6th fleet. For a detailed account of such right 
wing (mukaddesatçı-nationalist) collective actions see Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde 
Türkiye’de İslamcılık (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1999), 244-251. In fact, Bugün called its 
readers to “strangle the red” just a day before the Bloody Sunday see Appendix G, Figure 3. 
163 For instance, a news piece on an upcoming indoor event organized by some associations 
(Association for Fighting against Communism and the Nationalist Teachers’ Association) informs 
the readers that the purpose of the conference would be to find new ways to fight the leftists and to 
resist “the governments that put pressure on mukaddesatçı-nationalists.”  “Milliyetçiler Toplantısı 
Hazırlıkları ilerliyor” Yeni İstanbul, August 9, 1967. 
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against the JP’s “liberal” government. The activists demanded the restoration of 
İbrahim Elmalı, the discharged President of the Religious Affairs to his post164 
through two street protests in İstanbul and Kayseri, the dispatch of representatives 
from the JP local branches (those dominated by the conservative-nationalists) to 
Ankara, and joint petitions signed by various right wing associations.165  
As minor and major collective actions followed each other in different 
regions of the country as joint efforts of the right wing, a network of Islamists that 
cut across these institutions and networks (including the Nur students) emerged. 
Embellishing the right wing activities with religious symbolism, references and 
demands, the Islamists, without so much giving up on nationalism, reintroduced the 
Islamist language/ syntax into the public arena166, differentiated themselves from 
not only the ultranationalist but also the conservatives in their reading and clothing 
habits and the role they ascribed to religion in public affairs167, generated and 
recruited a new generation of Islamists, and finally contested not only the leftists 
but also, through leftist-bashing or directly, the dominance of the liberals within the 
JP.  
                                                            
164 Elmalı, an unusually outspoken and headstrong Presidency of Religious Affairs, had been 
discharged after having criticized the TRT (state radio and television) for its choice of programs and 
for allegedly having established ties with some religious leaders without the consent of the 
government during a trip to North Africa. A power struggle among rival groups within the 
Presidency (Süleymancıs, Nur students and the Prayer and Preacher School graduates) also seems to 
have played a role. On Elmalı mobilization see Appendix G Figures 4 and 5. 
165 See Yeni İstanbul, October 5-15, 1966. For instance, in Konya the following associations signed 
a joint declaration: the NA, the AFC, the Association for the Graduates of Prayer Leader and 
Preacher Schools (İmam Hatip Okulları Mezunları Cemiyeti), the Student Association of Advanced 
Institutes of Islam (Yüksek İslam Enstitüsü Talebe Derneği), Green Crescent Association (Yeşilay 
Derneği, an anti-alcohol use (not anti-abuse) organization). Yeni İstanbul, October 5, 1966.   
166 The Islamist frames and discourses of the 1960s were a reproduction of those of the 1950s, which 
had been themselves a readaptation of the Islamist political discourses of the 19th century. While the 
19th century Islamism was mainly an “imperial” political project that targeted keeping together the 
Muslim “nations” within the Ottoman Empire, the Islamism of the 1950s and 1960s focused on the 
new nation-state’s boundaries. The Islamists identified the nation with “Muslimness” in addition to 
“Turkishness” and then claimed to be the righteous and true representatives of that nation. Since 
components of this Islamism were ever present in the NSM frames further information on the 
subject will be provided in Chapter 5. 
167 It is “the interactive conversations that occur [within prior ties and group structure] and succeed 
in creating shared meanings and identities that legitimate emergent collective action.” Doug 
McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social 
Movements,” in Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, ed. 
Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 290. 
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While it cannot be claimed that the newly formed Islamist network and 
reactivated Islamist frames were “predictors” for the future Islamist party168, they 
no doubt contributed to the establishment of the NOP/NSP. Social movement 
scholars maintain that individuals are embedded in multiplicity of networks and 
organizations169 and that there are “multivalent influences at the individual 
level.”170 As such mobilization of an individual can be impeded by a multiplicity of 
factors: the “salience” of one collective identity over another, the vested interests 
(time, money etc) in an organization, professional responsibilities or negative views 
of family members etc.  
 Thus, on the one hand, the entry to the NOP from the Islamist network of 
the 1960s was no doubt differential. Some members had already been involved in 
an Islamist organization as was the case for the individuals in some Nur branches or 
for the Hilalciler (the Crescent-ists, the Islamists in the ultranationalist NAP). As 
such, they were less disposed to engage in a new organization. Some Islamists, 
though having participated in occasional demonstrations, would have been 
unwilling to commit their energies and time for party activities or simply personally 
unavailable.171 On the other hand, the Islamist network served as a pool for 
recruitment: thanks to their multiple ties and affiliations, those recruited served as 
bridges between the individuals in other connected social networks and the new 
party enterprise. Consequently, even those Islamists who did not approve and 
participated to all collective actions but who were embedded in the right wing 
networks and had been socialized into Islamist ideational elements could eventually 
enter the NSM.172  Most importantly, the collective action process and the Islamist 
                                                            
168 The existence of networks and collective identities do not necessarily directly lead to recruitment 
to movement organizations or collective action. See Mario Diani, "Networks and Participation," in 
The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter 
Kriesi (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 339-359. 
169 Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 792-795; Doug McAdam and Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying 
the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology 99 (1993): 
646-648.   
170 James A. Kitts, "Mobilizing in Black Boxes: Social Networks and Participation in Social 
Movement Organizations," Mobilization: An International Journal 5 (2000): 252. 
171 It should be added that being within an Islamist network did not necessarily mean being an 
Islamist either. In other words, not all individuals operating within the Islamist networks were 
necessarily Islamists.  
172 As was the case for most of the prospective NSM activists in Kayseri who, though being avid 
readers of Bugün in general, were also critical of what they considered “excessive” and “heterodox” 
collective actions such as collective morning prayers and street clashes with the left wing activists. 
As shall be seen in Chapter 4, such a critical stance became also a factor why the prospective 
activists chose the NSM over the NAP in Kayseri. 
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network brought together the Islamist elites themselves, a crucial step towards the 
new party.  
3.2 Meso-level constraints on the Islamists 
Through such broad-based right wing activism Islamists might have found 
an outlet within the JP, the party in power, but were obstructed by certain party-
level factors. The struggle for power within the JP between two major groups, the 
conservative-nationalists and the liberals,173 and this party’s internal structure 
impeded the right wing parliamentarians and local party elites to pressure the JP 
central administration and government to introduce the demanded policy changes. 
They thus contributed to the failure of two major mobilization efforts and brought 
the Islamists to the conclusion that they were entangled in an intraparty power 
struggle in which they had no leverage. Having lost confidence in their allies and 
realizing their relative vulnerability as scattered individuals and groups within the 
right wing organizations, the elites of the newly established Islamist networks 
engaged in party building activities to establish an organization of their own.174  
The following section discusses first the power struggle between the two 
groups within the JP and the right wing’s two failed major political contestations. 
Second, it examines the formal and informal internal structures of the JP as 
additional factors that influenced the outcome of right-wing activism. 
3.2.1 The intraparty struggle within the JP and the failure of the right wing 
mobilization 
In the mid-1960s the JP was divided into two main camps: conservative-
nationalists, on the one hand, and those known as liberals, on the other. The 
ultranationalists and Islamists within the JP, in the parliament and the right-wing 
associations supported the conservative nationalist leaders against their adversaries 
in the JP. Pejoratively called “Yeminliler” (those who have been sworn in) by their 
                                                            
173 Two other researchers also trace the genesis of the NOP to the JP’s internal struggles without 
however analyzing it in detail. See Ağaoğulları, L'Islam dans la vie politique de la Turquie, 207-
208, 220 and Ruşen Çakır, Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi : Refah Partisini Anlamak (İstanbul: Metis, 
1994), 21. 
174 For a background story of the NOP as told by a founding father see Süleyman Arif Emre, 
Siyasette 35 Yıl vol.1 (İstanbul: Keşif Yayınları, 2002). 
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opponents to refer to their unmitigated support for party chair Demirel, the liberals 
had relatively recently (1966) acquired the majority of seats in the party 
administration at the expense of conservative-nationalists.  
Empowering the conservative nationalists against their liberal opponents 
was a major goal of right wing activists. However, it was this very struggle for 
power informed by the dynamics of intraparty politics that rendered major right-
wing activisms of the period unsuccessful in acquiring their short-term demands. 
On the one hand, the conservative-nationalist elites of the JP chose to use the 
demands of the right wing associations as a bargaining tool in order to secure 
certain party related concessions from the liberals. On the other hand, the liberals 
took advantage of the situation in order to weaken the ties between the 
extraparliamentary right wing groups and the JP’s conservative-nationalists. 
In 1966, there were two major collective actions, during which almost all 
right wing organizations mobilized twice against the JP liberals and sought the help 
of the conservative-nationalist parliamentarians and senators and their allies. These 
demands were, first, the above mentioned, restoration of İbrahim Elmalı to his post 
and, second, the inclusion of those convicted under the Article 163/1 to the pending 
General Amnesty of 1966 (Law no.780).  
While these contestations as a whole targeted a symbolic gain against the 
liberals175, for the mukaddesatçıs in particular, the mobilization for the Amnesty 
was also a move against the Supreme Court’s decision of September 20, 1965 to 
persecute the Risale-i Nur students based on the Article 163176, a major disincentive 
to mobilization around religious frames.177 The Article 163/1 of the Penal Law 
stated that whoever establishes or organizes an association with the intention of 
changing “state’s social, economic, political or legal basis, even partially, according 
                                                            
175 JP’s assembly group discussions and parliamentary dealings on the subject can be followed on 
the press and parliamentary proceedings. For instance during a parliamentary group meeting Bilgiç 
and Serdengeçti shouted at the liberals “You do not let us speak in the Assembly, nor in the group. 
Where can we speak?” See “AP Grupunda Kavga,” Yeni İstanbul, July 15, 1966. See also Gökhan 
Evliyaoğlu, “AP Grubunda Curcuna ve Sebepleri,” Yeni İstanbul, July 17, 1966 and Millet Meclisi 
Tutanak Dergisi [National Assembly Proceedings], Term 2,Volume 8, Session 123, August 3, 1966.  
176 The new Head of the Court reminded the prosecutors this decision in his inauguration speech in 
1966. See http://www.yargitay.gov.tr/tarihce_aak/1966-1967.htm.   
177 Since the political engagement patterns of the Nur students will be discussed in detail below, 
suffice it to say here that, eager to protect and develop their grassroots organization and the “total 
institution,” the Nur student branch which will later to be known as Yeni Asya, decided to come to 
an agreement with the Demirel group. 
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to religious principles and beliefs, against laïcité, shall be punished by penal 
servitude for three to seven years.”178 As  mentioned above, the dispute over the 
clause was rather symbolic than real. On the one hand, those convicted from other 
clauses of the Article 163 were included in the Amnesty Law.  On the other hand, 
there were no convicts sentenced for crimes stated in 163/1 since although this 
clause was more severe in terms of punishment it prescribed than, say, the clause 
163/4179, it was also more difficult to prove the existence of an organization than 
the propaganda crime that the latter stated.  
At any rate, both the Elmalı and Amnesty demands resulted in 
disappointment for the extraparliamentary right wing groups. Since Demirel had 
only recently won chairmanship of the party against the conservative-nationalists 
represented by Bilgiç180, the demands of the right wing conveyed through their 
channel constituted a double-edged sword. Demirel’s group was forced to consider 
them seriously as the JP claimed to represent all colors of the right wing.181  
However, the liberals wanted to protect their position vis-à-vis Bilgiç group as well.  
This group included nationally known figures of the DP-JP tradition and enjoyed 
strong connections with right-wing groups, institutions and publications.182 
Consequently, any gain on their part on behalf of the right wing groups would 
further strengthen their symbiotic relationship, thereby reducing Demirel’s chances 
to establish connections of his own. Moreover, Demirel would not want to take the 
risk of seeing these gains converted to political and symbolic capital during the 
general party congresses convened every two years. 
                                                            
178 Translation by the author. 
179 The 163/4 stated that whoever propagates or indoctrinates using religion, religious sentiments or 
things held religiously sacred as an instrument to change, against laïcité, state’s social, economic, 
political and legal basis according to religious principles or “to gain and establish political benefit or 
personal ascendancy, shall be punished by penal servitude for one to five years.” 
180 Demirel had won against Bilgiç in the Second General Congress of the JP in 1964. The latter was 
the candidate of the conservative-nationalist-mukaddesatçı party elites’ intraparty coalition who 
accused Demirel for being a freemason.   
181 Plus, right wing collective activities were seen, even used, as a deterrent against the rising tide of 
the left and syndical movements. 
182 For details regarding relations between the Bilgiç group and right wing associations see for 
instance Bahri Savcı, “Bir parti içi bunalımından hükümet bunalımına…ve rejim bunalımı,” SBFD  
25 (1970): 287.  For a history and analysis of the “uneasy” relationship between the conservative-
nationalists and the “center-right,” or in this essay’s terminology “liberals,” see Yüksel Taşkın, Anti-
Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına Milliyetçi Muhafazakâr Entelijansiya (İstanbul: İetişim 
Yayınları, 2007), 79-134 
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Hence, the liberal group not only refused to comply with right-wing 
demands but also decided to counterattack. The party leadership and disciplinary 
committee decided in early 1967, for the expulsion of two parliamentarians from 
the party, who were the leading representatives of the right wing groups in the 
Assembly. Osman Turan (an ultranationalist university professor) and Osman 
Yüksel Serdengeçti (a prominent Islamist columnist) had severely criticized 
Demirel and his supporters both in newspaper columns and party’s parliamentary 
group discussions.183 Demirel’s refusal to comply with the demands was less 
because he was a staunch secularist and more because he was a political pragmatist.  
For the conservative-nationalists of the JP concrete intra-party gains took 
precedence over the symbolic and longterm gains that could be harvested through 
right wing organizations and activities. Particularly, during the mid-1960s, they had 
two major bargains to strike with Demirel to hold on to their position within the 
party: first, amnesty for convicted DP members and the restoration of their political 
rights184; and, second, administrative posts within the party and seats in the cabinet 
to have easy access to resources to distribute to their constituencies. Consequently, 
they were not willing to pull strings to find solutions to the cases of Elmalı Affair 
and the Amnesty. Neither did Bilgiç group prevent the expulsion of the leading 
right-wing parliamentarians from the JP. On the contrary, they used the 
mobilization demands as leverage against Demirel to achieve their ends, or at least 
Demirel took advantage of the situation. Consequently, while the Bilgiç group 
achieved its short-term goals (except for the restoration of political rights of the DP 
members),185 they lost the support of the ultranationalists and, most importantly for 
the purposes of the chapter, the Islamist elites, who then proceeded with their own 
party building activities.  
                                                            
183 Regarding the struggle within the JP see for instance, Serdengeçti, “Bizim Suçumuz -haysiyet 
divanına verilişimiz dolayısıyla- -iv-,” Yeni İstanbul, September 29, 1966, Serdengeçti, “Hodri 
Meydan!,” Yeni İstanbul, December 9, 1966, Ali Fuat Başgil and Osman Turan, “Osman Yüksel 
Bey Haysiyet Divanında!,” Yeni İstanbul, December 26, 1966.  The party expelled Serdengeçti in 
early January 1967 and Turan in June 1967. 
184 If pardoned the ex-DP leaders could enter the JP and challenge the liberals. Thus the latter was 
unwilling to include the “crimes” of the ex-DP leaders in the Amnesty. Most important, however, 
the JP liberals might have sought to keep cordial relations with the military who still exerted a 
degree of influence over the executive. For the “double discourse” of the JP elites, who both claimed 
to represent the DP legacy and civil politics and adopted policies that would satisfy the military’s 
wishes see Cizre, AP-Ordu İlişkileri. 
185 Before their expulsion, Süleyman Demirel had already won a victory in the JP’s Third General 
Congress (November 27-29, 1966) in the face of a long campaign against his group. The 
conservative nationalists in turn had acquired seats in the central party administration. 
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3.2.2 The JP’s Intraparty Structure 
The continuing influence of the JP’s liberal branch, which frustrated 
Islamist elites and thereby triggered the process of party formation, lay primarily in 
the JP’s organizational structure. The 1965 Law of Political Parties and clientelistic 
relations underlined the structural basis of the party, which overpowered the party’s 
central administration and the local executives at the expense of party members and 
parliamentary group. While the relationship between the local executives and the 
party center was one of mutual dependence, those in the party center had the upper 
hand since they controlled the distribution of central state resources in return for 
loyalty. This structure, with its opportunities and constraints, limited expressions of 
dissent within the JP and prevented the right wing to influence the party from 
within through mobilization. 186  In other words, it contributed to the failure of two 
major collective actions.  
The Political Party Law of 1965 established the rules of intra-party 
competition for local and national administrative seats of the party.187 Accordingly, 
local party offices were filled by a two-stage electoral competition. Members of the 
party could not cast their votes directly for the election of local executives. In 
subdistricts (ocak and bucak) and city neighborhoods (mahalle), the party members 
elected the delegates (two or three depending on the size of the district) who would 
represent them in subprovincial (ilçe) congresses. The latter then elected the 
members of the subprovincial administration and the delegates who would 
represent the subprovinces in the provincial (il) congress.188 The provincial 
congress would in turn elect Provincial Administration189 and the delegates (which 
automatically included the former) to the General Congress where the leader and 
the Central Executive Committee members were determined.  
                                                            
186 While this structure was not specific to the JP, the fact it was an incumbent party controlling the 
state resources, seem to have amplified its effects. 
187 This section is based on the text of the Law and the interviews with party delegates. See also 
Sabri Sayarı, “Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey,” The Middle East Journal 30 (1976): 187-
199. 
188 The subprovincial executives were automatically sent as delegates to the provincial congress. 
189 İl Yönetimi. In this essay the terms “local executives” and “local administration” are used 
interchangeably to refer to provincial and subprovincial administrations, including the central 
district. 
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Within the JP, this procedure, which forced the members of the party to 
“delegate” their intraparty electoral preferences, at the absence of accountability, 
quickly degenerated into a system based on clientelistic relations,190 where the 
delegates were almost predetermined by local party administrators (usually local 
founders of the party with ties to the DP period) and also by parliamentarians who 
had strong local roots and/or clienteles.  
Candidates to local party administration in subprovincial and provincial 
levels, who had been either the local founding members of the party or their friends 
from the DP period, established alliances with respected, influential or well-off 
members of the neighborhoods. Under the close scrutiny of the party executives191, 
these influential members of local communities would mobilize resources for their 
own election as delegates and then vote for the party executives and the 
parliamentary candidates presented by them. In return for their time, money, loyalty 
to fellow group members and vote, the delegates would acquire different forms of 
patronage. At best, they could acquire seats in the subprovincial municipal 
councils192 or at least, when needed, have access to social, economic, bureaucratic 
and political resources through the local administrators they had helped get elected.  
Having been elected, the local administrators would primarily work as 
brokers between the capital and the constituencies. The citizens and party members 
would have demands ranging from such personal affairs as finding a hospital bed or 
a bank credit to public needs such as bridges, roads, water, etc. The local party 
elites took great care to deal with these requests personally and prevented the 
“petitioners” to go to Ankara. There were at least three reasons: 1) to strengthen 
their individual position within the party branch, 2) to consolidate and increase 
local organization’s power as whole, which would help to strengthen it vis-à-vis the 
                                                            
190 As Güneş-Ayata puts it the patronage relations are rather complex. They are neither based on 
simple exchanges nor totally materialistic. See Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, “Roots and Trends of 
Clientelism in Turkey,” in Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society, ed. Luis Roniger and Ayşe 
Güneş-Ayata ( London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 60-61.    
191 The local executives would often be present during the election procedure. Telephone interviews 
with KayJP6,  Kayseri, March 17, 2009; KayJP10, Kayseri, March 18, 2009. 
192 The local executives were very careful in determining the candidates to municipal councils. They 
tried to have candidates  (selected among the party delegates) representing each neighborhood. “The 
decision of the [local executive committee] served as a filter.” Interview with KayJP12, Ankara, 24 
July 2006.  
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parliamentarians and the central party administration, 3) to be able to eliminate 
those wishes who come from non-partisans and non-voters. 193 
In return for their “services,” they were nominated and elected to municipal 
and city councils. For instance, in Kayseri and Konya during the 1960s, the party 
administrators and the JP’s representatives (which constituted the majority) in the 
municipal and city assemblies almost overlapped. Most would also serve in the 
executive committee and the assembly of the local Chamber of Commerce or 
Industry. A seat in a local party administration brought also additional prestige: 
through a political career, a well off but ordinary trader from local elites would be 
known and respected by many whom they had helped. Moreover they became part 
of the state protocol and their opinion and friendship mattered in all city affairs. 
Finally, those with a university education might hope for a seat in the parliament or 
the senate.  
Local elites’ dependence on the party administration for access to resources 
they themselves used and redistributed rendered them politically vulnerable and 
thus reluctant to express dissent. In other words, even though they enjoyed a certain 
degree of autonomy thanks to their control of resources at the local, this autonomy 
went hand in hand with dependency, until and when the two clashed. A conflict 
with the central administration (i.e. an “undesirable” parliamentarian sent to Ankara 
or protesting party decisions) would slow down the distribution of patronage, which 
would in turn cost local executives lose their seats. In Kayseri, the Bilgiç 
sympathizers lost their position through democratic means as they failed to 
redistribute resources efficiently.194 As a local executive who lost his position put 
it, “the Demirel faction showed that we had not accomplished anything. They said 
that Demirel did not support [this local administration].”195 In Konya, unlike 
Kayseri, the dominant faction among the local executives were not merely 
                                                            
193 Face to face and telephone interviews with JP local executives in Kayseri, August 2006-January 
2009. The latter was expressed explicitly only by one of the interviewees, who served long time as 
the local chair of the central district branch. For instance, if a village came with a public demand 
such as road or water supply system, he would check his records and if the village had not voted for 
the JP, he would simply tell them to come after the elections. Interview with KayJP8, Kayseri, 
September 30, 2006. 
194 They lost the intraparty elections first in 1968 in the Central District Administration and then in 
1973 in the Provincial Administration. A JP local executive who had lost his place to Demirel 
supporters admitted that as an administration they were unable to satisfy the requests of the party 
members. Telephone interview with KayJP10, January 31, 2009.   
195 Telephone interview with KayJP10, Kayseri, March 18, 2009. 
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sympathizers of the Bilgiç group but also enjoyed direct clientelistic ties with their 
strongest members. At least five out of nine JP parliamentarians from Konya were 
from the conservative group and three were cabinet members: Faruk Sükan, the 
powerful minister of interior, Hasan Dinçer, the minister of justice and Bahri 
Dağdaş, the minister of agriculture. Consequently, though under immense pressure 
they were able to protect their seats longer than their peers in Kayseri.196 In 
December 1970, they would quit the JP to join Faruk Sükan and Saadettin Bilgiç’s 
Demokratik Party. Operating under these circumstances and trying to remain in 
harmony with the balances of power at the party center, the local executives and 
leaders thus neither enthusiastically supported right-wing demands nor later 
followed the Islamist party entrepreneurs.197 
Parliamentarians, on the other hand, were in general dependent on local 
branches for reelection if they had not been put on the party ticket due to the party 
center’s quota.198 Both during the primaries and elections the parliamentarians 
needed the help of the local executives and their delegates. Since there would be 
very high numbers of candidates in the primaries, only those who can afford the 
time, money and the support of the local administration could enter the race, let 
alone the Assembly. Moreover, in the primaries, for easy access to resources, the 
local executives elected those parliamentarians who could potentially enter the 
cabinet or at least establish strong connections with the party leaders. For the 
parliamentarians, being well connected and influential at the capital meant less time 
spent in the electoral district. They took care of the affairs in Ankara but it was the 
local administrators who had face-to-face contact with the citizens, members and 
delegates, which further strengthened them vis-à-vis the parliamentarians. As a 
                                                            
196 For instance, a dispute over the intraparty elections for the central district administration 
continued from 1968 to 1969. Following the elections the Bilgiç supporters rejected the result, 
which had brought the Demirel faction to power.  While the liberals at the party center were 
reluctant to annul the elections, at the end they conceded, as they wanted to have a truce with the 
conservative-nationalist leaders before the general elections of 1969. See Yeni Meram, November 
13, 1968; April 4, 1969; June 28 and 30, 1969; July 29-30, 1969.  
197 As shall be seen in studying the NSM’s party building activities in the periphery, the JP’s 
intraparty structure had consequences for the NOP recruitment patterns as well; while the NOP 
would fail to attract executives and delegates of the local JP organizations who had vested interests 
in the party. Only a couple of JP executives, and not necessarily from the right-wing faction, would 
help the NSM during its early stages, and only behind the scenes at that. The NSM leaders would 
find its potential pool of recruits among people who could/did not have integrated into the JP.  
198 The researcher could not establish the exact nature of the JP quota. 
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matter of fact, the local executives would keep a record of parliamentarians’ 
performance in Ankara and of their attitudes toward the local organization.199  
Consequently, only those parliamentarians who had strong connections with 
influential members and families of the subdistricts and neighborhoods, long 
history and enough social, economic and political capital to distribute could launch 
an effective struggle against the party leadership, or independently legislate without 
risking their political career. At any rate, even locally well rooted parliamentarians 
could not disregard the balances of power between the liberals and conservative-
nationalists. Consequently, similar to local party administrators, in fact, following 
their lead, the parliamentarians refrained from acting upon right-wing policy 
demands and did not support Erbakan against Demirel’s government. 
3.3 The emergence of Islamist party entrepreneurs200  
For the mukaddesatçıs the failure of right-wing activisms, the expulsion of 
two of the leading opponents of Demirel from the JP and the reelection of liberals 
in party offices in the party congress revealed the power distribution within the JP 
and their respective vulnerability. Demirel group demonstrated that it could 
successfully influence legislation in the parliament and even decrease the support 
his main rival, Bilgiç, could garner in the parliament and party organization.  
The realization that Demirel was hard to defeat or to influence through an 
intra-party struggle supported by collective actions and the absence of eligible party 
alternatives led the Islamist elites to party building activities.201 By 1967, the 
Islamist leaders engaged in a series of political activities, which would culminate in 
the establishment of the NOP in 1970. As shall be seen, neither the Naqshbandi 
                                                            
199 IGS: Would the parliamentarians do whatever you wanted from them as local executives? The 
interviewee: Not always, but then we would not forget [if] that [happened]…We would take a note 
of it (Bir kenara yazılır). Interview with KayJP11, Kayseri, October 1, 2007. 
200 The term “entrepreneur” though borrowed from the disciplines of finance and economy do not 
emphasis rationality of the political actors in this study. This term will be used interchangeably with 
“innovator” and “initiator.” It helps to single out those political actors who first elaborated and 
developed the idea of the new political party and/or acted upon this idea, sometimes undertaking a 
certain risk (financial, social or political), to actually form and organize a party. Thus, they were not 
merely elites of the party, including those who have entered the party later or official founders, 
entailing those who have been invited by the party entrepreneurs to strengthen the new enterprise.  
201 As shall be seen, the same observation led Yeni Asya and the Süleymancıs, who were mainly 
interested to protect their movement’s grassroots institutions and proselytizing activities from state 
encroachments however means possible, to approach and establish ties with Demirel’s group.   
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Sheiks were among the party entrepreneurs, nor Risale-i Nur students as a whole 
opposed the new party initiative. As a matter of fact, while some leaders and elites 
of the Anatolian Risale-i Nur branches were themselves among the party 
entrepreneurs, there were Naqshbandi leaders who even refused to give their votes 
to the NSM, let alone being party entrepreneurs.  
3.3.1 Pioneers and their early activities 
One would expect that, having been defeated at the hands of the liberal 
group and “sold out” by their conservative-nationalist allies in the JP, the Islamists 
join one of the minor right wing parties. However, the Islamist elites, though they 
considered this option as well202, opted to work towards “a brand new” political 
party. 
 There were at least two factors, which alienated them from the minor 
parties. First, the RPNP and NTP had joined a coalition with the right wing’s 
archenemy Republican People’s Party right after the coup of 1960. Moreover, the 
RPNP was conquered by Alparslan Türkeş203, who was at the time still considered 
“suspicious” because of his role in the coup of 1960. Second, they were considered 
as “şahıs partisi,” a term, which refers to a party established around the persona 
and connections of the party leader. The fact that their party programs and frames, 
except the newly developing ultranationalist discourse of the RPNP under the 
leadership of Alparslan Türkeş, were not fundamentally different from the JP 
reinforced the Islamist conviction that these parties were mere instruments for 
political ambitions of their leaders. As such they were seen as a) incapable of 
accommodating a dava that could have attracted activists and voters and b) unstable 
as a result of their leaders’ erratic choices: while the leader of the NP resigned 
several times, the chairman of the NTP had quite a few attempts to resign.  
The establishment of a new party would not only brought organizational 
power to the Islamists but also through institutionalization enable them to 
distinguish their developing political identity and to put forward their demands and 
interests with clearer lines from the existing right wing forces. Specifically, as 
                                                            
202 Interviews with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006; Süleyman Arif Emre, January 30, 
2007 
203 As a result the leader of the RPNP, Osman Bölükbaşı, established the NP. 
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Boltanski argues institutionalization, or “objectification” of a social group in a 
juridical entity and that of the juridical entity in an institutional apparatus brings 
two major benefits to the incipient collective actor: first, institutionalization 
consolidates its existence and thus renders it both “stronger and lasting” than the 
aggregation of the actors who claim to represent and sustain it. Second, identity 
formation and framing 204 that accompanies institutionalization gives the 
collectivity a certain “structural stability.” The latter helps the collective actor to 
resist the blurring of its boundaries within its (social and political) environment and 
the tension that arises from its internal heterogeneity.205 
Consequently, as early as January 2, 1967 in the daily Yeni İstanbul, where 
Serdengeçti had a column, a news item appeared which denied the allegations that 
parliamentarians from various right wing parties were going to establish a new 
party, suggesting exactly that there were such attempts.206 A few days later, 
probably reflecting the JP rulers’ discontent by such activities as well, Serdengeçti, 
a prominent columnist and a JP parliamentarian was banished from the party. On 
June 6, the latter hinted for the first time the emergence of a new party in his 
column. A day before Osman Turan had tabled a motion of censure against the 
government, a move that sealed his fate and gave further impetus to party 
innovation. On June 8, Serdengeçti proposed three names for the new party: the 
National Movement Party, True Path Party and Democrat Party.207 He complained 
that the word Islam could not be used for legal reasons. By July he was comparing 
and contrasting the prospective party with the existing ones deploying metaphors 
alluding to the “religiousness” of the new party.208  
                                                            
204 Boltanski uses the expression “stylizing the group properties.”  
205 Luc Boltanski, Les Cadres: La Formation d’Un Group Social (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 
1982), 235-236. 
206 “Yeni Parti Icin Vakit Erken,” Yeni İstanbul, January 2, 1967.    
207 Milli Hareket Partisi, Doğruyol Partisi, Demokrat Partisi. “Yeni Parti Hakkında” Osman Yüksel 
Serdengeçti, Yeni İstanbul, June 8, 1967. These names were later adopted by future right wing 
political parties with slight changes. Earliest example is Republican Peasant Nation Party (the 
RPNP) of Türkeş which acquired the name Nationalist Action Party during their general congress of 
February 1969.  Ironically enough, it seems the term “National Order” adopted by the Islamists as 
their party name was used for the first time at the same congress by Mustafa Özdağ.  “CKMP’nin 
Yeni Adı: Milli Hareket, Başkanı: Türkeş” Yeni İstanbul, February 10, 1969. 
208 “Parti liderleri” Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, Yeni İstanbul, July  9, 1967.  
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Some of the interviewees were witnesses to the “open-secret” meetings 
where the new party was planned.209As one of the founders of the NOP, Süleyman 
Arif Emre, who was then the Deputy President of the NTP and a parliamentarian, 
narrate, their initiative started when with a group of his friends, including 
Serdengeçti, they requested from Professor Ali Fuat Başgil, to initiate and lead their 
movement. It should be noted that the Risale-i Nur elites Ahmet İhsan Genç and 
Hacı Tevfik Paksu were also involved and had also been actively lobbying for the 
establishment of a new party.210  When Başgil died soon after that meeting,211 they 
went to Professor Osman Turan with the same demand. Osman Turan proved to be 
“too intellectual” to lead a new political organization. He was taking it so slowly 
that as a result of the protests of his comrades he resigned from the role of the 
leader.212 Finally, having listened to his speeches in various mukaddesatçı-
nationalist gatherings, following his activities in the TOBB, and thanks to his 
impressive CV, the party entrepreneurs proposed that Erbakan lead the activities for 
the establishment of a new party. 
Necmettin Erbakan was a young professor of mechanical engineering, 
partner to a small motor manufacturing company and finally a pious disciple of the 
revered Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku. He did not have a previous 
experience in formal party politics. However; first, as the head of the industry 
department and then the general secretary of the TOBB, he had acquired the 
necessary skills as an outspoken critique of government policies with regard to the 
allocation of resources.213  
                                                            
209 Interviews with Hasan Aksay, November 22, 2006, Süleyman Arif Emre, January 30, 2007, 
Muzaffer Deligöz, July 24, 2007. Some younger interviewees (mostly engineers) witnessed TOBB 
Affair episodes of these meetings. Interviews with Tevfik Rıza Çavusoğlu, August 23, 2006, Turhan 
Utku, November 8, 2006.  Tevfik Rıza Çavuşoğlu would be become one of the founders and the first 
chairman (and the last) of the Akıncı Association and Turhan Utku would enter the Assembly as 
Çorum deputy in 1973.    
210 Reportedly, non-Yeni Asya Nur student members of Armutçuoğlu family provided the initial 
finances for the establishment of the NOP. Interview with Muzaffer Deligöz, July 24, 2007. 
211 The date of his death help to establish the chronology further: April 17, 1967. Feroz Ahmad and 
Bedia Turgay, Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971) (İstanbul: 
Bilgi Yayınları, 1976), 327.  
212 Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007. It should be added that it seems 
Osman Turan was not willing to lead such a movement as he was leaning more on the 
ultranationalist circles. As a matter of fact, he would later join the NAP of Alparslan Türkeş. 
213 As mentioned in the introduction, together with the government, the TOBB undertook the 
distribution of credits and assigned the foreign exchange quotas, to various sectors of commerce and 
industry.  
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On various occasions he was invited to conservative-nationalist activities214 
where he claimed that the large businesses of İstanbul and İzmir were favored at the 
expense of Anatolian small to medium enterprises and got most of the foreign 
credits, bank credits and investments. At the time he was approached by the party 
innovators, as the general secretary of the Union, he was struggling for the 
implementation of his policy proposals. He accepted the responsibility of leading 
the new party, reportedly, following a brief consideration with his spiritual mentor, 
the powerful Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku and getting his full 
support.215  
At first, the gatherings among the members of the parliament and the senate 
from the right-wing parties, some Risale-i Nur student branches in Anatolia216 and 
some civil servants217 and engineers (usually owners of civil engineering and 
building contracting companies) were loosely connected. In other words, the idea of 
a new party matured first within small groups of close friends (strong ties), which 
were connected to and communicated with each other through acquaintances and 
colleagues (weak ties) from various right wing organizations and activities.218  
The Islamist parliamentarians had already established close friendships with 
each other since the early 1960s, even the 1950s. They increased their contact with 
                                                            
214 For instance, in August 1967, he was invited for an upcoming event of the right wing 
organizations in Bursa alongside such nationalist university professors as Faruk Kadri Timurtaş and 
Tahsin Banguoğlu. “Milliyetçiler Toplantısı Hazırlıkları İlerliyor, ” Yeni İstanbul, August 9, 1967  
215 Interviews with various national level NSM entrepreneurs and activists. It should be noted that 
this story is told in a different tone by the NSM-Nur elites. In their accounts they emphasis that 
Erbakan would not even engage in party building activities or accept leadership if the Sheikh did not 
give his tacit approval. Such a perspective seems to reflect their attempts to overcome the dominant 
account of the NOP’s foundation, which overemphasize Erbakan’s role and overshadows those of 
the Nur elites (Oğuzhan Asiltürk also says that Erbakan would backdown. But as shall be seen, his 
motivation seems to be different from those of the Nur students).  
216 These were some of the groups formed around some “Ağabey”s (leading Nur students) in some 
Anatolian towns. Among them best known group was the followers of Hüsrev Altınbaşak (Üstad-ı 
Sani-the Second Master). They were called Yazıcılar (the Scribes) as they insisted that the Risale-i 
Nur needed to be written by hand and then distributed.  These groups will be studied in detail in the 
next subsection in comparison to Yeni Asya which supported the JP. 
217 These civil servants who had made public their piousness were called pejoratively takunyacılar 
(clog-wearers) in the press as they were imagined wearing clogs during ablution. An interviewee 
who also worked as a civil servant during the 1970s told me he never wore clogs, but flip-flops!  
218 While there is still an ongoing debate among the scholars regarding the relative role and 
effectiveness of the strong and weak ties for mobilization process, it seems the mobilization of the 
Islamist elites for a new party reflects the observation of McAdam and Paulsen: “…the ultimate 
structure for a movement would be one in which dense networks of weak bridging ties linked 
numerous local groups bound together by means of strong local interpersonal bonds.” Doug 
McAdam and Ronnell Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship between Social Ties and Activism, 
American Journal of Sociology 99 (1993): 640-667. 
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the Nur students through Hacı Tevfik Paksu, a JP senator and Nur student from 
Maraş, who, with the help and encouragement of a leading Nur student of the 
period, Ahmet İhsan Genç organized meetings in an apartment rented in Ankara.219 
Most civil servants and engineers220 knew each other and Erbakan from 
their university years in İstanbul where they studied in the same engineering faculty 
of İstanbul Technical University.221 They had come close through not only the 
university life and sharing similar professional interests but also their participation 
in the religious conversations of the Naqshbandi Sheikhs Mehmet Zahit Kotku 
(İskenderpaşa community) and/or Mahmut Sami Ramazanoğlu (Erenköy 
community).222 One should also add the previously mentioned “Milli Bakkal” of 
Alpkan close to Yıldız Technical University. Finally, they met with Islamist 
parliamentarians and Nur students either through Erbakan or during the activities of 
right wing organizations. For instance, Oğuzhan Asiltürk maintains that most of the 
official and unofficial founders of the NOP had been working in various religious 
benevolent organizations established to build a Prayer Leader and Preacher School 
or a mosque.223 
The informal meetings within and among these groups quickly evolved into 
regular and formal meetings, particularly after Erbakan agreed to lead the 
movement, and the party innovators began to prepare the party program and in-
                                                            
219 A Nur elite who had engaged in party building activities says that the apartment rented for Paksu 
was specifically aimed at bringing together the elites of the various sectors of the Islamist network. 
RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008. This leader says that the main purpose of the place was to initiate 
a party for the Islamists. However, Mehmet Kutlular, one of the Three Mehmets who administered 
Yeni Asya first under the leadership of Zübeyir Gündüzalp (and Bekir Berk) and following his 
death, by themselves, says that the apartment was a Medrese-i Nuriye (see the below discussion on 
the Nur students), designed to establish strong connections and friendships (dost yapmak) between 
the right wing parliamentarians and the Risale-i Nur students. Kutlular, İşte Hayatım, 132-133. It 
was called Parlamenterler Dershanesi, or Parliamentarians’ Training Center. It should be noted that 
at the time the term dershane was recently gaining popularity as a shortened way to refer to 
Medrese-i Nuriye. 
220 For instance Cevat Ayhan, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Recai Kutan.   
221 For example, Gündüz Sevilgen, a Nur student, who joined the NSM officially during the 
establishment of the NSP was a classmate of Asiltürk, and Turhan Utku who was part of the process 
that crystallized the party entrepreneurs (he would become a parlimantarian in 1973) was a 
roommate with Cevat Ayhan. Interview with Turhan Utku, İstanbul, November 1, 2006. 
222 As shall be seen in the discussion on the Naqshbandis in the following subsection, participation 
to these conversations did not require being a Naqshbandi disciple. 
223 “Most of [these people] had previously been in various benevolent associations. [These were] 
individuals, who served the people. Some were administrators in the associations for Prayer Leader 
[and] Preacher [schools], some make the construction of mosques. These [people] are known in the 
community. There was a certain previous affinity.” Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk October 5, 
2007. Hasan Aksay and Muzaffer Deligöz have also confirmed this observation.  
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laws. Despite these preparations, the Islamist elites did not expect to compete in the 
upcoming municipal and senate elections of 1968 or the general elections of 
1969.224 It was impossible to establish the number of local branches that the law 
required in time at several places and then convene six months later the first general 
congress.225  
Such a task, above all, required that the party innovators in the 
administrative center launch a consensus and activist mobilization for this specific 
cause all over the country. Collective actions such as the “Rise-up meetings” 
(Şahlanış Mitingleri), “collective morning prayers”226 or seminars of Şule Yüksel 
Şenler inviting women to veil throughout 1968 and 1969227 (all supported by the 
most read Islamist newspaper Bugün)228  no doubt created an atmosphere and 
network conducive for the new party. However, as shall be seen in the following 
chapter, it would be the party innovators’ symbolic (ideational) production and 
recruitment efforts that would attract the potential party activists and through them 
the prospective voters. 
3.3.2 The Risale-i Nur Student involvement and non-involvement in the new 
Islamist enterprise229 
In a rare scholarly comparison on the Nur students and the NSM, a 
tautological argument as to their political engagement patterns is advanced.230 
According to this argument, the Nur students was a grassroots movement that 
prioritized changing the society over changing state institutions following the 
religious teachings of their esteemed leader. Accordingly, they had refused 
                                                            
224 Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007 and telephone interview with 
Hasan Aksay, February4, 2009. 
225 Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007; “Yeni Parti Hakkında” Osman 
Yüksel Serdengeçti, Yeni İstanbul, June 8, 1967. 
226 For a photograph from one of the largest collective morning prayers see Appendix G, Figure 6. 
227 Şenler organized conferences in December 1967 as well. She would be imprisoned for insulting 
the President of Republic in 1971. For the photo of a conference in 1969 in İstanbul at the MTTB, 
see Appendix G, Figure 7. 
228 It should be noted although most interviewees were avid readers of Bugün, most did not 
appreciate and thus participate to the collective morning prayers, thinking that they were too 
provocative. 
229 This subsection is based on the interviews with the elites and activists of the Yeni Asya and non-
Yeni Asya Nur student branches and publications. 
230 Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity. See also Kuru and Kuru, "Apolitical Interpretation of 
Islam.”  
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engaging in active politics, satisfying themselves with lobbying activities and 
supporting the right wing parties through their votes. This claim, which takes 
ideational elements as a departing point, is problematic on two grounds.  
First, it does not explain why different Nur movement branches, that 
increasingly grew autonomous, and organized separately diverged in interpreting 
the same teachings in the post-1960 period. While the Yeni Asya elites chose to 
stick with the JP despite the failure of right wing mobilizations and consecutive law 
suits against the Nur students in general, the elites of some Nur Students branches 
in Anatolia directly or indirectly took part in the new Islamist party enterprise. 
There are only vague references to intra-Risale-i Nur Student power struggles to 
explain the differences, which implies that the pro-NSM Risale-i Nur Students 
misinterpreted the teachings as a reaction to rising prominence of their Yeni Asya 
counterparts. Second, this approach ignores the fact that although the Yeni Asya’s 
primary area of movement activity was right wing grassroots, they actively took 
part in electoral politics and in public discussions over a number of issues. Its local 
elites and activists did not simply vote or influenced others to vote for the JP. They 
actively worked in the JP local chapters231 and joined in electoral efforts both as 
candidates to offices and as party activists. 
Consequently following questions need to be answered. Why Yeni Asya 
members did not join the coalition that made up the NOP, the first party of the 
NSM and instead engaged in institutional politics through the JP? That is, why 
Yeni Asya supported and actively worked for the center-right Justice Party (the JP, 
the party in power from 1965 to the coup of 1971) and vehemently opposed the 
NSM, particularly following its entry to the Assembly? Why did they prioritize 
spreading the “dava” by grassroots work over institutionalized politics? Finally, 
why did other elites of the Nur students choose to establish and support the NSM 
instead of joining their fellow Nur students in Yeni Asya?  
                                                            
231 They even established formal youth associations as informal JP youth chapters, first in Ankara, 
Kayseri, Adana, Trabzon, Erzurum and Gaziantep. İslam Yaşar, Serencam (İstanbul: Yeni Asya 
Neşriyat, 2000), 398-401. It was probably the youth in these associations later formed the basis of 
“Hür Genç,” the formal youth branch of the JP in the 1970s. One of the the interviewees was at the 
head of Kayseri “Hür Genç.” Interview with KayYA12, Kayseri, May 4, 2009. See also, Appendix 
G, Figure 8. 
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The establishment of the Yeni Asya’s informal hierarchical organization 
with a clear division of labor, its goal of “Islamizing” the society not the state 
institutions, its opposition to the NSM and alliance with the JP’s liberal clique, and 
political positions over a range of issues throughout the 1960s and 1970s stemmed 
from three interrelated needs: a) the need to recreate and sustain “total institution” 
character of its core institution, the Medrese-i  Nuriye,  that had appeared in the 
1950s amidst their religious network and reproduced new ones in the periphery b) 
to ensure the continuity of movement’s grassroots activities which sustained the 
total institutions in tangible and intangible ways c) to avoid alienating the JP’s large 
electoral base which provided a pool of social, economic and political resources. 
The informal organization of Yeni Asya was, thus, not primarily a strategic 
response to the existing political opportunities and constraints of the 1960s. It was 
rather guided by the consequences and imperatives of a previously established 
organization model that had been formed within the inner circle of a network of 
devotees of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi during the previous repressive periods.232  
Common institutional and ideational roots of the Risale-i Nur Students 
Emergence and informal organization 
To begin with, the basics of the Nur students’ organization, that is its three 
layered federated networks,233 had emerged during the repressive regime of the 
single party period and enlarged during the relative liberalization of the 1950s. 
Following the Şeyh Said Rebellion in 1925 in Kurdish regions, the single party 
regime had accused and suspected Said Nursi234 harboring anti-regime and Kurdish 
                                                            
232 It should be emphasized that the total institution here refers to one particular group in the inner 
circle of the Risale-i Nur movement , who would later undertake the organization of the Yeni Asya 
movement. However, this inner group succeeded establishing new Medreses that is total institutions 
for new recruits who entered the first cycle as well. 
233 This description is advanced by Ziad Munson who also observes a similar movement structure in 
studying the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. “Islamic mobilization,” 500. 
234 He was also known as Said Kurdi. He was born in Bitlis in 1873 and was a graduate of religious 
medreses in the Kurdistan region under the Ottoman Empire. During the late 19th century, he 
attended classes of the leading religious scholars of the time and mastered Islamic disciplines at a 
very young age. During the early 20th century, apart from being a prolific writer and a talented 
debater which earned him the name Bediüzzaman (the Wonder of the Time), he had an active and 
adventurous life ranging from demanding the establishment of a university in the East from the 
Sultan (that ended him in a mental hospital to pay for his boldness) to supporting the 1908 
Constitutional Revolution as a reformist Islamist and from being captured by the Russian army in 
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Nationalist activities and ideas and exiled him to Burdur235, a small town in the 
West of Turkey where he established his first circle of followers and wrote the first 
epistle of the Risale-i Nur corpus: Nurun İlk Kapısı (The First Door of the Light). 
Thus began the Risale-i Nur movement’s’ emergence as a peculiar religious 
medrese, or a school of religious education.  Gradually, this “school” would turn 
into a grassroots Islamist movement with “a three-tiered membership” federated 
structure236. 
The secular reforms and modernization policies of the state that ban 
traditional local institutions of religious education and activity had effectively 
pushed the medrese and tarikat (brotherhood) activity, at least in the West of 
Turkey, to underground and even inactivity. While the former provided classical 
education in Islamic disciplines, the latter trained individuals in spiritual 
development (Islamic mysticism). The ban on medrese, was a direct challenge to 
religion in and off itself. Moreover, since it objectively created an environment that 
was conducive for questioning some basic religious behavior, if not the beliefs, it 
posed an indirect challenge as well. The ban on tarikats, in return, shut all access to 
religious authorities and a popular pass time activity of religious conversations. As 
such, an institution that could serve as an outlet to cease all sorts of anxieties 
emerging in the face of secular encroachment was lost.  
Religious exchange through letters between Said Nursi and his circle of 
growing followers thus served to fill the lacuna that these banned institutions left. 
These communications would lead Said Nursi to write his epistles, and both the 
communications and the epistles (until the mid-1950s) would be reproduced 
through handwriting and, later mimeographed, to be disseminated within the circle 
and to potential members of the circle. Said Nursi rejected the above-mentioned 
traditional avenues of religious exchange, not only because he saw a need for a new 
type of religious activity but also mostly because up until the late 1940s, he was 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1916 during the First World War to opposing the Sultan and taking sides with the Ankara 
government during the War of Independence. His active political life came to an end by the 
establishment of the new republic, the subsequent secular reforms and increasing Turkish 
nationalism. Accused and suspected by the ruling elites by anti-regime and Kurdish Nationalist 
activism he was exiled to Burdur, a small town in the West of Turkey where he established his first 
circle of followers and wrote the first epistle of the Risale-i Nur  corpus: Nurun İlk Kapısı (The First 
Door of the Light). 
235 This, despite the fact that the Court had acquitted him. 
236 Ibid. 
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under constant pressure and surveillance unable to bring physically together his 
followers under one roof to carry out some underground tarikat or medrese activity. 
While the ensuing network of written communication was as a whole called 
Medrese-i Nuriye (Medrese of Lights, in its shortened name Medrese), especially 
by the 1950s when Said Nursi for the first time began living and working together 
with his students under the same roof, and the leaders of the local branches opened 
houses where students can live and study together, the term began to specifically 
refer to these places (houses or apartments) where the Nur student activities took 
place.237  
Specifically, from the late 1920s through the 1960s, the continuous state 
repression that exiled Said Nursi to different towns (Barla, Kastamonu, Emirdağ) 
led to the emergence of separate circles communicating Risale-i Nur writings, 
which came to be connected and bonded through not only material and symbolic 
exchange of letters but also shared prison terms. Said Nursi either sent his students 
to different regions of the country to establish new networks or received students 
from elsewhere who would later go back to establish their circles. Since the 
reproduction and dissemination of the Risale-i Nur corpus needed to be carried out 
secretly because of state pressure, apart from the communication of new letters or 
epistles, these branches grew autonomously from each other led by a leader who 
had personal correspondence with Said Nursi. The leaders of the branches would 
personally supervise the reproduction and dissemination of the Risale-i Nur 
writings and recruitment of new members. 
Each network was comprised of mainly three layers consisting 
“talebeler”238 (the students), kardeşler (the brothers) and dostlar (the friends).239 
                                                            
237 For a study of a new religious movement formed and developed around publication (publishing, 
reading and disseminating religious books and other reading materials) in the Christian world see 
Arnaud Blanchard, Les Témoins de Jéhovah par leurs Imprimés (Yaoundé: Presses de l’UCAC, 
2008). Other forms of social networks can also emerge as a result of publication and dissemination 
of religious publications. For instance, the dissemination of religious books through specialized 
bookstores helped the formation of Muslim networks and a Muslim public space in certain Parisian 
neighbourhoods by the 1980s. Soraya El Alaoui, Les réseaux du Livre Islamique: Parcours 
Parisiens (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2006). 
238 Talebeler was also a generic term for all who were reading, helping to the writing/reproducing 
and disseminating the Risale-i Nur corpus. Incidentally, the layers of the Muslim Brotherhood are 
called (unlike this study Munson starts with the outer layer and calls it the first layer): the assistants, 
related and active. Since the Brotherhood is a formal organization, the assistants are regular due 
paying cardholder members.   
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The first, inner, layer (talebeler) included those who devoted majority of their 
resources, time, money, labour, even their lives in movement activities, particularly 
the publication and dissemination of the Risale-i Nur corpus. The second layer 
included first, regular readers of the Risale-i Nur, who participated in weekly 
Risale-i Nur studying sessions but contributed to the movement mainly financially; 
and second new initiates to the movement who might or might not move into the 
first layer. The final group constituted religious members of the local community or 
national political elites, who occasionally read the Risale-i Nur  and supported the 
activities of the Nur students. The non-members who were hostile to the activities 
of the Nur students were divided into two: the “menfi” (negative), mostly 
secularists and the münafık (hypocrites), the religious opponents of the movement. 
As far as the present discussion is concerned, the most important layer was even a 
smaller inner core group within the talebeler (the first layer), with direct and 
regular relations with Said Nursi. They were called has talebeler (royal students, 
among them also Varisler, or Said Nursi’s designated inheritors of his legacy, 
including the publication of the epistles240). They constituted the leaders or 
prominent members of the local branches and/or those who were in Said Nursi’s 
personal service. They were called “Ağabeyler,” or elders.  
The three-layered structure of the movement was essentially a result of 
close state surveillance. Through differentiating the degree of devotion among the 
members and creating very strong bonds in the inner circle they would impede state 
intrusions.241  Later, this structure acquired a second function as the activists; 
particularly the first circle experienced growing ideational and, for some, physical 
rupture from the rest of the Muslim population. The layers served as compression 
chambers for the initiates to the movement, who would incrementally go into the 
depths of the Risale-i Nur teachings, which as shall be seen bordered heterodoxy 
                                                                                                                                                                     
239 It should be noted that Mardin denies the existence of these layers referring to Dumont’s work. 
Dumont, though confuses the layers and their respective names and attributes and mistakenly 
assumes the existence of certain “rites,” gives a basic idea on how the layers function as a 
hierarchical system. He himself relies on a work in German. Ursula Spuler, “Zur 
Organisationsstruktur der Nurculuk-Bewegung,” in Studien zur Gescgichte und Kultur des vorderen 
Orients, ed. Hans R. Roemer and Albrecht Noth (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1981), 423-442, quoted in 
Dumont, 243-246.  
240 Said Nursi, however, also emphasized several times that the Epistles were “public good,” that is 
Umumun Malı. As such, over the years numerous Risale-i Nur movements published the epistles, 
even those who had not been originally counted among the “inheritors.”  
241 Not only Said Nursi and his students wanted to ensure the continuity of their activities but also 
believed that the state was trying to poison Said Nursi. 
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for ordinary pious Muslims and even other Islamists, and have to shoulder more 
pressure from outside and responsibility inside as activists at each layer. Munson 
also provides a similar explanation for the function of these layers saying that the 
layers helped the Muslim Brotherhood to cope with and recruit individuals with 
“variety of different beliefs and levels of motivation for collective action.”242 To 
this it should be added that these also enabled the members of the first and second 
layers to both acclimatize to the outer society, and “leave” the movement smoothly 
all the while remaining within the Nur circles.   
Ideational institutionalization as a “new religious movement” 
Stark and Bainbridge defines religious movements as “social movements 
that wish to cause or prevent change in a system of beliefs, values, symbols and 
practices concerned with providing supernaturally-based general compensators.”243 
The new religious movements in turn are understood as unconventional religious 
movements, which may or may not be born within an established religious tradition 
and community. Those which are off-springs of an established religion, would 
provide heterodox interpretations, which would gradually either dominate the 
religious market or become marginalized.  
Not only the above mentioned activities but the ideational properties of the 
Nur students attest that it was a new religious movement, with distinct 
interpretations and beliefs, produced through the writings of the Said Nursi and the 
letters of his students.244 First of all, the Risale-i Nur corpus focused on faith based 
articles of the Koran not only because, under the circumstances, it was the safest 
thing to do so245, but also because, as Şerif Mardin emphasizes it throughout his 
work, it helped the Nur students to deal with their rapidly secularizing 
environment.246 
                                                            
242 Munson, “Islamic Mobilization,” 499-500. 
243 Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge,  "Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Prelimanry 
Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 18 
(1979): 124. 
244 In fact at the time for non-movement Muslims this interpretation and accompanying behavior 
almost bordered heterodoxy.  
245 Unlike medrese and tarikat activities, talking and writing about the basics of faith was not 
considered a crime, at least in theory.  
246 Mardin, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi Olayı. 
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However, the interpretation of the faith based articles constituted only a 
part, albeit an important one, of the Nur students’ ideational features.  A close 
reading of the letters and writings accumulated in the major volumes of the Risale-i 
Nur  corpus and the memoirs of the Nur students attests to self-replicating 
ideational regime and activity and an exclusive identity. The corpus included not 
only an interpretation of certain articles of the Kuran but also the accounts of Said 
Nursi’s life, the Nur Student activities and the movement’s relations with the state 
forces.  Said Nursi and his students believed that to become and remain faithful 
Muslims, these epistles should be written, read and disseminated repeatedly. In fact, 
the movement members, especially, those in the second and inner circles refused to 
read or rarely read (only those who were in a religious profession) religious 
interpretations or materials, not to mention secular newspapers or books, other than 
the Risale-i Nur.  
Since the writings that the students read, wrote, studied and disseminated 
covered the stories and letters of the Nur students themselves, the implication was 
that to acquire and protect the faith as a Muslim, one had to read not only the 
Kuranic interpretations of Said Nursi but also his life and the movements’ struggles 
with the state. Moreover, a good Muslim with true faith had to do his best to 
disseminate these writings or at least avoid putting obstacles on their way. Those 
who opposed the Risale-i Nur writings, or who were simply uninterested were 
nominal Muslims at best, and münafik (hypocrite) at worst. As it is apparent, being 
a (real) Muslim was closely associated, even identified with being a Risale-i Nur 
student, especially among the members of the first circle. 
A second implication or related development was that the practices of 
reading and writing passages from the corpus and their dissemination, in fact any 
activity related to the movement, including personal service to Said Nursi came to 
be seen as an act worship, or religious service (ibadet).  The Students argued that 
the Risale-i Nur  was an interpretation of the Koranic articles and hence when they 
served the epistles they actually served the Koran. Reading passages from the 
epistles or other practices were thus ibadet by proxy. However, the fact that the 
Risale-i Nur  overwhelmingly contained the activities of the movement members 
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themselves,247 referring to Risale related practices as ibadet and equating them with 
reading the Koran blurred the boundaries between the sacred and the mundane and 
created a rupture between the mainstream religious community and even groups 
such as the tarikats.  
To clarify further, even in such “heterodox” spiritual groups as the tarikats, 
(at least before their transformations in the 1980s in the line of the Nur students ) 
the members attribute sacred or celestial qualities only to the religious leader not to 
themselves or their own mundane activities. Moreover, in a Naqshbandi 
brotherhood, for instance, zikr and sohbet as ibadet aim at connecting to the God 
and the religious leader is the only one who had experienced such a connection. In 
the case of the Nur movement, on the other hand, ibadet was not essentially a tool 
of the believer to connect with God. It rather became a tool of the God, since they 
believed, He worked through the Nur students and their activities to take part in the 
struggle between the secularization and its proponents (deccal248) on the one hand, 
and the religious forces on the other. 
 Any reference to a religious struggle between the deccal and the believers 
needs a comparison of the Nur movement with the Mahdist movements in the 
Muslim world. The latter wait and prepare for the coming of the Mahdi, the 
religious leader who would defeat the deccal. While the attribution of Mahdism to 
Said Nursi is still a subject of discussion within the movement, rather, it is the 
Risale-i Nur corpus, hence the movement itself that is perceived as the quintessence 
of Mahdi. The movement, therefore, annihilates the expectation of a Mahdi. Thus, 
in that sense, the Nur movement cannot be considered a continuity of the long list 
of Mahdist movements in the history of Islam (the most famous ones being in Iran 
and Sudan), which, however, also perfectly fit in the family of “new religious 
movements.”  
Be that as it may, it seems, teaching and propagating “the faith” under 
heavy state persecution enabled the Nur students to acquire an eschatological view 
                                                            
247 Only Sözler exclusively contains interpretations of the Kuran.  It should be added that the letters 
had always been downplayed, especially recently, since the movement engaged in activities over the 
internet. However, if one passed from one layer to another deep into the movement, they are more 
comfortably discussed. At any rate, those Nur Students who are further attached to the movement 
through such juxtapositions do not need them anymore, as they became leaders themselves.  
248In Christianity a parallel entity that cross the border between the physical and metaphysical 
worlds is the antichrist.    
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of history249: they drew similarities between themselves and the state elites and the 
early Muslims and the “kafirun,” thereby rendering it easier to attribute certain 
sacredness to Said Nursi and by proxy to themselves. As such even the most 
mundane activities of the Nur students (such as sleeping) were themselves sacred. 
In fact, the Nur students not only believed the epistles were written with “divine 
inspiration” to Said Nursi and but also used certain exoteric ‘tools’ in order to 
explain the “secrets” of the Koran which they believed pointed out the Risale-i Nur 
and the students’ activities by name.250 It should be added that to the extent that the 
state and its policies made part of this theology and they daily faced the direct 
power and pressure of the state the movements and activists’ actions acquired also a 
political character. 
Finally, related to the exclusivity of the practices and ideology of the 
movement was the necessity of conversion of the regular Muslims to the teachings 
of the movement.  Conversion in turn could not be achieved through public 
propaganda but through close and frequent association with the potential recruits. 
The Medrese-i Nuriyes that will be introduced below provided the perfect social 
spaces for such interaction. 
Divergent origins of the elites of the Risale-i Nur Students 
The elites of the Risale-i Nur movement, who began or continued to 
administer various Nur students branches following the death of their leader in 
1960, could be divided into two groups: those, who had lived and continued to live 
in Medrese-i Nuriye (Medrese) as a total institution, and those who had just 
administered without actually immersing in it. This essay argues that the divergent 
behavior of the Nur student leaders on the NSM enterprise was ultimately tied to 
their respective Medrese-i Nuriye background. Following is an account of the 
Medreses development within the three-layered federated structure of the Risale-i 
Nur Student  grassroot networks. 
                                                            
249 Bozarslan, Cent Mots, 115-116.  
250 These tools are called “ebced” and “cifir”, which assign numbers to the Arabic letters. Through 
intricate calculations of the numbers found in a given verse of Koran, various batıni (allegorical 
and/or anogogical) meanings can be derived. Throughout the history of Islam both, but particularly 
cifir, have been subject to controversy, rejected by the majority of the established orthodox scholars. 
Ebced, in turn, has been used for practical purposes as well, for instance in the Ottoman State to date 
official documents. 
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In the scholarly and journalistic accounts of the division between the Risale-
i Nur Students on the issue of the NSM, the emphasis is put on the “Readers” 
(Okuyucular) juxtaposed with Yeni Asya, and the “Scribes” (Yazıcılar) who are 
treated as a marginal group. The latter was the branch formed under the leadership 
of Hüsrev Altınbaşak (known also as Üstad-ı Sani, or the Second Master), in his 
early years Said Nursi’s closest follower and friend. They were called the Scribes, 
as they insisted that the Risale-i Nur needed to be written by hand in Ottoman 
Turkish and then distributed. The Readers on the other hand were those who, by the 
1950s began printing the Risale-i Nur in Latin script. Instead of writing the Risale-i 
Nur volumes as a ritual, they would just read the printed epistles in regular intervals 
individually or as a group during the day. It has been suggested that the Scribes’ 
support of the NSM was actually a reaction to their marginalization within the 
Risale-i Nur movement, which had started when Said Nursi was alive. The 
“Readers” were following the path of Said Nursi, who had publicly supported the 
DP.  
This view is problematic on two grounds. First, the leader of the Scribes, 
although administrating the largest network that could rival Yeni Asya, was not the 
only Risale-i Nur branch that contributed to the emergence of the NSM. As such, 
the analysis focusing on the dispute over “writing” versus “reading,” curtails those 
“Reader” Risale-i Nur groups and their leaders251 who either played a major role in 
the NSM establishment or supported the NAP. Second, since Yeni Asya, eventually 
conquered their networks, or established more powerful parallel networks 
throughout the 1970s, the situation of flux during the 1960s is forgotten. The 
argument that Said Nursi had also supported a mainstream party, reduces those who 
joined the party building activities to an anomaly and portrays Yeni Asya’s political 
engagement pattern as the norm for the Nur students.252  
                                                            
251Among them there were both elders who had had direct regular contact with Said Nursi and those 
who only briefly corresponded with him. Among them Said Özdemir, the leader of  an Anatolian 
branch centered in Ankara, Ahmet İhsan Genç of Antep and Maraş. Mehmet Feyzi Pamukçu and his 
networks in Kastamonu supported the NAP. 
252 For instance, though aprobably not as much worked and as much known as Bekir Berk of Yeni 
Asya, a lawyer defending Said Nursi and the Nur students all around the country from the 1950s to 
1970, Hüsamettin Akmumcu, one of the Nur student entrepreneurs of the NSM, was also very close 
to Said Nursi. In fact, Akmumcu was also granted power of attorney in all his affairs. See Appendix 
F for the notary public signed document. 
 104 
 
Following is an examination of Medrese-i Nuriye and its role in the 
divergent political attitudes of the Nur student elders and groups. 
The emergence of the Medrese-i Nuriye as a total institution253 
The process of the transformation of Medrese-i Nuriye into a physical body 
and a total institution began following the liberalization of the polity through 
multiparty politics and after the Afyon court254 acquitted both the Nur students and 
their “books” in the early 1950s. Said Nursi was now aged and tired of years of 
loneliness255 and suppression. When the state pressure was relatively lifted he 
started living with a group of his “royal students,” who not only took care of his 
personal affairs but also ensured his communication with the branches where the 
Epistles of Light were reproduced and disseminated. He urged the establishment of 
similar spaces under the supervision of the leaders from the first circle, which 
would become the movement’s contact points and basis of local activity. 
 From then on, Medrese-i Nuriye did not only refer to the “şahs-i manevi” 
(moral entity) of the movement, but also and increasingly specifically to these 
Risale-i Nur institutions. They constituted “total institutions.” Goffman defines the 
total institution as an “all encompassing” social organization and recommends the 
following definition not for “immediate analytical use” but as a guiding conceptual 
tool:256 
                                                            
253 In one of the rare and succinct scholarly discussions on the Medrese-i Nuriyes (using its modern 
name dershane) Yavuz studies only its public features. However, as shall be seen, while Medreses 
double(d) as public places, they were (and still are) private spaces for the inner layer members. M. 
Hakan Yavuz, "The Renaissance of Religious Consciousness in Turkey: Nur Study Circles," in 
Islam in Public: Turkey, Iran, and Europe, ed. Nilüfer Göle and Ludwig Ammann (İstanbul: 
İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2006), 148-151. He also makes references to Gülen movement 
dershanes. It should however be noted that it seems while the two converges on being both a total 
institution and public space, they diverge on their ideational and institutional structures. 
254 The Risale-i Nur Students and the Risale-i Nur corpus were prosecuted five times from 1935 to 
1952. The Risale-i Nur corpus was first acquitted by Denizli Court but the state prosecutors 
nevertheless started two more proceedings against Said Nursi and his followers for disseminating 
the books.  
255 Exiled from his home, he had been living away from not only his family and friends but also his 
language and people. 
256 Goffman, 5. It should be added that since the 1950s when Goffman developed the concept, 
scholars from different disciplines studied a variety of sociological subjects contributing to the 
refinement of the concept. For a review of the history of the concept see François Steudler, “Les 
institutions totales et la vie d’un concept,” in Erving Goffman et les Institutions Totales, ed. Charles 
Amourous and Alain Blanc, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001), 283-314. 
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A total institution may be defined as a place of residence 
and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut 
off from wider society for an appreciable period of time, together 
lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life. 
 In other words, the members of such an institution differ from the ordinary 
members of the modern society, who are necessarily entrenched in different 
institutions and networks and work, live and play (leisure activities) in different 
spaces. As such they came to contact and challenged with different world views. To 
be sure, not only a total institution is never totally total but also a social movement 
as a whole cannot be considered a total institution: there were circles that can be 
totalized and there are others that are left (intentionally or unintentionally) outside 
this dynamic.257 The Medrese was a total institution for its regular dwellers as long 
as they lived in it, since it exclusively absorbed individuals’ resources and in turn 
enabled them to live, work, and “play” in the same physical environment, devoting 
themselves solely to their religious activities. Moreover, it constrained the way in 
which its members had contacts with the outer society. The Medrese-i Nuriye 
members would communicate with the movement’s environment through the 
members of the two layers, who lived outside the Medreses, and within the physical 
space Medreses provided258, or when a fellow Risale-i Nur student accompanied 
them.  Finally, the contact with the extra-movement environment would involve 
only movement related issues.259  
Specifically, those who lived in Medreses, that is the prospective Yeni Asya 
entrepreneurs and those leaders, who eventually took the Yeni Asya’s side on the 
                                                            
257 Moreover, while this was not the case for the Yeni Asya group’s leaders, there are periods of 
“totalization” for certain organizations, as in the case of some armed political groups (for instance 
the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s). As Davies’ shows if “(1) the degree of openness or closeness of 
each institution, (2) the official explicit purpose of the institution though this may (deliberately or 
incidentally) be ambiguous, and (3) the dominant modes of eliciting compliance employed by the 
staff as perceived by the inmates" are taken into consideration in the study, the problems of 
definition and application of the concept that may occur in studying a case can be solved. Christie 
Davies, “Goffman's Concept of the Total Institution: Criticism and Revisions,” Human Studies 12 
(1989): 83. 
258 Potential recruits would be invited in a Medrese-i Nuriye. 
259 In an extreme case in the mid-1960s’ Yeni Asya, a young Medrese dweller and his partner, as an 
attempt to follow the advice of Zübeyir Gündüzalp, which was not to look at “display windows,” 
meaning also cars, women and cloths, decided to wear glasses covered with tissue paper. The 
experiment, which had rendered “people indistinct, like a painting,” did not work despite “their best 
efforts” as it created danger while they were carrying the books in and off the depot, etc. İbrahim 
Kaygusuz, Zübeyir Gündüzalp: Hayat-ı Mefkuresi (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 2007), 385. 
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dispute over the choice of political engagement pattern, 260 had lived commune 
lives, eaten and slept under the same roofs and invested exclusively in the 
movement at an early age. Following their entry to the Nur student networks, they 
would quit their jobs, schools, sometimes even their families (parents or wives and 
children261) and even their names.262 Until the early 1970s263, unless they had 
already been married, their marriage was frowned upon, and at times even 
forbidden by Said Nursi if it would potentially hurt the commitment of the 
particular student. In short, they endowed their lives to the reproduction, 
dissemination and reading of the Risale-i Nur corpus, hence, the name “Vakıf” 
(endowed) that came to be used for such Risale-i Nur Students. 
It was the Medrese-i Nuriye in particular and the movement in general that 
took care of the daily needs of the Nur students through a) 1/5 of the income 
coming from the selling of the Risale-i Nur,264 b) the charity of the wealthy Nur 
students or pious people sympathetic to the movement (himmet ehli), c) the 
individual resources of the hizmet ehli pooled in the movement. 
First, as far as the income coming from the Risale-i Nur was concerned, as 
Muzaffer Arslan tells in his memoirs, during the 1950s, the students were entitled 
to a) %12.5 of each book they sold and b) 9 Turkish Lira per month, called tayinat, 
or ration.265 Arslan, who travelled the country to sell the books and establish Nur 
circles and Medreses, says that the cost of a book would be calculated and %12.5 
                                                            
260 Zübeyir Gündüzalp (before Said Nursi changed it Ziver) and Bekir Berk were the leaders of the 
Kirazlımescit branch, in İstanbul. following the death of their leaders. Later together with a young 
generation of Nur Students, the three Mehmets, Mehmet Kutlular, Mehmet Birinci, and Mehmet 
Güleç became the entrepreneurs of Yeni Asya that formed around the movement’s two newspapers: 
Ittihad and Yeni Asya. The three young leaders would take over Yeni Asya following Gündüzalp’s 
death. All but Bekir Berk, who was a lawyer and had joined the movement later in his life, had been 
living in Medrese-i Nuriye. Those leaders who eventually supported and joined them, such as 
Mustafa Sungur, Bayram Yüksel, Hüseyin Bayram and Tahiri Mutlu (he was the first to accept 
Gündüzalp as the leader in the mid-1960s) had also been living in this instititution. 
261 For instance, to visit their sick parents or attend the wedding of a brother they needed to ask 
permission, which was not necessarily guaranteed. 
262 Said Nursi had assigned some of them new names. This was not only a security measure but also 
a token of their new lives. 
263 In the early 1970s Bekir Berk, the famous lawyer of the Nur students, was accused by some  
Risale-i Nur students with homosexual activity and had to leave the country for Saudi Arabia to turn 
back only in the 1990s. 
264 Said Nursi, “Umum dostlarıma ve Nur kardeşlerime bu vasiyeti ilân ediyorum” in Emirdağ 
Lahikasi-II,  http://www.sorularlarisale.com/subpage.php?s=kulliyat&id=3996 (Accessed June 25, 
2011) see also Said Nursi, “Vasiyetnamenin bir zeyli,” in Emirdağ Lahikasi II,  
http://www.sorularlarisale.com/subpage.php?s=kulliyat&id=3988 (Accessed June 25, 2011). It 
should be added that as shall be seen below the amount 1/5 was a rounded up number.   
265 Ömer Özcan, Ağabeyler Anlatıyor 2  (İstanbul: Nesil, 2008), 376.   
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would be added to that amount. Then he adds that this amount would then be spent 
to other costs, though he does not specify the actual selling price of the book or the 
other costs that he mentions (he says they did not seek profit). Similarly, an 
Ağabey, Ahmet Aytimur, who had started publishing the Epistles in İstanbul when 
Said Nursi was still alive, recounts that the resource for the distribution of the ration 
was also the Epistles. Those who published the books sent 1/10 of the cost of each 
book to Said Nursi, whether or not they actually sold the book.266 Under the light of 
the information provided above on the share that a bookseller was entitled to for 
each book, it can be deduced that publishers later added this percentage to the cost 
and the amount of the ration.267 
 Second, it is difficult to ascertain how, from whom and under which 
conditions the Nur students accepted financial help from 1950 to 1960. Since the 
finance of the movement and the Medrese-i Nuriye is a very delicate subject and 
both Said Nursi and the early students were at pains to prove that they did what 
they did for God’s sake and consent (Allah rızası) and that they did not accept 
money or presents from others because of their principle of istiğna,268 the written 
sources which mention the subject are scarce and the elders, who had lived in a 
Medrese-i Nuriye and still live with the income coming from the movement, prefer 
not to talk about it. It is a fact that both the Master and his students lived in poverty 
(as would be the case during the 1960s and at least until the mid-1970s), however 
the income of the Risales alone would not support the students and their master and 
would not have sufficed to publish and disseminate the books. The explanation 
provided by the movement members if “barakat.”269 Be that as it may, when Said 
Nursi died, he left a basket full of gold, reportedly only tayinat money, which was 
then given to Hüsrev Altınbaşak as he was the eldest. Kutlular says that Altınbaşak 
never returned the money and established an endowment (i.e. Hayrat Vakfı). The 
money was substantial enough and together with contributions from individuals 
who “respected” Altınbaşak, first helped to enlarge his networks and then sustain it 
                                                            
266  Ömer Özcan, Ağabeyler Anlatıyor 3  (İstanbul: Nesil, 2009), 60-61. 
267 It should be added that %12.5 (income from each book that an individual sells) plus 1/10 (the 
amount of ration) equals to %22.5 of the book’s actual cost, which is more than 1/5 of a book that 
Said Nursi says and less than 1/4. 
268 Istiğna is an Arabic word meaning contentedness, being financially independent etc.  
269 God’s blessing bestowed upon those He loves. 
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throughout the years to come.270 Today, the leading Nur students’ financial needs 
(individual and/or movement related) are provided partly by the income of some 
factories in İzmit owned by the movement.271  
The available resources show that Said Nursi and his students were indeed 
very careful in accepting gifts and preferred the charity of the wealthy Risale-i Nur 
Students that is those who had either converted to the teachings of the movement, 
or were part of the Nur student circles. The memoirs published by the approval of 
the current leaders, who were then members of the Medrese-i Nuriye(s), show that 
early students of Said Nursi such as Hüsrev Altınbaşak, Tahiri Mutlu, Mustafa 
Öztürk, Said Özdemir and Çalışkan Dynasty (known as Çalışkan Hanedanı) spent 
an important part of their wealth for the publication of the Risale-i Nur in general 
and for Said Nursi in particular. Until the late 1950s, such needs of the movement 
as paper, ink, mimeograph, typewriter, car, housing etc were provided by them, 
which helped to publish and disseminate the Risale-i Nur in large quantities, the 
income of which remaining to the Risales, Said Nursi and his students. 
Third, every student whether rich like Hüsrev Altınbaşak or not would 
contribute the movement’s pool of finance. Consequently, they would invest, their 
meager income from the savings of their previous lives or from humble family 
holdings, if any to the movement and movement related activities.  
Those Risale-i  Nur Student elders, including Hüsrev Altınbaşak, on the 
other hand, who directly and indirectly took part in the NSM mobilization and 
institutionalization, in turn, had never been part of the initial total institution formed 
around Said Nursi despite being part of the inner circle within the first layer.272 Nor 
did they live in a Medrese-i Nuriye in their own localities. They merely supervised 
the movement activities and the activists who were parts of this institution. They 
heavily invested in the movement materially and symbolically and also believed 
                                                            
270 Kutlular, 81-82.  
271 Interview with a Risale-i Nur leader, whose name or identifier cannot be provided. He did not 
however specify whether or not the factory belonged on paper to a movement endowment or to 
movement leaders. As the leader gave this information on the basis of unanimity and the names of 
the movement leaders are provided with the date of interview, the details will not be communicated 
here. 
272 It should be noted that there were also some elders who had not lived in a Medrese but who acted 
with the Yeni Asya or who supported the NAP. However, this does not disprove the argument that 
the Medrese-i Nuriye background was a factor in their political engagement patterns. On the 
contrary, it shows that they were not constrained by this factor in their choices, as all Nur student 
elders with a Medrese-i Nuriye background ended up with establishing an alliance with the JP. 
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that being a good Muslim could only be achieved through reading, reproducing and 
disseminating the Risale-i Nur corpus. However, the members of these branches 
had regular families, jobs and incomes, which were not associated with the 
movement. Though their focus was on the Nur students, having personal network 
of followers, they had also invested in various social, professional, associational 
and political networks in the right wing milieus as the rest of the NSM 
entrepreneurs. This was in fact how they had established ties with the latter. In 
short, they did not have a symbiotic relationship with the movement.   
The Medrese-i Nuriye background as a factor in the political engagement 
patterns of the elites of the Risale-i Nur Students 
When faced with the intransigent attitude of the liberals in the face of the 
right mobilizations and the frequent pro(per)secution of the Nur students in 
different regions of the country, the Nur student elders gave different reactions. 
While the elites with Medrese background tried to establish good relations with the 
JP liberals during a time when the latter faced increasing opposition from the right 
wing milieus, the non-Medrese elders began to contemplate on how to struggle with 
the JP more effectively. Despite the rift between the Scribes and Yeni Asya, then 
Kirazlımescit, up until early 1970s, the “Reader” groups, still shared their networks 
and the members of one branch worked in another’s formal and informal 
institutions, such as Medreses, publication houses, newspapers, endowments, etc. 
The elders of the Nur student branches, except Altınbaşak, were members of the 
Meşveret, or the deliberative assembly established following the death of the leader. 
While Yeni Asya elites vehemently opposed their NSM entrepreneurship in private, 
in their publications they satisfied with supporting the JP. Their serious attacks 
against the NSM began around 1973 general elections and increased following the 
the NSM’s entry to the Grand National Assembly. They simply worked for the JP’s 
electoral success and observed a wait and see policy. The Scribes and other elders, 
on the other hand were well immersed in party building and mobilization activities. 
What was the reason for this difference? 
To begin with, as a result of their Medrese membership, Yeni Asya 
entrepreneurs lacked diverse and rich range of individual cultural, social and 
economic capital necessary to engage in institutional politics apart from those they 
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derived from and through the movement activities. Moreover, they had come to 
firmly believe that within the conditions of modernity they could save their faith 
and lifestyle not only by reading and disseminating the corpus of Risale-i Nur time 
and again, but also living within Medrese-i Nuriyes.   
The change of political climate in the 1960s revealed, then, a reversal of 
means and ends for the Yeni Asya entrepreneurs. As members of the previous total 
institution formed around their deceased leader, their goal was not to Islamize the 
society over Islamizing the state institutions as such.273 They sought to reproduce 
the “total institution” of the 1950s for themselves and for new and older “converts” 
in various localities. They protected the total institution in particular and the 
movement from “imploding” in general, through establishing an alliance with the 
incumbent JP in order to avoid state encroachments (military and judicial). They 
concentrated on grassroots mobilization and regulation and standardization of the 
movement activities of printing, reading, and coordinating the dissemination of the 
Risale-i Nur corpus, newspaper publication, endowments, the Medrese-i Nuriye 
(Medrese) activities, legal issues, political relations, and the like. 
The JP liberals, in turn, trying to consolidate their power in the face of 
internal and external opposition, were happy to find such allies. The Nur students 
seemed much more powerful, united and numerous, partly thanks to the RPP’s, the 
Supreme Court’s and media’s statements and news that exaggerated the influence, 
activities and numbers of the Nur students. Yeni Asya and the JP established their 
relationship gradually. First, by 1966, the police and gendarmery raids and court 
proceedings against the Nur students had increased following the Supreme Court’s 
                                                            
273 Yeni Asya elders and others, who supported the JP and opposed the NSM were relying on some 
writings of Said Nursi and particularly his two expressions (which ever the situation necessitated), 
that represented his two different attitudes in two phases of his life: his “second Said” period under 
heavy handed single party regime between 1926-1945 and his “third Said” period during the 
Democrat Party period between 1950-1960 (the periodization of his life is his). During these two 
periods he said, respectively, a) “May god protect me from the evil of the Satan and politics” 
(Şeytanın ve siyasetin şerrinden Allah’a sığınırım) and b) “..if we ever have to be forced to interest 
in politics, out duty is to make politics an instrument and a friend to religion, so that we win our 
three hundred and fifty million brothers’ friendship” (bizim siyasete bakmamıza mecburiyet-i kat’iye 
olduğu zaman, vazifemiz siyaseti dine âlet ve dost yapmaktır ki, üç yüz elli milyon kardeşlerin 
uhuvvetini bu vatandaki kardeşlere kazandırmaya sebep olsun). It should be added that the last part 
of the second expression, which had pan-Islamist tendencies was usually omitted. 
See “Yirmiikinci mektup”, Mektubat, (accessed June 25, 2011). 
http://www.sorularlarisale.com/subpage.php?s=kulliyat&id=1004 and “Reisicumhur Celâl Bayar, ve 
Heyet-i Vükelâsına” (A letter to the President of the Republic and his committee of ministers), 
Emirdag Lahikasi-2, (accessed June 25, 2011) 
http://www.sorularlarisale.com/subpage.php?s=kulliyat&id=3834.  
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declarations of 1965.  The JP Minister of Justice tried to influence some 
prosecutors to accuse the Nur students not with the clause 163/1 but with 163/3, 
which would be included in the pending Amnesty. If unsuccessful, the Minister 
changed the area of jurisdiction of ongoing court proceedings whenever he could, 
sending the case to another court in another district.274  Then in 1969, the JP agreed 
to shelve the draft law for the “Protection of the Constitutional Order,” which had 
outraged not only the Islamists275 but also the left wing activists.  Finally, first the 
military intervention of 1971, then the NOP’s ban by the Constitutional Court 
convinced the Yeni Asya elites further to join their forces with the JP. 
The Yeni Asya elites had two major concerns as far as their grassroots 
activities were concerned: one related to the national arena of politics, the other to 
the local right wing networks. At the national level, they realized they needed a 
strong and mainstream ally like the JP, even if no longer incumbent. Engaging 
directly with existing distribution of power, the NSM could attract the wrath of the 
military and the judiciary further.276 At the local level, compared to the newly 
emerging NSM networks, the JP networks were larger and richer in capital. They 
would not like to alienate the sympathizers and activists of the JP277. Remaining 
unprotected under state pressure and alienating the JP circles would mean slowing 
down of proselytizing activities, the dispersion and/or distraction of the hizmet 
ehli278, and finally, the scarcity of financial contributions from himmet ehli279 
during a period when the movement was making investments in newspapers, 
                                                            
274 Telephone interview with a then local Nur elite, RNelder1,  İstanbul, January 3, 2009.  
275 See Appendix G, Figure 9, for an example of Yeni Asya’s mobilization against this draft law. 
276 It should be noted that Yeni Asya tried to establish cordial and even close relations with the 
military as much as possible and as long as it found a listening ear. For instance, they heartily 
supported the military intervention of 1971 and particularly Faik Türün, the Commander of the 
Martial Law in İstanbul. See Appendix G, Figure 10. 
277 The Yeni Asya’s relatively quite attitude until the elections may be related to the leaders’ wish to 
see the degree of support to the new initiative within the JP networks. 
278 “People of service.” They are those movement activists who devote, their lives (time, labour and 
in some cases also money) to the movement. 
279 “People of benevolence.” This name refers to the well off and respected members of the local 
communities who enjoy helping “less fortunate” and/or see a religious duty to help those who work 
for the religion regardless of their specific attachment. While the term is frequently used by the 
movement members, it is not exclusive. Various religious groups have used the term and competed 
with each other for the symbolic and material help of the himmet ehli. The Yeni Asya group 
systematized and regularized their efforts to attract the religious benevolent members of the local 
communities, hence the usage of the verb “marketing” for Yeni Asya’s efforts to attract them. 
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publishing houses etc.280 In other words, they would risk their very material and 
moral livelihood, the here and hereafter.  
Conversely, for those leaders of rival Risale-i Nur branches with no 
Medrese-i Nuriye background the costs of opposing the JP were lower. Both 
themselves individually and their networks could handle temporary blows on 
grassroots activities, as was the case during the period from 1960 to 1963. During 
this period, those with a Medrese background were dispersed all around the 
country, and disconcerted trying to return to their families, to find a place to live or 
to get a job.  The future pro-NSM Risale-i Nur Student elders, in return, though 
experiencing prison time and exiles (e.g Said Özdemir and Hüsrev Altınbaşak), 
kept their networks, Risale-i Nur publications and dissemination running, and the 
Medrese-i Nuriye’s that were under their supervision intact. They were well 
entrenched within their neighborhood, family and business networks who continued 
to help them. Consequently, they did not want to be an “amulet” (muska). 
According to the non-Yeni Asya Nur students the JP used this amulet to prove its 
religious credentials in return for small concession and protections all the while 
ignoring the majority of their demands, and allowing the judiciary and military to 
regularly harass them. 
In the long run, as the political landscape changed, especially following the 
coup d’état of 1980, the loyalty that Yeni Asya developed to the JP left the elders 
without a political “patron.” The room that was opened in the political arena in the 
absence of the JP and Yeni Asya would be filled by new comers: the Anavatan 
Partisi281 and the Fethullah Gulen movement. As for the Nur student-NSM elites, as 
they engaged in party activities, their networks never disappeared but remained 
smaller or weakened vis-à-vis Yeni Asya.  
3.3.3 The Question of the Naqshbandi Role in the New Party Enterprise 
As mentioned in the introduction, some versions of the NOP’s foundation 
argue that the Naqshbandi brotherhood (tarikat282) in general and the İskenderpaşa 
                                                            
280 In fact from 1960 to around 1963, these elders of the Nur students had experienced exactly this 
situation.   
281 The Motherland Party. 
282 Tarikat literally means path. Entering a specific tarikat is choosing a path to travel to the God.  
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Naqshbandi community in particular were the real force behind, even the initiator 
of, the NSM parties. While a more detailed fieldwork focusing exclusively on the 
Naqshabandis is needed to understand the relationship between the Naqshbandi 
brotherhoods and politics, it can safely be argued under the light of the new data 
this claim appears unfounded.283 In addition to the discussions of the previous 
sections which show the complex constellation of political variables that gave rise 
to the NOP, this subsection maintains that not only the Naqshbandis were not party 
entrepreneurs but also the Naqshbandi and non-Naqshbandi NOP activists 
perceived party politics and tarikats as different and autonomous registers of 
individual action. The tarikats constituted a social network among others from 
which the prospective NOP leaders tried to recruit adherents and activists. 
Moreover, recruitment did not only occur one way. Once the party established, its 
networks became a pool for Naqshbandi recruitment in turn. The NSM-Naqshbandi 
relations were thus multi-faceted and multi-linear.  
First, it will be demonstrated that the Islamist party entrepreneurs merely 
sought the blessing and “human capital” of the Naqshbandi leader(s) after having 
progressed in party building activities. Second, the Naqshbandi networks will be 
revealed as a social pool in which a renowned Naqshbandi leader’s “endorsement” 
of the NOP neither guaranteed the activism or electoral support of his disciples nor 
enabled other Naqshbandi leaders to give their support and blessing to the new 
enterprise. Finally, a hypothesis will be advanced: the nature of the relationship 
between the Naqshbandis and the NOP seem to conform to the respective modus 
operandi of the Naqshibandis and party politics. 
To begin with, the works which see the NSM parties as a Naqshbandi 
enterprise rely mainly on an article284 written by Esad Coşan Hocaefendi285, the 
son-in-law of and heir to Zahid  Kotku Hocaefendi, the mürşid (the Master in the 
                                                            
283 This essay then disagrees with the following work: Mardin, “The Nakshibendi Order of Turkey”; 
Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity. In a more recent study on the Justice and Development Party, 
Metin Heper’s treatment of the establishment of the NOP agrees with the previous work as well. See 
“A “Democratic-Conservative” Government by Pious People: The Justice and Development Party,” 
in The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi‛ 
(Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 347. 
284 “Bir Parti ve Biz”  http://esadcosan.awardspace.com/arsiv/fetih/g900526.htm (Accessed June 25, 
2011). 
285 It roughly means “master-teacher.” This word is usually deployed to refer to those Islamic 
scholars (not necessarily tarikat leaders) who have a considerable following and influence among 
the religious. 
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Sufi brotherhoods) of Necmettin Erbakan286 and  some other NSM leaders (for 
instance Recai Kutan). It is argued that this article constitutes an evidence to the 
entrepreneurial role of the Naqshibandis in the NSM. Consequently, before 
presenting further evidence from the fieldwork, one should adress the context in 
which it was written and its content.  
This article was written following the death of Zahit Kotku in 1980, when 
Erbakan refused to even pay lip service to Esad Coşan’s moral authority. Through 
this article, Coşan claimed such an authority over the party affairs, a deed his 
master had never even attempted despite his close relationship with the NSM 
leaders. Since it is a product of a certain power struggle between its writer and 
Erbakan, its content should be read cautiously. 
The article seems to deliberately adopt an ambiguous style and contains 
contradictory information. On the one hand, Coşan maintains that the party was the 
“action” of the brotherhood (dergahımızın bir aksiyonu), implying that they 
initiated the party. On the other hand, he relates the event as follows: “People came 
to our Master, and said ‘Master, should we do this type of things?’ He ordered and 
showed the way: ‘Do it! He told; [and] they did.” This account inadvertently shows 
that the Master, Zahit Kotku actually learned about the new party project when the 
party entrepreneurs sought his blessing, and his role as a tarikat leader was to 
bestow his blessing (thus his religious capital) upon the party entrepreneurs, not to 
initate the party. 
Underscoring common points in the interviews (though much more bluntly), 
Hasan Aksay’s (not a Naqshbandi disciple) following statements not only confirms 
this observation but also shows that the party activists place politics in an 
autonomous register: 
You cannot ask whether you should engage or not in 
[party building activities]. You have already engaged. What 
would you do if he says no. No this [such a question] is not 
possible: ‘Should I? Shouldn’t I?’ You have already engaged, 
                                                            
286 It should be added that it is possible that Necmettin Erbakan had two mürşids: Kotku and 
Mahmut Sami Efendi (Ramazanoğlu), the leader of Erenköy Naqshbandi community. During the 
fieldwork in Kayseri, it has been suggested quite a few times in passing that Erbakan was a murid of 
Mahmut Sami Efendi. Although it is rare in “modern” times, historically an individual could have 
two or more mürşids, even from a different tarikat such as the Qadiris.  
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ready, full of information. [Then] you go. Without any 
preparation, you cannot go and ask: ‘should I establish a political 
party?’ ...If it is all in the air yet (fol yok yumurta yokken) the Man 
would think you are mocking with him. You engage, you arrive at 
a certain stage and then you request his blessing [not approval]: 
would you pray for us? Then he says: “May God render [the 
establishment of the new party]  a beneficient and blessed 
(hayırlı) occasion for the nation and the motherland. Well, he 
should say so if he is in his right mind (aklı başındaysa). 
[Plus] this is the establishment of a political party, you 
[call] the nation, you tell them come with me comrades, follow 
me, I will go and serve you. And, then, [how could you say that] 
oh, by the way, I just talked to someone [special] he told me to 
turn back from this path, so I will  turn. You son of a gun (ulan 
eşşekoğlueşşek) why did you step forward in the first place? 
These shameless people [referring to their secularist opponents) 
attribute such things only to Muslims: whether he asked this 
person or that person [what to do].287 
Aksay, let alone mentioning any entrepreneurship on the part of the 
Naqshbandi leader, refuses even the claims that the prospective NSM leaders 
sought his approval before engaging in party building activities. What they sought 
was blessing rather than approval and not before but after engaging in party 
building activities. Politics, Aksay argued, was the “art of decision-making” 
demanding thus individual responsibility from the politicians and required 
information, which would be available only to them.288  
Second, the question as to whether Kotku’s blessing, or “endorsement,” 
guaranteed the support of other Naqshbandi leaders and or the activism of the 
disciples in general, need to be tackled. As Kitts reviews a social network may 
facilitate participation in an organization or movement through information flow, a 
collective identity that could partly overlap with that of the recruiting 
organization/movement and/or moral and material incentives that already recruited 
members could provide to others in the network. However, he also reminds that, as 
discussed earlier, an individual is embedded in multiplicity of social networks, 
                                                            
287 Interview with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, February 1, 2007.   
288 Aksay gave the example of the party chairmanship. He said that even if someone replaced 
Erbakan for few months as the party chair, he had to decide for various issues, as the required 
information would be available only to him. Ibid. 
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which not only differentially affect the life of an individual but also are subject to 
his/her positive or negative assessment289  (unless of course he/she is in an 
encapsulating organization and identity as was the case for the activists in the first 
circle of the Nur students). Accordingly, the Naqshbandi brotherhood circles 
potentially facilitated the recruitment to the NOP as it had created a religious 
collective identity that would render individuals sympathetic to the NSM frames 
and provided the “weak ties” which informed the Naqshbandis on the new party 
enterprise. However, the nature of the Naqshbandi organization in general and the 
relation between a mürşid and the mürids in particular, did not allow neither the 
mürşid nor the mürids to extend rewards and sanctions (moral and material 
selective incentives) to their fellow brothers regarding their (non)involvement to 
the NOP unless the Naqshbandi tie was combined with the collective identities and 
information provided by some other social ties (i.e commercial, neighborhood, 
family etc).  
It seems the masters, at least in the 1960s and 1970s, focusing mainly on the 
spiritual development of the disciple, trying to protect their integrity as religious 
authorities and local notables290 and finally being aware of multiplicity of social 
“pulls and pushes” over modern individuals, refrained from directly communicating 
their political position to their disciples or fellow masters, unless they were in the 
closest circle.291 For instance, when asked whether Erbakan would change his mind 
if his Master had not approved his engagement with party building activities, all the 
interviewees to whom this question was adressed, both Naqshbandi disciples and 
non-disciples, except Oğuzhan Asiltürk292, maintained that this question is 
                                                            
289 Kitts, 242. 
290 To see how a Naqshbandi group (İskenderpaşa) evolved into a “corporation” like entity see 
Hakan Yavuz, “The Matrix of Modern Turkish Islamic Movements: The Naqshbandi Sufi Order,” in 
The Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia: Change and Continuity, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga, 
Swedish Research Institute in İstanbul Transactions 9 (London: Curzon Press, 1999), 138-146. 
291 For a detailed account on how a Naqshbandi leader tried to achieve a balance between his own 
spritual and social responsibilities, on the one hand, and worldly and spiritual needs of both his 
disciples and the local community on the other, see Fulya Atacan, "A Portrait of a Naqshbandi 
Sheikh in Modern Turkey," The Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia: Change and Continuity, 
ed. Elisabeth Özdalga, Swedish Research Institute in İstanbul Transactions 9 (London: Curzon 
Press, 1999), 153-157.  
292 Asiltürk was not a Naqshbandi disciple but had often attended Kotku’s conversation cycles. His 
statements regarding Erbakan’s hypothetical attitude if Kotku had not permitted him entering party 
politics seem to reflect his eagerness to portray the NSM parties (he is still active in the Felicity 
Party, Saadet Partisi) as respectful to religious authorities. However, he also agreed with other 
interviewees that the Master would never interfere with such decisions unless he saw an imminent 
danger. Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 5, 2007. 
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irrelevant, since a Nasqshibandi leader would never overtly state his political views 
to his disciples. Not only, he would not know anything about politics (which is seen 
as a “dirty” business at the end of the day) but would see such an act beneath his 
position.  
To be sure, emprically the situation was much more complex. A 
Naqshbandi leader could and did show his political choices, though in a subtle way: 
letting his son or closest disciples become parliamentary candidates or party 
activists. As Oğuzhan Asiltürksay reports Erbakan personally visited all religious 
leaders around the country: “...he did not neglect even those who surrounded 
themselves with only twenty-thirty person. He met them, he talked to them, he told 
them.” Erbakan requested their moral support, if they granted, then he wanted 
activists from their cadres.293  
 What a master would not do, however, was to reveal his negative opinion 
on the political choices of his disciples. This subtlety, silent approval through 
symbolic acts and absolute refrain from stating negative opinions, gave freedom to 
the disciples, especially if there was a spatial distance between the master and the 
disciple and no other ties with fellow Naqshbandis, in interpreting the attitude of 
the master.  
The experience of a founding delegate of the NOP in Kayseri illustrate these 
dynamics: having listened one of Erbakan’s conferences in Kayseri in 1969, he was 
recruited to the prospective NSM through his acquaintances in his professional 
environment (he was working as a technician in a military factory), local religious 
networks (he had taken religious classes in local mosques) and his friends who had 
been involved in right wing activities in the 1960s.294 As a disciple of Mahmut 
Sami Efendi of Erenköy (his grandfather and father were also disciples) he was a 
pious person and as an avid reader of Büyük Doğu (Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, or 
NFK) familiar with Islamist frames. When asked whether he sought the approval of 
his master before his engagement to the party, he vehemently refused and praised 
Mahmut Sami Efendi for his avoidance to voice his opinion in political matters. 
However, he also complained stating that many among his disciples in Kayseri 
                                                            
293 Ibid. Incidentally this is also an evidence which shows that there is no Naqshbandi initiative as 
such. Asiltürk says Erbakan talked also to the “aghas” (feudal landlords) in the “east”.   
294 These networks will be studied in detail in the following chapter. 
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“abused” this attitude by attributing to his “silence” a status of non-approval and 
refused to vote for the NSM parties let alone becoming new party’s activists. 295  
Only when Sami Efendi’s son-in-law became the NSP’s parliamentary candidate 
from Kayseri in 1977, these disciples might have voted to the NSP, though it is 
difficult to ascertain how the disciples interpreted this symbolic act. But this time a 
number of political factors, which will be discussed in Chapter 6, weighed in the 
decision of local NSP activists: they did not work for their own parties’ candidate.  
As for the question whether a leading master’s endorsement of the NSM is 
indicative of other masters’ support, while Erbakan was able to convince some 
leaders, some others refused to comply despite the recommendation of the powerful 
Zahit Kotku. The article of Coşan itself confirms this information. Kotku had 
“advised” the Naqshbandi leaders such as Ali Efendi from Suluova (he was 
Kotku’s disciple himself) and Mustafa Bağışlayıcı from Samsun to support the new 
party. However, since these local Naqshbandi masters’ political preferences lied 
elsewhere (in Demirel and the NAP respectively), they proved to be unwilling to 
follow his lead.296 
Regarding the relationship between the Naqshibandi networks and the NSM 
it should finally be added that the recruitment did not occur one way. Once the 
NSM established its own network, the brotherhoods were able to recruit from its 
ranks. For instance, a NSP Kayseri executive, who became involved in party work 
following his recruitment to the party through an offer of parliamentary candidacy 
in 1973, followed the recommendation of his fellow activists to visit a local 
Naqshbandi master, Yahyalılı Hacı Hasan Efendi, a disciple of Mahmut Sami 
Efendi himself. Following couple of visits and after having participated to his 
conversations, he was impressed with his religious authority and knowledge and 
became a disciple. Similarly, during the late 1970s, younger members of the 
Akıncılar Association (the Raiders, the unofficial youth group of the NSM), were 
collectively brought to Hacı Hasan Efendi. Most of them became his disciples and 
reportedly thanks to him were able to distance themselves from street violence.297 
                                                            
295 Interview with KayNS5, September 27, 2007. 
296 M. Esad Coşan, “Hocamız’dan hatıralar,” http://www.dervisan.com/yazi/hatiralar.html (Accessed 
June 25, 2011) 
297 Interview with KayAkın, Kayseri, September 24, 2006. 
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To sum up, under the light of the fieldwork data following conclusion and 
hypothesis may be advanced. Neither Zahit Kotku nor the Naqshbandis in general 
were the party entrepreneurs. In fact, being a Naqshbandi did not necessarily lead to 
being an NSM activist (or voter for that matter) even if the master supported the 
movement. The Naqshbandi brotherhood served as a recruitment pool and “weak 
ties” for the NSM and vice versa. As such the Naqshbandi-NSM relationship could 
potentially produce various outcomes depending on the existence of other social, 
political and individual factors. For instance a) a disciple could be recruited thanks 
to his fellow disciples with whom he shared other collective identities and social 
environements; b) a disciple could refuse to vote or work for the NSM298; c) an 
NSM activist could become a disciple; d) an individual could be in touch with a 
Naqshbandi network without being one and recruited to the NSM.299 
It can be argued that the multiplicity of possible results was related to the 
modus operandi of the Naqshbandis. Naqhsbandis constituted neither a centralized 
nor a federated organization, which allowed the disciples and masters dispersed in 
different localities to make autonomous decisions. Moreover, the Naqshbandi 
leaders, at least during the 1960s and 1970s, were mainly interested in their 
individual ties with the disciples rather than formation of political and economic 
capital. According to the tarikat tradition the maintenance of this tie was essential 
for spiritual advancement, not the ties among the disciples (though they would help 
one). Imposition of a political preference, or any view unrelated to spiritual 
advancement without explicit demand on the part of the disciple could weaken that 
tie. With the thought of an hypothetical imposition of political views, a very devote 
Naqshbandi interviewee reacted: “Who are you to interfere that much? Have I not 
matured enough to vote myself?”300 As a matter of fact, as even Esad Coşan relates, 
Zahit Kotku would not insist on an issue (then not to mention politics) if his 
disciple refused to accept his advice. He would say: “Friendship is based on saying 
all right [then]” (Arkadaşlık pekiyi demekle kaimdir).301 
                                                            
298 It should be noted that a disciple might as well disengage from the brotherhood altogether. 
299 The last was the case of the son of one of Mahmut Sami Efendi representatives in downtown 
Kayseri.  Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006.  
300 This was the same interviewee who complained that Naqshbandis had not shown as much 
interest as he expected. Interview with KayNS5, Kayseri, September 27, 2007 
301 Coşan, “Hocamız’dan hatıralar.”  
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3.4 Conclusion 
Through studying macro and meso-level formal and informal institutions, 
power relations and contingent events on the one hand, and the properties and 
agency of the actors at the micro-level on the other, this chapter showed the 
complex and political nature of the factors that gave rise to the emergence of a 
group of Islamists as party entrepreneurs. The relevance of the findings of the 
chapter for the study of the Islamist political engagement patterns is twofold.  
First, in and off themselves, the findings demonstrate that the perspective 
which takes macro economic, social, political and cultural phenomena as factors 
fails to explain both the emergence of a particular Islamist movement and its 
specific “form” of organization the movement entrepreneurs establish. The NSM 
entrepreneurs emerged within the context of a relative liberalization of the polity 
that had allowed various modes and forms of socio-political mobilization. They 
constituted the elites of Islamist milieus, which became connected through nation 
wide right wing collective actions.  
They felt marginalized from political decision making processes, not 
necessarily because the state repressed them in absolute terms, but because such 
existing institutions as associations, informal Islamist organizations, publications 
and most important their main avenue to access the decision making structures, the 
right wing JP, proved to be inadequate to exert influence in the polity. Their 
disappointment with their allies within the political parties, the efficacy of existing 
grassroots Islamist movements and collective actions of various sorts, led them to 
seek a new avenue of politics. A political party would potentially bring together 
dispersed Islamist individuals and groups to aggregate their resources nationwide, 
tap into the existing discontents and finally acquire enough right wing votes to 
challenge their rivals, particularly the JP. Such a mobilization would likely change 
their unstable existence in the center: “a large plot” occupied by a nationally 
organized political party in the political field was easier to protect and enlarge than 
several plots inhabited in and through various right wing organizations.  
Second, the internal dynamics, action, interaction within the political arena, 
the JP and the right wing networks and the properties of the NSM entrepreneurs 
that this chapter observed in this early phase of the movement, set the stage for the 
 121 
 
upcoming phases of the NSM activities. Specifically, it shall be seen that the 
dynamics of the JP and the right wing networks were factors that directly (as the 
NSM continued to interact with these actors) and indirectly (as they partly shaped 
the material and symbolic resources of the local activists) influenced the NSM 
recruitment process and ideational production. In addition, the micro-properties of 
the NSM entrepreneurs make part of a configuration of variables that explains how 
the NSM reacted to the prospect of a coalition with the RPP.   
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NIZAM/SELAMET MOVEMENT IN THE MAKING: 
ACTIVIST RECRUITMENT AND PARTY BUILDING  
The emergence of Islamist party entrepreneurs in the political arena and 
their behind the scenes activities were necessary but not sufficient for the 
establishment of the NSM parties. The party entrepreneurs had to create “a 
consensus among a subset of the population”302 (consensus mobilization) around 
their initiative and recruit activists among those who sympathized with their 
endeavor (activist mobilization).303 This process involved symbolic and material 
construction of the prospective party in a competitive religious and political 
environment and depended both on the agency of political actors and existing 
formal and informal institutions in the administrative center and the geographical 
periphery.  It was the second and final steps towards the emergence of the NSM 
parties.304  
 The study of this political process at the local and national levels 
demonstrates that the route to the NSM parties was neither linear nor predetermined 
and that the emergence of the Islamist party cannot be considered a direct and 
aggregate result of societal cleavages or Muslim collective identity.   
                                                            
302 Klandermans calls this process as “consensus mobilization” and differentiates it from “consensus 
formation” which is “unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures.” Bert 
Klandermans, “The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus,” in International Social Movement 
Research, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney 
Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI-Press, 1988), 175.   
303 As Klandermans puts it social movement organizations mobilize support through two different 
tasks: “consensus mobilization and action mobilization.” Ibid., 176. 
304 A recent comprehensive research and academic project led by Elise Massicard, which includes 
conferences, seminars, a book and several articles makes a strong case for a sociological approach 
for the study of political parties. Similar to recent studies on Islamist movements, this project also 
demonstrates the fruitfulness of inserting intra- and extra- movement/organization/network, that is 
meso-level factors, into the analysis in relation to macro and micro levels. For the pre-discussion of 
the project, which has now come to conclusion see Elise Massicard, L’Étude des Partis Politiques 
en Turquie: Bilan des Travaux et Pistes de Recherche, 
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/16/44/74/PDF/problematique_site.pdf (Accessed June 25, 
2011) 
 123 
 
This chapter, then, rather than assuming a prior identity or societal cleavage, 
studies the consensus and activist mobilization efforts of the party entrepreneurs on 
the one hand, and the local social and political contexts within which they found 
their activists, on the other.  It was at the conjunction of these two axes that the 
NSM leaders could recruit their activists, institutionalize their party and, as shall be 
seen in Chapter 5, engage in the symbolic construction of the NSM.  
First section will examine the first collective action of the party 
entrepreneurs during which they undertook the consensus and activist mobilization 
and laid the ground for the new party. Second section will study the local social 
networks that facilitated the communication; collective action frame and identity 
formation and finally, the information flow at the local level and the properties of 
the potential NSM activists.  
4.1 Mobilization of the party innovators: towards the National Order 
Party 
The event, which came to be known as the TOBB Affair was a public 
conflict between Erbakan and the JP government over the chairmanship of the 
TOBB that resulted in the latter’s victory. As mentioned earlier some scholars have 
argued that the TOBB Affair reflected the center-periphery cleavages and as such 
constituted the genesis of the NOP. According to this view, Erbakan and his friends 
decided to found a new party following this incident.  
However, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, the party 
innovators had already emerged and party-building activities had started as early as 
1967. This section argues that the Affair’s explanatory power regarding the 
emergence of the NOP does not lie in its being a reflection of economic or cultural 
cleavages per se but in its functions as a “collective action” during which the party 
innovators produced the NSM “frames”305 to challenge their opponents and bring 
about a consensus and action mobilization around the new initiative. Not only the 
TOBB Affair was intertwined with the first electoral campaign of the prospective 
party elites, the Movement of Independents of 1969 (Bağımsızlar Hareketi), but 
                                                            
305Frames are “meaning construction[s]” produced through collective action. Benford and Snow, 
614. Further discussion of frames and frame making will be provided in chapter 5, examining the 
NSM mobilization frames and collective identity. 
 124 
 
also became the launching pad for future political action: party foundation and 
maintenance activities throughout the 1970s. 
4.1.1 A History of the TOBB Affair 
(Re)telling the history of the TOBB Affair helps to go beyond the TOBB 
“metaframe”306 and reveals the agency of the Islamist actors. This subsection 
suggests the need to reconsider this episode in the history of the NSM as an 
instance of collective action, partially the result (not the cause) and fully a 
constituent of an already started political struggle towards the Islamist party.  
According to the standard formula, as a candidate to the Union’s 
chairmanship, Erbakan asserted himself as the spokesperson of “the Anatolian 
capital” which, he argued, had long been denied the fair allocation of the resources 
in favor of the big bourgeoisie of İstanbul and İzmir and thus prevented the 
“material and moral development” of the country. Based on a previous cabinet 
decree that had stipulated the postponement of the General Assembly and its 
elections, the JP government did not recognize the election results. Erbakan, then, 
applied to the JP to become a parliamentary candidate from the district of Konya in 
the general elections of 1969. Having been vetoed by Demirel, he launched his 
political career as an independent parliamentary candidate from Konya, entered the 
parliament and established the NOP.307  
While the basic facts are there (except of course the causal relations 
between the foundation of the NOP and the Affair), such an account overshadows 
the fact that the Affair was not a single man’s struggle and that it lasted not couple 
of days but months that entailed a protracted social movement, or “collective 
challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction 
                                                            
306 A “metaframe” is a frame used not only by a specific movement but also by its opponents and the 
bystanders for different purposes.  The Affair has been deployed by the NOP leaders and activists 
(legitimation); their opponents (delegitimation); and scholars (analyses based on center-periphery 
dichotomy) as the story of the NOP’s emergence. For the study that developed the concept see 
Donatella della Porta, “Protest, Protestors, and Protest Policing: Public Discourses in Italy and 
Germany from the 1960s to the 1980s,” in How Social Movements Matter, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug 
McAdam and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 66-96.   
307 See for instance, Ayşe Buğra, “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context: Strengths and 
Weaknesses,” in The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey, ed. Neşecan 
Balkan and Sungur Savran (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002), 121-122. 
 125 
 
with elites, opponents and authorities.” 308 The Affair started from Erbakan’s 
election in May 1969, extended through the party entrepreneurs’ first electoral 
campaign309 from August to October 1969 and ended in January 1970 when the 
Union elected a new chairman and the NOP was established. It was a process 
involving not necessarily coordinated and premeditated but surely political actions 
of the party innovators. As Süleyman Arif Emre puts it, the TOBB “struggle was 
intertwined with party building activities and gave us and our environment even 
more determination, faith and speed.”310 
The background history of the Affair can be traced back to April 1968 when 
Erbakan resigned from the office of Secretary-General of the Union and declared 
his candidacy from the JP for a seat in the senate from Konya only to be vetoed by 
the JP administration.311 According to Emre, during this period, when the 
preparations for the future party were underway, conquering the JP from within was 
still considered an option for some party innovators. It seems that the conservative-
nationalists persuaded the Islamist elites for this candidacy in an attempt to close 
ranks in the right wing against the JP liberals. Be that as it may, following the veto, 
instead of becoming an independent candidate, as would be the case in 1969, 
Erbakan chose to compete against Demirel’s candidate, Sırrı Enver Batur, for the 
chairmanship of the Union.312   
Though Erbakan could not win, he managed to enter the Executive 
Committee, landing in a position that facilitated his election to the chairmanship in 
1969. Following his election in May 25, 1969, based on its previous order of 
postponement, the government ordered the administration of Sırrı Enver Batur to 
keep intact. However, Erbakan, having acquired the political support and legal 
advice from his fellow party innovators313, defied the government and for two 
                                                            
308 Italics are in the original. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 3-4. 
309 Since the party was not legally established, the candidates were independents, hence the 
campaign name Müstakiller Hareketi, or the Movement of the Independents. 
310 Emre, 35 Yıl vol.1, 168. 
311 See Appendix G, Figure 11 for the news of Erbakan’s candidacy to the Senate. 
312 For news items concerning the parliamentary and Union candidacies see Yeni İstanbul, April 6 
and 10 1968,  Bugün, April 6, 10, 12, 17 1968.  
313 Interviews with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006 and Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, 
January 30, 2007. While Emre provided the legal help, Aksay and Paksu tried to mobilize 
conservative-nationalist and ultranationalist parliamentarians.  
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months acted as the actual chairman.314 During these two months, Erbakan 
continued his visits to Anatolian towns such as Kocaeli (İzmit), Erzurum and 
Kars,315 which had begun before his election as chairman316. Erbakan was invited to 
Anatolian towns by various organizations (usually the local chambers of commerce 
and industry, but also the Advanced Institute of Islam or Intellectuals’ Hearth 
(Aydınlar Ocağı) and gave speeches on such topics as “Islam and science.” In 
Erzurum and Kars his visits coincided with those of Demirel, which gave him 
further opportunity to ridicule the government’s decision and crystallize his own 
position. 
Since Erbakan had declared that he would not leave the post unless a court 
decides in government’s favor and acted as the actual chairman giving speeches 
and press conferences, the JP leadership felt compelled to take countermeasures to 
enforce its authority. These measures were extremely drastic that strengthened the 
frame of “historical injustice” that Erbakan was constructing. First, by June 1969, 
the government began to impose financial pressure on the delegates. The Ministry 
of Trade took complete control of the allocation of foreign exchanges.317 This 
measure, which was only revoked shortly before the TOBB General Congress of 
January 1970, when Medeni Berk was elected, had delayed the access of businesses 
to foreign exchanges and thus the payment of dues and debts to the Union, 
prompting litigations against them.318 Next, from August 4 to 8, based on a 
disputed interlocutory court decision, Batur moved on to “reconquer” the Union by 
a police intervention 319 that brought an end to the “resistance” at the TOBB.320  
                                                            
314 It can be argued that the open-secret party building activities leaked to the press were the real 
reasons for Demirel’s opposition to his chairmanship.  Interestingly enough some of the gatherings 
for the party initiative did not only take place at Tevfik Paksu’s apartment but also in a room in the 
building of a private high school (Yükseliş Koleji) owned by Demirel’s brother Ali Demirel. 
Interview with Muzaffer Deligöz, İstanbul, July 24, 2007.   
315 See Bizim Anadolu, June 29, July 24 and July 25, 1969 for Kocaeli, Erzurum and Kars visits 
respectively. 
316  For instance, from late April to his election to the Chairmanship, Erbakan had visited Eskişehir, 
Adana and twice Konya. See Bizim Anadolu, April 24, May 11, and May 17 1969.  
317Bugün, June 20, 1969.    
318 The speech of Medeni Berk in the congress is short but illustrative as to why the TOBB delegates 
had experienced a sudden change of heart only 7 months later than Erbakan’s election. TOBB, 
“Medeni Berk, 25. Genel Kurul, 30-31 Ocak 1970,” in Başkanların Genel Kurul Konuşmaları 1. 
http://www.tobb.org.tr/Documents/yayinlar/1ciltyeni%20(2).pdf  (Accessed June 25, 2009) 
319 Yeni İstanbul, August 9, 1969. See also Appendix G, Figure 12. 
 127 
 
The peak of the Affair was reached when the very same day of police 
intervention, accompanied by a large group of journalist, Erbakan applied to the JP 
as a parliamentary candidate.  When the news of the veto came, he was in Konya, 
seeking the support of not only the local JP branch,321 but also other potential 
activists for his cause. 322 Following the veto Erbakan declared his independent 
candidacy323 with 34 of his friends and launched the Movement of Independents, 
the first electoral campaign of the prospective Islamist party. 
4.1.2 From the Affair to the New Party 
The new party, as the sum of a new political network of individual activists 
and members producing and carrying a collective identity, was not a direct and 
aggregate result of an existing discontent at the societal level against economic or 
secular policies. Nor were the local branches of the party autonomous initiatives of 
the citizens in different localities who then articulated their collective endeavor 
with that of the party entrepreneurs at the administrative center, as had been the 
case of the establishment of the Democrat Party in 1946.   
This subsection argues that in a very competitive political environment with 
eight political parties (four being right-wing party and one being in power), the 
formation of party networks and identity began with labor-intensive political action 
on the part of the party entrepreneurs.324 As Süleyman Arif Emre observes and the 
practices of the party leaders attest, “the organization (teşkilatlanma) of [the NOP] 
                                                                                                                                                                     
320 While the “commandos” of the NAP were at times physically present to “help” Erbakan, the 
Association for Fighting against Communism declared its support to Erbakan’s cause “in the name 
of 24 nationalist organizations”. Bugün, August 4-8, 1969.    
321 Yeni İstanbul, August 15, 1969. 
322 It should be noted that by early January 1970, the court decided in Erbakan’s favor. However the 
Union elections were renewed and the government’s candidate won.   
323 Emre recounts that the leader of the NP, Osman Bölükbaşı, invited Erbakan and his friends to his 
party and offered parliamentary candidacies. For the reasons provided in the previous chapter this 
offer was rejected. Emre, 35 Yıl vol.1, 169-170. 
324 Frédéric Sawicki arrives at a similar conclusion regarding the role of the leaders, when he 
observes that under an apperance of homogeneity, the political networks, which made up the  
federations of the Socialist party in France, ensure their unity and continuity (objective reality) 
through as much the action and interaction that take place within these networks as the symbolic 
production of the local and national leaders. Les Réseaux du Parti Socialiste: Sociologie d’un Milieu 
Partisan (Paris: Belin, 1997), 29. 
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was not like transforming an unclaimed piece of land into a farm. It was more like 
acquiring a plot in an already…parceled out…place like Taksim Square.”325  
The process of party formation started first with the TOBB Affair and then 
enlarged its scope only after the NOP acquired a juridical entity status in January 
26, 1970.  First the conferences and meetings organized around the TOBB Affair 
and then the party innovators’ creative invention of “opening ceremonies” of local 
branches in districts and subdistricts, enabled the crystallization of the NSM and its 
dava as it provided an opportunity to directly communicate and establish ties with 
the potential activists and members. In addition, they provided a space for 
interaction among the potential activists and members of different districts and 
networks. These were thus the initial “recruitment contexts that served as the 
microstructural basis for [the potential activists’] decisions to take part” in the 
movement.”326 The party entrepreneurs began their efforts before Erbakan’s 
application to the JP and continued until early April 1971 when the trial of the party 
in the Constitutional Court began.327  
This subsection will, first, very briefly study how the Islamist party 
innovators “assign[ed] meaning to, and interpret[ed], relevant events and conditions 
in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner 
bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.”328 Since the new party’s frames 
and collective identity will be examined in detail in Chapter 5, as the 
micromobilization process, here only their main features will be provided. Then, 
the two stages of action mobilization (i.e the TOBB Affair and the formal party 
building periods) where the party innovators formed unmediated ties with 
individuals in the social networks through face-to-face communication will be 
taken up. 
                                                            
325 Emre, 35 Yıl vol. 1,192. Taksim square is a central locality in İstanbul and its land plots are 
considered among the most expensive in Turkey. 
326 McAdam and Paulsen, 662.  
327 The party building activities thus continued even when the chief Prosecutor of the Republic 
(Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı) opened a case against the party in March 10, 1971. The party leaders even 
requested from the activists to learn the electoral rules and make preparations for the upcoming mid-
term senate elections as late as April 1971 (the elections did not take place).  See the party 
newspaper “Siyasi Partiler Kanununun Dördüncü Kısmı,” Tek Nizam, April 15, 1971. 
328 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization,” in International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action, ed. 
Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI-Press, 1988),198. 
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The TOBB Affair period as an informal recruitment context 
The TOBB Affair would have been a mere controversy without political 
consequence unless the party entrepreneurs acted collectively, engaged in “framing 
activity” and concurrent activist recruitment. The TOBB frame combined together 
and “simplif[ied] and condens[ed] aspects of”329 their particular struggle and the 
earlier right-wing mobilizations against Demirel’s liberal group dominating the JP. 
The TOBB frame drew on the earlier right-wing “master-frames”330 of nationalism 
and Islam, a significant feature of which being the argument that Demirel and his 
colleagues did not represent the nation and its values (Islam and Turkishness). 
Erbakan and his comrades associated Demirel and the large businesses with 
freemasonry, by implication (in Turkish politics) with being non-Muslims and fifth 
columns.  
The struggle over the TOBB, in turn, breathed a new life to this frame 
through its economic dimension and the discourse of injustice that the party 
entrepreneurs constructed. 331  On the one hand, the TOBB frame claimed the 
country’s resources on behalf of Anatolian Muslims and a cultural and economic 
reform: a “material and moral development” of the nation. On the other hand, the 
JP’s refusal to recognize Erbakan’s chairmanship and the veto of his parliamentary 
candidacy were framed as the very symbol of the negative experiences of the 
“Anatolian Muslim businessmen” in particular and Muslims, or the “nation” in 
general. 
During the TOBB Affair and the subsequent Movement of Independents, 
Erbakan and his friends targeted to win the hearths and minds of the right-wing 
“audience”, particularly those within the JP local branches. Through Erbakan’s 
application to the JP, the party entrepreneurs hoped to strengthen the injustice 
frame, to demonstrate that a new party imposed itself upon the Islamists, and to 
overcome the critic that they were weakening the JP against the rising left and the 
                                                            
329 Benford and Snow, 614.  
330 “…Master frames are to movement-specific collective action frames as paradigms are to finely 
tuned theories.” David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest,” in 
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (New 
Heaven: Yale University Press, 1992), 138. 
331 The question of economic justice had already been introduced to the public agenda as the left-
wing movements gained momentum by the mid-1960s. 
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state elites.332 Erbakan explained in the country’s most read Islamist magazine 
within the Islamist and, in fact, even ultranationalist circles, Büyük Doğu, that 
applying to the JP for a parliamentary candidacy had been envisaged on their part 
as a win-win situation (Bu iki taraflı kazanç yolunda ilerledim ve AP adına 
adaylığımı istedim...). If his candidacy were accepted they would be able to 
struggle within the JP, hence there would be no need for a new party. If refused, 
that would demonstrate that “the JP did not tolerate the right of a nationalist and a 
mukaddesatçı to manifest [his views] in the party.”333 While one may argue that the 
Islamist elites still held hopes for conquering the JP from within, as Süleyman Arif 
Emre did334, having been vetoed a year earlier and engaged in a heated contestation 
against Demirel government, his act should be seen, as other party entrepreneurs 
did, mostly symbolic serving aforementioned purposes.  
Neither this maneuver nor the Affair as a whole, however, helped to attract 
the JP members and delegates.335 While the TOBB frames might have influenced 
some of them and helped them to reinforce or create their perception of the political 
developments of the period, in practice, reminding the inertia of the JP’s 
conservative-nationalist parliamentarians during the Affair despite their behind the 
doors promises to help Erbakan336, the protests in the JP branches against Erbakan’s 
veto were merely sporadic and less than loud. As a matter of fact, through 1970, the 
participation to the new party from the JP rank and file would be minimal.337   
                                                            
332 Interview with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006.   It should be noted that in contrast, 
the NSM-Nur students saw his candidacy as evidence of his personal ambition and relative lack of 
interest in establishing a political party. It is not clear whether or not the non-Nur student group of 
entrepreneurs communicated their justifications and reasons for his candidacy to the Nur students. 
Be that as it may, based on such a perception they would later perceive Erbakan’s developing power 
and influence as a usurpation of the party. Interviews with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008 and 
Muzaffer Deligöz, İstanbul, July 24, 2007.  
333  See “Vesikalarla Büyük İfşalarımız Dedektif X Bir: Prof. Necmeddin Erbakan’ın Türkiye 
Çapında İfşaları,” Büyük Doğu 5 (1969): 9.  
334 Emre, 35 Yıl vol. 1,169. In fact, Emre also acknowledges that Erbakan’s candidacy did not stand 
a chance under the light of developments. 
335 Further discussion on the lack of support among the JP branches will be provided in the next 
section. 
336 Interviews with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006, Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, 
January 30, 2007.   
337 Mukaddesatçı newspapers, particularly Bizim Anadolu, sympathetic to Erbakan and his friends, 
reported neither noteworthy protest in local branches nor sizeable groups of delegates and 
executives (except in few small subdistricts in some cities) leaving the JP to join the NOP. The 
reasons for this lack of interest will be studied in the next chapter. 
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Nonetheless, the Islamist elites had already been working behind the scenes 
to recruit activists outside the JP circles in the meetings organized around the 
TOBB Affair in Ankara and in the provinces. These meetings though essentially 
aimed at creating a consensus mobilization, also constituted the first grounds of 
activist recruitment. In these meetings Erbakan either explained his conflict with 
the JP government or gave his one of now famous “conferences”338 treating the 
subjects of moral (İslam’da Kadın, or Woman in Islam) and material (İslam ve İlim, 
or Islam and Science) development.   
The conferences and meetings organized by party entrepreneurs enabled 
them to directly communicate their frames to an already sympathetic audience at 
best, to a curious public at worst.  Most importantly, they gave them the 
opportunity to employ face-to-face recruitment method. As Passy and Giugni argue 
the “status of recruiters” in a movement is one of the factors that influence 
individuals’ decision to participate in a movement and the degree of their 
involvement. The party innovators, as being “centrally located” in the movement, 
were able to provide first hand knowledge which in turn “reduce[d] the uncertainty 
related to participation” and as “true believers” worked harder to convince their 
audience to join their endeavor. 339  
For instance, following a conference, a smaller group could be formed at an 
intimate setting where the actual recruitment took place. “The first and last leader” 
of the Islamist youth group Akıncılar, the Raiders, Tevfik Rıza Çavuşoğlu, recounts 
that his first encounter with the party innovators, and especially Erbakan, was 
during such a conference that he and his friends (mostly engineering students) 
attended. Following the conference, Erbakan invited the young students for coffee 
and tea and noted their phone numbers. Having been vetoed and ready to launch the 
Movement of Independents, the party innovators later contacted Çavuşoğlu and 
many others who studied in Ankara or İstanbul and sent them to their hometowns 
                                                            
338 These were rather lectures. However since the movement elites and activists call them 
conferences, this essay will also refer to them as such. 
339 Florence Passy and Marco Giugni, “Social Networks and Individual Perception: Explaining 
Differential Participation in Social Movements,” Sociological Forum 16 (2001), 129.   
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for consensus and activist recruitment and/or Konya for electoral mobilization of 
1969.340 
Out of 17 Kayseri NSM activists that the researcher interviewed, nine were 
recruited after attending such a conference.  While four of them first engaged while 
they were engineering students in Ankara, five attended Erbakan’s conference in 
Kayseri. One out of the remaining eight interviewees was the main interlocutor of 
the party entrepreneurs in Kayseri (his brother was one of the official founders of 
the NOP) who at the time lived in Ankara and had already been in close contact 
with such figures as Erbakan, Hasan Aksay and Mehmet Emin Alpkan.341 Among 
the rest, four engaged in the NSM through their connections to those who had 
already been recruited and three became activists after the NSP offered them 
parliamentary candidacies in 1973. Those who engaged following Erbakan’s 
conference in Kayseri later joined the electoral efforts in Konya, without even 
being called upon revealing the incipient NSM collective identity before the 
establishment of the NOP.342 
During the TOBB Affair, the party innovators not only looked for activists 
but also independent candidates. Since such future party elites such as Aksay, Emre 
and Hüsamettin Akmumcu chose as a strategy to become candidates from their 
previous parties343  (the JP, the NTP or NP), the innovators needed independent 
candidates who would represent the collective nature of the conflict with the JP. 
For instance, İsmail Müftüoğlu, later the Minister of Justice in the “First Nationalist 
Front” government (1. Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti, or 1. MC) joined the NSM as a 
result of such recruitment in Sakarya.344  
 
                                                            
340 Interview with Tevfik Rıza Çavuşoğlu, Kayseri, August 23, 2006. A news item in Islamist daily 
Bugün informs its readers that the “lightening groups of Erbakan” (Yıldırım Ekipleri) visited 82 
villages within two days. Bugün, September 16, 1969. 
341 As shall be remembered Alpkan was the publisher of Bizim Anadolu and an important node for 
Erbakan in Konya as well. This future local NSM leader (first unofficial, then official leader) met 
him in the 1950s when his store, known as “the National Grocery,” was an informal hub for right 
wing engineering students in İstanbul. 
342 Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, Septembre 17, 2007. 
343 Telephone interview with Hasan Aksay February 2, 2009 and interview with Hüsamettin 
Akmumcu August 15, 2007. 
344 Interview with İsmail Müftüoğlu, İstanbul, April 14, 2008. In 1969 general elections, there were 
a total of 35 independent candidates.  
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Recruitment during the formal party building period 
The final stage of the party foundation came after the official establishment 
of the NOP. Following the TOBB Affair and the Movement of Independents, not 
only the TOBB frames but also those recruited during these phases of the party 
foundation, were deployed to recruit further activists and most importantly party 
members in the “periphery”. The party was legally established in Ankara and local 
party entrepreneurs (officially Müteşebbis İl İdare Heyetleri, or the Entrepreneur 
District Administration Committees) were present except in “eastern and 
southeastern provinces”.345 However, the party leaders were dismayed since there 
were no local party branches and party members.346 In other words, apart from few 
core local activists recruited during the TOBB mobilization, the NOP had not 
become a “natural” site for expressing religious, economic or political grievances 
of the periphery. In order to complete party foundation and organizationally 
institutionalize the party through party congresses, including the General Party 
Congress, the NOP needed party branches and members. Consequently, the party 
leaders decided creatively to organize “opening ceremonies” for the local branches 
with the help of the local party entrepreneurs.347  
The party leaders carried out these ceremonies not only in large cities but 
also in small towns and subdistricts and announced them even in the villages.348 
They took the form of large or small meetings depending on the demographics of 
the geography. In a typical opening ceremony, which took place either in a cinema 
theater or in a wedding hall, in addition to the local party entrepreneurs, at least two 
current or ex-parliamentarians349 would be present in addition to a representative 
from the youth branch of the NOP and a local executive from İstanbul or 
                                                            
345 Emre uses the term “eastern and southeastern” regions. In Turkish politics this refers to provinces 
where there exists ethnical heterogeneity with Kurds constituting usually the majority. Emre, 35 Yıl 
vol.1, 190-191.  
346 Ibid.,182 
347 Ibid.,183. In Kayseri the opening ceremony took place on December 13, 1970.  Hakimiyet, 
December 14, 1970. See Appendix H for the placard prepared for İstanbul branch’s opening 
ceremony and the flier for Sivas branch’s opening ceremony.  
348 Emre, 35 Yıl vol.1,183. 
349 These parliamentarians were usually Akmumcu, Abbas, Paksu and Aksay. The former two had 
been elected from the JP ranks in 1969 but joined the NOP as soon as the latter was officially 
established. The latter could not have been elected as they had explained their constituencies that 
they would join the prospective Islamist party. 
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neighboring large district.350 Erbakan would usually be present in these meetings. It 
appears that travelling from town to town the party leaders would stop by in small 
subdistricts as well where Erbakan and the parliamentarians would first go to the 
main mosque and pray and then call the mosque community to a coffee shop where 
they would give their speeches.351  
The opening ceremonies and Erbakan’s playing a leading role in recruitment 
proved to be very valuable especially in 20 districts in “eastern and southeastern” 
regions where the teams sent by the party center were not able to find even local 
party entrepreneurs.352 Only after Erbakan, Akmumcu and Abbas visited these 
towns, could the NOP form its local branches. These visits illustrate further the 
power of face-to-face recruitment. Emre recounts that following Erbakan’s 
speeches, which were always the last one, while everyone was preparing to leave 
the room, Erbakan would leave the stage, run to the door and lock it with a key he 
had acquired before the ceremony and shout at the crowd: “Where are you going, 
you cannot leave, nothing doing (yağma yok), this country is not only mine, it is 
ours, for better or for worse. Return [to your seats], I will register you as members.” 
Following this announcement, first membership registration would be completed 
and then local party entrepreneurs would be elected among these new members.353 
McAdam and Paulsen argue “for a much stronger effect of organizational 
(or other- wise collective) as opposed to individual ties in mediating entrance into 
collective action.”354 Both the conferences and meetings organized around the 
TOBB Affair and the party chapters’ opening ceremonies enabled the party 
innovators to establish direct ties with and among their prospective core activists. 
                                                            
350 See Milli Nizam Partisi Partisi Siyasi Parti Kapatma Davası, 1971/1 (Anayasa Mahkemesi, 20 
Mayıs 1971), Ekler Dosyası [The National Order Party Political Party Closure Case, 1971/1 
(Constitutional Court, 20 May 1971), Appendix files]. (The files and pages are not numbered 
separately. Only on one of the files the numbers “1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9” are noted altogether) These 
files contained the police and witness reports of the opening ceremonies and the transcriptions of the 
recorded speeches of party entrepreneurs, in various towns in addition to application documents for 
the establishment of local party branches. 
351 See for instance the documents on their Boyabat visit in September 18, 1970. Milli Nizam Partisi 
Parti Kapatma Davası, Ek dosyalar. In Boyabat, Cumalıoğlu informed also the “kaymakam”, or 
governor of the subdistrict who was at the time in the “city club,” (şehir klübü). 
352 Emre, 35 Yıl vol.1, 190-191. A further study in these provinces is needed in order to understand 
why the NSM initiative failed at the beginning. The fact that these provinces were considered as the 
strongholds of the NSM in the 1970s (relative to other provinces not relative to other political 
parties) , this question becomes all the more interesting.  
353 Ibid., 191. 
354 McAdam and Paulsen, 662. 
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These were thus the micromobilization contexts in which political socialization and 
collective identity formation processes took place among the potential recruits and 
party innovators. Obviously, not all audience, even those registered as members, 
would become active or even vote for the NSM parties. There may be a number of 
reasons: they could be there only out of curiosity or for recreational purposes; they 
could have already engaged in a political formation and unwilling to change their 
loyalties; personal unavailability; the NSM frames lacking “empirical 
credibility”355 on their part etc.  
However, those who did become active, everything being equal (i.e lack of 
possible obstacles), participated thanks to the collective movement identity formed 
within these contexts. In other words, while the potential recruits arrived to these 
political settings through their individual connections and prior socialization, it was 
within and through these contexts that they decided to participate in the NSM.     
4.2 The Early Networks “Feeding” the NSM in Kayseri: A Meso-level 
Analysis 
Scholars working on social movements and political parties have shown that 
preexisting local social networks and organizations facilitate and inform the 
recruitment and mobilization processes.356 As diachronically and synchronically 
constructed sets of interpersonal relations networks provide “structural connection” 
and “socialization functions”357. On the one hand, they help information flow and 
contacting individuals and on the other, through prior socialization render their 
constituent members predisposed to sympathize with certain ideas and frames.  
While the properties of networks may change depending on the locality, the 
Kayseri case shows that for the establishment of a political party, whether Islamist 
or not, “the articulation of the global and local, the particular and the general”358, a 
                                                            
355 This concept refers to social actors’ perception of the movement frames as congruent with the 
“events in the world” based on their subjective experiences or observances. The frames’ “empirical 
referents lend themselves to being read as “real indicators of the diagnostic claims.”  Benford and 
Snow, 620. 
356 For instance see Diani and McAdam, ed., Social Movements and Networks: Relational 
Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Sawicki, Les réseaux du 
Parti Socialiste.  
357 Passy and Giugni, 127- 128. 
358 Sawicki, 28. 
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political process, needed to take place.  Prior to their engagement to the NSM, the 
activists in Kayseri had been entrenched in some specific professional and business 
relations, religious, friendship, neighborhood and family networks. Moreover they 
had been embedded in right wing political and ideational milieus: either themselves 
or their families, close friends and neighbors supported and voted first the DP and 
then the JP, most had been reading right-wing, particularly Islamist publications, 
and if not they, their close circles, at least once visited right-wing associations 
and/or participated in a conference, meeting or demonstration related to right-wing 
demands discussed in the previous chapter.  The study of the networks, thus, 
highlights, these “frontiers of the milieu partisan [the social settings of the party 
activists], which is considered as the set of relations consolidated between groups 
whose members, though not necessarily aiming at participating in the construction 
of the political party, contribute to [its establishment] through their activities.”359 
Such a conceptualization of the “milieu partisan” in turn implies the existence of 
differential recruitment/entry on the part of the members of these networks. As a 
matter of fact, the study of the networks reveals that, not all, in fact few, of its 
members could be recruited as activists.   
This subsection argues that while the interpersonal ties within particular 
social networks provided the structural connection and socialization functions that 
contributed to the activist recruitment of the NSM in Kayseri, three interrelated 
intervening factors seem to explain the differential recruitment from the networks 
and rightwing milieus in particular and the “periphery” in general. First, it was not 
individuals’ position within the social, economic and political structures of the 
country per se, but within their own locality seem to have played a role. It was 
those who were marginalized vis-à-vis the periphery’s center joined the NSM. 
Second, being at the periphery of the periphery did not render the members of 
various professional, business and religious networks readily available for 
recruitment: the NSM could recruit among only those who lacked any prior 
engagement to or identification with a formal or informal political or politico-
cultural group. Third, everything being equal, generational factor seemed to have 
played a role: the political parties had not been able to accommodate (within their 
parties, in the strict sense of the word, the organization proper, and within the 
                                                            
359 Ibid., 24 
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clientelistic networks) the generational turn, or the emergence of young men at 
beginning of their social and economic careers, that took place between the late 
1960s and the early 1970s.360  
The following is a study of, first, the structure and substance of the 
networks and, second, some common properties of the NSM activists and 
adherents, which differentiated them from other individuals who shared the same 
social settings. 
4.2.1 The Networks of the NSM Activists in Kayseri 
The study of the networks from which the NSM enlisted its activists and 
through the latter their voters is based on not a quantitative work but a qualitative 
one. The frontiers of these networks appeared through an ethnographic study based 
on interviews conducted with NSM, JP and NAP activists and non-NSM Islamists. 
In addition to their personal trajectories, the NSM interviewees provided 
information on the now deceased or aged early local official and unofficial 
entrepreneurs and activists of the NSM (information on their professions and 
approximate age and their social relations with them), which was crosschecked and 
compensated with official application documents of the NOP and news, appeared in 
the daily local press. Overall, data gathered on 38 NSM activists, 12 JP activists361, 
four NAP activists and 17 non-NSM Islamists362, helped to see the right wing 
milieu as a whole in Kayseri in the 1960s and 1970s and highlighted the networks 
from which the NSM could recruit its activists.  
In Kayseri, the NSM found its potential activists and adherents within and 
through mainly four overlapping and crosscutting professional, business, religious, 
and “native” Kayseri family (yerliler) networks.  During the interviews, the NSM 
activists frequently referred to their acquaintances or friends within these networks 
                                                            
360 In the following pages, why the young men which joined the NSM had not joined the newly 
developing NAP (or its predecessor the RPNP) will be discussed in detail. 
361 Based on six face-to-face and six telephone interviews. Among them two were from Konya. 
Though the information gathered on Konya case is not used, it helped to understand Kayseri case 
better. 
362 Among them six followers of Büyük Doğu (Büyük Doğucular), one member of Milli Mücadele 
Birliği and 10 local Yeni Asya Nur students (those who were not born and in Kayseri during the 
NSM mobilization period are excluded). 
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who informed them regarding Erbakan’s upcoming conference, exchanged views 
on Erbakan and the new movement or invited them to join the ranks of the party.  
These networks were the “creeks,” that integrated to form the river that 
irrigated the NSM.  They overlapped through the multipositionality of the social 
actors and cross cut each other through direct and indirect ties. Granovetter argues 
that “the fewer indirect contacts one has the more encapsulated he will be in terms 
of knowledge of the world beyond his own friendship circle.”363  The networks 
were resourceful pools of not only direct but also indirect weak ties (acquintances), 
necessary for information and frame dissemination to longer social distances. These 
relations were forged and reinforced in certain social  (associations and oturma364) 
and spatial (workspace and mosques) environments where right-wing worldviews 
and frames were produced and reproduced. 
The differentiation between professional and business networks is not 
arbitrary but serves to analytically distinguish different relational types from each 
other. On the one hand, professional connections may or may not entail business 
relations. For instance, individuals exercising similar or related professions may 
know each other from school, factory or from some other social setting in which 
their professional affinity and common areas of interest (including religious 
subjects and occupations) bring them into contact.365 On the other hand, business 
relations may take place within the same professional milieu but also across 
different sectors.  Following descriptions of each network, this subsection will 
show how these were overlapped, intertwined and connected in particular social 
and spatial settings. 
                                                            
363 Granovetter,1370. 
364 Since the features and role of the oturma will be discussed below suffice it to say here that it 
involved regular informal meetings of a group of men or families. 
365 Although Turhan Utku is not from Kayseri his succinct description of how this mechanism works 
for him helps to illustrate this point. He says that as a freshmen at the University he had not been 
decided which Associations’ activities he wanted to follow: The “Atatürkist” Association or the 
Nationalists’ Association. He first chose to go the Nationalist Association (his father was a state 
employee and a dedicated RPP supporter) and having observed students who were doing their 
regular daily prayers, he decided to stay. He says “...if you do your prayers you feel closer to those 
who do the same...if someone is from your hometown (hemşehri) you feel close; if he is from your 
school you feel close. For instance you [meet someone] who is engineer [you suddenly feel like] 
your are friends for the last 40 years.” Interview with Turhan Utku, İstanbul, November 1, 2006.  
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To begin with, four main categories of profession appeared among the 
studied 37 NSM official and unofficial366 leaders and executives in Kayseri: civil 
engineers/building contractors (8), skilled craftsmen working in factories or in their 
workshops (mostly ironworkers, machinists, and fitters367, but also carpenter or 
woodworkers) (6), traders in fibers, textiles and/or carpets (6) and finally men of 
religion (4)368 working either in mosques or religious vocational schools.369  
While these categories are analytically useful, it enables one to see only 
partly the depth and range of actual interpersonal relations as they do not do justice 
to the complexity of the individuals’ positions within these categories. For instance, 
civil engineers and skilled craftsmen can be listed under the same professional 
category since most civil engineers were the graduates of the same vocational 
schools370 with skilled craftsmen with whom they might have forged lifelong 
friendships, business relations, or family ties. Nor do these categories show the 
intricacies of the business activities of individuals. Civil engineers also traded in 
building or raw materials, or previously worked as a state employee. Some 
craftsmen first worked in factories, then opened their own workshops, or engaged 
in totally different sectors. Textile or fiber traders could also work as building 
contractors or tailors. Finally, in one extreme case, a famous local preacher was 
also a trader in building materials  (he owned a hardware store). 
As far as the NSM activists are concerned, those working in the same sector 
or having the same profession knew each other either at least by name. For 
instance, the local NSM entrepreneur had already been known and respected by all 
other younger civil engineers since he was older, successful and one of a handful 
early graduates of one of two civil engineering faculties of the 1950s. Similarly, 
                                                            
366 Not all initial leaders of the local NSM took executives posts in Kayseri. 
367 Demirci, tornacı and tesviyeci, respectively. 
368 It should be noted that this number rises to five when one includes the first NSP parliamentarian 
who had previously been the director of the Prayer Leader and Preacher School and a high school 
literature teacher in a vocational in school in Kayseri before moving to Ankara. 
369 There were also three trading in auto parts or repair, one trading in wood, one worker 
(unspecified), six professionals (two pharmacists, one optician, one technical draftsman, one 
manager and one lawyer), one grocery store owner, and one trader (unspecified).   
370 In Kayseri, there were three major vocational schools established to produce skilled workers for 
the existing military institutions (previously factories but later airplane and tank repair centers 
known as Hava İkmal and Ana Tamir respectively) and civil state factories (textile and sugar): Çırak 
Okulu (Apprenticeship School of three years within Hava İkmal), Kayseri Sanat Okulu (Kayseri 
vocational school trainning blacksmiths, fitters etc.) and Yapı Meslek Lisesi (Vocational school of 
construction,  training skilled plasterers, masons, etc.). Yıldız Technical University had a special 
quota for the graduates of the latter two.   
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graduates of vocational schools were mostly familiar with each other’s skills and 
careers. 
Second, as far as the business relations are concerned one should take into 
account the economic context of the late 1960s and 1970s. During these years, in 
Kayseri and in its vicinities, there was a quantitative and then qualitative increase in 
building sector371 (professionalization in the sense that the construction of houses 
and buildings were now delegated to professionals)372 and a quantitative increase in 
small workshops oriented towards production of “windows, doors and frames, 
metal railings, furniture, etc.”373 Consequently, there was a lively commercial 
activity among civil engineers/building contractors, skilled craftsmen (for 
woodwork or ironwork), transporters, traders in building materials such as paint, 
plaster or in raw materials such as wood and iron.374 Parallel to the rise in building 
sector, which was itself partly related to internal migration, there was a rise in the 
furniture sector entailing relations between furniture makers (carpenters) and 
traders in “formica, hardboard, foam and rubber, upholstery textiles, etc.”375 
Obviously, business networks were not limited to the confines of particular sectors 
and professions.  A grocery store owner might have to establish business relations 
with building contractors; engineers, blacksmith, etc. if he decided not only to sell 
spices but also to engage in spice processing business: he would need to build a 
factory and machines. For instance, unable to buy machinery for packaging, one of 
the interviewees worked together with skilled craftsmen and engineers to replicate 
the necessary packaging machine for his products.376  
The business relations were referred frequently during the interviews in 
accounting how they had come to know the NSM. For instance, as one interviewee, 
who was himself a skilled factory foreman and who later opened his own workshop 
                                                            
371 Nermin Abadan-Unat et al., discuss the growth of the building sector in Boğazlıyan (a subdistrict 
of Yozgat bordering Kayseri) and Kayseri. Göç ve Gelişme: Uluslararası İşgücü Göçünün 
Boğazlıyan İlçesi Üzerindeki Etkilerine İlişkin Araştırma (Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık, 1975), 
290-304. 
372 Ibid., 299. 
373 Leo Van Velzen, Peripheral Production in Kayseri Turkey (Ankara: Ajans-Türk Press, 1977), 
173. 
374 For similar business relations in Boğazlıyan see Abadan-Unat et al., 290-303. For a short but 
vivid account of relations among carpenters, building contractors and wood dealers in Kayseri see 
also Van Velzen, 53.  
375 Van Velzen, 57. 
376 Interview with KayNS2, Kayseri, August 16, 2006. 
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has maintained that the engineers and shop owners (traders or artisans) “had 
partnerships, business relations. For example, the man is also a building contractor; 
from one person he buys cement, from another iron. Naturally, in the meantime, 
political views are exchanged, a communication is certainly established.”377 
Third, the religious networks involved personal and professional relations 
between professional and “amateur”378, men of religion and lay Muslims. The local 
mosques, the Advanced Institute of Islam, the Prayer Leader and Preacher School 
were the main institutions where the religious men were employed by the state.   In 
the mosques scattered around the town, or in their homes traditional religious 
scholars also continued teaching various religious subjects. The Naqshbandi 
disciples of Mahmut Sami Efendi of Erenköy or Yahyalılı Hacı Hasan Efendi 
formed another religious network, which was connected and sometimes overlapped 
with the latter two. Not only the students, graduates of the religious schools and 
religious employees and scholars but also above mentioned traders, small shop 
owners, engineers, artisans etc., who supported and benefited from the religious 
services, made up a dense and lively religious network. 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, in Kayseri, these religious networks were 
considered as traditional and “proper” religious milieus and until the mid 1970s the 
religious activities of the Nur students were neither well-known nor appreciated379. 
The following recollection of an NSM activist, in his words a “traditional Muslim,” 
illustrates this point: “…then they heard the call to prayer. Abdullah Hoca380 said 
let’s go to the mosque. The mosque was apparently close. They [the young Nur 
students) said, Master, we have a mescid381 right over here, we pray there. 
[Abdullah Hoca] used to use slang words. He said:  Man (lan) your prayer would 
not be accepted…If you do not go to the mosque who will? You should not break 
apart from the public (umum), from the mosque community.”382  This storyline, 
                                                            
377 Interview with KayNS5, Kayseri, September 27, 2007. 
378 Amateur here refers to those men of religion who do not gain their livelihood through religious 
activities, at least not officially or directly. 
379 The Kayseri Nur student community was quite small, no more than ten to fifteen first circle 
members up until 1970. By mid-1970s they would grow to have 70 active members. Telephone 
interview with KayYA9, undisclosed location, May 4, 2009. 
380 Hoca can roughly be translated as master referring to a preacher or scholar.   
381 Here refers to a small room designated for prayer. 
382 Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006. 
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notwithstanding its empirical reality,383 reflect the views of these “traditional” 
Kayseri circles of the 1960s and 1970s regarding the Nur students. 
The religious networks fortified not only business relations but also personal 
friendships. But most important was the informal right wing political activism of 
some influential local religious leaders384 who began working for the NSM by 
1969. Among them, a) Necmettin Nursaçan, a young preacher at Hunat Camii 
during the late 1960s, became an NSP parliamentary candidate in 1977 and deputy 
president of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in the mid-2000s; b) Abdullah 
Saraçoğlu, a Kayseri native, a respected religious authority with an informal 
education, leader of various oturma groups and founder of Kayseri branch of 
Büyük Doğu Club. Though he became the müftü385 of first Bursa in 1966 and in 
Kocaeli in 1968, he never cut his ties with his native town until his return in 1974 
as müftü of Kayseri. He was one of the unoffocial founders and leaders of the NOP 
and the NSP.386; c) H. Mehmet Çorakçı was a very famous unofficial preacher (and 
a hardware store owner). While whether or not he ever officially enlisted in the 
NOP or NSP is not clear, as a well-respected preacher and chair of the Philantropic 
Association for Prayer Leader and Preacher and Theology Schooling he enjoyed a 
very diverse social capital, which he mobilized for the NSM from the very 
beginning. 
Four, the network of “native” Kayseri families (yerliler) as a source of NSM 
activist recruitment needs to be mentioned. In Kayseri, families which claimed to 
be original habitants of downtown Kayseri consisted a network apart, which 
transcended political, social and economic positions and statuses of individuals.  
                                                            
383It should be added that it was not necessarily the case that Nur students avoid mosques.  In fact, 
mosques were the initial environments where they found audience for their Nur classes. However, it 
is true that Nur students from the first circle rather than going to a mosque would prefer praying in 
their medreses. 
384 The information provided here were brought together from bits and pieces of data gathered from 
several local newspapers and interviews. Two official biographies published on 
http://www.tasciogluhafiz.com are also used. 
385Highest official religious authority in a district or subdistrict under the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs. 
386 He was from an eminent trading family of Kayseri. His brother, a trader in watches and eye-
glasses, was also one of the local leaders of the NSM and an official founder of the local NOP. In 
1962 he became one of the founders of a local religious school (course) for memorizing Kur’an. In 
1965, he was a teacher at Kayseri Prayer Leader and Preacher School.  For more information on 
Saraçoğlu see http://www.tasciogluhafiz.com/?pid=35 (Accessed June 25, 2011) 
http://www.kocaelimuftulugu.gov.tr/Sayfa_Modul.asp?nedir=sayfa&id=92 (Accessed June 25, 
2011) 
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They all knew each other at least by name and had some connection with each other 
through marriages and business partnership. “Vineyard house” neighborhood was 
particularly effective in creating relations among the natives since the tradition to 
move to vineyard houses (bağa göçmek) in the outskirts of majestic Erciyes 
Mountain for the summer season existed only among the natives.  
The natives distinguished themselves from others mostly symbolically by 
emphasizing their difference through subtle and not so subtle ways. To begin with, 
the “others” consisted of “peasants” (köylüler, coming from the subdistricts or 
villages of Kayseri, Yozgat etc.) and “outsiders” (they were referred by their city of 
origin, i.e Adanalı, Malatyalı etc.). Even immigrants from Talas, a very large 
subdistrict just seven kilometers away from downtown Kayseri, were considered 
peasants.  
The distinction between the natives and the peasants appeared during the 
interviews as the natives constructed sentences like “I was a child of a certain 
Kayseri family;” “I had friends in the NOP, people we know of as Kayseri people;” 
or answered the question on their family origins, as “we are Kayseri natives 
(yerlisiyiz), regretfully nowadays only few of us are left.”387 Inquired further they 
would do such comments on their status as follows: “Though their numbers 
dropped…the natives are the owners of this city, Kayseri….They are the men who 
see Erciyes in their dreams.”388 
 In addition to the natives’ remarks, the so-called “peasants,” also 
emphasized that the natives were distinguishing themselves from others. In addition 
to some painful childhood memories from their first couple of years of education in 
Kayseri, they mostly referred to the dominance of the natives in the political parties 
in particular and in the city life in general. The most striking example they gave 
was the fact that while the funeral prayers of the natives were performed at Camii 
Kebir, the largest mosque in Kayseri downtown, in the middle of the marketplace, 
from the Seljuk period, those of the peasants were performed in Hunat Camii, a 
smaller mosque from the same period close to the marketplace.  
                                                            
387 Interviews with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006 and KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 
2009. 
388 Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006. 
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These symbolic differences did not mean, however, a strict exclusion of or 
discrimination against the peasants in political, business, social and religious life. 
The natives tried rather to assimilate them and the “peasants” tried to blend in. On 
the one hand, for the natives, producing and reproducing “nativity” meant 
maintaining a specific party of their social capital, just one set, albeit an important 
one, of interpersonal relations at their disposal that could be mobilized for various 
individual and social symbolic and material needs. The inclusion of the others 
amidst them would thus mean diversification and extension of their overall social 
capital without undermining the former.389 The native activists did not refrain 
marrying their children, at least their daughters, to “successful” peasants. As a 
matter of fact, some eminent families of the period had originally come from 
nearby villages, such the Kızıklı or Karakimseli families390. Another evidence for 
such “acceptance” was that though the natives’ funerals were not performed in 
Hunat, the peasants’ funerals could also be conducted in Camii Kebir. 
On the other hand, coming from different regions and villages, “the others” 
despite their professional skills, education, and their economic capital ensued from 
the latter, lacked such a ready to use social capital 391 unless they established close 
relations with the natives.  The 13 “peasants” among the 38 NSM local leaders392 
were high-achieved men (relative to their fellow village men) in their respective 
professions (engineering, technical or religious) and were connected to or 
embedded in native networks through marriage, political alliance, friendship or 
religious bond.  
Finally, to get a better grasp of the social tissue that fed the NSM one needs 
to see how the relations established within professional, business, religious and 
                                                            
389 Their strategies and practices to reproduce their nativity, to “reconvert” their capital accruing 
from being a native is very diverse and needs a further study. To understand how such processes as 
reproductions and reconversions of “nobility” (as being native in Kayseri is defined in terms very 
similar to being a native) occur in a rapidly changing and challenging environment see the pioneer 
study Monique de Saint Martin, L’Espace de la Noblesse (Paris: Métailié, 1993). 
390These two examples were given by an activist from a similar native-with-a-village-origin family. 
Interview with KayNS19, Kayseri, September 28, 2006. These families traced their origins to certain 
Ottoman governors who were given land in the greater Kayseri region, which might have facilitated 
their rise to power. However, the fact that their origins are still pronounced point towards the 
natives’ insistence to protect their own “purity.” 
391 The social capital that accrued from relations with fellow villagers could be important, in other 
walks of life, but could not be transformed into social, symbolic or economic capital in their 
relations with the natives.   
392 The number includes the Kayseri NSP deputy as well. 19 were natives. The origin of six activists 
could not be established. 
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native family milieus were reinforced, connected and overlapped in some major 
social and spatial settings.  It was mostly within these contexts that the right wing 
ethos prevailed and reproduced.393 In addition to their role in creating further weak 
ties (acquintances, political alliances, business deals) that eased communication, 
these settings enabled the members of these particular networks to get to know each 
other better, that is, to create and strengthen strong ties of friendship.   
 There were two such major social settings, one formal and the other 
informal: civil associations and oturma. First, civil associations can be categorized 
under three headings: professional, religious and politico-cultural associations. 
While within the former two members carrying left-wing, or at least RPP identity 
could possibly be present394, the right wing members, thus ideational elements, 
were dominant. While the leaders of the professional (and also the religious) 
associations were either JP executives themselves or had clientelistic relations with 
them,395 the rank and file members displayed all the colors of the right wing. Beside 
their professional goals, these associations provided the social spaces within and 
through which political and business alliances were formed.  
Aside from the associations for professionals of religion, the religious 
associations396 gave men of religion (including scholars and their students) and lay 
Muslims to get acquainted and form relations outside the boundaries of religious 
                                                            
393 For a study which challenges a homogenous view of civil society as a fully autonomous force 
from the state and political parties and which draws attention to various expressions, usages and 
functions of the right wing ethos (mostly shaped around nationalism) in “civil society” see Günter 
Seufert, Karin Vorhoff and Stephane Yerasimos, ed., Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: 
Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey (İstanbul: Ergon, 2000.)   
394 Particularly, since the membership to professional organizations was required by law, they 
contained members with different worldviews.  Since religiosity was not peculiar to the right wing it 
may be argued that the religious associations also contained some RPP sympathizers. However, 
historically, the establishment of the religious associations went hand in hand with an opposition to 
the RPP policies of religion and with the initiative of DP and JP activists or supporters. It is thus 
safe to assume that they were not frequented much by the RPP members. 
395 Since the properties of power relations within professional and religious organizations and the 
relations between them and the JP help to discern the peculiarities of NSM activists, they will be 
discussed in the following subsection.  
396 For instance the Association of Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu or, the above mentioned Philanthropic 
Association for Prayer Leader and Preacher and Theology Schooling. The former was a private 
school (course) under the authority of the Ministry of Education training its students to completely 
memorize the Koran. 
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practices (i.e prayers, funerals, and rituals) such as political alliances and 
friendships.397  
 As far as the politico-cultural associations are concerned since they were 
established to promote ultranationalist and/or Islamist worldviews they did not 
contain RPP or left-wing sympathizers. They were open to anyone who were 
interested in their activities, and were particularly popular among the young men 
who sought recreational activities. Not necessarily card carrying members, high 
school (including vocational school) students, students studying in Advanced 
Institute for Islam or of Education, young men working in the factories, 
marketplace or the industrial zone attended conferences of famous right wing poets 
and writers (particularly Necip Fazıl), read right wing and Islamist publications 
(especially Büyük Doğu, Serdengeçti, Bugün) or just chitchatted with each other in 
association headquarters.   
 During the 1960s either the organizations as legal entities or their members 
took part in the early country-wide right wing mobilization that were discussed in 
the previous chapter and involved in certain collective actions limited to Kayseri398.  
For instance, a news that appeared in a local ultranationalist daily, on the Rise Up 
(Şahlanış Mitingi) meeting of 1968 in Kayseri provides a laundry list of these right-
wing or right-wing dominated civil associations. As shall be remembered, the Rise 
Up meetings were organized in order to protest the left. The local newspaper 
informs that the “freemasons,” implying the JP liberals, were also the target of this 
collective action.399  The participant professional organizations were the Nationalist 
Teachers’ Syndicate, Association of Religious Employees, which can also be 
                                                            
397 Yücekök shows that Kayseri, similar to other more developed cities in the country (except 
industrial regions such as İstanbul and Adana), hosted the highest number of professional and 
religious associations. In 1965, there were one religious association for every 2311 individuals 
(national average is 7143) and one professional association for every 10470 individuals (national 
average is 14006). In 1968, in the greater Kayseri district there were 359 religious associations 
including 263 organizations for construction of mosques. However, Yücekök analyzes these 
associations in terms of regional socio-economic development and concludes that in more developed 
regions such as Kayseri they indicate a rising reaction of those traditional traders and shopowners 
who cannot adapt themselves to new conditions, and in less developed regions the reproduction of 
the existing status quo of traditional forces. Yücekök, 178-188 and the Appendix. 
As shall be seen, this chapter brings an alternative perspective and tries to show that the prospective 
NSM activists were well adopted to industrial development but faced difficulties as result of 
exclusion from decision making mechanisms in professional organizations and the JP.   
398 For instance, the street protest of the Prayer Leader and Preacher School students and graduates 
in 1968 for the right to enter universities with their diplomes, or the mob-like action against the left-
wing TÖS (Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası, Teachers’ Syndicate of Turkey) congress in 1969.   
399 Yeni Sabah, March 30, 1968. 
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considered a religious association, The Association of Craftsmen Unions (Esnaf 
Birlikleri Derneği), Associations of  Hotel-keepers, stove-makers, ironworkers, 
woodworkers, Kayseri Chamber of Commerce and TEKSİF ( Turkish abbreviation 
for Textile, Tricotage, and Clothing Industry Workers’ Syndicate of Turkey).  As 
can be seen, this list mostly overlaps with that of the professional networks from 
which the NSM recruited its members. The religious associations which 
participated the Rise Up meeting were the Association for the students of Advanced 
Institute for Islam and the Association for the Graduates of Prayer Leader and 
Preacher school. The politico-cultural organizations were Nationalist Teachers’ 
Association, Turkish Cultural Association (Türk Kültür Derneği), the Turkish 
Hearth (Türk Ocağı) and Büyük Doğu Club. The members of these civil 
associations not only sympathized with rightwing frames but also reproduced and 
disseminated them at the local level.  
Second, oturma, was the other main social setting, a major local informal 
institution, which brought together members of different associations, professional, 
business, religious and native family networks in the intimate setting of individuals’ 
homes. Oturma, as shall be remembered, was the name given to regular informal 
meetings of a group of men or families, which harked back as long as 50 years in 
some cases.400 While civil associations usually accommodated weak ties, oturma 
was the embodiment of strong ties par excellence. Originally a “native” tradition, 
oturma was the social context that enabled men who had got acquainted and grew 
affection for each other within various contexts to deepen their relationship into 
life-long friendships. Men might have different oturma groups (neighborhood, 
apartment-building, or mixed groups from the workplace, school and business 
networks) with different dominant themes such as classical Turkish music, 
literature or religious conversation. A typical oturma, however, involved around 10 
to 20 person, an informal “leader” moderating the conversations (usually the oldest 
or a man of religion), drinking a soup peculiar to the Central Anatolia (Arabaşı) or 
tea and conversations and discussions on various subjects of interest such as 
religious issues, business experiences, and the like.  
                                                            
400 The longest standing oturma group mentioned in the interviews has been around for 52 years.  
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 Since the members of an oturma were not necessarily from the same 
business, professional, or regional milieus and their party allegiances could differ, 
this institution provided an ideal context for exchange of news and ideas on the 
city’s social, economic, and political life. However, despite the differences in party 
allegiances, the participants as a whole were either from right wing or left wing 
milieus. Consequently, the oturma provided an additional context for the 
sympathizers of the right wing to reproduce and disseminate the right wing frames 
(Islamist, ultranationalist, etc.) that emerged during the collective actions of the 
1960s.401 Consequently, not only the oturma hosted a potential pool of activists 
with whom the NSM frames could resonate, but also helped the NSM entrepreneurs 
to reach their potential local elites and activists through providing structural 
connection. The national NSM elites were able to get access to some influential 
local men who had been frequenting various oturma groups in town. Their 
acquaintances and friends of Kayseri origin in the Islamist engineer-civil servant 
circles in Ankara and İstanbul formed the early bridges between the national and 
local levels. Once a relationship is established the latter began to serve as a 
platform where the NSM ideational elements, notwithstanding the actual rate of 
participation into the NSM and the way in which specific actors receive them, 
could freely circulate and penetrate into the right wing networks. 
In addition to these formally and informally institutionalized social 
environments, two socio-spatial setting, the workspace and the downtown mosques, 
need to be tackled as well since unlike civil associations and oturma, which 
convened in intervals, they constituted the every day context of most future NSM 
activists in particular and the members of the above mentioned networks in general. 
A workspace can be defined as a geographical or spatial setting in which people 
work and establish a variety of ties, which are not limited to professional and 
business relations.  In the case of Kayseri, the ancient marketplace (çarşı) in 
                                                            
401 An insightful discussion on oturma demonstrates how this institution has evolved over the years 
as to substitute for formal and informal open public channels of local policy making such as political 
parties, associations, urban spaces such as coffeehouses. Oturma helped to create, what the author 
calls, a “provisional public space” (Eğreti Kamusallık) where only those who commanded a certain 
economic and social capital could shape or influence the policies of public investment, urban 
development and reconstruction. Ali Ekber Doğan argues that while previously the oturmas were 
social resources for political parties, today they (particularly those of the rich that come together at 
the outskirts of  Erciyes) became the dominant institutions overpowering even the political parties. 
See his Eğreti Kamusallık, 242-252. 
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downtown and the industrial zone (sanayi) built in 1956402, were the two 
workspaces geographically very close to each other in downtown. In these places, 
tradesmen, small shop and workshop owners not only working in the same sector 
and having business dealings, but also in different sectors and having no business 
or professional ties whatsoever could establish relations by virtue of, usually, being 
neighbors, but also belonging to a native Kayseri family, coming from a same 
subdistrict of Kayseri or frequenting the same mosque for mid-day and afternoon 
prayer.403  
The mosques within or close to the marketplace (Camii Kebir and Hunat 
Camii) were part of the workspace but also separate spatial settings not only 
because they brought together the vicinity’s small traders, craftsmen, engineers etc. 
for prayers during the day but also because they provided a relaxing environment 
for the mosque community where small talk, exchange of information and news, 
regularly took place. It should be added that a major right wing protest action of the 
late 1960s, collective morning prayers organized by the daily Bugün all over the 
country, took place in Hunat Camii as well, bringing together not only the regular 
mosque community but also participants from greater Kayseri and neighboring 
towns. 
An incident that took place on July 8, 1969 in Kayseri is a powerful 
example that illustrates how the complex web of professional, business, workspace, 
and mosque relations within the marketplace and industrial zone carrying a right 
wing ethos could rapidly disseminate information and produce collective action 
within a very short time frame. That day Kayseri witnessed a major right-wing 
mobilization: thousands of shop owners and workers from the marketplace and 
industrial zone, also high and middle school students frequenting the Nationalists’ 
Association and Association for Fighting Against Communism404 marched towards 
the Alemdar cinema theater where the general congress of left-wing TÖS 
                                                            
402 van Venzel, 17. 
403 Please see the Appendix D, Figure 2, for downtown Kayseri, industrial zone, the market place 
and the two major mosques, Camii Kebir and Hunat Camii. 
404 The information regarding the involvement of these two politico-cultural associations is provided 
by a then ultranationalist activist (today an independent Islamist intellectual figure in town), who 
participated in the mobilization. Interview with KayNAP3, Kayseri, September 4, 2006.  
It is interesting to note that he was from a notable (native with a village origin) family of Kayseri 
who had sent its first parliamentarian to the Second Grand National Assembly (1923-1927). In the 
1960s and 1970s, the family was supporting the JP.  
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(Teachers’ Syndicate of Turkey)405 was taking place. The night before, following a 
peaceful first day of the congress, there were explosions in two mosques (Sümer 
Örnekevler Camii, Mimar Sinan Camii), Prayer Leader and Preacher School and 
Turkish Cultural Association.406 It appears that early in the morning, first the news, 
or rather the buzz, that the left-wing militants were responsible for the explosions 
traversed the marketplace and the industrial zone and, second a consensus appeared 
to protest, even drive out the TÖS members out of the town. Early in the morning a 
large crowd was formed outside the theater protesting the teachers, and some 
groups resorted to violence, breaking down glasses of nearby restaurants, attacking 
the teachers, a left-wing bookstore, a church407, a brothel and a woman with mini-
skirt.408   
Following the incident, leaders of a number of civil organizations published 
a declaration in the Islamist magazine Büyük Doğu409, criticizing not the violence 
but the mainstream newspapers, which had found the attacks outrageous and 
reactionary (gerici). They asserted that the notables (şehrimiz ileri gelenleri) of the 
town and members of the associations, though they tried their best, could not 
entirely calm down the people (it should be noted that most of “the people” were 
actually their members). They were happy that there were no injured or dead410, but 
more sorry that this incident happened. But they were even more sorry that some 
circles tried to portray these regretful events as a reactionary movement.411 It was a 
                                                            
405 Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası.  
406 For the places of explosions, the cinema theater where the congress took place and their 
proximity to the above mentioned workspaces please see the Appendix D, Figure 2. 
407 Kayseri was an ancient city, which hosted sizeable Armenian and Greek-orthodox communities 
during the Ottoman Empire until the early 20th century. Although the Armenians were forced to 
migrate from the town in 1915 and the Greeks were obliged to leave for Greece following the 
establishment of the Republic, there were still some Armenians living in town up until the 1970s and 
their church was intact. The last few Armenians of Kayseri left for İstanbul during these years. 
408 According to Milliyet, there were around six to seven thousand protestors. “Kayseri’de tahribat,” 
Milliyet, July 9, 1969.  The above mentioned young ultranationalist reports that those who actually 
tried to burn the theater and attacked the bookstore were the youths from the Nationalists’ 
Association and the Association for Fighting against Communism. He also says that the family, the 
Top family, who owned the bookstore eventually moved out from Kayseri: “What happens if you 
raid their store each week. There were lots of socialist and communist publications. We would just 
destroy their windows, glasses and books…They could not stand it anymore and they left.” He says 
that a family member was actually his classmate at high school. KayNAP3, Kayseri, September 4, 
2006. It should be added that following such incidents (the TÖS incident was his first arrest) they 
would be arrested for a short period and let go. 
409 “Bildiri,” Büyük Doğu  3 (July 1969),18, 32.  
410 There was at least one injured, the mini-skirted woman that some protestors attacked.  
411 “...bazı çevrelerin müessef hadiseleri Kayseri de bir gerici hareketi gibi gösterme gayretleri ise 
olaydan fazla üzücü ve insafsız bulunmuştur.”   
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fact that one has to be proud, that Kayseri people, like the Turkish nation as a 
whole, were very attached to their religion. Having been religiously offended, they 
gave a minor response (küçük bir mukabele) as opposed to what would Christians 
in Europe do as a result of such an attack to their churches.412  
The declaration413 was signed by the leaders of the following, some by now 
familiar, right wing, or right wing dominated, organizations: Chamber of Industry, 
Craftsman’s Cooperative (Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifi), Chamber of Commerce, the 
Association of Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu, the Philantropic Association for Prayer 
Leader and Preacher and Theology Schooling, Turkish Cultural Association, the 
Association of Craftsmen Union (Esnaf Birlikleri Derneği) and Associations of 
Shoemakers, Stove-makers, Ironworkers, Copperworkers, Barbers and Coiffeurs.  
The event and the list of associations show the mobilization potential of the 
existing right-wing networks, and the power of the right-wing mobilizing frames in 
Kayseri based on Muslimness and Turkishness.414 The structural and socialization 
functions of these networks helped the NSM to reach first its activists, and then 
through their associative ties and electoral efforts, the voters: in 1973, in downtown 
Kayseri the NSM acquired 20, 81% of the votes415. However, this event also 
highlights a sharp contrast between the numbers of potential sympathizers of the 
NSM frames (which included the TOBB frames) and the difficulties the party 
innovators faced in recruiting its local leaders and activists and maintaining a stable 
electoral base. Having been unable to recruit from the local JP branch, its main 
                                                            
412 Ibid., 18. For an example of how this incident was receieved and reflected by a  nationally 
distributed Islamist press (Yeni Asya) see Appendix G, Figure 13. 
413 As shall be remembered the right wing collective actions of the 1960s in general involved 
frequently petition signing campaigns and joint declarations on the part various associations. Here it 
should be added that as in many democratic states such collective actions are part and parcel of 
social movements and mobilization as “repertoires of action”, in Turkey too these actions are closely 
tied to the enlargement and democratization of the political arena dating back to the Ottoman Period. 
For instance, Aykut Kansu shows that prior to the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, for two years, 
from the east to the west there were petition campaigns and declarations against a tax law targeting 
the Sultan’s administration, which in turn formed structural and socialization basis for the upcoming 
constitutional revolution. See his The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey (Leiden and New York: Brill, 
1997). 
414 It should be added that since the researcher realized the analytical utility of the TÖS incident 
towards the end of her interviews with the NSM activists, the question of whether or not the 
interviewee actually took party in the protest could be asked to only last five interviewees. Only one 
reported participation. Be that as it may, among the previous interviewees, there were many who 
discussed the event without mentioning whether or not they had actually participated. This event had 
unintended consequences for the NSM mobilization. 
415http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?il_id=472&ilce_id=5037&x=31&y=14&yil_id=7&sonuc_ge
tir=TRUE  
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target, as was the case in other regions, the NOP leaders had to organize opening 
ceremonies in Kayseri to attract members and activists. Moreover, while they were 
able to capitalize on the existing right wing potential in the general election of 
1973, the loyalty of activists, thus voters was still contingent on a number of issues. 
Due to vertical and horizontal intraparty conflicts, the party activists would not 
deliver the necessary electoral effort and the NSM would not protect this electoral 
base in 1977: in downtown Kayseri, the NSP would get only 10,03 of the votes416. 
4.2.2 Differential Recruitment/entry417 to the NSM in Kayseri 
The right wing ethos and a peripheral position vis-à-vis the administrative 
and economic centers were common to all the members of the above-discussed 
networks. Yet, relatively few joined the NSM as activist. This section aims at 
examining differential recruitment/entry to the NSM from these networks and, 
through this study, highlighting some common properties of the NSM activists. 
Here it is argued that at the local level there were at least three intervening 
factors that influenced the differential entry to the NSM. First, individuals’ 
structural position within the local economic and political networks needs to be 
taken into account. It is not the marginalization vis-à-vis the “center” per se but the 
relative marginalization seems to account for different levels of interest to the new 
party initiative.418 Though, economically dynamic, the NSM activists were 
peripheral within the economic and political networks that tied the periphery to the 
center. Second, being peripheral at the periphery did not necessarily urge 
individuals to join the NSM. A prior engagement to or identification with a political 
party, group or organization or their lack thereof affected such a decision. Third, 
the generational factor and political parties’ formal and informal institutions, ceteris 
                                                            
416http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?il_id=405&ilce_id=4399&x=24&y=10&yil_id=8&sonuc_ge
tir=TRUE  
417 As discussed earlier the concept differential recruitment/entry refers to the question of divergence 
in entering an incipient or long standing movement among the individuals populating a common 
area, network, group, social class, etc. In other words, it deals with the question of why and how a 
movement can recruit some individuals but not others.  
418 For an excellent work on how structural positions of the local elites in a given network and their 
respective relations with the “federal patronage” and “local clients” influence their allegiances and 
political actions (their involvement or not in the Whiskey Rebellion in the 1790s in the United 
States) see Roger V. Gould, “Political Networks and the Local/National Boundary in the Whiskey 
Rebellion,” in Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics, ed. Michael P. 
Hanagan (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 36-53. 
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paribus, have contributed to the participation to the NSM. The potential recruits 
were politically and organizationally unattached. As far as the JP is concerned, a) 
this party and its clientelistic network were neither able nor willing to integrate 
young men, or latecomers to the political, social and economic scene, to positions 
of power where they could directly influence decision making processes and benefit 
more from the distribution of state controlled material and symbolic spoils; b) at the 
beginning of their social and economic careers, these young men were not in a 
position to individually force their way up within the JP. As for the NAP, though it 
was institutionally more open, its frames and its activists’ practices had repelled the 
future NSM recruits. 
 These factors then narrowed down the properties of the NSM activists as 
follows: they were socially and economically upwardly mobile, relatively young, 
shopowners, artisans, engineers and traders. On the one hand, as Binnaz Toprak 
also observed focusing on the NSP parliamentary candidates419, they were 
professionally successful and well educated (formally or informally in their own 
branches) young men, and by no means traditional shop owners and artisans “who 
have been adversely affected by modernization and turned to religion as a means of 
registering their discontent”420.  On the other hand, they had limited and dependent 
access to political and economic resources compared to small-medium421 and 
medium scale business owners. The latter was frustrated by the alliance of the large 
businesses and the government422, but controlled the economic and political 
resources available for the periphery. What differentiated the NSM activists from 
them were their relatively young age, their lack of a previous identification with a 
collectivity, and their difficulties in influencing economic and political decision-
making processes. Thus, in contrast to Toprak’s argument, it was not their “deep 
interest in religion” which distinguished them from their counterparts.423 They 
                                                            
419 Toprak, Islam and Political Development,107. 
420 Şerif Mardin claimed that the NSP was the party of the small shopowners and artisans who 
remained “unassimilated into the “modernist center”” because of “the social and economic failures, 
with whom Kemalism has proved unable to cope.” “Religion and the Turkish Social 
Transformation” (paper presented at the conference on “The Republic of Turkey, 1923-1973: 
Studies in 20th Century Nation-Building,” University of Chicago, December 1973), quoted in 
Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development, 105. 
421 van Venzel considers enterprises with 25 to 100 employees small middle-scale. van Venzel, 67.  
422 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay argues that the NSP was a product of a clash of cultural and economic interests 
and represented the small and medium size “provincial capital.” Sarıbay, 96, 219. 
423 Toprak, Islam and Political Development, 107-108.   
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shared the same religious networks and used the same right wing frames with those 
who did not enter the NSM. They did not constitute a “counter elite” with deeper 
religious sensibilities as of yet, since the latter, as shall be seen in the next chapter, 
was itself a product of the NSM collective identity formation.  
Whither periphery? 
In the first press conference following his veto, Erbakan asserted that he had 
applied to the JP to help his friends within the party and that his veto is not a simple 
matter but prone to produce important outcomes. While he did not specify what 
would those outcomes be, he seemed to imply they would be related to the JP’s 
future: a possible division within the party. In the same conference, he also 
emphasized that the economic development of the country is possible through the 
development of Anatolia but that the bank deposits of Anatolian entrepreneurs are 
spent to finance the imports of the İstanbul merchants.424 As discussed in the 
previous section, and this press conference demonstrates, the party entrepreneurs 
primarily aimed at mobilizing the JP local branches and the local economic elites 
associated with this party in Anatolia.  Through their recruitment, it would be much 
easier to reach right wing milieus, thus attract their clients and voters and establish 
local party organizations.  
Despite the potential appeal of the TOBB frame, the discontented JP local 
executives (owners of small and medium businesses) and delegates and members 
(mostly small merchants and craftsman) did not quit their party and when few did, 
they went to the NAP which had been reorganized within the last few years425. 
While the commercial and industrial businesses in Kayseri were as a whole 
peripheral vis-à-vis, say, İstanbul, İzmit or İzmir, the owners of small-medium and 
medium scale enterprises, were at the center of the socio-economic and political life 
of Kayseri.  Though they were vulnerable compared to large enterprises, through 
the medium of the existing political parties, particularly the JP, they controlled the 
socio-political and economic networks that linked the center and the periphery, 
                                                            
424 “Müracaatımdaki büyük faydayı kavrayamadılar,” Bizim Anadolu, August 21, 1969.   
425 It seems, in Kayseri, the NAP (then its name was still the RPNP) had been on the rise between 
1967-1969. Some discontented conservative-nationalist elites of the local JP branch, for instance, 
KayJP6 and Fikret Erel, joined the NAP by late 1969.  Interview with KayJP6, Kayseri, March 17, 
2009 
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which reinforced their economic, social and political power at the local level. Even 
a person who expelled from the JP could continue enjoying the advantages of these 
networks. For instance, Mehmet Kaşıkçı, the leader of the (Mehmet) “Çalık 
faction”, one of the three factions competing within the local JP, after having been 
dismissed from the JP by disciplinary action426, landed to the chairmanship of the 
board of directors of zinc processing factory, Çinkur, a joint venture of public and 
private sectors in Kayseri.427 
There are three indicators, which help distinguishing “the center of the 
periphery”. First, as mentioned in the previous chapter, in Kayseri the JP local 
executives also served in the Municipal and General District Assemblies.428 
Moreover, as owners of small-medium and medium size businesses they also 
dominated the local chambers of commerce and industry (they were executives 
and/or assembly members) at the expense of small-scale enterprises429. Second, in 
addition to their dominance within the local chambers, some had sidestepped the 
existing laws (the government turning a blind eye)430 and enlisted also in and 
controlled the professional associations established for small shop and workshop 
owners.  For instance, the head of the Craftsman’s Cooperative (Esnaf Kefalet 
Kooperatifi) and the local chamber of industry was the same person, Cemal 
Bilgin.431 The annual congress of the Cooperative in 1969 was directed by names432 
who were also at the administrative positions both within the JP and the local 
chambers.433  
Thus, the JP executives who already had easier access to state controlled 
resources through their political connections and control of the local chambers also 
acquired “credits, subsidies, and special import quotas that had been earmarked for 
                                                            
426 “Mehmet Kaşıkçı A.P den tamamen ihraç edildi,” Hakimiyet, February 25, 1969. 
427 See Hakimiyet, February 11, 1970. 
428 For who’s who in the local chambers of commerce and industry, General District Assembly and 
Municipal Assembly see 1968 Kayseri İl Yıllığı (Kayseri: Kayseri Valiliği [İçişleri Bakanlığı], 
1968).  
429 The Chamber of Industry accepted  “production-oriented businesses with more than 5 
employees.” van Venzel, 46  
430 Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 249.  
431 “Bildiri,”18. 
432 “Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifinin yıllık kongresi dün yapıldı,” Hakimiyet, March 28, 1969.  
433 See the local newspapers, Hakimiyet and Yeni Sabah, for the names elected for the offices of the 
local chambers and the JP between 1965-1971.    
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small traders and artisans.”434 Moreoever, small producers, whether artisans or 
small scale enterprises, were depended on traders not only to buy raw materials but 
also to market their finished product, or to take loans.435  Small traders experienced 
similar difficulties vis-à-vis medium traders in Kayseri. For instance, a small textile 
trader could not buy the best or latest fashionable fabrics as the distributor in 
İstanbul would prefer a bigger company in Kayseri with whom he had long 
established trust relations.436 
Though a more focused study is needed, some news pieces that appeared in 
a right wing national daily suggest that during the late 1960s, small enterprises, 
members or non-members of the chambers, operating within particular sectors 
became particularly vulnerable within this structure. For instance, in June 1969, the 
government prohibited the import of “textile machinery.” Only factories that had 
contracts with the state could import “industrial sewing machines.”437 This meant 
that a large business which produced military and police garments for the state, 
such as the company of a leading JP, then NAP, executive in Kayseri, could 
improve its business, or that above mentioned chair of Craftmens’ Cooperative, 
who produced sewing machines, would be protected and increase his profit. But a 
small textile trader who wanted to, say, transform his enterprise to a small 
manufacturing company would be unable to do so as they would not be able to buy 
an affordable industrial machine for the institutional reasons provided above. 
Another example is on the sector trading or using iron and iron scrap. It appears 
that, until 1969, there had been an iron shortage and a resulting iron and iron scrap 
black-market.438   The government policies on iron importation had no doubt 
affected primarily smaller actors within the building sector: building contractors, 
hardware stores, and ironworkers.  
 That there was a reaction to these and similar policies was evident during 
the TOBB Affair.  As the renewal of TOBB elections approached following 
Erbakan’s departure, some sectors439 mobilized against the government, inviting 
                                                            
434 Bianchi, 136. It should be added that this has been the case since the 1950s.  
435 van Velzen, 53-59. 
436 Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.   
437 “Ticaret Bakanlığı Batur’un emrinde mi?” Bizim Anadolu, June 19, 1969. 
438 “Sanayi Bakanlığı inşaat demiri ithaline başlıyor” Bizim Anadolu June 24, 1969. 
439 It is reported that the mobilized sectors on behalf of Erbakan were knitters, paint, wood, textile, 
fiber traders, printing businesses and hotel owners. See Bizim Anadolu, November 13, 1969. 
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thereby an intervention. For instance, in İstanbul, the district electoral board (İl 
Seçim Kurulu) abolished the election results of the following groups: iron traders, 
hardware store owners, and knitters.440 
To sum up, while the party innovators had targeted the right wing milieus 
and manufacturers and merchants of Anatolian towns as a whole, they could recruit 
only those individuals who were marginally situated in the networks that tied the 
center to the periphery.  These individuals were fully embedded in the right wing 
milieus through acquaintances, friendships or family ties, but situated at the 
“periphery of the periphery” in terms of political and economic relations.  
Salience of identity 
McAdam and Paulsen argue that prior ties lead to activism if “they (a) 
reinforce the potential recruit’s identification with a particular identity and  (b) help 
to establish a strong linkage, between that identity and the movement in question. 
…In the absence of these processes, prior ties do not appear to be predictive of 
participation.”441 The election of Erbakan to the chairmanship of the Union showed 
that the “injustice and exclusion” and “material and moral development” frames of 
the party innovators were potent forces of mobilization not only among the 
members of the periphery of the periphery but also the center of the periphery. Both 
local elite groups shared the same social networks marked by right wing frames and 
had a view of themselves as being marginalized. Yet, both the center of the 
periphery and many members of the periphery of the periphery remained aloof to 
the new party initiative.  
This, in turn, suggests the existence of “multivalent influences at the 
individual level.”442 While some social ties may encourage activism some others 
may prevent an individual from joining a movement.  In other words, some 
identities acquired through social ties may be more salient than others. The identity 
                                                            
440 See Bizim Anadolu, December 24, 1969. Previously, among the 230 and odd İstanbul companies, 
which supported Erbakan during the police intervention, hardware stores, iron workshops and 
related building sector businesses (electrical appliances, paint traders) were numerous.  The exact 
number of the latter, and which other sector representatives signed the declaration, are not clear as 
many companies did not specify their sector in their names. See “Polis Odalar Birliğini basıp, 
kapılarını kırdı” Bizim Anadolu, August 9, 1969.  
441 McAdam and Paulsen, 663. 
442 Kitts, 252. 
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invoked and reinforced by a movement may not be an individual’s most salient 
identity.443 The NSM, then, could recruit only among those who lacked a prior 
“positively valued” collective identity, and collective ties that opposed the 
participation to the new party initiative.444  
As a matter of fact, out of 17 local NSM interviewees only one had 
previously been embedded in a formal or informal political or politico-cultural 
organization. Even in that case, the ties had already been weakened as a result of 
some political and contingent events.445  There were four people who had relatives 
among the local/JP elite circles and two others who briefly frequented, or 
sympathized with, the NAP.  But among them only one identified himself with a 
party, the NAP. But then again, he did not have a direct tie with this party’s 
members: he was a state employee at the time and followed the party activities 
through media (radio and newspapers).446 
Here, a particular group among the early NSM activists needs to be 
introduced as they had made a previous failed attempt to build local JP branch in 
1961. This group was made up of around ten people, slightly older men than other 
activists but still younger than the JP executives.447 Deeply entrenched in all the 
above discussed networks and also tied with the Islamist circles that had emerged 
during the earlier right wing mobilization, they had more social capital than 
younger NSM activist but marginalized vis-à-vis the JP elites. While some became 
official executives of the NOP, most remained unofficial leaders. Be that as it may, 
leading members of this group had previously made a failed bid to establish the 
local JP branch in Kayseri. Having found out the news that two political parties, the 
                                                            
443 McAdam and Paulsen, 645-646. 
444 Kitts, 252.  
445 This interviewee had been invited to the JP by his uncle. As a member of the JP’s youth branch, 
first the marginalization of an ultranationalist Kayseri parliamentarian (Mehmet Ateşoğlu) within 
the party, then a traffic crime that went unpunished, which involved a JP executive and his family, 
alienated him and many of his family members from the JP.  While most joined the ranks of the 
RPP, he, as a factory foreman, was attracted more to the NSM frames. Interview with KayNS4, 
Kayseri, September 20, 2006. 
446 Interview with KayNS8, September 14, 2006. 
447 Unfortunately, since they were either death or very old the researcher could conduct an interview 
with only one member of this group, who was also the primary contact person of the NSM elites in 
Kayseri. Since he was both the leader of the said group and their close friend, he was able to provide 
some information on the group and its members. In addition, necessary information on some 
individual members of the group is gathered from the local newspapers and some other interviewees 
(among them not only other NSM activists, but also a follower of Büyük Doğu (who was the son of 
one of the members) and a prominent JP executive (the brother of one of the members).  
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NTP and the JP, were being established, they went to Konya to see which party was 
popular among the citizens. Having been convinced that the JP was the true heir to 
the DP, they had begun party building activities in Kayseri. However, they could 
not even apply to the party’s center to acquire the official document that entrusted 
them with the task of local party foundation. Another and older group, who had 
been junior official or unofficial activists from the DP period had already 
completed forming unofficial organization and got the formal permission from the 
party center to build the local branch. As the local entrepreneur puts it, at the time 
they were too young and too inexperienced to undertake such a task.448 However, 
he also implied that as the other group did not call them to join in, they felt hurt and 
excluded and never ever attempted to join the JP.449 This is all the more interesting 
when one considers the fact that two members of this group had an older brother 
and an uncle among the founders of the JP. If entered the JP, being much younger, 
thus inexperienced and lacking enough political, economic and social capital next 
to their older relatives, they could not have been executives but just regular activists 
depending on local party leaders. The NSM initiative gave them the opportunity to 
level themselves up with the JP executives who had previously excluded them from 
decision-making positions, not because they were pious Muslims, but because of 
the generational hierarchy and their limited capital. 
The NSM was thus able to attract part of the JP’s electoral base through the 
“non-attached” members of the right wing milieus, in other words the activists who 
were not ex-JP members. The party innovators’ injustice and exclusion frames were 
influential on the JP executives and member and non-member adherents to the 
extent that they did not jeopardize their relationship with the JP. For the JP’s local 
party executives and activists, some as pious as or more pious Muslims than the 
potential NSM activists,450 or situated in a similar peripheral position in the 
periphery, joining the NSM would mean betrayal of their cause and their history. 
They had acquired a strong sense of party identity since the DP years against the 
                                                            
448 Telephone interview with KayNS17, Kayseri, May 29, 2010. 
449 Interview with KayNS17, September 6, 2006. 
450 The pious JP activists belonged to the same local religious networks and worked in the same 
religious associations with the Islamists.  For instance, there were many JP executives and members 
either chaired or worked for religious associations. Among them were Mehmet Soyöz, (chair of the 
Association for the Prayer Leader and Preacher School Graduates); Atıf Gözübüyük, Hacı Mustafa 
Ömerli and Mehmet Küçükçalık (respectively a chair, a benefactor and founder of the Taşcıoğlu 
Hafızokulu). See Yeni Sabah, May 22, 1968 and http://www.tasciogluhafiz.com, respectively.  
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state elites represented by the Republican People’s Party and the military and 
endured their immense pressure following the 1960 coup d’état.451 Moreover, 
operating within the circles of the party in power, which controlled the flow of 
resources, they would be unwilling to give up their relative political, economic, and 
social affluence acquired throughout the past years.   
As an interviewee puts it, if one was not happy with the party, he would 
simply quit the party.452 For instance, one ex-JP executive, a supporter of Bilgiç, 
who left the active party life following an unsuccessful bid to parliamentary 
candidacy did not even think about joining the NSM despite the fact that his brother 
was one of the national official founders of the NOP and his nephew (their age was 
close) was the connection of the NSM in Kayseri. He satisfied himself publishing 
pamphlets for the new party (may be as a revenge) without slightest sympathy, to 
say the least453, with its cause. 
Those who left the JP constituted thus an exception to the rule. Very few 
actually switched parties and when they did, they preferred the NAP, or later, in 
late 1970, the Democratic Party (DkP) of the Bilgiç group.  While further research 
is needed among the NAP leaders and members in Kayseri, the following two 
arguments can still be advanced regarding their choice of party. First, those who 
joined the ranks of the NAP had previously been active in certain ultranationalist 
politico-cultural organizations such as Turkish Culture Club and Nationalists’ 
Association.  They had even helped elected an ultranationalist deputy (Mehmet 
Ateşoğlu) and senator (Hüsnü Dikeçligil) from Kayseri. They had thus a parallel 
ultranationalist collective identity even while they were JP executives.  When these 
JP executives lost power to Demirel supporters by 1969, and their representatives in 
the senate and the assembly were marginalized within the JP, their natural address 
was the NAP itself. As for those who left (or forced to leave) the party for the DkP 
(they were almost non-existent in Kayseri), they would not feel like betraying their 
                                                            
451 The supporters of the coup d’etat used various derogatory terms, such as düşükler (the fallen 
ones) or kuyruklar (the tails, or the remaining parts of the DP), for the ex-DP members and 
sympathizers during the early 1960s. Some local DP administrators were even jailed by the military 
government. 
452 The interviewee was himself a rare example. He joined the NAP after he quit the JP.  Telephone 
Interview with KayJP6, Kayseri, March 17, 2009. 
453 He found the party too “reactionary” for his taste. Interview with KayJP9, Ankara, July 19, 2006.  
 161 
 
cause as the DkP claimed to be the authentic carrier of the DP tradition: it was the 
JP that had lost its true identity. 
Generational, institutional and ideational obstacles to political participation 
before the NSM activism 
Local NSM entrepreneurs who would devote and aggregate their energy, 
time, financial and social resources for the establishment and growth of the new 
party from 1969 onwards were relatively young men, most at the beginning of their 
social and economic careers. Since they had not been previously engaged in a 
political party or acquired a specific collective identity, their recruitment to the 
NSM was thus relatively easy. Rather than assuming that the potential NSM 
activists had been particularly religious than their counterparts in other parties or 
already acquired an Islamist identity waiting for their party to appear, one needs to 
scrutinize their subjective and objective conditions, which had prevented them from 
prior political party engagement.  
Two objective conditions seem to have played a role as far as the JP was 
concerned: the generation factor and the formal and informal institutions of the JP. 
To begin with, the NSM executive/activists454 were relatively younger than the 
executives and activists within the JP. Compared to the JP elites, they were not only 
late comers to the existing right wing political networks which had been 
constructed as early as the 1950s; but also being at beginning of their social and 
economic careers, lacked the necessary capital to individually compete with them. 
On the application documents for the NOP, the average age of the NOP’s 
Kayseri Central District committee, which consisted of 11 individuals, was 28,5 in 
1969.455 When the ages of the 15456 interviewed NSM activists are added to this 
list, the average age of the NSM activists in 1973 was 31.8. Studying the NSP 
                                                            
454 It should be noted that as observed by the researcher and reported by the activists themselves, 
within the NSM, since the number of activists were, relatively low, almost all activists also served in 
executive roles at some point during the 1970s. 
455  See the party application documents in Milli Nizam Partisi Parti Kapatma Davası, Ek dosyalar. 
The average age of founders of the NOP’s Konya Central District organization was 39. 
Understanding the age difference between Konya and Kayseri requires further demographic research 
conducted in both cities, which could not be done within the limits of this study.  
456 One interviewee is already included in the official document, one interviewee’s age could not be 
specified. Hence, the added number of interviewees is not 17 but 15. 
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parliamentary candidates in 1973,457 Binnaz Toprak also found that “the age 
distribution of the 450 candidates was heavily biased in favor of younger people 
(62.8 percent between the ages 30-45).458  A study on the local branches of three 
parties (the JP, the PRP and RPNP) in the 1960s further confirms the observation 
that the NSM elites were younger than their counterparts.  In 1964, the average age 
for party executives was “the early 40s” and “over half were engaged in industry 
and commerce or skilled artisans.”459 By 1969, then, these local party executives 
had not only aged and but also prospered, particularly those of the JP following the 
JP’s victory in 1965.  
The future NSM activists, if entered the JP, had to individually struggle 
within a quite demanding and competitive environment against middle-aged men 
with well-established economic, social and political relations in both the center and 
periphery dating back to the DP period.460 Not only these young professional men 
were relatively poor in these capitals, but most also lacked time: a valuable asset for 
intraparty struggles. Still at the beginning of their careers as shop owners or 
engineers, they had to attend their businesses individually unlike those JP activists 
who could delegate their rather managerial roles to business partners, managers, or 
family members.   
These objective conditions seem to have contributed to the potential NSM 
activists’ perception of politics within and through the JP as pursuing only self-
interest. Notwithstanding the fact that the JP activists perceived themselves as 
promoters of development and democracy and felt a deep and sincere loyalty for 
their party and their fellow party members, the factional disputes, the manipulation 
of delegate selection461, and finally the failure of right wing mobilization to 
influence the JP administration in general, convinced the potential NSM recruits to 
                                                            
457 It is probable that most of these candidates, except may be for the national leaders and those who 
ranked at the top of the party’s list of candidates, were activists themselves as was the case in 
Kayseri.  
458 Toprak, Islam and Political Development, 107. 
459 Frank Tachau, “Turkish Provincial Party Politics,” in Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A 
Structural-Historical Analysis, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 286.    
460 For the intraparty politics in JP’s local branches see Chapter 3. By the late 1960s unlike the JP, 
the RPP appears to have integrated younger generations to its ranks and allowed them to come to 
executive posts.   
461 It should be added that these features of intra-JP dynamics were part and parcel of the JP’s 
collective identity. During the interviews, the local JP executives made clear that they particularly 
enjoyed the thrills of intraparty competition. 
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stay away from the JP. While pursuing self-interest had been portrayed and 
understood as morally wrong, their critique also reflected the fact that pursuing 
self-interest individually through the JP required considerable resources. 
As far as the RPNP/NAP is concerned, from 1965 to 1969, one witnesses an 
evolution from a rather mainstream conservative-nationalist party to an 
ultranationalist one, during which the party, as opposed to the JP, became relatively 
open to new players. Thus, rather than its institutional structure, its ideational 
aspects and mobilization practices need to be taken into account to understand as to 
why the future NSM activists had not been attracted to, even repelled, by this 
party.462  
First, the NAP/RPNP’s mobilization frames, as they were reflected at the 
local level, were found too unsophisticated on the part of the interviewees. Similar 
to the NOP of the time, the NAP frames also contained Islam and Turkishness as 
symbolic resources and targeted to undermine the “power” of both “the freemasons 
and Communists.” However, while the NOP’s “diagnosis” advanced economic, 
social and political causes for the emergence of “internal enemies” and its 
“prognosis” primarily aimed at eliminating these causes, for the NAP the enemies 
were the problems in and off themselves. The “solution” was thus limited to their 
physical and symbolic elimination from the political scene. As such, the NAP 
frames left little room for individual ideational contribution and creativity and 
simply demanded implementation. This was a real handicap as the potential recruits 
enjoyed and were used to religious, ideological and quasi-philosophical discussions 
from their, say, oturma settings. As one interviewee recalls an NAP conference he 
attended was “too shallow…too superficial…I even tell [my friends from the 
NAP]: among you neither science, nor wealth, nor knowledge could develop…”463 
Moreover, as Bora and Can put it, especially by 1970, the “anti-freemason” 
discourse of the NAP, which was very attractive for the small entrepreneurs at the 
                                                            
462 It may also be the case that informally the situation was more fluid than one could imagine, with 
individuals entrenched in different circles, going from one party to another. However, if this is the 
case this should have rather been for the rank and file members at the networks, rather than the 
activists and elites whose number was already limited enough to develop mechanisms of close 
scrutiny, affection and stigmatization to prevent free riding and easy exit-reentry. Such frequent 
circulation and fluidity potentially weaken the resolve of the activists through blurring the 
boundaries of identity and legitimate behavior necessary for a functional organization. 
463 Interview with KayNS9, September 25, 2006. 
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periphery of the periphery, rapidly disappeared in favor of a purely one-
dimensional anti-communist one.464 The latter was more “empirically credible” for 
those ex-JP members who joined the NAP by 1969 than for the small shop owners 
and engineers. They owned small-medium and medium enterprises, which faced 
rapid syndicalization. Finally, the NSM activists referred to the racist dimension of 
the NAP frames, which they, vehemently, disapproved. However, as shall be seen 
in the next chapter, though the NSM activists were critical of the NAP’s racism, a 
study of the NSM mobilization frames and their own statements reveals that for 
most of them, a racist frame was not repelling to the extent that it did not involve 
any Muslim/Sunni ethnicity as a target or an outright statement of the superiority of 
the Turks over, say, the Kurds. 
Second, in Kayseri, the practices of the NAP’s local entrepreneurs were 
congruent with their frames, which only further alienated their targeted audience, 
those critics of the JP liberals. Almost all the NSM interviewees, when asked why 
they did not care joining the NAP, mentioned the violent acts perpetrated by the 
NAP commandos (later the Idealist Youth, Ülkücü Gençlik) during the late 1960s 
and 1970s. They carefully emphasized that (and not only them the JP activists as 
well) in Kayseri, it was not the left-wing groups, which initiated or undertook 
political violence, but almost always the ultranationalists who engaged in such 
activities. Particularly, the TÖS incident of 1969, seem to have marked their 
perception of the NAP as a violent organization for good. As discussed above, 
those who mobilized against the TÖS members, in general, the smaller groups that 
committed violent attacks on civilian targets in particular, believed/argued that the 
explosions at religious buildings were “Communist” acts. The right wing milieu as 
whole, whether or not participated in the incident initially agreed with this view. 
However, shortly after, it became an open-secret within the right-wing circles that 
the culpable was not the “communists” but the NAP activists.465 As an NSM 
                                                            
464 Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah: 12 Eylül’den 1990’lara Ülkücü Hareket, 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 55-56. 
465 As a matter of fact, a prominent local NAP leader, who is still effective in ultranationalist circles, 
voluntarily provided the information that it was the NAP who had planned and instigated the 
explosions and following mobilization. It should be noted that he did not assert this boastfully but 
rather casually when the researcher asked him what he knew about the TÖS incident.  
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activist, who was among the crowd that day, puts it, they felt “betrayed” and 
manipulated.466 
While the NAP hence failed to convince socially and economically 
upwardly mobile young men, at least in Kayseri, it seems it recruited from even 
younger generations467 and precariously employed468. The traditional shop owners 
and artisans “who have been adversely affected by modernization” thus probably 
turned not to Islamist parties as Mardin argues469 but to the NAP.470 However, as 
maintained by an NAP leader, they targeted mainly the youth, particularly 
university or high school students who could neither vote at the time, nor bring 
votes, not even those of their father who voted for the JP (oy sahibi olan yoktu).471 
An example he gave illustrates the two attributes of a typical NAP activist in the 
late 1960s: “One day, a child told me why he became an idealist. He said that his 
father was a porter and that they were two brothers. Because of the cold, during the 
nights they would wrap their arms around each other to sleep. He told me that he 
had nothing to lose, he could easily become a Communist, but his moral values 
were too strong, he became an idealist.”472 Porters had in fact become particularly 
vulnerable in Kayseri by the late 1960s as the transportation opportunities increased 
and the JP mayor exiled both the porters and street peddlers from the downtown 
area to peripheral neighborhoods.473  
                                                            
466 Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 2007. 
467 Bora and Can also says that the NAP was a platform where younger children of the provincial JP 
supporters initiated themselves into politics.    
468 It is not totally clear whether the NAP turned to these groups because they failed to mobilize the 
former, or they failed because they initially targeted these groups.  
469 Mardin, “Religion and the Turkish Social Transformation,” quoted in Toprak, Islam and Political 
Development,105. 
470 Bora and Can mentions “traditional” traders and artisans as main supporters of the NAP as well.  
But they include small manufacturers into this group, and argue that the NSP attracted provincial 
traders and industrialists. It has however been demonstrated that while the latter remained within the 
JP, it was rather small manufacturers who supported the NSM. Bora and Can, 86. 
471 In contrast to Bora and Can’s claim that this youth turned to mainstream parties once they 
became older, this leader said that they owed the rise of their votes in 1977 to the fact that these 
activists had grown up, married and became professional men with certain social capital. He was 
proud of them. Telephone interview with KayJP6, Kayseri March 17, 2009. 
472 Telephone interview with KayJP6, Kayseri March 17, 2009. 
473 As a result the porters and street peddlers organized a protest march. “Kayseri’de hamal ve 
işportacılar yürüyüş yaptı,” Yeni İstanbul, July 1, 1969.  
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4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter studied the two axes through which the NSM emerged: 
consensus and activist mobilization efforts of the party entrepreneurs and the local 
social and political contexts in which they recruited their activists. The examination 
of these two axes reveals differential recruitment to the NSP and the difficulties the 
party innovators faced in activist recruitment at the local level. It thus refutes the 
existence of an a priori collective identity and a direct causal line between socio-
economic, political and cultural frustrations of the “periphery” and Islamist political 
activism.  
In contrast, it highlights the interaction between the social structures and the 
agency of the political actors in the emergence of the NSM. On the one hand, at the 
local level the social networks and political parties appear not only as structural 
units where power relations take place but also as areas where various forms of 
socialization and identity formation take place.  On the other hand, the study of the 
party innovators’ efforts within the constraints and opportunities of the formal and 
informal political institutions underline the fact that individual and social discontent 
at the local level do not naturally translate into Islamist party activism.474  
Finally, the Kayseri case demonstrated that it was the young small 
shopkeepers, owners of workshops, traders, engineers, factory foremen, who, 
unlike the notables of the JP, had weaker ties to the center joined party building 
activities. They had nothing to lose but lot to gain if the new initiative succeeded. 
Having been marginalized in the local political and economic games, the injustice 
frame, the call for material and moral development, Erbakan’s command of 
technical issues475 and the face-to-face recruitment methods attracted them.  As 
shall be seen in the following chapters in detail, as a young and pious professor of 
                                                            
474 It also showed that this agency did not necessarily entail a rational assessment of formal and 
informal institutions and of other political and social players’ actions. Success of the party might be 
intended but not foreseen.  
475 At different occasions the interviewees, who were skilled workers or artisans commented on 
some engineers that they have met in the workplace and their “deplorable” lack of knowledge on 
simplest matters concerning the production of a certain item, use of a machine, problems with a 
machine etc. When the subject was Erbakan, though very critical of his recent actions etc., all 
emphasized and admired his deep knowledge of machines, machine cutting techniques and the 
smallest of problems that a small shop owner could face in day-to-day workshop production. In 
most of his speeches published in the movement newspapers, Erbakan, in fact, revealed his interest, 
enthusiasm and knowledge on such issues. 
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engineering and as an entrepreneur Erbakan (and his comrades) not only spoke 
their religious, technical and entrepreneurial language but also offered morally and 
potentially materially rewarding opportunities: “a noble cause” to fight for and 
leadership positions in the local branches. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FORMATION OF THE NSM SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES: 
COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES AND IDENTITY   
This chapter develops further the line of argument introduced in Chapter 4, 
which draws attention to differential recruitment/entry to the NSM from the right 
wing networks. It states that the NSM institutional and symbolic boundaries were 
produced in action and interaction within the political field. It tackles the 
production of the NSM’s ideational resources that enabled and sustained activist 
recruitment and mobilization from 1969 through the 1970s, and beyond. 
Specifically, it disentangles action-oriented and identity-oriented features of the 
NSM ideational products, which together drew the symbolic boundaries of their 
endeavor and helped them, as stated in Chapter 2, to observe, recognize and/or 
interpret their relations, histories with their environment and each other and to 
project a better, and thought to be a well deserved, future.476  
Studying the crystallization of the NSM’s symbolic boundaries reveals that 
rather than being preconceived, in this case pre-political, ideational elements, the 
NSM collective action frames and identity were shaped as a result of objective 
conditions and perceptions of the NSM activists, within the political arena, both at 
the national and local levels of politics. 
This chapter argues that as the ideational products of a movement that 
emerged within a relatively liberal and extremely competitive political arena and 
that aimed at building and sustaining a political party, the collective action frames 
and collective identity of the NSM, which drew its symbolic boundaries, proved to 
be differentiating and articulating/integrating at the same time. Through their 
intentional and unintentional dimensions, first, they distinguished the NSM 
                                                            
476 Melucci, 341-342. While Melucci attributes these functions to collective identity, or identity-
oriented frames, they define quite well the role of the action-oriented frames, or collective action 
frames as well. See Benford and Snow, 614. 
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activists from other players of the political arena at the local and national levels and 
contested the power and constituencies of their opponents. Second, the (new) 
meanings and values that the NSM ideational elements brought to the political 
arena to open a space for itself, appealed, and helped to reinforce, the pre-
mobilization professional, business and religious individual identities and social 
ties of the local activists. They articulated the activists’ interests, concerns and 
identities with each other and, most important, the political center.  
The NSM collective action frames and identity defined the nation as 
primarily Muslim and the NSM as its representative. It challenged other political 
forces in the political arena blaming them for the “material and moral decay of the 
nation” and urged individual Muslims to act in the name of the nation to bring 
about a “material and moral development.” The juxtaposition of nation with 
Muslimness and the call for moral development put the NSM squarely within the 
Islamist tradition in Turkey and differentiated the party from other right and left 
wing forces in the political arena. The incorporation of an economic injustice 
frame, which demanded material development through industrialization in 
Anatolia, in turn, distinguished the NSM from all other right wing forces, including 
the fellow Islamists. The former helped them to express their particularistic (both 
objective and subjective) material and moral interests477 and to associate them with 
the “best interest” of the “Muslim” nation. The latter created a sense of “we” 
through affective ties, solidarity and altruism, which not only empowered 
individuals within their social and political settings but also reduced uncertainty 
regarding political action. In short, within the right wing networks, these ideational 
products attracted the potential activists, the periphery of the periphery through 
providing a new language and giving them a new identity. 
Alongside these more or less intentional features and implications, the NSM 
ideational products had also unintentional aspects and consequences for the 
political arena and the NSM activists. On the one hand, produced by political 
insiders478 who had been crystallized and invested in the political game, underneath 
                                                            
477 As Asef Bayat reminds “interest” means “having a ‘stake’ in something, or ‘being affected by 
something.” Moreover, interest may involve both material and moral concerns. “Islamism and 
Social Movement Theory,” Third World Quarterly 26 (2005): 901.   
478 It has already been empirically demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the NSM entrepreneurs were 
political insiders. 
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this apparent challenge, or heterodoxy, they also latently reproduced the doxa479 of 
the political field. The NSM challenged the hierarchy within the political arena, or 
the dominance of the existing forces, but similar to them, rejected to construct the 
objective and observable condition of the nation as a political collectivity composed 
of diverse citizens and socio-economic, ethnic, cultural, and interest groups.  
On the other hand, the ideational products that promoted a “natural” 
affinity, or rapport between being a Muslim and joining, voting and supporting the 
NSM parties revealed that Muslimness, or Islam, was not only a resource but also a 
constraint at the local level, particularly within the right wing networks. To the 
extent that “Muslimness” was the norm within the society, the NSM activists faced 
the danger of “invisibility” as members of an incipient collectivity. Moreover, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, as the majority of the Muslims, including pious 
ones, rejected to support, let alone joining the movement, the NSM activists needed 
to deal with the difficulty of justifying the juxtaposition of the Muslimness and 
Muslim nation with themselves as pious, or proper, Muslims. Consequently, the 
NSM elites and activists found themselves in an unintended additional latent 
symbolic process. Since within the religious economy of the right wing networks 
religious stringency had been equated with proper religiosity and piousness, they 
felt compelled to become more religiously stringent in an attempt to differentiate 
themselves from the rest, particularly the pious Muslims, and justify their action in 
the name of the “Muslim” nation. 
From a theoretical point of view, ideational products of the social 
movements as a whole, both the action and identity frames, initiate and sustain 
mobilization through providing an interpretive schemata that renders meaning to 
the actions and experiences of the movement activists. Moreover, collective action 
frames and collective identity further complement each other in drawing the 
symbolic boundaries of the movement organization. While the former draws the 
boundaries between and “us” and “them” through establishing normative positions 
based on designation of causes and blame,480 the latter specifically creates a sense 
of “we,” which differentiate both the collective actor and its activists from the 
                                                            
479 As mentioned in the introductory chapter doxa means “the entire set of cognitive and evaluative 
presuppositions” of a field. Bourdieu, Méditations, 145.  
480 Eric Neveu, Sociologie des Mouvements Sociaux (Paris: Découverte, 2005), 100. 
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others. 481 From an empirical perspective based on the fieldwork research as well, 
the collective action frames and collective identity of the NSM are produced in an 
intertwined fashion through action and interaction within the movement and with 
the extra-movement actors, and nurtured each other.  
Ira Silver’s conceptualization of “boundary framing,” which differentiates  
instrumental vocabulary (collective action frames) and expressive vocabulary 
(collective identity frames) from one another allows one to see not only their 
overlapping and complementary functions of mobilizing activists and drawing the 
boundaries of the movement but also their specific action- and identity- oriented 
features.482 For heuristic reasons, then, this chapter studies the NSM ideational 
production disentangling analytically collective action frames and collective 
identity frames from each other.  
The organization of the chapter follows this logic and is divided into three 
sections. The first and second sections study the NSM ideational products 
separately. First part focuses on the NSM mobilization frames, which attracted the 
potential activists and carved a space within the political arena for the NSM 
through challenging the political rivals. Second section tackles the collective 
identity process, or the creation of the NSM’s “we” and interpersonal bonds among 
the activists. Final section reintegrate the action- and identity-oriented frames in 
order to examine two major subliminal (i.e unintentional and uncalculated)483 
features and outcomes of the NSM ideational production, which inadvertently 
helped the articulation of the national with the local level and the differentiation of 
the NSM activists from the rest.   
                                                            
481 It should be noted that in the social movement literature the qualities and functions attributed to 
collective action frames and collective identity frames greatly converge despite efforts to 
analytically separate them. For collective action frames see Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes 
and Social Movements” and Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of Social Movement Framing 
Perspective," Sociological Inquiry 67 (1997): 409-430. For various approaches on collective identity 
see for instance Scott A. Hunt and Robert D. Benford, "Collective Identity, Solidarity, and 
Commitment," The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah Anne 
Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 433-457; 
Polletta and Jasper, “ Collective Identity and Social Movements” and Melucci, “Getting Involved.”   
482 Ira Silver, "Constructing "Social Change" through Philanthropy: Boundary Framing and the 
Articulation of Vocabularies of Motives for Social Movement Participation," Sociological Inquiry 
67 (1997): 497-498. Instead of collective action frames and collective identity Silver uses the terms 
“instrumental vocabulary” and “expressive vocabulary,” respectively. Throughout this study these 
terms will thus be used interchangeably. 
483 Here the term subliminal used in the sense of what Bourdieu calls “reasonable action.” Please see 
below for further details. 
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5.1 Collective action frames of the NSM  
Collective action frames (instrumental vocabulary) are rather action 
oriented and answer such questions as “why should we act” and “for and against 
what we act.” Entailing what Snow and Benford call “core framing tasks” of social 
movements, they pertain more to the activists’ extra-movement relations than 
internal relations. The core framing tasks are: definition of a problem area 
(diagnostics frames), proposed solutions (prognostic frames) and motivation of 
activists (motivational frames).484 They are thus potentially informed by and inform 
an existing and/or incipient “ideology”, or relatively stable worldviews on socio-
political problems and their solutions.485  
The party entrepreneurs shaped and communicated their collective action 
frames, or instrumental vocabulary, from the TOBB Affair of 1969, the first 
collective action of the party entrepreneurs, through the 1970s, in meetings around 
the TOBB Affair and party opening ceremonies, conversations in coffeehouses, 
village-rooms and through pamphlets, booklets, radio speeches, etc. Once these 
resonated among and adopted by the potential activists, they were then deployed 
directly or through tape recordings of Erbakan’s speeches, for member recruitment 
or electoral mobilization purposes.486  
This section argues that both the radical, or anti-systemic and moderate -
signifying the willingness to play by the rules of the game- features of the NSM 
symbolic work shaped in action and interaction within the political field. While 
cognitive/strategic and generational factors and power relations pertaining to the 
national level of politics marked the production of the instrumental vocabulary, the 
potential activists received and evaluated them based on their previous individual 
identities, experiences, and observations. Shaped and received in reference to the 
two registers of political arena in general and other collective actors in particular, 
the collective action frames of the NSM, including their anti-systemic and systemic 
                                                            
484 Benford and Snow, 615. 
485 “Collective action frames ... perform this interpretive function by simplifying and condensing 
aspects of the “world out there,” but in ways that are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists”...” Benford and Snow, 614. 
486 For instance, in Konya, during the Movement of Independents, the activists would record 
Erbakan’s “conversations” and later play the records to the public, in shops, houses and village 
common rooms.  “Prof. Erbakan’ın seçim bürosu dolup taşıyor,” Türkiye’de Yarın, September 12, 
1969.  
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aspects, proved to be reinvigorating for the individual identities of the NSM 
activists and articulative and integrative for the NSM as a whole constituting a new 
collective actor.  
Following is a four-step examination of these NSM action-oriented 
cultural/ideational products. The first subsection will provide an overview of the 
instrumental vocabulary in relation to cognitive/strategic, generational and 
institutional factors that influenced the NSM frame makers, the party entrepreneurs. 
The second and third subsections will study in detail its diagnostic and prognostic 
components as they relate to the political context and intra-movement needs. The 
final section will focus on how the NSM frames compelled the potential activists at 
the local level to engage in direct political action through a political party. 
5.1.1 An Overview of the NSM Collective Action Frames 
To begin with, the NSM mobilization frames reflected the cognitive 
processes and strategic evaluations of the NSM leaders within the political arena. 
At the macro/national level, the NSM innovators had to compete with and 
differentiate themselves from eight other political parties and overcome the voters’ 
apparent lack of interest in the electoral process.487 At the micro/local level, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, they had to recruit those members of the right wing 
networks who had been marginalized from the political participation process and 
who, thus, despised and distrusted party politics. Consequently, the NSM 
mobilization frames aimed at covering and rising above the salient issues of the 
political arena, designating the NSM as the only force capable to address such 
broad based political concerns and convincing the potential activist to engage in 
party politics.  
Accordingly, the NSM argued that unlike the other eight existing political 
parties, their political outlook, or diagnosis and prognosis, involved two axes: 
material and moral. In that sense they were “not the ninth but the first party” ever 
                                                            
487 The parties which entered the general elections of 1969 were the RPP, the JP, the NTP, the NP, 
the NAP, the Reliance Party (the RP, Güven Partisi established by conservative Kemalists who left 
the RPP following the adoption of “left of the center” stance), the Union Party (the UP, Birlik 
Partisi of the Alevis) and the Labour Party of Turkey (the LTP, Türkiye İşçi Partisi). However, only 
64, 35 % of the eligible voters casted their votes. See http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=6 
(Accessed June 25, 2011) 
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truly representing the best interest of the nation.488 The existing parties could not 
solve country’s problems since having focused merely on material issues and 
favored only particular sections of the nation they were themselves responsible for 
creating economic and social injustices. In fact, they had lost confidence of the 
voters as evidenced by the decrease in the over all votes cast in the general 
elections of 1969.489 The NSM parties (in the early sources the NOP) were different 
from others since their targeted two-dimensional area of political action would 
restore the true purpose of politics: “using total power of the nation in the name of 
the nation.”490 Refusing to employ political party as a tool to achieve this end was 
similar to rejecting using a gun just because a lunatic had once used it to commit 
suicide.491 The NOP (or other NSM parties for that matter) was “a [political] party 
only in name,”492 actually it was the embodiment of the Muslim nation and the only 
entity to solve problems observed in the material and moral domains and bring back 
the glory of the past centuries.  
The inclusion of a “material dimension” into an Islamist frame in addition 
to moral issues and all the while criticizing the “material ambitions” of their rivals 
echoed the generational difference of the NSM leaders from their Islamist 
counterparts and predecessors. Since the 19th century, the Islamists, and those 
conservative-nationalists and ultranationalists who borrowed from the Islamists 
during the Republican period, as men of letters, such as university professors, 
writers, poets, publishers, journalists, theologians and lawyers, or as members of 
“new religious movements” had merely developed a critique of modernization (and 
secularization) in abstract terms, never touching any tangible socio-economic 
issues. Their arguments had rarely gone beyond “adopting the west’s technical and 
economic tools but discarding its culture” discourse, as shall be seen, developed 
against the secularist elites. The earlier Islamist frames actually reflected the 
dominant political frames of the political arena, which revolved around 
modernization discussions from the 19th century up until the mid-1960s.493 The 
                                                            
488 Hasan Aksay, Milli Nizam Davamız (İzmir: Karınca Matbaası, 1971), 33; Necmettin Erbakan, the 
Opening Ceremony of the NOP in Ankara, February 8, 1970, in Milli Nizam Partisi Parti Kapatma 
Davası, Ek dosyalar. 
489 Erbakan, the Opening Ceremony in Ankara. 
490“Siyaset bir millet adına o milletin toplam gücünü kullanmaktır.” Aksay, Milli Nizam, 45. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Hüseyin Abbas, the Party Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli, October 6, 1970. 
493 Toprak, Islam and Political Development, 32-96 (in passim). 
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NSM local activists and national elites, in contrast, consisted of a new generation of 
Islamists (literally and figuratively) composed of men of trade, manufacturers, 
engineers, skilled workers, etc., who were deeply entrenched in the developing 
industry of the country. As Erbakan’s statements on the subject illustrates, the NSM 
entrepreneurs were aware of this generational difference, which led to the 
ideational difference between them. The nation had finally produced its “organic 
intellectuals” (tabii aydınlar),494 whose attitude and ideas diverged from the 
existing and previous right wing forces: “The right had been faltering for a long 
time now, discussing [only] metaphysical issues. However, our question is one 
related to life, consequently obviously economic.”495 
Finally, the injustice dimension embedded in the material development 
frame was a reflection of the dominated position of the NSM entrepreneurs within 
the political arena as compared to the other right wing forces. The conservative-
nationalists and liberals of the right wing had been in power since 1950 and despite 
military and civil bureaucracies’ continuous guardianship over the regime, they had 
exercised considerable control and influence over the distribution of material and 
symbolic resources. Hence, though they dwelled on socio-economic questions, their 
discourses did not include any injustice component since they neither needed nor 
possessed the symbolic tools to interpret the economic condition as unjust as was 
the case for the Islamist party entrepreneurs.  
5.1.2 Diagnostic Claims 
As far as “the material dimension” of the diagnostic frames was concerned, 
the NSM leaders created an economic injustice frame that drew partly on their own 
                                                            
494 MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, ed., Basında Prof. Dr. Erbakan, (İstiklal Matbaası: İzmir, 1970), 
38. In Turkish “tabii” have two meanings: organic and natural. Here the choice of translation is not 
arbitrary. The way Erbakan and his fellow activists established the relation with their intellectual 
work and the nation was similar to how Gramsci used the term “organic” describing the relationship 
between the intellectuals and the social groups from which they emerged. According to Gramsci 
“[e]very social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the 
world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of 
intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the 
economic but also in the social and political fields.” Antonio Gramsci, “The Formation of the 
Intellectuals,” in The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York: 
W. W Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 1138. 
495 MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı,13. It should be noted that this book, published by the youth 
organization of the NOP, was a compilation of interviews that non-Islamist journalists conducted 
with Erbakan, mostly during the Movement of Independents. 
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interaction with the JP and partly from the left-wing critique of the capitalist 
economic system.496 As mentioned above, this particular frame constituted one of 
the major differences between the NSM Islamist frames and the politico-cultural 
products of previous Islamist movements in particular and the right wing forces in 
general.  
In contrast to the latter, the NSM frequently addressed (either through 
numbers, statistics, dates, specific laws, etc. or in generic terms depending on the 
context) such economic questions as “uneven economic development across the 
regions and socio-economic sectors; low average per capita income compared to 
other countries; an industrial development depended on export of raw materials and 
auxiliary equipment; foreign capital’s dominance on areas of high financial turn-
over and trade balance deficit,” which resulted in inflation and rising poverty on the 
one hand, and weak state finances that depended on foreign aid and resulted in 
“rubber stamp” (şahsiyetsiz) foreign policy, on the other.497  
  Frames of motivation498 underlining the urgency and the severity of the 
situation were deployed to support this diagnosis:  the country was on the brink of 
devastation and the question was one of “survival or death of a nation.”499  Anatolia 
lagged behind industrialization as the small and medium scale manufacturers were 
denied a just distribution of financial resources; impoverished citizens were forced 
to seek jobs in foreign lands leaving their families behind500; “the spread of the 
workers’ uprising and revolution” from İstanbul to whole country could have only 
been prevented by the martial law thanks to the government which failed to take 
                                                            
496Ibid, 7. The influence of the left can be considered a “spill over effect.”  The latter is the outcome 
of some or all of four basic transmission processes from a movement to another: “coalitions”, 
converging movement constituencies, “shared personnel” and finally, “broader changes in the 
external environment” created by the first movement. David S. Meyer and Nancy Whittier, "Social 
Movement Spillover," Social Problems 41 (1994): 277. 
497 Erbakan, the Opening Ceremony of the NOP in Ankara. 
498 Robert D. Benford, ""You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey": Collective Action Frames and 
Vocabularies of Motive within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement," The Sociological Quarterly 
34 (1993): 201-204. Benford divides motivational frames into four parts: urgency, severity, efficacy 
of action and propriety of action frames. While the first two complemented the diagnostic frame, the 
latter supported prognosis. 
499 Hüseyin Abbas, The party opening ceremony in Kırklareli, October 6, 1970. 
500 The party innovators were particularly sensitive on this issue. In fact, Erbakan mentioned his 
observation of the results of worker immigration to Germany as the most sorrowful aspect of his 
visits in Anatolia and cried while answering the journalist’s question. MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, 
35. 
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precautions.501 There were moral consequences to these economic problems as 
well. For instance, in defiance of customs and mores “the wives and daughters” 
were leaving the country becoming immigrant workers without the permission of 
their husbands and fathers. Diminishing value of the lira enabled “lousy tourists” 
(bitli turistler) to come to the country potentially threatening the local culture.502 
It can be argued that the economic injustice frames achieved their purpose 
of challenging other Islamists and right wing groups and differentiating the new 
political enterprise. They were so successful in incorporating the frames partly 
borrowed from the Left that up until the mid-1970s, the changes brought to the 
Islamist frames fascinated the left and even became a factor paving the way for an 
RPP-NSP coalition in January 1974.503 For instance, as early as 1969, that is five 
years before the said coalition, a left-wing journalist in Milliyet wrote that Erbakan 
and his supporters’ use of “left wing slogans” was useful in the sense that citizens 
would now understand that talking about “some issues” did not necessarily mean 
that you are a Communist.504 The rival right wing forces, in turn, including the JP, 
the NAP and Yeni Asya felt threatened enough to accuse the NSM for helping the 
left. Particularly, during and following the coalition with the RPP, they nicknamed 
the NSM activists “green communists.”    
The NSM leaders in turn legitimized their diagnostic similarity with the left 
in following terms:  “When Erbakan said “we are of the same mind with the RPP” 
he just meant we are together in diagnosis of the country’s problems. It is a logical 
imperative for both the supporters of the right and the left to arrive at the same 
diagnosis similar to doctors who had to ally in the diagnosis of a cancer.”505 It 
should be noted that though wary to loose votes to the JP, most NSM activists 
actually enjoyed being compared to the left.506  
                                                            
501  Police report on Necmettin Erbakan’s speech, the Opening Ceremony in Tekirdağ, July 9, 1970. 
In his speeches by “precaution” Erbakan usually meant preventing the economic exploitation of the 
workers by lavish and extravagant business owners as much as an ideological struggle with the left. 
502 Ibid. 
503 The RPP supporters who applauded the NSM had an additional agenda. The votes that went to 
the NSM would no doubt weaken the JP. 
504 Kemal Bisalman, “Cızz..,” Milliyet, November 13, 1969. 
505 “Yorum: Teşhis-Tedavi,” Türkiye’de Yarın, November 25, 1969. The question of NSP-RPP 
coalition and how the NSM activists perceived and interpreted it will be discussed in Chapter 6.    
506 This will be discussed further while discussing the NSP-RPP coalition. 
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At any rate, thanks to the moral component of the frames, the NSM 
positioned itself squarely within the Islamist tradition and became distant to the left. 
As one Erbakan speech illustrates507, the NSM entrepreneurs argued that “the 
nation that had once showed the way (ışık tutmak) to the humanity, was now…in 
distress within a moral quagmire,” devoid of its authentic education system; this 
was a nation, “under moral occupation” of communists and “cosmopolites”, who 
took every measure to keep “the real landlord” out of his own house.508 These 
measures were twofold: pressure on the religious expressions, lifestyles, and 
education on the one hand and promotion and encouragement of secular 
perspectives and ways of life on the other.  
For instance, while the government was financing “the ballet schools which 
raised prostitutes” and the Jews and Christians enjoyed their holidays on Saturdays 
and Sundays, “those who practiced their religion” such as the Risale-i Nur students, 
were jailed, Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools were underfunded, and Muslims 
did not have the right to their Islamic weekly holiday on Friday.509  Moreover, the 
state radio was urging women defy their uncompromising husbands and use their 
right granted by the Civil Law510 if they wanted to work. Finally, universities had 
become centers of moral and material destruction511 and the mosques were left 
empty512 since in state schools students were taught sociology and philosophy texts 
authored “by Durkheim, a Jew”513 and psychology books “written by a Jewish 
rabbi.”514   
5.1.3 Prognostic Claims 
The content of the NSM prognostic claims can be divided into three 
analytical parts: a) a critique of other political parties; b) the NSM’s answer to the 
                                                            
507 Incidentally, in this particular speech  the sentence constructions Erbakan used sounded more like 
those of Necip Fazıl, than his. In fact, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s and early 1980s when a 
new group of Islamist intellectuals emerged, such as İsmet Özel and Ali Bulaç, most NSM activists 
adopted a writing and speaking style influenced from Necip Fazıl and Büyük Doğu. 
508 Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara. 
509 The summary report of the government inspector on the NOP Opening Ceremony in Karabük, 
Speeches by Hüseyin Abbas, Ali Oğuz and Hacı Tevfik Paksu, May  31, 1970.  
510 Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli, October 6, 1970. 
511Aksay, Milli Nizam, 54. 
512Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli. 
513 MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, Backcover note. 
514 Police Report on Erbakan’s Speech, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Tekirdağ.   
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moral and material crisis (buhran) of the country; c) the call for direct political 
engagement through a political party. While the diagnostic components of the NSM 
frames remained pretty much the same, even today515, as they evolved into an 
ideology, or quite stable paradigms in interpreting social and political life, 
prognostic frames proved to be less resilient in the face of changing movement 
needs. Moving from consensus mobilization to activist recruitment; from 
institutionalization to parliamentary activities the NSM entrepreneurs reshaped 
their prognostic frames, except those concerning moral issues, within short time 
frames. 
To begin with, it should be maintained that the party innovators’ critique of 
the other political forces appeared to focus more on the JP than the RPP, or the 
NAP. They only paid lip service to right wings’ traditional anti-communist and 
anti-RPP discourses while taking their time to attack the JP policies and views. 
Within the political arena their main rival was thus the JP with which they shared 
the same right wing networks and constituencies rather than the RPP with which 
they shared some core diagnostic frames and the same major adversary, the JP. 
The NSM critique of the existing political forces entailed a differentiation 
between two groups identified through a Kuranic idiom: hak (just, God) and batıl 
(vanity, idolatry).  The NSM represented the hak in the face of batıl forces. The 
latter was divided in itself into two main groups. On the one hand, there was the 
RPP associated either with communism and/or with left (signifying social 
democracy in the political field). On the other hand, there was the JP, which was 
associated with freemasonry and/or liberalism considered as “renksizlik”, or 
colorlessness. During the consensus and activist recruitment mobilization period 
from 1969 to the electoral mobilization for the general elections of 1973, the NSM 
elites argued that communism and freemasonry invaded the RPP and the JP, 
respectively. These ideologies represented two sides of a coin: on the one hand, 
communism was an ideology created by Karl Marx, “a Jewish rabbi”, in order to 
bring an end to Islam.516 On the other hand, freemasonry was promoting capitalism, 
                                                            
515The Felicity Party, the current party of the NSM still uses most of the diagnostic frames produced 
during the 1970s.  In fact, to understand the continuities and ruptures between the NSM and its 
spinoff, the JDP, tracing the changes in the diagnostic claims would be a fruitful starting point. 
516 Necmettin Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceromony in Edirne, October 7, 1970. 
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a system that was rooted on “money, material things”.517 Both were materialist 
ideologies, or Jewish conspiracies, that had brought about the material and moral 
decay of the country through Westernization in the first place.518 As such the 
parties, which were associated with them, would not be able to bring solutions to 
the country’s devastating problems. The anti-Semitic frames of the NSM, which 
they shared with almost all extreme right groups in Europe and the United States 
served, thus, two major interrelated purposes within the context under 
consideration. They not only helped to raise the NOP above all other parties, 
denying them legitimacy and attributing to the NSM a religious and historical, even 
trans-historical, mission to save the country and Islam. They also served to 
underline the incipient collectivity’s symbolic boundary, which was prone to blur. 
As shall be discussed in detail below as its opponents the NSM also claimed to 
represent the nation as a whole, which has been defined by almost all parties based 
on Muslimness and Turkishness. 
The opportunities and constraints that the political arena presented, such as 
the ban of the first NSM party, the NOP, by the Constitutional Court519, the election 
of the NSP to the parliament and the senate, and the prospect of coalition 
governments, seemed to have promoted a change in the NSM frames criticizing the 
RPP and the JP. By 1973, the NSM leaders quit referring to the RPP and the JP as 
tools of “world Jewish conspiracy,” and preferred less conspiratorial terms such as 
“left” and “colorless” or “ socialist” and “capitalist” rather than communist and 
freemason, though freemasonry as behind the scenes “master of ceremonies” was 
still frequently mentioned. 
Whatever terminology is used, however, from 1969 through the 1970s, the 
NSM accused both parties for promoting Westernization. The latter was unsuitable 
                                                            
517 Ibid. 
518 One of the most extreme case of public anti-Semitic discourses appeared in the local NSM 
activists’ daily in Konya in 1969. It blamed the Jews for their own extermination in Germany. 
Accordingly, the Holocaust was a result of accumulated resentment against the Jews. Only after the 
latter “had gone” that the German trade developed, black market disappeared, the state finances 
improved and the German industry was established. Şahin Kahraman, “Ölçü, Yahudi Düşmanlığı,” 
Türkiye’de Yarın, September 27, 1969. 
519 It should be added that the Constitutional Court closed the party but did not punish the party 
executives. During the interviews, the NSM leaders implied that they took a lesson from this event 
and chose to be more careful in their public speeches involving the critique of the regime and other 
political parties. This issue will be discussed further in studying the intraorganizational aspect of the 
NSM in the next chapter. 
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for the fabric of Muslim nation and as such responsible for the material and moral 
crisis (buhran) in the country.  The second aspect of the NSM prognostic frames 
was then their proposed solution to this “crisis”:  the establishment of the “National 
Order.”  The latter would bring material development through shifting 
industrialization to Anatolia and put an end to moral decay with an education 
system by focusing on the (re)Islamization of the country.  
 As was the case for the critique of the existing political forces and 
government policies, the NSM modified its solutions to the “crisis”. While the 
prognostic claims on moral issues remained unaltered, as they were the main 
markers of the NSM collective identity and boundaries, in the material domain the 
NSM elites led by Erbakan modified the role they attributed to the state’s role in 
industrial development as the NSM moved from consensus mobilization to activist 
recruitment stage and parliamentary activities. Early on during the TOBB Affair, 
Erbakan stressed the state’s responsibility in supporting the capabilities and power 
of the private enterprise through a just distribution of credits and quotas.520 By 
September 1969 that is during the period when they were engaged in the first 
electoral mobilization and overt activist recruitment, Erbakan began mentioning the 
state’s role as an initiator of heavy industry as well.521 By 1972, the economic 
frames and program of the NSP definitely shifted its focus from private initiatives 
to the state led development of heavy industry: in order to decrease dependence on 
imports, facilitate the creation of sub industries and boost local economic life, the 
state would invest in motor, turning machine (torna), cement or tractor factories in 
Anatolian towns. It can be argued that as the NSM entrepreneurs proceeded with 
activist recruitment and party building activities they recognized what this study 
revealed in Chapter 4: the small-medium and medium enterprise owners that they 
initially targeted did not show the expected support for the new political 
enterprise.The potential activists which were comprised mainly of young small 
workshop owners, traders, engineers and skilled workers of “periphery of the 
periphery” found the prospect of becoming sub-industrialists or subcontractors of 
                                                            
520 For instance see “Refaha kavuşmak için hükümet özel sektöre yardımcı olmalıdır...,” Bizim 
Anadolu July 25, 1969. 
521 To see how Erbakan mentioned both types of industrial development in 1969 see his interviews 
with a journalist from the daily Cumhuriyet, Sadun Tanju. MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, 11-31. 
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state establishments more feasible and attractive than seeking credits and business 
partners to become part of a large scale private industrial venture.522  
The call for political engagement through a political party constituted the 
final element of the prognostic frames. While the NSM leaders called for direct 
political action on the part of the Muslims, convincing the potential activists to 
engage through a political party was considerably difficult.  
First, the NSM leaders needed to take into account the identities and 
concerns of potential activists.  In 1969, they primarily aimed at recruiting from the 
JP ranks and networks whose activists and voters were notoriously loyal to the JP. 
These JP supporters would refuse to betray their party if the project of the new 
party publicly revealed. For instance, since before the elections Paksu and Aksay 
had made their intention to join the prospective party in Maraş and Adana public, 
they failed to get reelected from the JP ranks.523 Second, the NSM activists tried to 
attract those individuals who had remained outside the institutional party politics. 
Individuals from the “periphery of the periphery” had serious misgivings regarding 
party politics having observed the internal disputes within the right wing parties, 
especially the JP. On the one hand, they saw party activists as individuals seeking 
to satisfy solely their own self-interests, which they deemed an unethical behavior. 
On the other hand, based on their hitherto observations, they rightly assumed that 
party activism necessitated extensive individual social, economic and political 
capital, which they did not possess.  
The second problem was the constant political agitation on the part of those 
Islamist and right wing publications and groups supporting the JP. They designated 
                                                            
522 It should be noted that Ayşe Buğra also draws attention to the differences in the industrial 
development frames of the NOP and the NSP. She argues that the NOP and the NSP constituency 
was made up of “marginalized” small and medium enterprises. Thus, when she attributes the NSP’s 
statist politics to the its willingness to foster patron-client relations; in addition to the economic 
policy ethos of the period; the question of why the NSM choses one type of clientelism (state 
contracts, sub-industries etc. for workshop owners and small businesses) over another (credits and 
quotas for small and medium enterprises to establish private large business ventures) remained 
unanswered. “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context,”  121-124. However, Buğra also 
succintly shows that by the 1980s the liberal economic policies created an atmosphere favorable to 
small and medium enterprises and that the network ties among the businesses filled with religious 
signs and symbols helped these enterprises to establish solidarity. It should however be noted that 
these businesses and networks were the outcome of the previous years of NSM activity. The young 
men in the NSM networks would become more affluent having accumulated some capital and 
engage exactly in the type of business activities that the NSM had initially been proposing. See Ibid, 
125-138. 
523 Telephone interview with Hasan Aksay. İstanbul, February 4, 2009. 
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the NSM movement as the tool of an ambitious man, Erbakan, who failed to satisfy 
his thirst for power under the Demirel government. They also warned against the 
dangers of dividing the mainstream party of the right and urged their constituencies 
to support the “lesser of two evils” (ehven-i şer), which would prevent the RPP’s 
coming to power and keep the communists at bay. Finally, since the NSM elites 
portrayed their adversaries as formidable forces rooted in a worldwide conspiracy 
and the political question as one of survival and death of nation there was always 
the danger of creating a sense of powerlessness and a perception of the political 
action as futile.524  
Therefore, in order to convince their potential activists to engage in direct 
political action and maintain those who had already been recruited, the NSM 
entrepreneurs used two strategies. First, they deployed motivational frames of 
“efficacy” and “propriety” in an intertwined fashion, which as shall be seen, 
contributed to the NSM collective identity to a great extent. The efficacy frame 
targeted to instill the sense that individual involvement to the NSM would not be in 
vain. Totally blanketing out the fact that the NSM organized the opening 
ceremonies because it had been unable to recruit activists and members, the NSM 
elites, propagated that the Muslim Turkish nation was already on the rise in every 
corner of the country coming together under the NSM, or Islam’s, banner.525 Since 
a nation-wide and national movement had already been in the making and was 
bound to succeed, the individuals would not risk anything in joining the cause. 
The propriety frames, on the other hand, constructed individual participation 
to the NSM as historically and religiously appropriate action. Muslim Turkish 
nation had been selected to shoulder the responsibility to “promote the good and 
prevent the bad.”526 Politics, they argued, at the hand of those who can differentiate 
between good and bad (mümeyyiz), would become goodness (fazilet).527  The cadres 
rooted in the Muslim nation would then chase the alien powers through politics and 
                                                            
524 In Benford’s terms this is an “hazard” that urgency frames may create. Benford, “Hundredth 
Monkey,” 208. 
525 See for instance Hasan Aksay, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara, February 8, 1970. 
526 Although this Kuranic idiom entrusted this duty to every individual Muslim, Erbakan and other 
NSM leaders explicitly or implicitly stated that the Turkish nation was “selected” to accomplish this 
job. See for instance, Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara. 
527 “Yorum: Siyaset ve Islam,” Türkiye’de Yarın, September 11, 1969. In this NSM newspaper 
published in Konya, local elites with close ties to the party entrepreneurs reproduced the NSM 
collective action frames. 
 184 
 
institutionalize the “National Order.”  Erbakan argued that such historical leaders as 
Fatih Sultan Mehmet, from the Ottoman period, and Alp Aslan from the Seljukid 
period were the real founders of the NOP thereby comparing them to the activists 
and leaders of the NSM.528 The NSM activism was not only a reenactment of a 
historico-religious responsibility but also a religious duty. A faithful Muslim would 
fight with injustice and evil thanks to its ever-renewing hope and through selfless 
political action, without any material considerations.529 A Muslim should not 
choose “the lesser of two evils” when and if “the good” were present.530  
Second, while urging for political action, they tried to avoid using the 
adjective political party for their initiative, which was associated with self-interest 
and petty politics and instead deployed the term “movement,” which implied 
solidarity and altruism. Up until the late 1969, they chose not to make public their 
intention to establish a political party. In a brochure of the electoral campaign of 
1969, they argued that their intention was not to establish a political party since the 
existing laws did not allow Muslims to organize as such.531 Several times, they 
repeated that their short-term goal was to “heal” the JP’s horse,532 which would 
“whinny with faith like the horse of Fatih Sultan Mehmet” (imanlı imanlı 
kişneyecek).533 Moreover, as shall be seen below, even after the official 
establishment of the party, the NSM leaders refused to designate their political 
collectivity as a party and described it as a movement.534 Only following the NSP’s 
first electoral campaign and entry into the parliament in 1973, that the political 
party, not qua party but qua movement organization that sustained the movement, 
would gain its permanent legitimacy in the eyes of the NSM activists. 
                                                            
528 Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara. 
529 Aksay, Milli Nizam, 18-19.   
530 A very well known slogan of the NSM parties was “Ehven-i şer yok, hayrın ta kendisi var” (No 
more “lesser of two evils but the good itself.” 
531 See for instance the campaign brochure of 1969 entitled Mukaddesatçı Türk’e Beyanname. 
Document at National Library catalogue no 1970 AD 563. 
532 The JP’s symbol was a white horse, which in turn implied that it was a continuation of the 
Democrat Party. In Anatolia, citizens had deformed the Turkish translation of Democrat, Demokrat, 
into similarly sounding “Demir Kırat” which literally meant “Iron White Horse.” 
533 “Prof. Erbakan İlçeleri Geziyor,” Türkiye de Yarın, September 23, 1969. 
534 The NSM leaders also paid lip service to a possible merger with parties closest to their position, 
even organized some meetings. However, since efforts to act together against the JP had not 
produced any tangible results before, it would be difficult to argue that the NSM leaders seriously 
considered uniting the NOP with smaller right wing parties after 1970. 
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5.1.4 The Reception of the NSM Collective Action Frames Among the 
Potential Activists in Kayseri 
The NSM frames helped to create “individual’s cognitive, moral, and 
emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or 
institution”535 through rendering new meanings to the activists’ experiences and 
sub-identities at the periphery of the periphery and then articulated them with the 
political center.  
This section studies how the NSM action-oriented frames were received 
among the activists and their functions and properties through a reinterpreted 
perspective of Noakes and Johnston on “frame resonance.” Noakes and Johnston 
argue that a mobilization frame has three major qualities which contribute to its 
resonance, or its compelling power, among the potential activists: “cultural 
compatibility,” or “the overlap between a frame and the cultural stock of the 
potential constituents;” “relevance,” or the capacity to make sense of what is 
happening in the lives of the targeted audience; and finally “consistency,” or “the 
internal consistency of the movement’s beliefs, ideology, claims, and actions and 
whether these “hang together”.”536 While the authors attribute the above-mentioned 
qualities to the frames themselves and assign agency mainly to potential activists 
only within the context of the discussion of “relevance,” this study argues that all 
these qualities should be studied from the lenses of the potential activists as well, 
who filter and negotiate the meanings and relative importance of politico-cultural 
products. In other words, a frame is culturally compatible, relevant and consistent 
to the extent that the target audience perceives or accepts them as such in relation to 
their own previous experiences.  
During the interviews, the NSM activists in Kayseri either intentionally or 
unintentionally made clear that they had received NSM leaders’ frames with 
caution, subscribing to some views and disagreeing with, even discarding, others. 
When they did not take a frame into consideration, they either dismissed it critically 
or laughed it off. In some cases, they enjoyed a frame even though they did not 
                                                            
535 Polletta and Jasper, 285.  
536 John A. Noakes and Hank Johnston, "Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective," in 
Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, ed. Hank Johnston and John A. 
Noakes (Lanham, Boulder and New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 15-16. 
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embrace or use it themselves, since they knew it damaged the reputation of their 
political opponents. One interviewee gave an example of the latter attitude through 
relating a conversation he witnessed. Right after the coup of 1960, a man who 
“knew people” in high places came to Kayseri and, in order to criticize the coup he 
told his father and those who were present about the atrocities that the military 
government committed. After he left, someone said “we know that all he told is a 
lie but we like it.” Another agreed, with the words of a “wise man”: “if someone 
deceives us with good (hak) in mind, we would purposely be deceived.”537 
 This subsection, then, discusses how and why the NSM activists found the 
NSM frames a) compatible with their own identities and religious and political 
culture of the networks in which they were embedded; b) consistent and relevant 
under the light of comparisons with other parties and their own experiences and 
observations538 at the periphery of the periphery.   
To begin with, from a broader perspective the NSM frames on the moral 
and material domains were congruent with the stories and narratives539 and political 
discourses prevalent within the right wing networks. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
such cultural and political compatibility meant that the NSM frames could have 
appealed to any member of the right wing. However, only those situated at the 
periphery of the periphery, or those who could not have benefited from the material 
and moral resources distributed by the JP found the NSM frames internally 
consistent and relevant to their own experiences.  For the prospective activists the 
NSM frames highlighted the disparity between the rhetoric and actual practices of 
other parties, particularly those of the JP’s. 
As far as the material domain is concerned, the major right wing parties, 
particularly the DP and later the JP had long been arguing for and promising rapid 
industrial development. However, the NSM frames incorporated an injustice 
component that the JP and other right wing parties lacked and criticized in detail 
previous and current governments’ technological and entrepreneurial policies. 
                                                            
537 Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006. 
538 Benford and Stanford differentiate between empirical credibility, or “the fit between the framing 
and events of the world” that the potential activists observe, and “experiential commensurability,” or 
similarities found between the frames and personal experiences. Here, experience and empirical 
observation are used interchangeably. See Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance,” 208-
210. 
539Snow and Benford call this type of resonance “narrative fidelity.” Ibid., 210. 
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While the dominant elements of the right wing networks, which had had access to 
state-controlled resources or had long established ties with economic centers and 
powers, remained unmoved by the economic injustice frame, the small traders, the 
factory foreman, engineers and small workshop owners established a 
correspondence between their own peripheral situation, the unjust treatment of 
Erbakan in the hands of the JP liberals, and Turkey’s peripheral position within the 
world economy.  
The NSM activists found the NSM’s claims regarding the JP’s “dependent 
industrialization” and unjust economic policies particularly relevant as they had 
themselves already witnessed or discussed such problems as how military factories 
in Kayseri had been buying overpriced auxiliary equipment like washers from the 
United States which could have been easily produced by the local workshops540 
reviving the local economy; how artisans were struggling to buy turning machines 
and industrial cutlery to start or enlarge their own businesses541; or what deemed to 
be the unjust rivalry of bigger local traders who could buy the latest products from 
their years-old connections in İstanbul.542  
Compared to the industrial policies of the JP, for the activists, the NSM 
prognostic frames promised ingenious, original and just solutions consistent with 
diagnosed problems.543 Despite its rhetoric of industrial development, the JP was 
building “pasta, soda, and chocolate,” even worse, beer and rakı544 factories545 and 
let the larger business owners to siphon resources at the expense of small 
businessmen. In contrast, the NSM entrepreneurs promised not only protection but 
also an opportunity for growth through the establishment of “factories which would 
manufacture factories,” for instance, factories that would produce “turning 
machines and industrial cutlery” in Anatolia.   
As for the moral domain, the right wing parties since the DP period had 
already been crying a moral decay and accusing the RPP and the state military and 
                                                            
540 Interview with KayNS4, Kayseri, September 20, 2009. 
541 Interview with KayNS12, Kayseri, September 12, 2006. 
542 Interview with KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.  
543 Interviews with KayNS12, Kayseri, September 12, 2006; KayNS13, Kayseri, September 17, 
2007; KayNS3, Kayseri, August 7, 2006. 
544A strong anise flavored spirit prevalent in the Mediterranean basin, considered as national drink 
of citizens of Turkey.  
545 Interviews with KayNS10, Kayseri, August 15, 2006 and KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006. 
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civil bureaucracies for repressing the religious who could have fought against 
corruption. At any rate, as other members of the right wing networks, the 
prospective activists had been familiar with stories of repression having either 
witnessed themselves, or learned from their fathers, grandfathers, neighbors or 
older colleagues how citizens had been arrested for teaching Kuran to little children 
or for putting an Islamic headwear during the 1940s.  
At first sight, the solution that the NSM promised for moral problems did 
not appear radically different from previous right frames which had promised to 
“defend religious freedoms” against the RPP: a promise to redress the injustices 
inflicted on the religious by the ruling (state and political) elites on the one hand 
and to fight with moral corruption through educational reform on the other. In their 
reception of the NSM frames, as important as the narratives prevalent within the 
right wing networks, was their own and recent experiences and observations under 
the JP government. The failure of the right-wing collective actions of the 1960s, 
including the TOBB Affair, the marginalization of ultranationalists and Islamists 
within the JP546 and the daily appearing news of the Risale-i Nur students being 
imprisoned547 attested to the inconsistency between the JP frames and actions.  
Moreover, the prospective NSM activists witnessed that the adjective 
“reactionary” that had so far been deployed against the DP and JP supporters by the 
RPP elites, was now used against all those who were critical of the JP’s policies, 
including not only the Islamists but also the conservative-nationalist and 
ultranationalist opponents.548 In addition to these more general concerns, some 
religious technical specialists and engineers who at some point worked for the 
government had had individual difficulties concerning their religious life. They had 
been subject to symbolic violence on the part of their non-practicing peers. For 
instance, in order to pray, they had to literally and figuratively descend below stairs 
                                                            
546 Interview with KayNS4, Kayseri, September 20, 2009. 
547 Interview with KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 2007.  
548 Interestingly enough, though the ultranationalists, conservative-nationalists and Islamists were all 
subject to such belittling, once the Islamists emerged as a political party, the former two began using 
the same terminology for the Islamists. Incidentally, almost all the NSM interviewees were pleased 
with the partial convergence of their economic injustice frames with the left and enjoyed being 
called “green communists” as they, in a way, proved false those who had been calling them 
“reactionaries”.   
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with janitors,549 an experience which hurt both their religious feelings and middle-
class pride.  
Hence, the activists perceived the NSM’s solution to moral decay, that is 
educational reform through Muslim political action, as a just solution both for 
themselves and the Muslim nation and consistent with the diagnosed problem.  
They welcomed the prospect of “Muslim power,” which for most meant to regain 
Muslim dignity in state affairs vis-à-vis “the Alevis, Christians, and Jews,”550 and 
for some to restore the Muslim superiority that they believed had been lost to non-
Muslims by the introduction of the Republic.551  
Moreover, the prospective activists thought educational reform was 
consistent with nationalism and Islam, as it promoted the principle of uniting the 
nation under the same values without brute force. In contrast to the NAP or the 
right wing movements of the 1960s (including various Islamist circles), which had 
engaged in street violence against the left wing in the name of the nation, the NSM 
leaders, at least at the beginning of their endeavor and up until the late 1970s when 
they turned a blind eye to the actions of some branches of their youth group, 
specifically refused to fight with other “children of the nation.” Instead of 
advocating a struggle against “the symptom” of moral decay, that is communism, 
educational reform targeted the root cause. Whether or not previously participated 
to anti-communist aggressions, the NSM activists had concluded that such 
strategies were fruitless, not only because they invited state intervention but also 
because such a struggle is inherently divisive for the society and an impediment to 
moral and material development.  
Finally, it should be added that the NSM frames became all the more 
credible when the prospective activists compared the NSM entrepreneurs with other 
right wing leaders. Above all, they appreciated the party entrepreneurs’ ability, ease 
                                                            
549 Interview with KayNS19, Kayseri, September 28, 2006. “Below stairs” refers to the servants’ 
area in a rich household.  
550 Interview with KayNS5, Kayseri, September 27, 2007. It should be added here that the NSM 
elites had never made official statement that would exclude the Alevis from the definition of the 
nation. However, during the interviews a considerable number of the NSM elites and local activists 
made clear that they viewed the Alevis as heretic brethren who lost their way at best, or fifth 
columns at worst.  
551 Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006. Interestingly enough the political 
superiority of the Muslims was first lost in the 19th century, when the Ottomans introduced equal 
civil and political rights for the non-Muslims. The Republican period was in a sense its continuation.   
 190 
 
and confidence in using religious idioms, signs and symbols. As an interviewee 
suggested, “a person familiar with traditional culture would sense” when these 
religious cultural elements were used even if they were communicated discreetly.552 
The potential activists were impressed most with the leadership’s refusal to be 
discreet compared to the JP’s search of balance in displaying public religiosity. For 
instance, it was the first time they saw political leaders who saluted the audience 
with the Islamo-Arabic phrase “Esselamün Aleyküm”553 despite the fact that it was 
frequently used in daily life. Likewise, it was the first time they witnessed a 
political leader, Erbakan, who, rather than bowing down to such insults as 
“takunyacılar” (clog wearer), took pride in what the insult implied: “ If this term is 
used in reference to ...wearing clogs to make ablutions for daily prayers, then I 
should state that we are proud to be Muslims.”554 There was then a marked contrast 
between this bold attitude and other right wing leaders’ occasional use of religious 
signs and symbols. The latter was either religious but hiding it, or not religious but 
abusing religion.555 Whatever the right answer was, in comparison to others the 
NSM leaders appeared to live and behave according to their principles and beliefs. 
Moreover, unlike other parties’ national executive bodies, which included both 
publicly religious and not-so-religious or not-publicly-religious personalities, the 
NSM's higher echelons demonstrated an apparent homogeneity in religious matters: 
not only Erbakan was a Naqshbandi disciple (being Naqshbandi was deemed a 
“doctorate” in religion among the pious) and there were prominent Nur students 
among the party founders, but also the NSM elites as a whole were very 
knowledgeable and fluent on traditional religious subjects.  The NSM leaders’ 
consistent and regular public display of individual religiosity and the homogeneity 
of the movement leadership were taken to be the sign of being genuinely religious 
and honest thus an indication of and future guarantee for consistency between 
frames and actions. In the eyes of the potential activists, then, the NSM leadership, 
                                                            
552 Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006. 
553 Interview with KayNS10, Kayseri, August 15, 2006. 
554 “Müslümanlığımızla iftihar ederiz,” Bizim Anadolu, May 28, 1969. 
555 They concluded that other right wing leaders’ religious signs and behavior constituted “an 
abuse.” Interview with KayNS9, September 25, 2006. 
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particularly Erbakan, was credible enough to acquire the status of true 
representative of the nation556, and of the activists for that matter. 
5.2 The NSM Collective Identity Process 
Collective identity frames (expressive vocabulary), similar to mobilization 
frames “define in cognitive terms the field of possibilities and limits which [the 
activists] perceive”, but involve more inward looking symbolic production which 
“give sense to [activists’] being together and to the goals they pursue.”557  The 
collective identity provides the answer for “who we are” and “what we do and how 
we do it?” Through the creation of a sense of “we,” collective identity nourishes 
“positive feelings”558 among the activists. Such positive feelings as responsibility, 
affection, solidarity facilitate individuals’ engagement  to political action even 
when the prospect of collective and individual benefits that collective action frames 
promise seem remote, unlikely or even unattainable.  
On the one hand, since targeted collective goods expressed through 
instrumental vocabulary are available to all if the movement succeeds, individuals 
would choose to “free ride” on the efforts of others.559 On the other hand, at the 
beginning of the mobilization process, the material benefits that an individual 
activist could harvest through activism, or the “Olson’s … solutions to the free-
rider dilemma,” would be neither immediately available nor visible.560  
Consequently, the effective expression and construction of grievances and 
interest through collective action frames leads to political action to the extent that 
they are coupled with and contribute to the collective identity formation. Neither 
the prospect of collective goods, nor selective material incentives for individuals 
introduced through instrumental frames guarantee mobilization unless they 
contribute to and interact with senses of solidarity, duty, empowerment and 
                                                            
556 As one interviewee maintained the person who would be his leader should have to be perfect like 
Erbakan, who had not missed a single prayer during his visit to Kayseri. Interview with KayNS13, 
Kayseri, September 17, 2007.   
557 Melucci, 332. 
558 Collective identity has been differentiated from frames and ideology mainly emphasizing 
“perception of shared status” and “positive feelings.” See Polletta and Jasper, 285.  
559 For a discussion on “free rider” problem see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: 
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.  
560 Polletta and Jasper, 284. 
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affection that form among the potential activists through action and interaction at 
social and spatial settings of movement activity.561 
5.2.1 The Collective Identity Frames, or the Expressive Vocabulary of the 
NSM Leaders 
The expressive vocabulary of the NSM leaders defined both their collective 
endeavor as a whole and the properties of the individuals who make part of the 
collectivity. They intertwined individual and collective qualities to form a sense of 
“we” which not only helped activist recruitment and sustained mobilization but also 
set the symbolic boundaries between the NSM and other political groups. 
 To begin with, the NSM innovators emphasized that the NSM party(ies) 
did not represent a “simple [political] party cause” but embodied the revival of the 
essence of the nation562, or Muslims. In fact, the NSM was not actually a political 
party. The latter was an identity imposed by the existing laws on “35 million” 
person who wanted to unite under the banner of Islam (şehadet bayrağı).563 The 
NSM was thus not a simple partisan endeavor but a collective action of people who 
“shared the same religious faith.” Unlike the parties who had divided the nation 
into different interest groups, the NSM activists came together to establish the 
National Order and unity, and to fight against vanity and blasphemy through 
solidarity  (omuz omuza), cooperation (elbirliği) and bonds of love (gönül 
birliği).564  
The properties that the NSM leaders attributed to the members of the 
movement celebrated and reinforced individual Muslim identity through its 
reconstruction within the context of the NSM as an ideal individual: not only 
religious, or “had fear of god,”565 but also politically responsible, active, 
courageous, altruistic, and enlightened person who was sensitive, able to find and 
execute correct solutions to economic, political, technical, social and cultural 
problems of the country. Erbakan was himself promoted as a model Muslim who 
                                                            
561 It has been argued that one should simply admit the importance of emotional satisfaction derived 
from collective identity. See Ibid, 290. 
562 Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Ankara. 
563 Erbakan, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Edirne. 
564 Hüseyin Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli, October 6, 1970.  
565 Hüseyin Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Karabük, May 31, 1970.  
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could represent and speak the mind of the cadre that constituted the NSM in 
particular, the nation in general.  
 Hasan Aksay’s expressions illustrate the way in which the NSM activists, 
were defined as people who could shoulder the responsibility of politics to fight 
with injustice: “Politics is difficult. Political life is not comfortable. It is like falling 
into an arena. Politician is situated at a point where everybody scrutinizes to find a 
fault…” Those who observed such difficulties feared from political activity and 
would produce excuses not to engage politically and pull back, calling politics “the 
swamp;” all the while complaining about injustices and waiting sacrifice from 
others. The activists in contrast were Muslims who tried to practice the Kuranic 
principles of “do not let two days be the same” and “prevent the bad.” They were 
good, virtuous and altruistic people who did not expect any benefits from politics 
and hence did not hesitate to “fill the swamp” with their “unsoiled existence.”566  
Moreover, the NSM expressive vocabulary designated the activists as an 
enlightened cadre that possessed historical qualities of the nation and thus entitled 
to govern the nation.567 At various occasions, the NSM leaders, particularly 
Erbakan, emphasized how early Muslims contributed to the development of science 
and how the Ottomans and the Seljukids Islamized Anatolia. The NSM activists 
were equally capable of undertaking similar tasks: they would industrialize 
Anatolia and clean “un-national (gayri milli) elements that became a nuisance in 
government.”568  
Such a construction of the NSM activist identity then supported the NSM’s 
portrayal as a meta- and a-political political entity, which would bring salvation –
“God willing”- not only to the nation, but also to the umma (the entire Muslim 
community in the world) and the world.  
The NSM Collective Identity in Kayseri 
The collective identity of the NSM in Kayseri, as shaped by action- and 
identity oriented frames and emotional interaction among the NSM activists, 
                                                            
566 Aksay, Milli Nizam,18. 
567 MNP İzmir Gençlik Teşkilatı, 38 
568 Ibid. 
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provided a sense of “we,” which solidified interpersonal bonds among the potential 
activists. Both the symbolic and practical creation of solidarity, affection and 
empowerment and the reinforcement of already existing individual subidentities 
helped the individuals to overcome their reservations and then articulate themselves 
with the national and local level of politics. As such, the emergence and functions 
of the NSM collective identity can best be understood in relation to the previously 
acquired individual subidentities and experiences of the NSM activists.  
  First, the feelings of solidarity, affection for each other and duty helped the 
NSM activists to overcome their reservations regarding party activism, which they 
associated with “petty politics” and “self-interest” as a result of their experience 
under the JP government and within the right-wing networks.   The interviewees 
expressed their sense of solidarity with and affection to fellow activists most when 
referring to such events as party opening ceremonies, congresses and electoral 
mobilization periods where individuals undertook collective tasks and when they 
read, heard, and experienced “outsiders”’ reactions, comments, interests regarding 
themselves. Referring to their initial participation and subsequent contributions to 
the NSM, they deployed the same expressions that the NSM innovators had first 
used in the party opening ceremonies, which emphasized altruism, sacrifice and 
duty for the good of the nation: “…this cause is not an individualistic 
cause…This…is a divine sacred cause. Each of us is a soldier within it. None of us 
is different from the other”569; “Those who are afraid of damages to their wealth 
should not come to our party… Our motto is to be under God’s command and serve 
those who are [also] under His command.”570  
The NSM activists felt that joining the NSM was a duty however it was 
conceptualized: religious or citizen duty, or both. Some expressed this sense of duty 
as follows:  “We realized that country was in a terrible situation, it seems the duty 
falls upon us, we should get together with others and contribute to country’s 
[development]”571; some others maintained that the party leaders called him 
                                                            
569 Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Kırklareli. 
570 Abbas, the NOP Opening Ceremony in Karabük. 
571 Interview with KayNS9, Kayseri, September 25, 2006.  
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(literally and figuratively) to grab the Islamic flag together with others as a Muslim 
and he dutifully did.572  
Second, the NSM expressive vocabulary, which celebrated individual traits 
of Muslims as representing the qualities of the nation and called them for political 
action for material and moral development, filled the activists with a sense of 
empowerment and responsibility/duty through acknowledging their individual 
cultural capital and its importance. The NSM activists had been extremely 
uncomfortable with the equation of religiosity with reactionary attitude for they not 
only did not see any relevance but also perceived themselves as more than religious 
subjects: (informally or formally) well-educated men in their own areas of interest 
ranging from professional issues to politics, economy, literature, history and 
traditional Islamic philosophy.  The NSM thus gave them an opportunity to 
“socially realize” and to put into good use their individual selves within and 
through political action.  
This aspect of their collective identity had such prominence that following 
the NSP’s entry into the parliament it became a factor that the NSM leaders had to 
take into account in the choice of party policies and strategies. The activists 
reproduced the centralized decision making structure of the party and admitted that 
the NSM leaders, especially Erbakan was very knowledgeable, experienced and 
visionary in technical issues, and insightful and knowledgeable in political and 
religious matters. Nevertheless, they also emphasized that they were capable and 
competent enough to criticize the actions and choices made by the party elites. As a 
symptom and/or consequence of this attitude, most local party executives did not 
like reading the party’s newspaper Milli Gazete (National Newspaper), thinking 
that it was too aggressive at times. As one interviewee put it their reaction was: “Do 
not impose me your politics, I can do [it] myself.”573 This critical stance and 
individualistic tendencies of the NSM activists574 supported by the NSM collective 
identity was balanced, in fact, controlled, through above mentioned aspects of 
                                                            
572 Interview with KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 2007. 
573 Interview with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006. 
574 This was also true for some central young elites. For instance Turhan Utku and Çavuşoğlu who 
were among the first young activists to be recruited during the Movement of Independents, though 
they had the greatest admiration and respect for Erbakan and a true dedication to the cause, they 
were also “free spirits”. During their political careers they often conflicted with the NSM leadership. 
Especially Çavuşoğlu, as other Akıncı leaders, tried to keep Akıncı youth as autonomous as possible 
from the NSM. 
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collective identity: solidarity, altruism, and sense of duty. Most important, as shall 
be seen these features of the NSM identity would prove to be very valuable as the 
NSM selective material and moral incentives for the party and individual activists 
became more accessible and visible during the electoral processes, creating 
intramovement power struggles. 
5.3 Unintended Dimensions and Consequences of the NSM Ideational 
Products  
In order to challenge their electoral rivals and recruit activists, the NSM 
leaders displayed a rather calculated effort to differentiate their initiative from other 
political parties and forces. They redefined the “nation” as primarily Muslim, 
without so much giving up on emphasis on Turkishness, and promoted the NSM 
parties as the embodiments and representatives of this nation. Through new 
meanings and interpretations the NSM ideational elements mobilized the potential 
activists of the right wing networks helping them to articulate their professional, 
social, political and economic experiences, perceptions, connections and identities 
with the national level of the political arena. 
However, the NSM politico-cultural production involved subliminal 
(meaning unintentional) dimensions as well, which can also be called 
“reasonable”575 facet of symbolic activism. These dimensions entailed a process of 
reproduction of orthodoxy of the political arena where heterodoxy and change were 
intended and a parallel process of differentiation within the right wing networks 
while claiming to represent a natural affinity between being a Muslim and joining 
the ranks of the NSM.  
In other words, on the one hand, within the political arena the NSM, as 
other contemporary and previous Islamists in Turkey, reproduced the orthodoxy in 
                                                            
575 Erik Neveu contributes to the scholarly discussion of social movement frames reminding Pierre 
Bourdieu’s differentiation between different types of action: rational action (calculative, strategic), 
mechanical reaction (cause and effect) and reasonable action. Reasonable action is carried not 
because actors have a predefined object or because actors react against an external stimuli but just 
because within a particular field of action the players of the game act for “practical reasons”. This 
act, which literally and figuratively “goes without saying,” is produced by the “ontological 
complicity between the mental structures and objective structures”. Neveu, Sociologie des 
Mouvements Sociaux, 83-84; Pierre Bourdieu, “Un Acte Désintérressé est-il Possible?” in Raisons 
Pratiques: Sur la Theorie de l’Action (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 149-157.  
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a heterodox fashion: similar to other political players (state and political elites), the 
NSM immersed the particularistic interests, demands and problems of its activists 
and supporters in a political frame that claimed power in the name of a 
homogenously conceptualized nation, in this case defined as Muslim. For the NSM, 
the meta-rule of the political game, which defined politics as the representation of 
the nation, was thus a resource as much as a constraint within the political field. It 
was a constraint since the nation had already been defined in particular terms by the 
existing dominant powers. It however became a resource because it provided a 
window of opportunity for the NSM who could redefine the nation through 
attributing new meanings and values to the “trump cards” of the political game: 
Turkishness, Muslimness, progress, and secularism.  
On the other hand, the institutionalization of the definition of the nation as 
Muslim within the framework of party politics, and the designation of the NSM as 
the sole legitimate representative of this nation revealed inadvertently the relative 
lack of interest in political activism (i.e voting or party work) in the name of the 
“Muslims” or “Muslim nation.” Within the right wing networks while Islam was a 
resource as a tool bag of socially entrenched signs, symbols, values, and beliefs, 
Islam as differently interpreted and practiced religion was a constraint for political 
action. Moreover, the NSM activists needed to differentiate themselves as a 
collectivity from other pious members of the right wing. Therefore, while 
pretending to represent orthodoxy, the NSM local and national leaders had to 
undergo a process of differentiation from other Muslims in order to justify and 
legitimize their juxtaposition of Muslimness with the NSM. Not only a Muslim 
needed to be redefined as a politically conscious and active subject but also in an 
environment where religiousness was equated with religious stringency the NSM 
activists were forced to refashion themselves according to ever more-stringent 
interpretations of religion to be “more Muslim” than other Muslims worthy to 
represent the nation.  
 This section argues that the cognitive, relational and environmental factors 
peculiar to political field rendered not only the intended but also the unintended 
aspects and consequences of the NSM ideational products articulatory and 
integrative for the activists and the party. The reproduction of the orthodoxy at the 
national level blurred the boundaries between the NSM and other political players 
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and thus facilitated the integration of the NSM into the political game. The electoral 
gains and subsequent coalition partnerships which allowed access to state 
distributed resources firmly consolidated the NSM. The redefinition of Muslimness 
underscored the boundaries that united the NSM activists and supporters and 
fortified their sense of solidarity, empowerment and affection which symbolically 
supported the party throughout the years to come.  Since both the extra- and intra-
movement resources were the primary conditions to sustain political activism 
within the existing national and local contexts, it can thus safely be maintained that 
as long as the conditions within these contexts persisted, these features proved to be 
more salient than the diagnostic and prognostic mobilization frames even in the 
face of new challenges, needs and changes. 
5.3.1 The NSM Ideational Production at the National Level of the Political 
Field  
Steinberg reminds that social movements’ ideational elements (she uses the 
term discourse, discursive repertoires) are “only partly the product of calculated 
action. …[These are] partly bounded by the cultural practices available for [the 
social movements] to make meaning.”576 She thus recommends a “dialogical 
analysis” which would take into consideration how power holders within a specific 
sociological field determine the terms of communicative interaction, in fact, the 
discourses of the challengers.577 While this recommendation is the first step 
forward to understand the layered and “dependent” nature of the NSM collective 
identity and the mobilization frames, Pierre Bourdieu provides the second step, 
which refuses to imprison interaction among the players of a field within simple 
“communication relations.” According to Bourdieu, communication relations are 
inseparable parts of power relations, which, not only, “in their content and form, 
depend on the [thus far] accumulated material and symbolic power of the 
individuals (or institutions)”578 but also serve to increase them within a field of 
                                                            
576 Marc W. Steinberg, “Toward a More Dialogical Analysis of Social Movement Culture,” in Social 
Movements: Identity, Culture and the State, ed. David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier and Belinda 
Robnett (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 208. 
577 Steinberg, 224. 
578 Pierre Bourdieu, “Sur le Pouvoir Symbolique,” Langage et Pouvoir Symbolique (Paris: Éditions 
Fayard, 2001), 206. It should be noted that in this text, Bourdieu focuses on the relations of power 
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action and interaction. Particularly, it is through accumulation of symbolic power, 
or increasing the value of a specific symbolic capital, which relates to one’s status 
within the field, that one builds up material (economic and social) capital, even 
achieve the monopoly of ideational production.579 From this perspective, the 
symbolic work, or the instrumental and expressive vocabularies and collective 
identities of the social movements and political parties are part of the power 
relations specific to the political arena aiming at increasing the symbolic and 
material power of their participants. 
The NSM actors, like their contemporary or predecessor Islamists, who had 
had engaged in action and interaction with their rivals without a political party of 
their own, were heterodox players trying to increase the value of a symbolic capital 
which was available in the political arena and with which they associated 
themselves: religion. Through their mobilization frames and collective identity, 
they tried to augment the value of things associated with Islam, or reshuffle the 
symbolic order of things in “Muslims”’ favor. However, the very fact that they 
were engaged in power relations and tried to accumulate symbolic and material 
power in the political field, demonstrated that they were also as orthodox players as 
their opponents. They (subliminally, or “reasonably”) appropriated the doxa of 
field, or the entire set of cognitive and evaluative presuppositions, whose 
“recognition is implicated by the membership to the field itself.”580 In other words, 
the NSM actors, similar to the dominant members of the field, who defended the 
existing hierarchy of the things, adopted the stakes of the game and tacitly 
“agree[d] on the objects of dissensus” as these were “constitutive of the field 
itself.”581   
The NSM ideational products and practices entailed, thus, on the one hand, 
a challenge to the hierarchy, which had placed “Islam” at a subordinate position in 
the political sphere, and on the other hand, a consensus, which reproduced the doxa 
                                                                                                                                                                     
between the classes. However, he applies his conceptualization of symbolic production to any 
relation of power between groups who play within a specific field. 
579 Bourdieu, “Sur le Pouvoir Symbolique,” 206-207 
580 Bourdieu, Méditations,145. 
581 Pierre Bourdieu, “Le Champ Scientifique,” Actes de Recherches en Sciences Sociales 2 (1976): 
100. See also, Pierre Bourdieu, “Pour une Science des Oeuvres,” in Raisons Pratiques: Sur la 
Theorie de l’Action (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 71. This essay finds Bourdieu’s analysis of the 
scientific or the literary field much more useful to understand the nature of power relations in a 
given field. The Turkish political field since the 1950s witnessed the clash of legitimacy of “the 
truths” (positivist truth of the Kemalists and the religious truth of the Islamists) much like the clash 
of truths in a scientific field.  
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of the politics in Turkey, originally the Kemalist582 doxa, which still survives 
today.583 The latter involved squeezing the meaning of political activity to 
representing the nation584 and creating “social engineering projects” which rendered 
“the society as the object [as opposed to subject] of the politics.”585  
In studying the foundational ideational elements of the new republic, Binnaz 
Toprak maintains that in their endeavor to build a modern nation-state, the 
Kemalists took the West as their muse and saw an inherent “incompatibility” 
between Islamic and Western societies. They believed that in order to modernize 
the country, they had to eliminate Islamic values, laws and customs, which opposed 
the Kemalist perception of a modern nation based on the Western example.586 
However, Bozarslan shows that the radical measures that the Kemalists took to 
decrease the influence of religion in state affairs cannot be solely attributed to their 
ideational framework. They were party related to the practical and difficult task of 
creating a nation-state over the ruins and the remnants of a multi-ethnic, multi-
confessional and multi-cultural empire where the primary loyalties were above all 
for the confessional communities, tribes, and brotherhoods. Since the religious 
geography of Anatolia had become quite homogenous following the deportation 
and massacres of the Armenians and the exchange of populations with Greece, the 
Kemalists faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they had to accept Islam as a resource 
for “imagining” or identifying the Turkish nation as the remaining and immigrating 
populations to Anatolia were overwhelmingly Muslim; on the other hand, using 
religion as such constituted a risk for the Kemalist imagination of the nation. It 
could a) reinforce communitarian loyalties and thus diminish the loyalty for the 
nation-state; b) encourage extraterritorial ambitions seeking to unite Muslim 
                                                            
582 The adjective Kemalist is a word derived from the name of the Republic’s leading founding 
father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and used generally to refer to the worldviews of the state elites (civil 
and military bureaucrats) who had been acting as the guardians of the regime in the name of the 
nation since the inauguration of the Republic. See below for further discussion.  
583 For an early work that draws attention to the analytical danger of putting the Islamists and the 
Kemalists in “binary opposition” in terms of their ideational production see Banu Helvacıoğlu, “ 
‘Allahu Ekber’, We are Turks: yearning for a different homecoming at the periphery of Europe,” 
Third World Quarterly 17 (1996): 503-523. 
584 Hamit Bozarslan, “Islam, Laïcité et la Question d’Autorité de l’Empire Ottoman à la Turquie 
Kemaliste,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 125 (2004): 111. 
585 Menderes Çınar, “Kemalist Cumhuriyetcilik ve İslamci Kemalizm,” in İslamcılık, ed. Yasin 
Aktay, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce 6 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), 176. Comparing 
and contrasting the Kemalists and the Islamists Çınar succintly demonstrates that the Kemalist 
project and Islamist “counter project” have essentially the same authoritarian tendencies. He, 
however, does not dwell on why and how exactly these two projects came to reflect each other. 
586 Toprak, Islam and Political Development, 39-40. 
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countries and c) become an ideational resource for the mobilization of Kurdish 
nationalists around the brotherhoods.587 But the greatest danger that “Islam” posed 
for the Kemalists and their vision of the nation was that religion “…could, at least 
potentially, substitute itself for the nation as the principal reference of politics and 
identity, thereby subordinating [the nation] to its own principles.”588 
The Kemalists “solved” this problem through not completely separating 
religion from state (and community) affairs as was the case in France, but 
submitting religion to state’s control. The state’s jurisdiction over the religious life 
and institutions identified “legal” and “illegal” religious activities and 
interpretations and banned religion from the public life, rendering religiosity a 
strictly private affair. Bozarslan argues that the Kemalist project during the early 
years of the Republic was two fold: First, it was about shaping “a rational and 
national Islam, charged with the task of legitimizing the power, supporting its will 
to eradicate all non-official [forms of] religiosity (brotherhood, “Ottoman”, 
“Arabic”, popular) in the name of the progress, revolution and civilization. 
…Second, within a society whose legitimacy resided in its religious homogeneity, 
secularism was elevated to a constitutional obligation, conditioning even the 
citizenship.”589 These ideational and institutional developments in turn meant 
respectively that at least within the political arena “religion and the religious could 
exist only in a submissive condition” and the nation, whose Muslimness had been 
admitted, could only exist if secular.590  
The Republican elites, having guaranteed the loyalty of the urban middle 
classes, intellectuals and the alliance of the rural notables and İstanbul big 
bourgeoisie, launched this project believing that the society at large would 
eventually be secularized, meaning abandoning the idea that religion should play a 
role in state affairs. Until then, the single party regime of the RPP, Law of High 
Treason and various other Penal laws protected not only the secular reforms but 
also the elites themselves.591 Secularism, henceforth, became an element of the 
doxa of the political field, for, it both institutionalized the Kemalist vision of 
                                                            
587 Hamit Bozarslan, “Islam, Nationalisme ou les Paradoxes Turcs,” Après Demain, no. 447/449 
(2002): 17. 
588 Ibid. 
589 Hamit Bozarslan,  “Islam, Laicité et la question d’Autorité”: 112 
590 Ibid. 
591 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
412.  
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nation-state and provided a dispositive of power, supporting and ensuring the 
dominance of the Kemalist state-builders, who claimed to represent the nation.  
Following the passage to multi-party electoral system by 1945,592 
notwithstanding its submissive, subordinated and “domesticated” status, Islam had 
paradoxically become, alongside Turkishness, secularism and 
progress/modernization593, an element of the political field’s doxa.594  Since the 
latter was ultimately tied to “the question of exercising power in the name of the 
nation,”595 the existence of Islam as a constitutive of the doxa, even if subservient, 
offered an alternative dispositive of power for the newcomers. By 1945, when the 
establishment of political parties became legal, both Islam and secularism became 
the most disputed subjects of the political arena. While the new political parties 
opposing the RPP, the Democrat Party (DP) and the Nation Party (NP), attacked the 
RPP for its stringent approach to secularism, the RPP in turn accused these parties’ 
leaders for encouraging “reactionaries” (irticacılar). Following its victory against 
the RPP in 1950, the DP introduced a liberal interpretation of secularism allowing 
religious life to thrive.  For the purposes of this study, the most important 
development of the period was the mobilization of individual Islamists and some 
informal (including the Nur students) Islamist groups in support of the DP and the 
NP. Since the introduction of the Law of High Treason, the Islamists – some had 
been active members of the Islamist branch of the Constitutionalist movement (the 
Young Turks) of the Ottoman Empire- came out of the closet for the first time, 
taking advantage of the relatively liberal atmosphere. They tried to refute the 
arguments that Islam was the main cause of the “backwardness” of the Muslim 
world in general, the Turks in particular, through providing their own 
conceptualization of civilization and reading of Westernization. Most important, 
they redefined the nation as Muslim, claimed in their turn to represent the authentic 
will of the nation and asked the DP government to introduce changes in the 
                                                            
592 For a discussion of how Turkey abandoned the authoritarian single party regime and adopted a 
semi-authoritarian multi party democracy by the 1950s see Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern 
History (London and New York: I.B. Tauris &Co Ltd, 1993), 215-228. 
593 On the question of how the Islamists and Kemalists position themselves vis-à-vis “Europe” see 
Helvacıoğlu, 514-519. 
594 For a detailed discussion of this process see Hamit Bozarslan, “La laïcité en Turquie,” Matériaux 
pour l’Histoire de Notre Temps no. 78 (2005): 42-49.  
595 Bozarslan, “ Islam, Laicité et la question d’Autorité”: 111. 
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religious policies of the state ranging from recitation of Kuran in the state radio to 
reversing certain secular reforms of the earlier period. 
While the NSM entrepreneurs had their intellectual roots within this early 
Islamist movement of the 1950s, it can be argued that as important as the legacy of 
the previous movement for the ideational production of the NSM was the 
persistence of the doxa of the political arena. The military coup of 1960 that had 
been staged against the DP and the “reactionaries” had introduced the military as 
the guardian of the regime and reinstituted the terms of the political game despite 
the introduction of a relatively liberal constitution discussed in Chapter 4. While the 
military junta justified its intervention claiming to represent the national will, the 
JP, which had capitalized on the DP’s legacy, opposed the coup also in the name of 
the nation. In that sense, the NSM innovators, as other political actors, including 
other Islamists, could not escape from reproducing the discourse of the “national 
will” and presenting “social engineering projects,” all the while trying to 
differentiate themselves from other political elites, through the display and 
promotion of an “Islamic life style” and particularly from the other Islamists596 
through the introduction of injustice and economic development frames.597 As a 
matter of fact, it was the reproduction of the orthodoxy, which gave them the 
opportunity to introduce their “limited” heterodoxy.  
At any rate, while the heterodox elements of the NSM frames challenged 
the opponents, the reproduction of orthodoxy, to the extent that Islam was its 
constitutive element, consolidated the NSM as a legitimate player of the political 
game, forced the other actors to “play along” and hence amplified the NSM 
demands and influence disproportionate to its actual power and numbers.  The 
appropriation and reinterpretation of the Islamic element of the doxa forced all 
political actors to think and comment on the issue: since the mainstream right wing 
                                                            
596 i.e the Nur students, Süleymancıs and various organized or unorganized Islamist individuals and 
groups. 
597 It should be noted that Nilüfer Göle has already argued that the Islamist “counter-elites” engaged 
in a struggle with the “secular elites” through the creation and promotion of alternative, “Islamic” 
modern “life-worlds.” However, as shall be discussed further below, her conceptualization of the 
arena of “intersubjectivity, stratification, and power” is problematic which prevents her from 
differentiating national and local levels of political activity and from seeing how meso-level factors 
(organizations and networks) influence Islamist identity and action frames in interaction with macro 
and micro factors at the national and local fields of action.“The Making of Elites and Counter-
elites,” 51-52. 
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parties had already put Islam into use to increase their democratic credibility in the 
eyes of the electorate and the RPP had established itself as a guardian of the secular 
system, in order to face the NSM’s challenge these parties needed to introduce and 
reintroduce their own versions of “Muslimness” attributed to the nation.  
 Consequently, from a point of view which takes into account the relations 
of power and political opportunities and constraints that accompany these relations, 
the goal of the Islamists in the political field does not appear as one of changing the 
state and society as such but as one of transfiguring the hierarchy of material and 
symbolic values associated with Islam in order to increase the interest (political, 
economic and social capital) of one’s own and the supporters of the movement. 
There is no need then to attribute “hidden plans,” “ill formulated ideology” or 
“moderation” to the NSM actors to explain the discrepancy between their frames of 
Islamization of the state and society and their consensual relations with other 
political parties in the parliament. To be sure to capture the state apparatus and 
bring into the Islamist wagon the majority of the citizens would be the ultimate 
solution, as it would “reseal” the game in the NSM’s terms, placing Islam and its 
“guardians,” the NSM participants, at the highest echelon. However, as shall be 
seen, the symbolic and material gains achieved through party politics, satisfied the 
actors in a multiplicity of ways that the ultimate solution came to serve more as an 
element of the NSM mobilization and identity frames and a symbolic challenge to 
the rivals than a full fledged, well-thought of social engineering venture.  As other 
institutionalized actors of the political field, their engagement patterns entailed not 
only contestation and conflict but also negotiation and compromise.  Meanwhile 
however, the forgotten, the undiscussed, were the development of individual rights 
and liberties. As long as the nation was defined primarily through Turkishness and 
Sunni Islam, the doxa of the political field was an impediment for those political, 
cultural, religious and ethnic groups such as the Kurds, the Alevis, the non-Muslims 
religious minorities and even the socialists, who could not express their interest, 
demands, and grievances within the confines of representing such a constructed 
nation.  
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5.3.2 The NSM Ideational Work and the Local Level of Political Arena 
This subsection studies another “reasonable” (subliminal) dimension of the 
NSM ideational production, particularly that of the collective identity, that emerged 
in action and interaction at the local level: the promotion and adoption of religious 
stringency as a defining characteristic of being an NSM activist in an attempt to 
distinguish the NSM activists, voters and supporters from other pious members of 
the local right wing networks, particularly from those of the JP.   
In studying “organized racism” through white supremacist groups in the 
United States, Blee argues that since “whiteness” is an ambiguous, “unmarked”, 
even an “invisible” category in a white-dominated society where existing policies 
and goods that benefit the whites “are seldom acknowledged as racial in their intent 
or consequences” and only “non-whites” are remarked through “otherness, a stigma 
of difference,”598 the racist groups have difficulties in trying to draw and justify the 
boundaries of their collectivities in particular and whiteness in general. Facing the 
“unstable” and “unmarked” nature of whiteness, the activists of the racist groups 
have to identify the whiteness with “political commitment as much as biology”599: 
“those who act on behalf of the white race as a whole-and those who are steadfast 
personal friends-are white.”600 
For the NSM activists the secular(ist) attitudes of the elites of the 
mainstream right and left-wing parties and the existence of secularism as the 
dominant component of the political field’s doxa facilitated the drawing of the 
NSM boundaries through the adoption of Islamic, signs and symbols vis-à-vis the 
elites of other institutionalized players (the state, the political parties, the military 
and judicial bureaucracy etc.) of the political game, particularly the JP. The 
definition of the nation as primarily Muslim, the public display of basic religious 
rituals such as praying five times a day, ablution, fasting and emphasis on 
conservatism regarding gender roles and, finally denying Muslim subjectivity to the 
                                                            
598 Blee, Inside Organized Racism, 56. 
599 Ibid., 63. 
600 Ibid., 71. It should be noted that Ismail is also very insightful in demonstrating the common 
“Islam” field and the tensions and heterogeneity created by different interpretations. She, however, 
does not dwell on movement level differentiations and interpretations. She differentiates between 
various competing Islamist frames in general lines such as conservative Islamism, radical Islamism, 
etc. Salwa Ismail, “The Study of Islamism Revisited.”   
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elites of the mainstream parties,601 were enough to challenge the opponents and 
distinguish the NSM activists from them. 
 At the local level of politics, however, where the daily interaction with non-
NSM members of their social networks was unavoidable; the definition of the 
nation with Muslimness blurred the boundaries between the NSM activists and 
other Muslims. The NSM activists faced a similar difficulty with the white 
supremacist groups: the invisibility of Muslimness in a Muslim dominated society. 
Moreover the mobilization and institutionalization of a group of Islamists through a 
political party revealed that not only ordinary and non-practicing but also many 
pious Muslims, were unwilling to join or vote for the NSM for various reasons, as 
admitted by a Kayseri NSM activist602, a deeply discouraging experience. The 
NSM activists faced a dilemma: They had to distinguish themselves from other 
Muslims of their locality without creating a rupture that could endanger their 
pretension to represent the Muslims.  
Consequently, in order to make sense of their being together and distinguish 
themselves from others, the NSM activists redefined Muslimness, or how to be a 
“good” and “honest” Muslim603 worthy of representing the Muslim nation. 
Accordingly, on the one hand, the local NSM activists internalized the NSM 
mobilization frames, which associated being such a Muslim with having political 
consciousness and engaging in political action in the name of the “Muslim nation.”  
A proper Muslim had to act in order to “prevent the evil and ensure the goodness” 
within the society he lived. On the other hand, as a “reasonable” behavior within 
the right wing networks where religious stringency was associated with religiosity, 
or orthodoxy, the NSM activists tried to increase their level of religious stringency 
and to create a homogenous group where non-stringent behavior was frowned upon 
at best, chastised at worst. The latter enabled the NSM activists to fortify their 
affective and solidary bonds and distinguish themselves from both “ordinary” and 
                                                            
601 For instance, attacking Demirel, Hüseyin Abbas claimed “He pretends to be Muslim, [but he is 
actually] a freemason. They opened elementary schools even in the villages but not Prayer Leader 
and Preacher Schools. With a drinking glass in his hand he told me he is the prime minister who 
served Islam the most.” The report of the Government Inspector at the NOP Opening Ceremony in 
Karabük, May 31, 1970. 
602 Interview with KayNS5, Kayseri, September 27, 2007. 
603 Among the intervieewees “İyi” (good) and “dürüst” (honest) were the two adjectives used 
frequently together with the word “Muslim” in order to refer to  fellow activists and to non-NSM 
friends and acquaintances whom they deemed religious.  
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pious Muslims without rupturing from them but maintaining increased social 
distance from them. A rupture, if any, occurred not before but following the 
deepening and solidification of the NSM networks. Since increased religious 
stringency, became an intramovement resource as well, some actors bordered the 
line of (social) heterodoxy for regular pious Muslims. 
Salwa Ismail argues that religious orthodoxy (i.e stringency) of the 
Islamists, entailed adopting “an evaluative grid whose main components are the 
ideas of truth and falsehood and the categories of halal (licit) and haram 
(illicit).”604 Within the Kayseri context, in fact, in Anatolia, religious stringency had 
been defined in various ways depending from where one looked at it ranging from 
regularly performing “five pillars” of Islam to applying religious sources entirely in 
one’s life based on a detailed and pretty literal reading of the religious sources, 
particularly the Sunna and the Hadith605. Nevertheless, as the interviews with both 
the NSM activists and activists of the other political parties revealed, in general the 
most stringent was considered the most religious notwithstanding the fact that at 
times depending on the context such a religiosity could be disapproved or thought 
to be socially inappropriate or even pretentious. While the outcome was different 
from one person to another in terms of the achieved level of stringency when 
compared with the pious members of the other political parties, the common 
denominators that distinguished the NSM activists were the following. 
 First, they became dissatisfied with the “basic” Islamic rituals, and jointly 
and individually tried to accumulate knowledge of the Hadith and Sunna to be able 
to apply them in their daily lives thoroughly. As the words of an interviewee 
illustrates: “We were inviting religious masters (Hocaefendiler) to our oturma 
sessions. We were trying to learn Islam. I learnt Islam during that period.... 
Previously, even though I was doing my daily prayers I had not known Islam.”606 
                                                            
604 Ismail, 62. 
605 These refer to the catalogued and written traditions and sayings attributed to the Prophet 
Mohammed. In their content which give minute details of how a Muslim should behave in his/her 
daily life; they resemble more to Talmud then the Bible. However, there has been neither a 
consensus nor an established official authority (not even the Presidency of Religious Affair) that can 
definitely prescribe the right interpretation of and selection from these sources. Not only the 
reliability of their content is a matter of dispute among the Muslims, but also because their 
respective interpretation is part and parcel of power struggles among and between the lay and 
trained religious scholars, intellectuals, brotherhood leaders etc. 
606 Interview with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006.  
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Second, in their daily lives they introduced the use of religious signs and 
symbols in novel ways and situations. For instance using the Islamic salutation 
“Esselamün Aleyküm” not only in face-to-face interactions but also in telephone 
conversations clearly differentiated the NSM activists from “ordinary” Muslims, 
provoking even reactions.607  
Third, they extended the individual religiousness so as to cover the behavior 
of the immediate family, principally the children. The interviews and observations 
on the interviewees revealed that while the pious local elites of the JP (i.e. those 
who joined the activities of religious associations, regularly performed daily 
prayers, fasted during the Ramadan and made their pilgrimage) had displayed a 
liberal attitude towards the actions and choices of their daughters or sons regarding 
religious matters, though not necessarily their wives, the NSM activists had been 
deeply involved in the religious education and direction of their children trying to 
render them “conscious” Muslims. Though appeared in a Konya NSM newspaper 
the following paragraph that appeared during the early months of the NSM 
mobilization reflect how the behavior of the immediate family could be used for 
multiple purposes. Among them, to measure the level of religiousness even among 
the pious, to attract the religious among the ranks of the NSM and persuade them to 
buy an NSM-affiliated newspaper, a symbol of religiosity. 
Imagine a head of the family; he is a quite pious (mazbut) 
person. He fulfils his religious duties regularly. He also became a 
pilgrim (hacı). Both his wife and his daughter accommodated 
themselves to his lifestyle. While the wife is sincere in her 
conformity, the daughter follows the orders of his father willy-
nilly. A particularity of this head of the family is also his 
tenderness towards his children. Consequently, he has to put the 
newspaper with promiscuous photos in his pocket and bring it 
home. Despite that neither the wife nor the daughter wears skirts 
above their knees608 …one day, by accident, this honorable head 
of the family comes across with his daughter in the street. 
                                                            
607 Interview with KayNS19, Kayseri, September 28, 2006.  
608 One should draw attention to the fact that while the proper measure for Islamic modesty was a 
skirt under the knees for the Islamists of the years under consideration, today, the Islamist women 
barely show their ankles.  
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Surprise, the skirt of the daughter is a miniskirt…Yes the 
pilgrims, the masters (hacılar, hocalar), honorable heads of the 
family: choose carefully the newspaper you would bring home.609 
 
Finally, one should discuss another form of religious stringency prevalent 
among the NSM activists during the years under consideration: avoiding to the best 
of their ability the social environments where they might have to mingle with the 
opposite sex or with those who consume alcoholic drinks. This form of religious 
stringency was not necessarily a result of their traditional education or culture. Nor 
was it a simple emotional recognition of the need to differentiate oneself. It was 
also the pressure of the rivals on the NSM activists to live up to the unmitigated 
Muslim identity they claimed to (strive to) possess.  
An extreme thus a very illustrative example was the change of attitude of a 
NSM local executive when a newspaper published his photos taken during a dinner 
party organized for the alumni of his university. Though he was not drinking 
alcohol he had not seen any harm to sit at a table with his old friends who were 
drinking and he even danced with them. Using the photos of him at the table and 
dancing, the newspaper insinuated that the NSM activists were not as Muslim as 
they pretended to be but using Islam to attract votes. Though his fellow NSM 
activists did not reprimand the executive, he never set foot again in a similar social 
environment.610 It is also safe to assume that this and similar incidents rendered the 
NSM activists to be more vigilant to protect their image.  
 It should be added that at the national level as well, the interaction with the 
opponents influenced the religiously stringent behavior of the NSM activists. A 
reading of the NSM’s national newspaper, Milli Gazete from 1973 to 1980 shows 
that the period when the NSM elites pushed hardest to introduce censorship to 
prohibit “erotic art” and publications was when they were in a coalition government 
with the RPP and the attacks of the JP, the NAP and Yeni Asya were at their height. 
This was mostly during public debates over the draft Amnesty Law of the coalition 
                                                            
609 Ziya Tanrıkulu, “Ölçü, Gazete seçmek,” Türkiye’de Yarın, November 11, 1969  
610 Interview with KayNS8, Kayseri, September 14, 2006. A similar incident would happen to 
Korkut Özal as well, Minister of Food, Agriculture and Stockbreeding in the First National Front 
Government (I. Milliyetçi Cephe), in 1975. First nationally distributed JP supporter Tercüman and 
then Yeni Asya published his photos raising a glass at a state event. See Appendix G, Figure 14. 
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partners, which included those who were convicted as “communists” under the 
Article 141 and 142 of the Penal Law.611 The right wing opponents accused the 
NSM elites and activists for betraying the “cause” against the RPP and the 
communists through entering into a coalition government with the RPP and 
promising to grant, and indirectly granting612, an Amnesty to the left-wing activists.  
The push for censorship was a means to reemphasize the religiosity of the NSM 
participants and to show that the NSM policies and attitudes regarding the left had 
been carried out by good, honest and honorable Muslims, hence legitimate.613  
To sum up, not only the politicization of certain religious practices but also 
the apparent stringency and homogeneity of the NSM activists’ religious behaviors 
at the local level were not solely shaped in oppositional interaction with the 
secularist elites of the center. They were partly unintended features of NSM 
activism that appeared through action and interaction with other Muslims rather 
than a result of a rupture from “traditional Muslims of the periphery.”614  
5.4 Conclusion 
Taking into account the context within which the NSM entrepreneurs 
emerged and the differential recruitment to the NSM among Muslims as cues, this 
chapter has taken up the formation/construction of the NSM ideational elements in 
                                                            
611 See Appendix G, Figure 19, for how the NSM pro-coalition elites organized the party 
newspaper’s front page to please the activists and constituents and protect the movement collective 
identity while engaging in a bitter battle over the Amnesty within and outside the movement as 
coalition partners. 
612 Despite the fact that some NSM parliamentarians voted against the Amnesty for the left-wing 
militants and contributed to the failure of the bill at the parliament, the RPP brought the case to the 
Constitutional Court. The latter decided that the Amnesty law, which covered the right-wing 
militants but left out the left-wing ones, was against the spirit and letter of equality of the 
Constitution and granted the left wing prisoners Amnesty.   
613 They served to legitimize the NSM actions rather than to justify them since as shall be seen, the 
NSM activists justified their actions not in religious but in political terms. 
614 In studying Islamist identity, Nilüfer Göle looks at the “ intersubjective” relations between the 
Islamists and the secular elites at the national level, which she defines as non-Muslim, and argues 
that the Islamist identity was shaped in opposition to the Kemalist elites. She also argues that the 
Islamist identity also constituted a break from and a critique of “traditional Muslims of the 
periphery” thanks to its hybrid nature that brought together the Islamists’ secular education and 
professions and religious beliefs. While she enriches the previous works looking at the interaction 
between the macro and micro levels, since she does not study the local level and discards the role of 
the movement organizations in shaping particular Islamist identities, she fails to see that, at the local 
level, in this case in Kayseri, a peripheral urban center, the elites and activists of the JP had also 
acquired secular educations, struggled against the Kemalist elites and many among them retained 
their “traditional” religious beliefs with no interest in Islamism whatsoever.   
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action and interaction during the mobilization process of the movement.  The NSM 
case allows advancing the following arguments on Islamist collective action and 
identity frames. The ideational products a) do not constitute preconceived, or pre-
collective action, (in the NSM case pre-political) cultural products; instead b) they 
are shaped in relation to both the national and local environments, not merely 
drawing upon Islamic sources, and finally, c) they emerge not only through 
conscious efforts but also as subliminal processes. 
As shall be seen, the elements that created the symbolic boundaries of the 
NSM informed how the activists reacted to opportunities and constraints within the 
political arena and sustained its activist and electoral mobilizations throughout the 
years to come. On the one hand, the NSM collective action frame of material and 
moral development of the “Muslim nation” enabled the NSP to establish a coalition 
partnership with the RPP. This frame, which had put other political parties in one 
basket and the NSM in another; also created certain similarities between the NSM 
and RPP outlooks on socio-economic matters; most important, it demanded 
responsible behavior in the name of the nation from its members.  These in turn 
facilitated for some NSM elites and activists to choose a coalition with the RPP 
over the danger of early general elections, except of course, those who did have 
salient identities and commitments parallel to that of the NSM. On the other hand, 
the NSM collective identity that prevented the institutionalization of intraparty 
competition through emphasis on altruism and solidarity helped the activists with 
limited means to sustain local activism throughout the 1970s. Moreover, the NSM 
identity, through legitimizing and strengthening the centralized decision-making 
structure of the party, enabled a group of party entrepreneurs not only to pursue the 
coalition strategy but also to take over the party at the expense of their rivals. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EVERYDAY POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING WITHIN 
THE NSM: THE CASE OF THE COALITION WITH THE RPP   
In the general elections of October 14, 1973, the NSP, the second party of 
the NSM that was established following the ban of its predecessor by the 
Constitutional Court, acquired 11.8% of the votes and entered the Grand National 
Assembly with 48 deputies. The parliamentary arithmetic did not allow a single 
party government and rendered the NSP slowly a key party that all parties needed 
to take into consideration either as a potential coalition partner or an external 
supporter of a prospective government. In January 26, 1974, following a period of 
approximately three months of government crisis, the NSP became the junior 
partner of the coalition government formed with the RPP. 
The coalition marked a turning point in the history of Islamist activism in 
Turkey.615 Not only the Islamist movements and groups had long considered the 
RPP the archenemy of “Islam” as the architect of the secular reforms but also, since 
the late 1960s, when the RPP officially positioned itself as a “center-left” party, 
they had perceived it as harboring and encouraging left-wing activism, or in the 
right-wing lexicon, the “communist” movements, another perceived archenemy of 
religion.616 Not surprisingly, even before the unofficial talks began between the two 
parties, the prospect of an RPP-NSP coalition provoked heated debates within both 
the greater Islamist movement and the NSM, not to mention the right wing sectors 
and the political arena. These debates would continue throughout the short 
existence of the coalition (seven months) and in its aftermath. 
                                                            
615 Both the NSM and the RPP were giving messages of brotherhood and peace See Appendix G, 
Figures 15 and 16. 
616 Considering the RPP’s long term distrust of Islamist movements, the RPP’s willingness to form a 
coalition with the Islamists was also a historical development in itself.   
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How and why the NSM changed its initial stance differed from other 
Islamist movements in its approach to the coalition with the RPP? Specifically, how 
and why the NSM constructed a coalition government with the RPP provoking 
immense internal opposition from a group of party elites and external attacks?  
Previous chapters have discussed why and how the NSM emerged and organized as 
a political party and constructed its ideational elements different from other Islamist 
movements. How and why the majority of the NOM elites and activists internalized 
the arguments that justified and legitimized the coalition so as to support an 
Amnesty for the left-wing prisoners and to defend their position throughout the 
years to come? Through engaging with such an unaddressed historical puzzle that 
relates to “everyday politics,” this chapter studies the practical aspects of the NSM 
political engagement right after the construction of its symbolic and institutional 
boundaries. Moreover, through integrating the findings of the essay on the early 
stages of the movement, that is organizational and ideational features, it aims at 
showing how the micro-properties of the NSM elites and activists, the symbolic 
products of the movement and finally the type of organization that a movement 
establishes influence routine dynamics of movement decision-making processes.  
The question of how and why Islamist movements adopt particular policy 
positions and choose specific lines of action is a relatively new area of research in 
the literature on Islamist movements. As previously argued, the earlier corpus, 
including the literature on cases from Turkey, has treated Islamist movements 
mostly as unitary actors, or black boxes. In these studies, as was the case for the 
organizational form and ideational elements, practical aspects of Islamist activism 
are descriptive at best, overlooked at worst. As far as the NSM’s coalition 
partnership with the RPP is concerned, there are very few studies that address the 
issue. The literature on Turkey, either left the subject unaccounted for or treated it 
merely as a political strategy aiming at either a) legitimizing the party in the eyes of 
the Kemalist/secularist establishment, or b) launching economic measures that 
would satisfy socio-economic demands of the party’s constituency and/or c) 
introducing changes to Islamize state and societal institutions which, as shall be 
remembered, are assumed to have given rise to the party in the first place. Such a 
treatment, while rightly pointing out certain environmental (socio-economic and 
political) and ideational incentives has a major setback: the NSM (or the NSP) 
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appears “as a unified actor in the sense that party members behave as if their actions 
were determined by a single autonomous decision maker617 which is assumed to be 
conditioned by a struggle between the center (the secular state and the big 
bourgeoisie of İstanbul) and the periphery (the religious Anatolian society and 
small and medium business owners) and a preconceived ideational position 
(Islamization of the state and society). 
 In contrast, the recent literature on Islamist activism, seeking to understand, 
whether or how far the Islamists could become “moderate,” that is accept and 
internalize political pluralism and/or contribute to democratic expansion, wittingly 
or unwittingly, revealed that behind (or preceding) the appearance of a unified 
actor, the political attitudes and policy choices of Islamist movements regarding 
such matters as the degree of involvement in electoral politics, coalition making 
with non-Islamists, the expansion of political and civil rights to left-wing political 
actors, religious minorities and/or women are not predetermined by macro factors 
or by the declared goals of the movements. They are influenced by complex 
configurations of political opportunities and constraints and emerge as an outcome 
of intense internal debates and struggles.  The available lines of action on such 
issues within the context of environmental opportunities and constraints brings to 
surface latent power struggles or creates new ones within the movements and 
provokes renegotiation, realignment, reprioritization or alteration of movement 
goals and identity.  These studies, then, suggest the need to study the decisions and 
choices of Islamist collective actors as products of both formal and informal 
institutions of the political arena and their internal dynamics.618 
                                                            
617 Michael Laver, “Divided Parties, Divided Government,” in Legislatures: Comparative 
Perspectives on Representative Assemblies, ed. Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill Squire, and D. 
Roderick Kiewiet (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 206. 
618 See Janine A. Clark, "The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-ideological 
Cooperation in Jordan," International Journal of Middle East Studies 38 (2006): 539-560; Janine 
Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler, "Who Opened the Window? Women's Activism in Islamist 
Parties," Comparative Politics 35 (2003): 293-312; Mona El-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," International Journal of Middle East Studies 37 (2005): 373-395; 
Schwedler, Faith in Moderation; Eva Wegner and Miquel Pellicer, "Islamist Moderation without 
Democratization: the Coming of Age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development?" 
Democratization 16 (2009): 157-175; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy 
and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 205-228. 
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This chapter not only draws on the footsteps of the recent body of work, but 
also tries to fill what appears to be a lacuna. Recent research, while studying 
internal dynamics, limits its attention on elite level decision making processes, 
ideational (re)production, and power struggles. While showing the relevance of 
these processes for the studied outcome (i.e. a specific line of action, policy 
position, overall moderation etc.), the recent literature does not discuss why and 
how a group of movement elites succeed or fail, when they do, in the struggle to 
determine the party’s course of action and to secure activists’ ideational and 
behavioral support. Nor do they inform us on the degree to which the local activists 
are involved in decision-making processes, and why and how local party activists 
support or oppose a group of elites, a policy proposal/choice, etc.  Neglecting how 
local activists situate themselves in the decision-making mechanisms and contribute 
to the maintenance and/or change of the existing intraparty organizational and 
ideational structures may inadvertently lead to either structural determinism or 
ideational essentialism.  
Taking up the issue of the RPP-NSM coalition and the NSM’s pro-coalition 
group’s subsequent unorthodox attitude with regard to left-wing activists, this 
chapter analyzes not only extra-movement factors and the power struggles among 
the movement elites but also the internal dynamics and mechanisms of the 
movement organization, that is the political party (without a parent and pre-
established societal organization), which enabled a group of party elites to pursue 
and execute their line of political action in the face of internal and external 
resistance. It also tackles briefly the consequences of their actions for the internal 
dynamics of the party and its relations with its environment.   
Accordingly, two interrelated arguments are advanced. First, the NSM’s 
macro-level prospect of coalition with the RPP unfolded at the meso-level, or 
organizational level, through formal and informal institutions and power relations.  
Specifically, a meso-level study is needed to understand how, within the existing 
context of political opportunities and constraints and following the crystallization 
of pro- and anti-coalition groups, the objective and symbolic institutions of the 
party, that is the decision making structure and ideational products of the movement 
that developed during the initial mobilization stage, enabled the pro-coalition group 
not only to pursue and execute its line of action but also, gradually, to take over 
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first the movement organization, the NSP, and then the movement networks, or the 
NSM itself.  
Second, a diachronic micro-level analysis on the power relations, ideational 
properties and material and symbolic resources of the elites at the party center and 
local activists at the periphery is necessary to understand why and how the party 
elites were divided into two groups and these institutions brought about the victory 
of the pro-coalition group. Without a micro-level perspective, the overall analysis 
would remain incomplete at best; descriptive at worst, since the function, 
performance, and/or existence of the above mentioned meso-level institutions 
partly depend on these factors. As a matter of fact, following the February 28 
process, or the so-called post-modern military and bureaucratic coup in February 
28, 1997, the same institutions, which had survived a previous and more disruptive 
coup in September 12, 1980, did not bring similar results for the NSM elites. The 
NSM elites, who had been ruling the political part(ies) uninterruptedly since 1977, 
while kept their seats in the latest two parties of the movement established after 
February 28, the Virtue Party and the Felicity Party, they lost majority of their 
networks and local activists to the Justice and Development Party (the JDP) 
founded by their intraparty opponents.  
Accordingly, the chapter is organized in four sections. The first section 
focuses on macro-level factors, that is formal and informal power relations and 
institutions of the political arena and some contingent factors which constrained the 
NSM leaders to choose between the two options during the longest government 
crisis up to that date: an early general elections and a coalition with the RPP. 
Second section provides a micro-level analysis of ideational and structural 
properties of the two groups of party elites and the power relations between them as 
factors that influenced their strategic assessment on the prospect of the coalition 
with the RPP and later their divergent behaviors during the coalition. Third section 
discusses the three major intra-movement institutions that enabled the pro-coalition 
group to prevail over their challengers and maintained the local activists’ support 
even when they pursued and defended their controversial position with regard to 
the inclusion of the left wing in the General Amnesty Law of 1974. These were a) 
the centralized decision making structure that empowered the party elites as a 
whole at the expense of the activists; b) the movement’s collective action frames 
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that had constructed the nation as primarily Muslim and the party’s cause as 
material and moral development of such a defined nation; positioned the NSP to an 
equal distance to (i.e. above) other political parties; included certain diagnostic 
similarities with the RPP; and finally demanded responsible behavior in the name 
of the nation c) the NSM collective identity that empowered the activists and 
emphasized solidarity and altruism.  Finally, the chapter provides a brief review of 
the consequences of the coalition on the intraparty dynamics and the party’s 
relations with its environment.  
6.1 The Prospect of an RPP-NSM Coalition and Opposing Intra-elite 
Views 
Focusing on the period from October 14, 1973 (NSM’s entry into the 
parliament) to January 26, 1974 (the establishment of the RPP-NSP coalition 
government), this section studies the opportunities and constraints at the macro 
level of national political arena that forced the NSM to seriously consider a 
coalition with the RPP. It also provides an analysis of the divergent views and 
perceptions of the NSM elites (i.e. official and unofficial entrepreneurs and 
founders of the NSM, the central party administrators and some parliamentary 
deputies) on the environmental factors and the NSM’s  role and function within this 
context.  
As has been discussed in previous chapters, the opportunities and 
constraints in the political arena at the local and national levels have a considerable 
impact on the emergence of social movements and their mobilization strategies, 
goals and symbolic and material institutionalization patterns. Following the 
appearance of a movement organization (in case it appears one), while the political 
environment (which is itself changing) continue to influence and shape the 
performances, alliances and policy choices; the degree and the way they influence 
these aspects of collective action in daily politics would change depending on the 
nature of the initially established organization.619 Taking into account the nature of 
                                                            
619 For an early example on the impact of intraorganizational structure and dynamics on movement-
environment interactions (involving such issues as coalition, strategy, policy decisions) see Suzanne 
Staggenborg, “The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice 
Movement,” American Sociological Review 53 (1988): 585-605. Debra C. Minkoff and John D. 
McCarthy draws attention to the need for further studying movement organization emergence to 
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the movement organization in the study of a movement’s political participation 
patterns in everyday politics, in turn, requires both designating the particular 
category in which the organization falls (political party, informal networks, 
association, charity organization, a tabligh organization etc.) and the internal 
specificities of the organization in consideration. While the former enables one to 
see environmental formal and informal institutions and power relations that directly 
concern a specific type of organization; the latter helps one to understand how and 
why their impact is processed differently within similar and/or the same 
organization, when they do.  
The NSM entrepreneurs had appeared in the administrative and political 
center through the development of and based on an Islamist network within the 
right wing milieus. The crystallization of the movement entrepreneurs was followed 
by a consensus and activist mobilization with the specific purpose of founding a 
political party. As shall be seen, both the  ban of the first party, the NOP, by the 
Constitutional Court, and the entry of the second party, the NSP, to the Grand 
National Assembly and the senate, revealed to the  elites and activists the extent to 
which they were bounded by the formal and informal institutions and power 
relations of the political field. Particularly, the latter forced the NSM to make “hard 
decisions” that all political parties do between “policy, office [and] votes.”620 
Translated into social movement terminology, the political parties had to realign 
and renegotiate internally and with other players of the political field, the 
collectivity’s identity and goals, the degree of engagement with state institutions 
and the terms of activist and constituency mobilization. 
Focusing on macro level factors and their impact on the party’s national 
elites, this section advances two interrelated arguments. First, a specific 
constellation of political and contingent factors in the parliament and the political 
                                                                                                                                                                     
assess later the influences of this initial stage on organizational developments. “Reinvigorating the 
Study of Organizational Processes in Social Movements” Mobilization: An International Journal 10 
(2005): 304. 
620 As Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang C. Müller argue, although political parties cannot be defined or 
categorized as organizations which exclusively seek one of these political goods (for instance, as an 
office-seeking or a vote-seeking party), it is one of their defining features that they all have to 
regularly engage in trade-offs among them in the political arena. “Political Parties and Hard 
Choices,” in Policy, Office, or Votes? How political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard 
Decisions, ed. Wolfgang C. Müller and  Kaare Strøm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999),1-35. 
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arena objectively cornered the NSM to choose between early elections and a 
coalition with the RPP.  Second, the party elites’ choices between these two options 
depended on their strategic assessment of the opportunities and constraints that 
each choice presented in relation to policy, office and votes. The process of intra-
party deliberations regarding these issues revealed that the NSM elites were divided 
into two groups who assigned divergent meanings and values to the existing 
political opportunities and constraints that policy, office and votes presented.  
The rest of the section is divided into two subsections analyzing first the 
opportunity structure within the parliament which imposed the NSM only to 
alternatives; and second, the two groups’ perceptions of this structure in relation to 
policy, office and votes. It is the next section that will deal with the reasons as two 
why the elites displayed conflicting views and positions on the issue of coalition. 
 6.1.1 “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea” 
Following the general elections of October 14, 1973, the parliamentary 
arithmetic did not allow the two most powerful parties of the country, the RPP and 
the JP621 to form a single party government. Although the RPP had acquired the 
majority of parliamentary seats (185), in order to establish a government it needed 
either an external supporter or a coalition partner. The JP, in turn, with only 149 
seats, needed the support or partnership of both the NSP (48 seats) and the 
Democratic Party (45 seats) if it decided to form a government.  
From October 1973 to early January 1974, all government alternatives with 
the existing parties were officially or unofficially considered as the President of the 
Republic gave the duty to form a cabinet to first, Bülent Ecevit, the new and young 
leader of the RPP, second, to Süleyman Demirel, the JP’s leader, and third to an 
independent - an appointed senator- Naim Talu, who at the time had been  heading 
a “nonparty” caretaker government. The combinations that were seriously and 
formally discussed by the political parties, the President of the Republic, 
newspapers, interest groups, the Assembly and the Senate, and reportedly military, 
                                                            
621 The Justice Party had been in power from 1965 to the military memorandum of March 12, 1971. 
From March 1971 to April 1972, military supported technocratic cabinets governed the country.   
The JP was influential in the establishment and survival of the last (fourth) non-partisan caretaker 
cabinet that lasted until the RPP-NSP coalition. 
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were as follows: a) RPP-JP, b) RPP-NSP, c)RPP-JP-NSP, d)JP-DP-NSP(-RTP)622, 
e) a “national coalition” (Milli Koalisyon). The less seriously considered option was 
a minority government formed either by the RPP or the JP. An early general 
election would impose itself, if the parliamentary parties failed to come up with a 
solution that would guarantee the necessary number of confidence votes. 
As can be seen, the NSP had become a key party, as all options but one, had 
to include it to get a vote of confidence in the Grand National Assembly.623 Despite 
this increase in the value of the NSP (or rather the NSM parliamentarians), the 
process would unfold a much narrower range of options for the NSM: an alliance 
with the RPP or early general elections. First, very early on, the RPP and the JP 
made it clear that they were not willing to cooperate with each other, leaving the 
NSM with the options of joining a coalition or accepting an early election.624  
Initially, mostly due to the internal opposition and fear of alienating the 
constituency, the NSM appeared to prefer a coalition, which would include the JP. 
It thus rejected the RPP’s first offer  (in October 30) in November 7. Complaining 
about the RPP’s intransient position regarding the postponement of upcoming local 
elections and the intra-parliamentary election of the Speaker of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, Erbakan argued that the RPP would not make a proper 
coalition partner given its rejection to make compromises.625 Before sending an 
official response to the RPP, it had sent a public letter to the JP asking its leaders to 
change their declared official position to remain outside coalition governments.626 
However, the JP rejected to engage in coalition building activities. 
                                                            
622 The Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi), was established in 1967 (first the 
Reliance party), by those party elites who left the RPP following the process that ended up with the 
RPP’s official adoption of a left-wing position. 
623 Incidentally, the NSM’s emblem was a key. 
624 Actually the NSM leaders, particularly the pro-coalition elites did not favor an RPP-JP 
government, thinking that such a coalition might create further societal strife and attract the wrath of 
the military (before the memorandum of 1971, extra-parliamentary groups on the far right and left 
had engaged various violent political actions trying to influence policy making on various issues). 
625 As shall be seen, these were rather excuses. The NSM leaders, whether sympathetic to the offer 
or not, were caught rather unprepared and divided over the question.  Particularly, as far as the local 
election question is concerned, an early election would hurt the NSM more than a local election that 
would take place during its incumbency.  
626 See Milli Gazete, November 1 and 4, 1973. As early as October 16, Demirel had announced the 
JP’s decision to remain outside the coalitions. It has been suggested that the JP was actually 
unwilling to join a coalition, which would have to take some unpopular financial measures such as 
price rises.  Ahmad, Demokrasi Sürecinde, 318.  
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Second, the JP’s position with regard to remaining in opposition was not 
permanent, as evinced by Demirel’s acceptance of the duty to form a government in 
November 13.627 However, except for the case of a “national coalition”, which 
could be chaired by an independent senator, the JP insisted on Demirel’s leadership 
in case of a right-wing government. The JP’s persistence on Demirel, coupled with 
the DkP’s rejection of any Demirel led government, reduced further government 
alternatives to the RPP-NSM coalition by December 16. Just seven days after the 
local elections, the President of Republic asked Talu to form a government: a 
national coalition.628 As far as the national coalition is concerned, the RPP insisted 
on Ecevit’s leadership, as the head of the majority party group in the Assembly, and 
demanded an early general elections date as a deadline for the coalition. The rest of 
the parties refused either one or both demands. While the NSM did not insist on an 
independent prime minister, as shall be seen, an early election was to be delayed as 
much as possible. It can be argued that the other right-wing parties refused the 
elections, not only because they did not want to see the RPP returning to the 
Assembly more powerful, as the local elections results suggested, but also because 
they wanted to see an NSP-RPP coalition, which they hoped would weaken them 
both.  
Finally, the process, which lasted around three months, first forced the NSM 
elites and activists to deliberate regarding a coalition with the RPP, and then 
gradually placed them, literally and figuratively, between the devil and the deep 
blue sea. On the one hand, the RPP was “the devil”629 for the right wing tradition in 
general and the Islamist movements in particular. An early general election, on the 
                                                            
627 The JP engaged in various informal coalition bargains throughout the period under consideration. 
See the newspapers of the period.  
628 Ahmad suggests that Democratic Party (DkP) of Bilgiç and Sükan, which had 45 
parliamentarians, was too closely associated with the defunct Democrat Party members and its 
legacy to join forces with the RPP. Moreover, they did not share even a single common ideational 
element. An RPP-DkP coalition was not even an issue. See Ahmad, Demokrasi Sürecinde, 318. 
Regarding the DkP’s refusal of Demirel’s leadership, it can be argued that it was too early for them 
to reject their raison d’être. As shall be remembered, the DkP entrepreneurs had formed the party as 
a result of their personal and political struggle with Demirel.  However, only two years later, half of 
the DkP parliamentarians, including Saadettin Bilgiç would join the right wing coalition government 
chaired by Demirel in March 1975 (I. MC, or I. Milli Cephe, National Front). See Appendix G, 
Figure 17, for a a snapshot from the JP congress of 1974 where Demirel attacks fiercely his 
opponents, most of whom had already been either expelled or resignedç 
629 While the “devil” in the idiom may have originated from a nautical term, in its every day usage it 
in fact denotes the devil. 
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other hand, appeared more and more as a deep blue sea where the NSM would be 
drowned. 
6.1.2 Divergent Perspectives on the RPP-NSM Coalition in terms of Office, 
Policy and Votes630  
Following an examination of the subjective and objective constraints that an 
early general elections presented for the NSM as a whole, this subsection studies 
the opposing perceptions of the opportunities and constraints that the prospect of an 
RPP-NSP coalition presented in terms of votes, office and policy. It is argued that 
the difference between two views reflected their respective conceptualization and 
understanding of the NSP’s role as an Islamist movement organization. 
The question of early general elections 
 To begin with, both groups of the NSM elites agreed that they had to avoid 
early elections as much as possible. However, while the pro-coalition group worked 
hard to eliminate this option through establishing contacts and good relations with 
all parties, including the RPP, in the hope to contribute to the establishment of a 
government, the anti-coalition group preferred playing for time and if necessary 
facing elections rather than entering into a coalition with the RPP.   
First, the NSM leadership had two major concerns regarding the possible 
outcomes of an early general election. They even desperately tried to postpone the 
local elections that had been scheduled for December 9, 1973,631 arguing that 
consecutive elections and winter could cause voter’s fatigue and apathy, negatively 
influencing the NSM along with other parties.632 Considering that an early election 
                                                            
630 This section is based mainly on a) the interviews conducted with three anti-coalition and seven 
pro-coalition NSM elites; b) the NSM daily, Milli Gazete; c) a center-left national daily, Milliyet; 
and d) M. Gündüz Sevilgen, MSP’de Dört Yıl, 1973-1977 (N.p: Yüksel Matbaası, 1980). Written 
and brought together with a single author, this book was a joint product of the anti-coalitionists, who 
had contributed to its appearance through their writings, official and unofficial documents and 
feedbacks they provided. Most of the surviving anti-coalitionists the researcher contacted refused to 
grant interviews referring her back to the book, which, they believed, included every information 
one would need. 
  
631 “MSP’nin müspet teklifine AP menfi bir tavır takındı,” Milli Gazete, November 4, 1973;  
“Erbakan: Koalisyon şartlarını reddetmedik,” Milliyet, November 8, 1973. 
632 “MSP’nin müspet teklifine” Milli Gazete, and “ Koalisyon şartlarını reddetmedik,” Milliyet.  
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was a powerful option at the time, it can be argued that this argument, particularly 
the one regarding the consecutive elections, applied to the general elections as well. 
Moreover, they feared that the early general elections, would weaken the 
democracy not only because the parliament would appear inefficient, but also 
because, notwithstanding the participation rates, the balance of power in the 
parliament might remain the same after the elections, further perpetuating the 
government crisis and the perception of the political parties as incompetent. 
Erbakan said that such a result could bring about a “disaster” to the country, 
implying military intervention.633 
Second, the NSM elites, though they would not voice it openly not to 
discourage the activists, had to worry about the scarcity of resources. The resource 
mobilization approach to collective actions (mostly social movements) that 
developed by the late 1960s and 1970s have offered a set of conceptions and 
perspectives which demonstrate that the emergence and maintenance of collective 
actions through and/or in the form of political parties, social movements, trade 
unions, associations, informal networks etc., require the mobilization of diverse 
material and symbolic resources.634 While “political process” and 
“culturalist/identity” approaches have advanced various correctives and critiques to 
this outlook635 which overemphasizes structure over agency and culture, its major 
contribution still stands its ground: without the aggregation of individual resources 
and/or incorporation of extra-movement ones (such as state institutions, media, and 
infrastructures such as transportation and communication technologies) collective 
action cannot be sustained in the long run.636  
A major collective action that a political party organization needs to engage 
is electoral campaign. Electoral campaigns are among the most demanding 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Studies on voter behavior show that the NSM leader’s assertion actually holds true. See for instance, 
Colin Rallings, Michael Thrasher and Galina Borisyuk “Seasonal Factors, Voter Fatigue and the 
Costs of Voting,” Electoral Studies 22 (2003): 65–79. 
633 “Meclis’e baskı ve emrivaki yapıyorlar,” Milli Gazete, December 18, 1973.   
634 See John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A 
Partial Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 1212-1241; Anthony Oberschall, 
Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1973). For a review of 
resource mobilization literature see J. Jenkins Craig, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study 
of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 527-553. 
635 For a recent example see James M. Jasper, “A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking 
for Agency in Social-Movement Choices,” Mobilization: an International Journal 9 (2004): 1-16. 
636 McCharty and Zald, 1216-1217. 
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collective action categories, particularly in centralized political systems as was the 
case in Turkey in the 1970s.  They require nation-wide organizational chapters, 
well-established networks, and aggregation of individual resources, most 
importantly in the form of money637 and labor (which require time and 
commitment). Şevket Kazan638, a prominent NSM leader, also pointed out that 
establishing and sustaining political party activity is not easy task. As he put, it 
requires “finances” and “faith.” Finances would help at the beginning to reach to 
the activists and establish preliminary chapters in a district. However, finances, 
alone, would not help either: in the subdistricts no one would be willing “to pay the 
expenses from his pocket” unless there is a “cause,” an “idea.”639  
During the 1973 general election campaign, the NSP was already short of 
party branches and well established networks (source of labor) and initial finances.  
Moreover, the “faith” to the efficiency of a political party has been hurt (even 
though not necessarily to the cause or the NSM). The Constitutional Court had 
banned the first party of the NSM, the NOP, in May 1971, and the country had 
experienced a military memorandum in March 1971. The ban, coupled with the 
military intervention640, had an extremely negative impact on the material and 
symbolic resources of the movement. First, the state had confiscated its real estates 
and movable properties of the party. Second, it had rendered the party leaders 
overcautious, leading them to keep a low profile in an attempt to minimize party’s 
media exposure (an extra-movement resource).641 Third, it infused the local party 
activists, members and sympathizers with fear at worse and discouragement at best 
which prevented the timely (or full) use of the available resources642. This was 
partly resulted from the cautious attitude of the national leaders of the party. While 
                                                            
637 Financial aspects of political party activism are of particular importance as the existence of 
detailed regulations imposed by political party laws in electoral democracies attest.  
638 Initially a simple parliamentarian representing Kocaeli, Kazan rapidly rose to power within the 
NSM, first, becoming the Minister of Justice in the RPP-NSP government and then occupying 
various ministerial and party executive posts in the NSM parties until today.  
639 Interview with Şevket Kazan, Ankara, August 8, 2007. Needless to say, contributions in terms of 
labor would require “faith,” or in the terminology of this essay, collective action frames and 
collective identity as well.   
640 The two events, that is the coup and the Constitutional Court trial, have the same systemic roots 
but not necessarily direct causal relationship. A month before the military intervened and forced the 
JP government to resign, the prosecutor had opened an investigation and the trial had begun two 
days ago. 
641 Süleyman Arif Emre, Siyasette 35 Yıl vol. 2 (İstanbul: Keşif Yayınları, 2002), 20.  
642 For instance, in Kayseri some prominent official and unofficial founders and executives of the 
NOP not only asked to be excused from the NSP activities but also stayed inactive up until when 
electoral campaign was well underway.  
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no NOP national or local executive was tried in the court and there was no ban on 
their political activities, most of them did not join the ranks of the NSP.643 Erbakan 
too stayed  abroad long time and he, and two other NOP parliamentarians officially 
joined the NSP as late as May 1973.644  Fourth, the resources (money and 
time/labor) that the NSM could mobilize at any given time were already quite 
modest, since,  as discussed in Chapter 5, apart from few wealthy local and national 
elites, the NSM activists were mostly self-employed young men at the beginning of 
their careers with limited resources (money and time).645 Finally, consecutive 
elections would likely cause what can be called an “activist fatigue.”646  Against 
such a background, then, from July to October, the NSM had undertaken parallel 
tasks of organization building647 and electoral campaign in the districts and 
subdistricts,648 having been established only in October 11, 1972. 
Consequently, while the NSM leaders saw the results of the 1973 general 
election as a victory under the circumstances649, they were unwilling to engage into 
a new one, particularly not right after a local election. Notwithstanding their 
persistent declarations that a new election would bring the NSP a glory, the NSM 
was simply devoid of adequate resources to carry out three consecutive campaigns. 
However until around November 20, the NSP executives and parliamentarians felt 
secure enough. As an early general election was still a remote danger, they assumed 
that there were still various government alternatives, at least in principle. First in 
                                                            
643 Süleyman Arif Emre, the first Chair of the NSP, says that they were particularly careful regarding 
keeping the original founders of the NOP under the shadows. Ibid., 18-20. 
644 “Erbakan, Akmumcu ve Abbas MSP’ye girdiler,” Milli Gazete, May 17, 1973. Erbakan became 
the party chairman only after the elections. “N. Erbakan Genel Başkan,” Milli Gazete, October 22, 
1973. Considering that during the heat of the electoral campaign of 1973, there were twice public 
and twice behind the curtains legal action threats against the party (see further below), the NSM 
elites were not necessarily overreacting. 
645 Erbakan’s speech to small workshop owners in Akşehir, a small town in Konya, is quite 
illustrative. Several times during his speech, Erbakan recognized the time constraints of the shop 
owners (time meant money for them literally and figuratively) and pleaded (even almost begged for) 
their time and participation into party’s campaign meetings. “MSP Konya Milletvekili Erbakan’ın 
Akşehir’de yaptığı konuşması,” Milli Gazete, September 25, 1973.    
646 Right before the local elections, an anti-coalition NSM elite, Gündüz Sevilgen, urged the activists 
to overcome their fatigue stating that the best way to dispel it is “to serve the great cause of” their 
collectivity. “Tek Yol: Mahalli Seçimlere doğru,” Milli Gazete, November 20, 1973.  
647 Şevket Kazan rates the degree of the NSP’s party organization %25 by the time of the coup d’état 
of September 12, 1980. He said that by then they had been organized only in the districts and 
subdistricts and lacked active party members that went all the way down to the ballot box.  
648 For a speech that mentions the difficulty of these parallel tasks see “MSP Manisa Milletvekili 
adayı G. Sevilgen Kırkağaç’ta konuştu,” Milli Gazete, September 4, 1973.  
649 11.80% of the total votes.  http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=7 (Accessed June 25, 
2011). 
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late October, when rumors about an RPP-NSP coalition began to circulate650, then 
in early November, when the RPP officially invited the NSP to form a coalition; 
both members of the NSP General Executive Committee651 and parliamentary 
group652 twice rejected the idea of a coalition with the RPP.653  
The question of the RPP-NSM coalition 
As the local elections approached towards the end of November and the 
prospects of other coalition alternatives disappeared one by one, a pro-coalition 
group of elites began to surface within the Executive Committee and the 
Parliamentary Group.  This group, which at first was made up of Erbakan’s a 
handful of closest associates within the Committee and few parliamentarians,654 
would eventually take control of the Committee and the Parliamentary group and 
then the whole party. Following are the arguments of the conflicting groups in 
favor of and against a coalition with the RPP in terms of office, policy and votes.  
To begin with, the anti-coalitionist leaders’ political strategy regarding the 
prospect of an RPP-NSP coalition reflected their understanding of the role and 
function of the NSP. They claimed that the NSP should function, at least initially, 
as an intra-parliamentary pressure/interest group and “educational” organization 
where members and activists would be trained in the principles and goals of the 
NSM movement. This view, in turn, was based on the following premises. 
First, as far as the “office” was concerned they perceived two constraints, 
one internal and one external to the NSM. On the one hand, they thought that the 
NSP was too young, too powerless -with only 48 deputies- and too inexperienced, 
to be able to shoulder government responsibilities.  The NSP parliamentary 
community was “at the level of a primary school student”. Thus, the party leader(s) 
                                                            
650 For Erbakan’s preliminary answer to the journalists’ question on the coalition see “Geniş hudutlu 
af’la iç barış sağlanmalı,” Milli Gazete, October 19, 1973.  
651 Genel İdare Kurulu was the highest executive organ within the NSP composed of 26 members 
out of which, 13 were also parliamentarians. 
652 The parliamentary members who entered the parliament and/or acted under the same party label 
formed “Meclis Grubu”. In the NSP’s group there were 48 deputies and three senators who regularly 
joined the meetings. 
653 Sevilgen, MSP’de, 47-67. It has even been claimed that it was the NSP that educated the RPP on 
certain issues. Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007.  
654 The properties of the group and the intraparty institutions in which they operated will be 
introduced in detail in the following subsection and section respectively. 
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should not have expected them “to solve trigonometric equations”.655 At any rate, 
neither the God nor the voters wanted the NSP to govern the country.656  With only 
48 parliamentarians the NSP was given a simple duty: to represent the “ideas” 
(fikriyat) of the nation in the Assembly and adopt related policies gradually.657 
During the process, young party activists would be trained in order to serve later in 
administrative or political positions.658 On the other hand, they believed that the 
military had misgivings about both the NSP and the RPP. They would naturally 
oppose a government established by these two parties. While the anti-coalitionists 
stick with the former argument till the very end, they eventually changed their 
opinion on the military’s attitude, probably, following a meeting with an officer.659 
Second, the anti-coalitionists elaborated on the degree to which the NSM 
could implement its goals within and outside the government on the one hand, and 
protect the integrity of the NSM collective identity within a coalition with the RPP, 
on the other. The anti-coalition group members were extremely distrustful of the 
RPP, despite the diagnostic similarities the NSM shared with it. They claimed that 
the RPP just wanted to use the NSP to come to power and that the NSP was too 
inexperienced to “control” the RPP, implying that the NSP would not be able to 
introduce policy changes it sought or check the RPP’s power.660 Moreover, let 
alone such a weak position in the coalition, but the coalition itself would likely to 
damage the NSM identity. The RPP and the NSM were representing completely 
opposing causes. The NSP had entered the parliament to protect and improve the 
religious life of the citizens; the RPP was “responsible of horrid murders” (of things 
pertaining to religiosity)661. The former represented “righteousness”, the other 
“vanity”; one was “vinegar” and the other “honey” that should not be mixed.662  
                                                            
655  In Gündüz Sevilgen’s letter to the Party Chairmanship dated January 11, 1974. See Sevilgen, 
MSP’de, 84. 
656 Ibid, 64, 84. 
657 Interview with Cemal Cebeci, Ankara, October 10, 2006. 
658 Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008.  
659 Tevfik Paksu revealed this meeting during an Executive Committee meeting over the question of 
prospective General Amnesty Law. He said that the military had agreed to the coalition but opposed 
an amnesty law that would include the left wing prisoners. Sevilgen, MSP’de, 119. 
660 Ibid., 63. 
661 Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008.  
662 RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008; Cemal Cebeci, Ankara, October 10, 2006. Sevilgen, MSP’de, 
75. It should be noted that the anti-coalitionists also opposed a government with the JP. However, 
they did not categorically reject this option, as was the case for the RPP. 
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Finally, the anti-coalitionist point of view projected a direct and indirect 
loss of votes in the case of a coalition with the RPP. The NSM would lose its voters 
directly because the electors would feel betrayed663 and an RPP incumbency would 
bring disaster to the country through strengthening communism.664  The NSM 
would indirectly lose votes as well since such a coalition would endanger a 
breakdown of the organization because of a damaged identity.665  Even Süleyman 
Arif Emre, a pro-coalition elite, had initially believed that the activists were more 
sympathetic to the JP than the RPP.666 Given the long term animosity between the 
JP and the RPP, the activists could leave the party. 
Based on these views, the anti-coalitionist group argued that if the NSM 
activists and parliamentarians wanted to gain party experience to introduce policy 
changes, to protect its identity, and finally, thanks to these measures, maintain its 
organization and constituency, it had to refuse any government responsibility, 
particularly that of a government that would be established with the RPP. As such, 
it would also be able to “play a great political game” better as a “pressure group” in 
the parliament than as a party in power, through rendering the party(ies) in 
government dependent on the NSP parliamentarians.667 The latter would support 
those laws and policies, which were in accordance with their goals (that is 
protecting and developing religious life) and force the government to introduce 
changes the NSP wished, and to abort those the NSM opposed.668 
As for the members of the pro-coalitionist group, while most initially shared 
the same misgivings regarding with the anti-coalitionists (it seems except for 
Erbakan himself), they gradually developed a new perspective as they interacted 
with various individuals and institutions, particularly with the RPP elites. During 
the period of search for a workable government, not only their self-perception had 
changed but also their views on the RPP. Unlike the anti-coalitionists, the pro-
coalitionists came to think that the NSM could consolidate itself as a political party 
only if it assumed or appeared ready to assume government responsibilities. The 
                                                            
663 The electors would not have voted for the NSP if the party told them the prospect of a coalition 
with the RPP. See Suudi Reşat Saruhan’s comments in Sevilgen, MSP’de, 64. 
664 Comments of Gündüz Sevilgen and Hulusi Özkul in Ibid., 63 and 66.  
665 M. Hulusi Özkul’s comments in Ibid., 63. 
666 Ibid., 51. 
667 Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008 
668 Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2008; Sevilgen, MSP’de, 65 
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latter, in turn, meant accepting to tackle country’s problems as a whole, rather than 
focusing on a narrow range of issues related to religious life.  
Accordingly, the NSP should not keep refusing the office claiming 
inexperience. Initially, similar to anti-coalitionists, the pro-coalitionists also 
conceptualized the NSM as a movement and thought the NSP had to act as an 
association-like movement organization. Hasan Aksay has pointed out that before 
the NSP entered the parliament, they had thought the NSM had been to weak as 
compared to the DkP, and that they had planned to engage primarily in 
consciousness raising activities “to teach...or rather promote the nation’s basic 
values.”669 However, following the NSP’s entry into the parliament and as they 
worked with other parties with the hope to come up with a government, the pro-
coalitionists came to see that “the raison d’être of a political party was to come to 
power, and the reason for playing the political game was to win the ultimate 
prize.”670 The ultimate price was attaining the government. Even if this prize would 
come at the expense of a coalition with the RPP, it was an opportunity for the NSP 
to become a proper political party. A political party could claim power and render 
its ideational position hegemonic only when in government, only “with 
associations, that would not work [could not be achieved].”671 
Moreover, the pro-coalition group adopted the view that a pro-active rather 
than a low-profile attitude would protect the NSP from the military. An officer that 
Oğuzhan Asiltürk was well acquainted with (Eşref Bitlis672) had warned the NSP 
leaders that they should form a government by whatever means possible if they 
wanted to survive.673 The military officers had reservations regarding the NSP’s 
                                                            
669 Interview with Hasan Aksay, İstanbul, November 22, 2006. 
670 Interview with an Akıncı (NSP’s youth group) leader in the 1970s. Mehmet Tezel, Ankara 
September 3, 2007. He said that the NSM leaders, particularly Erbakan, explained these to the party 
activists. As an activist he also initially thought the NSM’s role was to train people in religious 
ethics. 
671 Interview with Turhan Utku, İstanbul, November 8, 2006. 
672 Asiltürk knew Bitlis and his brother from Malatya.  Plus, Bitlis’ brother was Asiltürk’s classmate 
at the university. In 1990, Bitlis would become the Commander of the Gendarmerie Forces and in 
1993 die in a much disputed helicopter accident during the height of clashes between the Kurdish 
guerillas and the state forces.    
673 Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007. Metin Heper argues that before the 
1980s, the military sought “responsible” behaviour (i.e long term interests of the state) on the part of 
the political parties, and frowned upon “responsive” behavior (i.e stratifying short term interests 
such as pleasing the voters). Metin Heper, “The consolidation of Democracy versus 
Democratization in Turkey,” in Political Parties in Turkey, ed. Barry Rubin and Metin Heper 
(London: Frank Cass,  2002), 138-139. 
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loyalty to the regime and, reportedly, Demirel was inflaming their suspicions. 
“These men had prejudged the NSM without first reading, inspecting, 
looking…”674 Being in office would show that they were willing to play “the game 
in town,” legitimize the NSP and hopefully thwart short and long run “secularist” 
attacks against the party.  
On the question of policy, the party goals and party identity, the pro-
coalitionist elites also changed their opinion regarding their own capabilities and 
the ideational gap between the RPP and the NSP, as they came to know the RPP 
leaders, particularly Bülent Ecevit, and compared themselves with them. First, the 
RPP’s elites had recently come to power within their party, they were about the 
same age with the NSP leaders and were only slightly more experienced than their 
interlocutors. Consequently, the NSP’s future pro-coalitionists, not only found that 
the RPP elites were quite reliable and easy to communicate but also themselves as 
empowered, knowledgeable and effective in their dealings with the RPP than they 
had expected.675  Second, they had already recognized overlapping goals of the two 
parties. Both parties were “idealists,” wanted to protect the country from foreign 
economic encroachment, both argued for a just socio-economic system.676 To be 
sure, Ecevit was a “leftist, did not pray, did not fast. [But] he would respond to 
God, receive his just deserts;” however, Demirel was doing something worse, 
“selling out Turkey.”677 Moreover, the current leaders of the RPP had publicly 
admitted to their past wrongdoings against the religious and denied their 
associations with the communists.678 It should be reemphasized that it was the 
behind-the-door negotiations between the parties that had contributed the most to 
the changing perspective of the NSM elites on the feasibility to introduce policy 
changes in a coalition with the RPP. The RPP, unlike the JP, had not only agreed 
with the NSP on such issues as the Cyprus problem, development of the heavy 
industry in Anatolia, the Amnesty for “thought crimes,” relegalization of opium 
poppy production, but also promised compromises on religious policies. They had 
                                                            
674 Interview with İsmail Müftüoğlu, İstanbul, November 12, 2007. 
675 Interviews with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007; Turhan Utku, İstanbul, 
November 8, 2006; Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007. 
676 Interview with Şevket Kazan, Ankara, August 7, 2007. 
677 Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007. Here Asiltürk refers also Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the 
current leader of the Justice and Development Party.  
678 The party’s newspaper had published commentaries on the changes within the RPP as early as 
June. See Ali Ulvi Polat, “Ankara Mektubu: Yürüyüş Kanunu” Milli Gazete, June 26, 1973. 
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accepted to increase the cadres of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the 
budget of the General Directorate of Endowments, reopen the Prayer Leader and 
Preacher Schools’ junior sections, give 5 million TL to finish the construction of 
the Kocatepe mosque in Ankara.679   
Third, the NSM collective action and identity frames were based on the 
claim that the NSM was different from and above both parties and that the NSM 
represented the Muslim nation and its best interest as a whole, no matter the party 
differences of the individuals. The pro-coalitionists drew on these action and 
identity frames arguing that a coalition with the RPP would make clear the NSM’s 
distinction and readiness to act selflessly for the best interest of the nation. While 
the JP was avoiding a coalition with the RPP for fear of losing its constituency, the 
NSM was trying to protect the nation from yet another election by taking the risk of 
losing its voters from the right wing networks.680  It should also be noted that a 
coalition with the RPP, let alone diluting the NSM’s identity, would directly and 
indirectly further reinforce the singularity and difference of the NSM’s identity. In 
a coalition with the JP, it would be much difficult to take credit for changes related 
to religious issues. However, during the coalition with the RPP, the actions of the 
NSP would immediately be recognized given the RPP’s record and the NSM 
identity. 681  
Regarding the constituency base and the activists, or the issue of votes, the 
pro-coalitionists were aware that they risked the votes they had attracted from the 
JP and even the activists they recruited from the right wing networks. However, 
they traded the short-term risks of early elections and/or yet another party closure 
with such long-term risks. They calculated that during their incumbency they could 
generate and redistribute enough symbolic and material political goods to maintain 
the voter base and sustain the NSM. At the symbolic level, forming a government, 
even if it were with the RPP, would render the NSM legitimate and relevant in the 
eyes of the general electorate.682 As Muzaffer Deligöz, then the head of the Bolu 
district branch and the party-inspector for some Kurdish-majority districts, recounts 
                                                            
679 Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007. 
680 Interviews with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 2007; Şevket Kazan, Ankara, August 
7, 2007; Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007. 
681 That would in fact be the case in 1975, when the NSP joined the right-wing coalition led by the 
JP. Interview with Akıncı chairman, Mehmet Ali Bulut, Ankara, August 10, 2006. 
682 Ibid. 
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that especially in the East, some of the notables, who, reportedly, had the power to 
channel votes, saw the JP as a means to “make peace” with the state and had not 
wanted to ruin this relationship by voting for the successor of a banned Islamist 
party.683 The procoalitionists thus hoped that a coalition government with the RPP 
would legitimize them in the eyes of the military and civil bureaucracy, which 
would then translate into votes in the long run. Moreover, if they prevented civil 
strife through granting an amnesty law that would include both the left and right 
wing prisoners of thought, they believed, the citizens’ appreciation would bring 
further votes. Concerning the organization, the NSM leaders were confident that 
given enough time they would persuade the activists in the benefits a government 
partnership could create. As Asiltürk said, in politics nothing should be rushed and 
everything should proceed incrementally: leaders first needed to instruct (the 
others) on the information they had access to.684 Based on new information such as 
the military’s point view and the RPP’s concessions, and observing leaders’ loyalty 
to the principles of the NSM, the activists would see that a coalition with the RPP 
was in the best interest of the nation and the NSM. Overall, the implementation of 
the NSM goals while being in power would be a symbolic asset in enlarging both 
the electoral base and the activist networks. 
Similarly, Erbakan and other leaders explained the material advantages of 
being in power. As a movement, the NSM needed to sustain its networks and 
engage in the mobilization of further human resources. The NSP as the movement’s 
organization now acquired an opportunity to have an access to “iktidar nimetleri,” 
or the “resources of power.” The resources controlled by the state institutions 
would be redistributed via the NSP to consolidate and develop further the 
movement organizations, networks, and voter base.685  As Şevket Kazan says, a 
party in power, just shortly before the elections, would take short-term measures to 
ameliorate the lives of groups of citizens using state resources. A party in 
opposition, especially if it was new, had limited resources to distribute to the 
constituency through its own organizations and networks: “how much a women’s 
                                                            
683 Interview with Muzaffer Deligöz, İstanbul, July 24, 2007. 
684 Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007 
685 Interview with Mehmet Tezel, September 3, 2007. The Akıncı leader stated that these material 
aspects of being in power were carefully explained to the activists and that he, and many others, 
trusted Erbakan that he would not sacrifice the NSM principles in exchange for such benefits. 
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branch can do” to alleviate poverty?686 At the very least, then, being in power 
would prevent other parties, particularly the JP, from benefiting from these 
advantages at the expense of the NSM, a young movement with limited resources. 
To sum up, the pro-coalition elites presented a different picture of the 
existing opportunities and constraints in terms of office, policy and votes. Unlike 
the anti-coalitionists who claimed that the office meant sacrificing policy and votes, 
the pro-coalition group argued the exact opposite. The anti-coalition group 
basically assumed that the NSP could keep its organization and voter base intact 
only while in opposition. The pro-coalition group, on the other hand, not only did 
not take the organization and voter base for granted, but was also of the opinion 
that they had to develop it even further if the NSM were to survive. In their eyes, 
without the redefinition and/or relocation of symbolic and material resources 
controlled by the state neither the organizational nor the electoral loyalty was 
guaranteed. The office could ensure not only the NSM’s access to these resources 
but also to implement the NSM goals. At any rate, without the office, an early 
general election was a Damocles’ sword that put even the existing parliamentary 
seats in jeopardy. 
6.2 The Micro-properties of the Conflicting Elite Groups and the 
Intra-movement Struggle for Power 
 What were the factors that influenced the two groups’ respective positions 
on the coalition with the RPP? Why did the NSM elites crystallize into two groups 
that interpreted the environmental opportunity structure and the “right” political 
strategy in divergent ways around the issue of coalition? This section advances two 
interrelated arguments. First, the two groups of NSM elites had access to different 
types of material, ideational and symbolic resources depending on their structural 
position within and in relation to the multiplicity of environments in which the 
party operated. Their dissimilar positions and the available resources associated 
with these positions influenced the way in which they perceived the role and the 
function of the NSM, thus the environmental challenges and opportunities. Second, 
                                                            
686 Şevket Kazan, Ankara, August 7, 2007. Asked whether they preferred being in coalition for this 
reason, Şevket Kazan was quick to emphasize that they “did not use government opportunities,...not 
as much [as other parties].” 
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the question of coalition presented itself as an opportunity to challenge the existing 
power structure within the party for the anti-coalitionists and to consolidate it for 
the pro-coalitionists. The divergent views and attitudes had thus a symbolic value 
on their own and were partially influenced by the process of power struggle, 
notwithstanding the particular ideational and structural properties of the NSM 
elites. The conflict over the coalition was a catalyst on the crystallization of a latent 
power struggle between two rival elite groups that dated back to the genetic phase 
of the NSM mobilization.  
 These micro- and meso- level processes and factors that interacted with the 
macro level opportunities and constraints help to understand why the NSM elites 
adopted different policy positions. The question of how they prevailed over their 
rivals, on the other hand, is the subject of the next section.  
Following is an examination of, first, the micro-properties of the NSM elites 
and second, the sources and dynamics of the struggle for power between the two 
opposing groups. 
6.2.1 Multi-positionality and its Effects on the Attitudes and Views of the 
NSM Elites 
 A diachronic perspective reveals that the multi-positionality of the actors 
affected their perceptions and arguments on the question of coalition with the 
RPP.687 The multi-positionality of an actor occurs as party elites and activists act 
and interact both “…within the organization, and … at the juncture of organization 
and the environment (or parts of the environment)”688. The “action systems” at the 
juncture of the party and the environment(s) that are called secante marginale689 
(marginal secant) are multiple as well. First, there are two different fields of 
                                                            
687 It should be noted that in their very insightful study on the moderation of the Morroccan JDP, 
Wegner and Pellicer, through drawing attention to the increasing distance between the Movement of 
Unity and Reform and its political party the JDP, reveal how different type of organizational 
membership may give rise to different comportements. However, they do not dwell on why or 
whether or not individual activists choose one organization over another during their double 
membership.  Wegner and Pellicer, "Islamist Moderation without Democratization."   
688Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties and Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 34. It should be noted here Panebianco highlights a concept that was first 
developed by Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedhberg in their work L’acteur et le système : les 
contraintes de l’action collective (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1977).  
689 Panebianco, 34. 
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political action at local and national levels and, second there exists multiplicity of 
“milieu partisan,” or local networks. Consequently, the party actors may have 
homologous, analogous or dissimilar structural positions.690 
 As Sawicki shows, the multi-positionality of organizational actors affect 
intraparty dynamics as networks and the fields of political action in which they are 
entrenched provide material (e.g. time, money, labor, votes) and symbolic resources 
(e.g. ideational elements, information, friendship, loyalty) that constraint and 
facilitate how political actors (re)act within and through the party.691  In the case of 
the NSM too, the networks and fields of action in which the NSM elites had been 
embedded before, created through, and/or entered following the NSM mobilization 
and the resources they presented showed diversity and influenced the way in which 
the NSM elites perceived and acted upon the issue of coalition. 
It is pertinent to start with a brief overview of the origins of the two 
opposing groups within the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group. 
The groups can be traced back to the genetic phase of the NSM. As shall be 
remembered, the NSM entrepreneurs had been embedded in close-knit groups of 
friendship or brotherhood (strong ties) and connected to each other via various 
overlapping acquaintances and activities within right wing religious, professional 
and political associations and political parties (weak ties). At first, there were three 
prominent groups of party entrepreneurs: some parliamentarians and senators from 
right-wing parties, some leading members of the Risale-i Nur student branches in 
Anatolia, and finally, a group of civil servants and engineers, including Erbakan. 
Following the establishment of the NOP, the smallest group, that is, the 
“parliamentarian and senator” group, and some new comers such as Şevket Kazan, 
gradually fused with the civil servant/engineer group that surrounded Erbakan. In 
turn, particularly following the foundation of the NSP, some professional men of 
religion, or Diyanetçiler692, who entered the Assembly, (some also present in the 
Executive Committee) established close relations with the Risale-i Nur group 
                                                            
690 Please see below for the explanation of this terminology. 
691 Sawicki studies the “milieu partisan” of the Socialist Party in three regions in France: le Pas-de 
Calais, le Var, and l’Ille-et-Vilaine. Sawicki, 67-327. 
692 Professional men of religion came from the ranks of Prayer Leader and Preacher schools, 
Presidency of the Religious Affairs, or the Directorate of Religious Education, a branch of the 
Ministry of Education. They were all related to the Presidency of Religious Affairs in some way or 
another, hence they were given the name Diyanetçiler (the Religious Affairs People) by the pro-
coalitionists.   
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within the NSM. While the former eventually formed the pro-coalition group, the 
latter would become the anti-coalitionists.  
The core members of the pro-coalitionist, or rather Erbakan group693, were 
“homologous,” or they had structural correspondence: the secante marginale within 
which they interacted with intra- and extra-party actors and drew resources was 
similar. At the local level, unlike the Risale-i Nur students and men of religion, 
their vertical and horizontal ties with the “milieu partisan” did not involve a salient 
pre-party organizational identity and extra-party institutional relations (neither 
formal as in the case of most men of religion nor informal as was the case for the 
Risale-i Nur students). Prior to mobilization period, their ties with the networks that 
would later provide activists, members, sympathizers, and voters constituted mostly 
weak ties of professional, associational and ideational (Islamist or right-wing in the 
general sense of the term) affinity and exchanges.694 Whatever strong ties they had 
among themselves and with the activists recruited from the local right wing milieus 
partisan were created through action and interaction within the context of the NSM 
mobilization for party building purposes, which aggregated and then articulated 
local interests and identities with the national political arena.  Moreover, their 
interactions with non-NSM actors were carried out within the context NSM 
mobilizations.  In other words, the resources they tapped into and invested in at the 
local level were created and marked primarily by the NSM practices and collective 
identity. Consequently, they believed that the coalition with the RPP presented an 
opportunity a) to protect the NSP, the organization that materially linked the 
activists, the “periphery of the periphery” to the political arena; and b) to tap into 
state controlled symbolic and material resources, which could then be used to 
consolidate and enlarge the NSM activist base and constituency networks. As shall 
be seen below, their concern with consolidating and enlarging the NSM networks 
proper, was also related to the intra-party struggle. Suffice it say here that having 
observed the behaviors of the NSM elites who were rooted in pre-NSM religious 
                                                            
693 Among the leading core members from the Executive Committee and Parliamentary Group were 
national figures such as Süleyman Arif Emre, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Fehmi Cumalıoğlu, Hasan Aksay, 
İsmail Müftüoğlu and locally strong names such as Yasin Hatipoğlu (Çorum), Şevket Kazan and 
Abdürrahim Bezci (İzmit), Abdülkerim Doğru (Kars), and Fehim Adak (Mardin). 
694 As had been discussed in Chapter 3 membership to a Naqshbandi brotherhood did not necessarily 
involve strong ties with other members. As a matter of fact, as early as 1978, Korkut Özal and 
Necmettin Erbakan, both disciples of the same Naqshbandi sheikh during the same period while 
students at the same university, would later become rivals for the party’s chairmanship at the party 
general congress. 
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networks, they came to realize that the NSM needed to create its own networks if it 
were to survive. 
At the national level, even before the NSM mobilization, the pro-coalitionist 
elites, as politicians, (parliamentarians from the right wing parties), or as civil 
servants and engineers, (the students and friends of Erbakan), with few exceptions, 
had already been interacting with various state and political actors. Following the 
NSP’s entry to the parliament, thanks to either their prior experiences695 or their 
positions within the formal power structure of the party696, or both, they established 
further and more frequent contact with other players of the political field. As 
discussed in the previous subsection, among these contacts, the relationship with 
the RPP (and also the military), through the information and affinity it provided, 
would prove to be decisive in changing their perception of the RPP elites and 
themselves. As a matter of fact, during a heated dispute over the coalition, an anti-
coalitionist leader attacked the pro-coalitionists saying that their frequent contact 
with the RPP created a rapprochement, which blurred their vision.697  
The core members of the anti-coalitions group,698 on the other hand, were 
Risale-i Nur students (the Nur students).699 When the NSP entered the parliament, 
they allied themselves with Diyanetçiler700 who had recently been elected from the 
ranks of the NSP. The members of two groups had prior (weak) ties not only 
because there were Nur students701 who worked in the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs but also because they had carried out joint activities (conferences, seminars 
etc.) through certain right wing associations. While the members of each subgroup 
                                                            
695 Among them Şevket Kazan was an exception. 
696 The power relations within the party will be discussed below. 
697  Sevilgen, MSP’de, 75. 
698 Among them only two were national figures from Risale-i  Nur background, Hüsamettin 
Akmumcu (in Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group) and Hüseyin Abbas (in the 
Group), thanks to their speeches during the “party opening ceremonies” as the NOP 
parliamentarians (they had been first elected from the ranks of the JP and then transferred to the 
NOP). 
699 They constituted the group that opposed the Yeni Asya group’s dominance within the Nur 
students networks. The Executive Committee: Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, Suudi Reşat Saruhan, Rasim 
Hancıoğlu, Gündüz Sevilgen (all were also parliamentarians), and Sabri Özpala (a local elite from 
İstanbul). The Parliamentary Group:Vahdettin Karaçorlu, İhsan Karaçam, Sabri Dörtkol.  
700 They were in the Parliamentary Group: Cemal Cebeci, Hulusi Özkul, Zeki Okur, Ömer Lütfi 
Zararsız.  
701 For instance, Vahdettin Karaçorlu (later an NSP parliamentarian), Said Özdemir (a leading Nur 
leader in Ankara who had supported the NSM from the very beginning), and Muzaffer Deligöz (a 
young middle ranked Nur leader in Ankara and later the chair of the local NSP branch in Bolu) all 
worked in Presidency of Religious Affairs.  
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were homologous (having structural correspondence), the anti-coalitionist elites as 
a whole were analogous (having structural similarity) within the party. While they 
had limited activity and connections at the marginale secante at the national level, 
they drew their resources basically from their pre-NSM connections at the local 
level.  
 Specifically, before their engagement in politics through the NSM, the anti-
coalitionists had previously been embedded in organizational networks, which were 
well-defined in terms of their identity, culture, formal and informal roles and rules. 
The Nur students had been entrenched in an informal “new religious movement” 
organization in various Anatolian localities, including Ankara, and rose to power 
within the movement networks by the mid 1960s, following the death of Said 
Nursi.  The Diyanetçiler in turn, though working within and through state created 
or controlled schools, PRA, mosques etc., were carriers of long established tradition 
of orthodox Islamic scholarship and institutions critical of state introduced secular 
reforms and enjoyed their own personal networks at the various localities they 
worked.  The religious institutions in which they were embedded emerged in 
radically different conditions, the former being an underground “new religious 
movement” and the latter being state institutions, and had quite different 
Islamic/Islamist practices, interpretations, and networks. Nevertheless, the elites 
coming from the ranks of either religious institution reacted the same way to the 
prospect of the coalition and allied against the pro-coalitionists. Their anti-coalition 
attitude and alliance was partly related to similarities in their institutions/networks’ 
historical background and partly to their relative independence from the resources 
produced within and through the NSM. 
On the one hand, having been active within the same “religious market,” 
and under the watchful eyes of the secularist military, bureaucratic and political 
elites, the Nur students and the Diyanetçiler resembled to each other in their 
relationship with and attitudes towards the ruling elites (civil and military 
bureaucracy, the RPP and the right wing political parties). Historically, their 
respective religious institutions and activities had emerged and grew under the 
heavy-handed rule of the RPP’s single party regime in the 1930s. Both the informal 
organization of the Nur students and the personal networks of men of religion had 
developed within the local and national right wing milieus by the late 1940s. 
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Through the connections they established with various sectors of society at the 
local (followers, notables, local officers, and judicial elites702) and national levels 
(sympathetic political, and military elites) they had been able to protect, enlarge 
and strengthen their personal and religious networks and resources.  Having 
objectively and/or subjectively suffered at the hands of the RPP regime, they had 
established an uneasy alliance with the right wing parties, particularly the DP and 
the JP. These latter had adopted a “carrot and stick policy” towards the Nur 
students and men of religion, instead of just “stick policy” of the RPP. 
Consequently, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, despite the apparent liberalization 
of the religious life under the right-wing governments, almost all anti-coalition 
elites had witnessed and personally encountered (either themselves or a close 
family member) state persecution such as investigation, prosecution, imprisonment, 
and/or exile (usually under the Penal Law, article 163). The conflicts with the 
Demirel leadership during the right wing mobilizations of the 1960s,703 however, 
constituted a final stroke on the camel’s back, which had contributed to their 
engagement in politics through the NSM704. 
On the other hand, both groups of leaders considered themselves above all 
as men of religion.  While the Diyanetçiler were professional men of religion 
previously employed by the state, the Nur student leaders, though being in lay 
professions, considered themselves “men of religion” as well; they provided 
unremunerated religious services within the cadres of their religious circles. As was 
the case for the Naqshbandi leaders, in order to maintain and recruit activists and 
followers they needed to adopt “above-petty-politics” attitudes. Their religious 
authority and legitimacy partly depended on such a behavior. Historically, they had 
justified whatever ties they had with right wing political parties (also the NSM) 
with the need to protect Islam and the activities of the religious networks. 
The history and identity of these organizations and associated networks had 
the following effects with regard to the question of coalition.  First, since the 
                                                            
702 It was not a coincidence that out of eight above mentioned Nur students there were four lawyers, 
two of which being retired judges. 
703 See Chapter 3 for the details of this conflict. 
704 These Anatolian based Nur student local elites had become NSM entrepreneurs partly because 
they were uncomfortable with the increasing power of a younger generation within the İstanbul 
branch in particular and İstanbul leaders’ rising influence within Anatolian networks through a 
newspaper and expansionist attitude in general. 
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collective identities of their religious organizations and networks had been shaped 
partly by hostility towards the RPP, they thought a coalition with this party would 
alienate their activist and constituency base. Second, because of their deep-seated 
distrust towards the RPP, in contrast to pro-coalitionist group, they either lacked or 
refused ties with the RPP elites (though not necessarily with the military elites).705 
This, in turn, prevented them from appreciating or confirming the changes that the 
RPP claimed it had been gone through. Third, the coalition would render the NSP a 
political party proper. However, keeping the NSP as a “pressure group” would 
enable them to protect their “above-petty party politics” status. It should be noted 
that the danger of losing one’s constituency base was more immediate for the Nur 
students, as their rivals, the leaders of the powerful İstanbul based Nur student 
group, later known as Yeni Asya group, had been expanding its influence within and 
even capturing the Anatolian based Nur student networks at the expense of local 
and free-floating Nur student elders since the late 1960s. Moreover, although 
remained publicly passive and neutral with regard to the NSM mobilization up until 
the NSP entered the parliament, Yeni Asya had been skeptical about the benefits 
the NSM (or any other party but the JP for that matter)706 could bring to the Nur 
students movement; in their private meetings had warned those Nur student leaders 
who decided to engage in such a movement. Not only the NSM could potentially 
attract the wrath of the secularist elites, but also threaten the Nur students’ survival. 
The latter depended on recruitment from, and influence within, the largest right 
wing network in the country, which was open to experimenting with religious ideas 
and practices: the JP voters and sympathizers. Even the prospect of a coalition with 
the RPP had brought the JP and Yeni Asya even closer and provoked public attacks 
against the NSP.707 The Yeni Asya elites were also urging boycotts against the Nur 
                                                            
705 Particularly, the Nur students, Vahdettin Karaçorlu, Tevfik Paksu and Hüsamettin Akmumcu had 
close relations with some members of the military establishment. Karaçorlu used to be a colonel, 
Paksu used to be a member of the Senate which included members of the military junta of May 27, 
and finally Akmumcu had been introduced to the military circles thanks to his neighborhood with a 
high ranking officer.  The purpose of the Nur students was to protect their networks from further 
state encroachments; and their opposition to the communist activism gave an opportunity to build 
bridges with the military. As discussed earlier this need was more prominent for Yeni Asya 
movement, which established particularly close relations with the military, especially with Faik 
Türün, Commander of Martial Law Administration in İstanbul following the military intervention of 
1971.   
706 For instance, in 1969, Yeni Asya fiercely attacked the NAP in its booklet published as a 
supplement for İttihad. See the advertisement for the supplement in Appendix G, Figure 18. 
707 See for instance the issues of Yeni Asya newspaper between 1973-1975. In May1977, shortly 
before the general elections and during a period when 14 members of Nur student/Diyanetçi group 
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student elites who worked for the NSM.708 The NSM Nur Students were now 
facing implosion of their very own networks let alone increasing their influence in 
Anatolia in general. Finally, as far as the anticoalitionists’ position within the NSM 
was concerned, the alienation of their supporters could result in a diminished 
bargaining power at best, loss of their elite status at worst. In that case, they would 
have lost not only their religious and social reputation and circles that they had built 
over the years, but also their recently flourishing political careers. 
6.2.2 The Conflict over the Coalition as a Symbolic Tool in the Intra-party 
Power Struggle 
 The internal dynamics of the NSM leadership reveals that dating back to 
the NOP; there was a latent struggle for power between two groups of NSM 
entrepreneurs. The entry of the NSP to the parliament and the prospect of coalition 
became catalysts for an open conflict and the crystallization of contenders of 
organizational power into anti- and pro-coalition groups. As discussed above, both 
elite groups drew upon the role and function of the NSP in order to assess the 
opportunity structure and right political strategy. The divergent views and attitudes 
were thus not only a reflection of the resources available to them but also symbolic 
tools to fight “over the legitimate definition of the party and over the right to speak 
in the name of [this] entity and the collective brand.”709 The result of the conflict 
could potentially determine who would produce the political goods in the name of 
the party and reap the benefits and how and where these benefits would be put into 
use.710  
The Anti-coalitionists  
The Nur students, who were the core of the anti-coalition group considered 
Erbakan and his close circle almost as usurpers. While the party entrepreneurs had 
invited Erbakan to become the leader of the new enterprise, the Nur students 
                                                                                                                                                                     
announced that they would not put their candidacies for parliamentary seats under the NSP banner, 
Yeni Asya published a supplement to reveal the “corruption” of the NSP. Hüseyin Demirel, Ümit 
Şimşek and Bünyamin Ateş, İslami Hareket ve MSP (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 1977).   
708 Interview with RNelder1, İstanbul, May 15, 2007. 
709 As Offerlé puts it a political party is an objective space where actors “contribute to the existence 
or rather to the belief in the existence of” the party through such a competition. Offerlé, 15.   
710 Ibid.,17. 
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wanted to control him in the best case scenario and expected him to act like as 
primus inter pares at worst. However, Erbakan had emerged as the undisputed 
leader from the TOBB Affair. As one Risale-i Nur also noted, Erbakan had 
advantages that prominent Nur students lacked and became the public face of 
contemporary young religious men. During the TOBB Affair he had demonstrated 
that his oratory abilities, name recognition, easy communication with workshop and 
shop owners, extensive social capital ranging from student circles to businessmen 
and brotherhoods, cultural capital (both secular and religious) were unmatched 
among the NSM elites. Moreover, he did not have the stigma associated with being 
a Risale-i Nur student.711   
The Nur students were uncomfortable with this unexpected development. 
As a behind the scenes Nur student party entrepreneur noted they had even tried to 
convince Tevfik Paksu to become a candidate for the NOP’s chairmanship arguing 
that even if he lacked Erbakan’s qualities the Nur student elites combined could fill 
the void of Erbakan. At the end, however, they supported Erbakan’s chairmanship 
for the following reasons. First, Paksu refused the offer. Second, since despite his 
extensive social capital Erbakan lacked a reliable religious community network of 
his own, they miscalculated that Erbakan would eventually need the Nur students 
and render them behind the scenes power.712   
However, as shall be discussed shortly, the Erbakan group had already 
realized that the NSM, if it would survive and succeed, should not rely exclusively 
on religious communities and leaders. They had even managed to take certain 
measures against the Nur student elites. The question of coalition was thus the first 
opportunity window for the Nur students to legitimately challenge Erbakan’s and 
his close companions’ growing authority since the establishment of the NOP. Since 
1970, the NSM had faced with a ban on the party, a military intervention, the 
establishment of the new party, and finally the elections.  It was the emerging pro-
coalitionist attitude that allowed the Nur students to launch their struggle. They 
were now more powerful, joined by Diyanetçiler,713 who were unhappy to witness 
that they did not get the respect they had expected from the secular Islamist elites. 
                                                            
711 Interview with Muzaffer Deligöz, İstanbul, July 1, 2007. 
712 Interviews with RNelder1, May 15, 2008; and Muzaffer Deligöz, July 1, 2007. 
713 It should be noted that unlike the Nur students, not all men of religion joined the ranks of the 
anti-coalitionists.  
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During the intra-party discussions, they made veiled attacks on the pro-
coalitionists, particularly Erbakan. Sudi Reşat Saruhan’s speech in late November 
1973, in the joint meeting of the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group 
following the RPP’s first offer, illustrates these points. On the one hand, Saruhan 
questioned the pro-coalitionist loyalty to the NSM identity invoking in a very subtle 
way the incompatibility of seeking office with altruism and avoidance of petty 
politics. Drawing attention to the RPP’s record he argued that such a coalition 
would mean (for those who supported it) giving up on the “cause”. On the other 
hand, he attacked Erbakan personally in a muffled way when he compared the two 
paths imposed on the NSP. According to Saruhan early elections should not induce 
worries about the votes since it was not the NSP parliamentary candidates’ (read 
Erbakan) “personal accomplishments (kabiliyet), talents (istidat) or etiquettes 
(etiket)” but God’s will that had sent the NSP to the Assembly to represent the 
“ideas” the NSP claimed to defend. If God wanted the NSP to be in power, he 
would no doubt allow more parliamentarians to get elected.714  
The Pro-coalitionists 
Although the pro-coalitionist interviewees did not overtly use the word 
distrust, their accounts of the developments during the initial mobilization period 
suggest that they mistrusted Nur student leaders and men of religion in the NSM in 
particular and the pre-NSM religious networks in general. Consequently, not only 
the Erbakan group tried to marginalize these religious leaders’ influence within the 
NSM institutions but also minimize the need for activists coming from the Nur 
student networks. 
There were three basic reasons for their misgivings. First, during the two 
electoral stages of the NSM, (the Movement of the Independents and the 1973 
general elections), they had observed that a considerable number of local religious 
leaders, whether a Nur student, a man of religion, or a brotherhood Sheikh, had not 
kept their promises. These leaders had promised either votes or at least a non-
oppositional stance as in the case of Yeni Asya and the Süleymancıs. While it 
                                                            
714 This should be read as Erbakan since he makes a comparison between Sivas and Konya, the two 
districts which had sent three parliamentarians to the Assembly. He was trying to show that Erbakan 
was not actually a factor. This was, of course, a false comparison. To say the least Konya  had 
almost twice more voters than Sivas. Sevilgen, MSP’de, 63-65. 
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immediately became clear that those who promised votes had not delivered “the 
good”, by 1973 Yeni Asya, which had been publicly relatively quite and neutral 
regarding the NSM since 1969, adopted an increasingly aggressive attitude against 
the NSP. These experiences revealed how these rather autonomous religious leaders 
and networks were “zones of uncertainties”715 that the prospective pro-coalitionists 
could not easily control. Difficulties in controlling these zones were potential 
sources of destabilization of the party, and thus the NSM. 
Second, the members of the group that had formed around Erbakan thought 
that particularly the Nur student leaders (and some man of religion) lacked certain 
skills and/or qualities.716 Their mistakes or weaknesses, which were actually either 
a reflection of their material and symbolic properties or strategic moves, were 
considered harmful for the NSM development or survival within the political arena 
under the existing regime. Asiltürk, for instance, claimed that the prosecution of the 
NOP by the Constitutional Court was partly the result of the Nur students’ 
irresponsible and reckless attitudes during the mobilization period. Despite multiple 
warnings about the laws governing the political parties, the Nur students spoke to 
their audience as if they “preached in a mosque.”717 While it was not their speeches 
that led to the closure of the party in particular, their aggressive tone no doubt 
attracted the attention of the Prosecutors of the Republic.  
If one way to gain legitimacy was to act within the limits set by the law, the 
other was to change the perception of the individuals about the NSM elites at the 
national level. As Emre stated, the party was trying to act within the limits set by 
the law but the enforcers of the law (civil and military bureaucracy) arbitrarily 
changed the limits through reinterpretations when they deemed necessary.718 The 
                                                            
715 The term zones of uncertainty that Panebianco borrows from Crozier and Friedhberg’s work 
mentioned above and develops refers to “areas of unpredictability” from which the organization, the 
leaders and even “the lowliest activist,” derive their resources. There are six such zones: 
competency, environmental relations management, internal communications, formal rules, 
organizational financing and recruitment. Those who can establish a control over most of these areas 
could command a considerable freedom of action. Panebianco, 33-36.  
716 It should be noted that the mid-level ranked Nur student NSM activists also made similar 
comments regarding the NSM parliamentarians of Nur student origins during the interviews. 
717 Interview with Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Ankara, October 9, 2007. When the speeches of the Nur 
students and non-Nur student NSM elites in the party opening ceremonies are compared, though 
they did not differ radically in terms of their content, it is true that the Nur students emphasized 
more moral/religious issues than the others and were much more aggressive attacking the RPP or 
Demirel.   
718 Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, February 2, 2007. 
 245 
 
members of the Erbakan group thus sought to leave a positive impact on the 
military and civil bureaucracy. To do that they needed to mingle with them in 
state’s various social and official gatherings. Unlike the members of the Erbakan 
group, the Nur students neither wished nor possessed the right cultural capital to 
socialize with the state elites. For instance, Müftüoğlu explains his being deputy 
chairman responsible from auxiliary organizations and his eventual ministerial 
position (and compares his trajectory with those of the Nur students) by his cultural 
and social attributes. He knew how to behave among the “socialites” as much as 
how to pray in a mosque. He already had a large social network and a considerable 
intellectual accumulation, which reflected in how he dressed and spoke. He created 
a pleasant aura that the military officers liked in the cocktails; so much so that he 
would joke to them: “you cannot be as handsome as I am.”719  
Third and final source of distrust to the Nur students (and the Diyanetçiler), 
which surfaced particularly after the NSP’s entry into the parliament, was related to 
their performance as parliamentarians. The pro-coalitionists perceived them as 
relatively indolent in party affairs, particularly in those questions related to the 
parliamentary responsibilities of the NSP.720 For instance, the party needed to come 
up with its own proposal of a General Amnesty Law to bring about the “social 
peace” that it had promised during the electoral campaign. The anti-coalitionists’ 
proposal included only an Amnesty for those who had been convicted in 
accordance with the Penal Law, Article163. When an intra-party commission was 
set up to produce a more comprehensive proposal, only Kazan properly worked on 
the subject, which in turn paved the way for his position as Minister of Justice 
during the coalition. Members of the Erbakan group complained that their 
opponents were unable to come up with detailed solutions or proposals despite their 
fierce opposition on various subjects. For the pro-coalitionists, a proper political 
party could not function unless its administrators and parliamentarians prepared 
policy proposals, made them public, took decisions and then shouldered the 
responsibility for these decisions.  
                                                            
719 Interview with İsmail Müftüoğlu, İstanbul November 12, 2007. 
720 It should be reemphasized that this perception was not peculiar to the pro-coalitionists. The 
interviewed mid-rank Nur student NSM activists and local elites from Kayseri also made similar 
comments. 
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It can be argued that the behavior of the anti-coalitionists in general and the 
Nur students in particular, were as much a result of their structural and ideational 
properties as a strategic choice. To give an example from the coalition dispute,  
most of the anti-coalitionists in the Executive Committee and Parliamentary Group 
went for pilgrimage during the height of government crisis when the RPP and the 
pro-coalitionists had begun behind the doors negotiations. Such an act cannot be 
solely explained by lack of experience or reckless behavior. It was in their absence 
that the pro-coalitionists had acquired the majority’s support in a joint meeting of 
the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group to conduct coalition talks.721 
The absence of the anti-coalitionists seems more like a move a) to portray the pro-
coalitionists as authoritarian leaders seeking office benefits and, of course, b) to 
render them responsible for the coalition in the eye of, at least, their constituencies. 
Be that as it may, based on early evaluations of the Nur students and their 
behavior, Erbakan made sure that unlike the NOP, the NSP’s Chairmanship 
Council (Başkanlık Divanı)722 did not include any of the seven prominent Nur 
student Executive Committee members. In addition to the Chairman, the members 
of the Council, particularly the General Secretary and the deputy chairmen 
responsible for the party organization, electoral affairs and auxiliary organizations 
had frequent contacts with the NSM public and public in general. The exclusion of 
the Nur students from the Council, thus, partly aimed at reducing the risk of 
damage their public statements could cause for the NSP.  However, this exclusion 
also concretized the mutual mistrust and contributed to the formation of an anti-
coalitionist block within the party. As anti-coalitionists increased their opposition 
within the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group, the Erbakan group’s 
negative views strengthened. The question of coalition thus became a symbolic tool 
in the struggle for power.  
                                                            
721  Sevigen, MSP’de, 79. 
722  The Executive Committee elected a Council of seven members from among its members. In 
practice, the Chairman determined the members of the councils with whom he would work closely. 
In the NSP five out of seven, including Erbakan, were also parliamentarians. In the Committee 
meeting of 22 November, the Council’s three out five parliamentary members but İsmail Müftüoğlu 
indicated that they preferred a coalition with the RPP to an early election (Erbakan, Süleyman Arif 
Emre, Oğuzhan Asiltürk and Fehmi Cumalıoğlu).  Sevigen, MSP’de, 73-75. Müftüoğlu would 
follow the suit later.   
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Although the pro-coalitionists won the first battle easily when they acquired 
the backing of the parliamentarians and majority of the local activists and cornered 
the anti-coalitionists to support (and vote for) the coalition government, they won 
the second battle of the coalition question with heavy losses. The second showdown 
was about the draft General Amnesty Law  that the RPP and the pro-coalitionist 
NSP elites had prepared for almost four months. The anti-coalitionists for the very 
same reasons that they had opposed the RPP, opposed the inclusion of the left wing 
convicts (under the Penal Law, Articles 141-142) to the Amnesty. Having secured 
22 votes, instead of voting for their government proposal, in May 1974, they voted 
for the opposition’s draft law that excluded the left wing prisoners.723 Not only their 
action would prove to be the beginning of the end of the coalition but also lead to 
an open conflict in the General Congress of the party in 1976. Although the 
Erbakan group emerged victorious from the congress, by the general election of 
1977, a total of 14 anti-coalitionists, including all the Nur students and the 
Diyanetçiler, would refuse to be parliamentary candidates and quit the party to 
establish Nizam Partisi (The Order Party). While the NSP and the pro-coalitionists 
survived this blow, they nevertheless lost some of their votes in the localities of 
these parliamentarians.724 Overall, the NSP lost half of its Assembly seats (though 
not the votes) in the general elections of 1977.725  
6.3 The Pro-coalitionists Prevail: Organizational and Ideational Factors 
What were the factors that enabled the pro-coalitionist elites to pursue and 
execute their line of action? How could they prevail over their rivals and obliged 
them to vote for the coalition government formed with the RPP? How could they 
                                                            
723 The RPP later applied to the Constitutional Court, which decided that the Amnesty should cover 
those convicted under the Articles 141-142 alongside those who fell under the jurisdiction of the 
sister Article163. 
724 It should be added that it is difficult to assess whether or not the anti-coalitionists who had quit 
the party caused the decrease in the votes in these regions. While their networks had probably 
reacted to the NSP pro-coalitionist elites, there might be other reasons as well. For instance, the 
better performance of the JP and the NAP in their 1977 electoral campaigns; the NSP’ coalition with 
the right wing parties in 1975 might also have been influential. Moreover, for instance in Kayseri, it 
seems that it was local intra-party disputes over parliamentary candidacies and the central 
administration’s imposition of an outsider as a candidate that contributed the most to the decline in 
votes. Interviews with local Kayseri NSP leaders and activists.  
725 The NSM did lose the parliamentary seats but not the votes. It simply could not enlarge its 
electoral constituency despite the increase in the overall number of the eligible voters.  
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keep the activist base intact even when their decision to support Amnesty for the 
left wing prisoners was quite unpopular?  
This section argues that in the case of the NSM, the NSP’s formal and 
informal organizational structure and ideational products helped the pro-coalitionist 
elites to secure the support of the local activists and resist the pressure of their 
opponents. To understand how the structural, relational and ideational features of 
the NSM worked in favor of the pro-coalitionists require a three steps analysis. 
First step involves looking at the genetic period of the NSM, or its structural and 
ideational institutionalization around the NOP and the NSP. The NSM had 
produced a centralized (decision-making) structure, a collective identity based on 
solidarity and altruism that supported this structure and finally collective action 
frames that argued for introducing material and moral changes and demanded from 
the activists to shoulder this historical and religious responsibility in the name of 
the Muslim nation.  
The second step entails examining why and how the organizational and 
ideational traits of the NSM were reproduced at the local level. The centralized 
decision making structure and the movement’s symbolic products had two major 
sets of function at the local level. The initial functions were to provide collective 
incentives for participation and to reduce the cost of political activism for 
individual local activists through aggregating the available resources. Starting with 
the electoral campaign of 1973, when the NSP, the movement organization, began 
to institutionalize and entered the competition within political arena in every sense 
of the term, altruism and solidarity revealed their limits among the local elites. The 
organizational and ideational elements of the movement served to provide selective 
incentives and “dissimulate” their existence respectively.  
The third and final step is to study how and why these organizational and 
ideational features had provided advantages to the Erbakan group both before and 
during the conflict over the coalition. While the centralized structure helped the 
pro-coalitionists to increase their control over the party center at the expense of 
their rivals and the local party branches, their arguments, or frames regarding the 
coalition aligned much better with the NSM collective identity and action frames.    
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6.3.1 Organizational Institutionalization of the NSM  
 This subsection studies the vertical power relations of the party, focusing 
on its formal and informal institutions of decision-making and accountability. Who 
made decisions on policy (goals and strategies on various issues) and recruitment 
(activists and parliamentarians) and the degree of the decision makers’ 
accountability concurrently shape and reflect intraparty vertical power dynamics.726  
In turn, as Angelo Panebianco argues, vertical power relations between the party’s 
central leadership and the local activists constitute a factor in the horizontal power 
games at the center of political parties. According to him, “the greater the freedom 
of movement won by the leaders in vertical power games (the more such freedom is 
configured as a “carte blanche”) the stronger their trump cards wielded in 
horizontal power games vis-à-vis the internal opponents.”727   
The NSM had a highly centralized728 decisional structure and lacked a 
functioning system of accountability. The ideational features of the NSM that 
helped the party entrepreneurs to mobilize the local activists also sustained their 
domination within the party.729 As shall be seen in the last subsection, the pro-
coalitionists would take advantage of this existing structure, to the establishment of 
which their rivals themselves had contributed as party entrepreneurs.   
The main features of the NSM organization became apparent and 
functioning in 1973, shortly before the electoral efforts began. The NOP had not 
had time to operate properly because of its “legal problems”. As was the case in 
studying the JP’s internal structure in Chapter 4, studying bylaws and the 1965 Law 
of Political Parties  alone would tell very little about how the NSP was organized. 
The written rules constitute “an area of uncertainty,” that is, they are open to 
                                                            
726 For a discussion on the subject see for instance, Strøm and Müller, 16-18 and Kaare Strøm, 
“Party Leadership in Theory and in Norway: An Entrepreneurial Perspective,” in How Political 
Parties Work: Perspectives from Within, ed. Kay Lawson (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), 
111-112. 
727 Panebianco, 23. The task is quite similar to one that is carried out in Chapter 4, which provides a 
study of the internal structure of the JP. Since the subject of the essay is primarily the NSM, this 
section includes more theoretical and empirical details. 
728 The term oligarchy is not used as the term’s historical and academic baggage may curtail the 
dynamic and interactional features of this centralized structure.   
729 Since the role of the ideational elements in organizational institutionalization will be studied in 
detail in the next subsection, here they will be dealt with only briefly.   
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interpretation, neglect and (ab)use.730 The NSP, in particular, enforced the written 
rules to the extent that it protected the party from legal scrutiny and empowered the 
central administration.731  
To begin with, since the Law of Political Parties conferred executive and 
decisional powers to the central administration; the NSP was a centralized party 
similar to its counterparts in the political field. The central administration, which 
had to include no less than 15 members, was entitled to exercise authority732 in the 
name of the party’s highest organ, the General Congress. The latter convened every 
two years and brought together local delegates, central administrators, and 
parliamentarians. The central executive body in the NSP, the Executive Committee, 
was composed of 20 elected and 5 appointed members, who in turn, “elected” a 
Chairman Council (the Council) from among its members. It should be noted that, 
as in other political parties, the Chairman was actually allowed to choose the 
members of the Council who would become his close aids in party affairs 
responsible for specific tasks.  
While it was the Executive Committee’s duty to deliberate and ultimately 
decide on matters related to party policy and strategies, particularly coalition 
questions, the Council handled day-to-day relations with the party branches, 
negotiations with other political actors, and interim decisions. The Chairman and 
the Council were thus formally accountable to the Executive Committee. Both, in 
turn, reported to the General Congress. The central executives reported their actions 
ranging from party finances to policy choices to the delegates, who, in theory, had 
the power to change their executives through their votes in case they were 
dissatisfied with their performances.  
                                                            
730 Panebianco, 35. 
731 This subsection is, then, based on the newspaper accounts and the interviews conducted with 
central party elites and local activists, which revealed those formal, that is written rules that were 
actually applied and also the informal rules and norms that governed the party’s decisional 
mechanisms.  
731 As mentioned earlier, the NSP named this organ the General Executive Committee (Genel İdare 
Kurulu). 
732 The Law designated the central administration as the “central decisional organ” (Merkezi Karar 
Alma Organı) of the party. It was responsible from executing party program and bylaws and taking 
decisions in the name of the party. It could not however decide for self-abolition of the party or 
changes in the party program and bylaws. 
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As for the relationship between the Executive Committee and the 
Parliamentary Group, the party was expected to harmonize the legislative work of 
the parliamentarians with the decisions of the Executive Committee.  However, 
according to the article 25 of the Law of Political Parties, the votes of confidence or 
non-confidence for a government could only be taken by parliamentary group 
decision. No other party institution, including the Chairman Council or the 
Executive Committee, could take legally binding decisions for the parliamentarians 
on the matter of voting for a government, by implication, even if it entailed a 
coalition government that included their own party. 
At first glance, the formal institutions of accountability and parliamentary 
independence appear to decrease the power of the Chairman and the Council in 
particular and the Executive Committee in general, within the party organization. 
Nevertheless, as was the case for other parties of the political arena, the formal 
institutions of accountability and parliamentary independence did not work in 
practice. In fact, compared to their counterparts in well-established major parties, 
for instance the JP, the Executive Committee had decidedly more prerogatives at 
the expense of the local activists and parliamentarians. Consequently, if and when a 
group succeeded to dominate the executive organ, it was able to use them at the 
expense of their opponents within the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary 
Group. The details of how Erbakan and his close aids, the pro-coalitionist elites, 
were able to swing the Executive Committee’s power to their advantage and 
cornered the anti-coalitionists to accept the coalition with the RPP will be studied in 
the last subsection. Here, it is pertinent to study this informal power structure itself. 
The national party entrepreneurs, who populated the central administration, 
enjoyed the advantages of administrating a new and “marginal” party. First, in 
addition to lack of structural mechanisms that could have incorporated the local 
activists in decision-making processes, the local branches lacked sufficient 
resources to influence party decisions even in informal ways. Specifically, as 
mentioned earlier, unlike the RPP or the JP local networks that had been formed 
with the initiative of local notables; the NSM local branches, both during the NOP 
and the NSP period, had been established with difficulty. They were able to 
succeed thanks to face-to-face recruitment of local party entrepreneurs and 
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activists. The local party branches were still “under construction”733 and not at all 
crowded with “veteran” local party leaders, activists, members, or sympathizers and 
political wanderers one would see in older parties. Neither the local party 
administrators nor the rank and file activists had enough political, social, economic 
and cultural capital to exert concerted influence on party policy.734  During the 
establishment of the party the delegates’ role was to approve the list of the 
Executive Committee candidates (there was only one list), the party program and 
the bylaws put together by the national party innovators. Throughout the 1970s, 
they were basically engaged in a) electoral and activist mobilization efforts in their 
localities drawing upon the party’s collective identity and action frames and b) 
promoting the local and or/self interests at the party center.  
 Second, unlike their counterparts in major political parties, who used, 
though to a certain extent, their position of brokerage among the parliamentarians, 
local networks and the party center as leverage in the decision making processes, 
the NSP local administrators were not able to transform their local activities into 
political capital. They occupied these posts thanks to their “founding fathers” 
position and relatively more economic, cultural, economic and/or social capital. 
While the support of the local activists whom they had themselves recruited 
contributed to their ascendance in the local movement, it was rather their personal 
ties with the Executive Committee members that ensured their position. The major 
function of the local executives, which differentiated them from rank and file, was 
their mediation in the preparation of the list of parliamentary candidates that would 
compete under the NSP’s banner. This mediation did not necessarily contribute to 
their political capital vis-à-vis the national leaders of the party since it did not 
involve summoning major social and political resources, as was the case in, say, the 
JP. Since there were not many applications and the NSP wanted to protect its 
collective identity through choosing the “right candidates,” the NSP did not hold 
primaries to choose and rank its candidates. The role of the local executives, thus, 
consisted of “head hunting” and bringing together a list of potential candidates 
                                                            
733 For instance, in the First General Congress, only the delegates of 22 districts, which had earlier 
convened their congresses, were present. “ Teşkilat delege listelerini seçim kurullarına veriyor,” 
Milli Gazete, July 18, 1973. 
734 They also lacked well-established ties with activists from other districts. 
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(which usually included their names as well).735 They would merely provide 
suggestions regarding the ordering of the party list of parliamentary candidates, 
informing the Executive Committee about the properties of the candidates and 
sensibilities of the local district.  
Third, consequently, for most local elites, contributing to party’s policy 
making through elected representatives from their districts was also a remote 
option. The parliamentarians owed their seats ultimately to the members of the 
General Executive Committee not the local executives. Studying the process of 
how the parliamentary candidates were selected and than elected to the Assembly 
in 1973 throws light upon the mechanisms through which the members of the 
Executive Committee, particularly the Council, was able to concentrate decision 
making power in its own hands at the expense of both the local executives and 
parliamentarians.  
Accordingly, although the Law of Political Parties required primaries for the 
selection of parliamentary candidates, the Article 31 also gave room to skip them in 
case the party lacked sufficient number of candidates in a given district. The central 
administration was then allowed to find and rank the candidates of a district to be 
registered later with the Supreme Electoral Board within an established timeframe. 
The NSP leaders drew upon this exception to designate the parliamentary 
candidates in all but four districts.736  Having been established recently and being 
successor of a banned party, the NSP had in fact experienced difficulty in finding 
candidates. However, as was the case in Kayseri, in many places, this practice was 
not totally justified. There was enough number of candidates to warrant primaries at 
least to determine the rankings. Even in such places the Executive Committee 
sidestepped the laws and did not hold the primaries.  
 Instead of undertaking primaries, then, the Executive Committee, 
particularly the members of the Council, would a) review the list provided by the 
local executives, b) call the candidates for interview, c) meet with the local 
                                                            
735 Since only the first few candidates would have a chance to go to Ankara, most of the remaining  
would include their names just to fill the quota of the electoral district. However, filling the spaces 
was not the only incentive, becoming a parliamentary candidate was also an approval of an 
individual’s merits and status in the local networks. The implications of such an approval will be 
discussed below in studying the local activists’ reproduction of the party’s internal structure.   
736 “MSP Milletvekili seçimine 67 vilayetten katılıyor,”  Milli Gazete, August 14, 1973. 
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executives and d) take out or add some names and finally, e) rank the candidates. 
Following their initial recommendations, the local administrators or parliamentary 
candidates had no formal room to make appeals for the decisions. Typically, those 
who wanted to make some changes would wait several days even to get an 
appointment. Most important, appeals and disputes over the candidacies would not 
only be frowned upon but also usually punished by the appointment of a new 
candidate from outside the district (usually a prominent name originated from the 
region but lived elsewhere in the country).737  Through such a punishment, the party 
leaders would put focus on the goals of the movement, not individual incentives, 
and made clear the boundaries of acceptable behavior.738   
Finally, the question of accepted and unaccepted behavior brings to the fore 
the function of the NSM ideational elements in supporting the centralized 
mechanism of decision-making. The NSM collective identity that emphasized 
solidarity, altruism and the action frames that demanded working for the material 
and moral development in the name of the nation, effectively delegitimized 
intraparty competition over party posts at different levels and parliamentary seats. 
According to the NSM motto, which is still in use today, “a party duty was not 
sought after but offered”739 and the NSM activists were supposed to work for 
nothing but Allah’s blessings (Allah rızası).  
                                                            
737 As shall be seen this is exactly what happened in Kayseri. The interviewees reported similar 
incidents that took place in various other districts. However, Emre argues that only in three districts 
there were such problems, Çorum, Sakarya and Hatay, where he had to “punish” the troublemakers 
(notice that he does not mention Kayseri). Interview with Süleyman Arif Emre, İstanbul, January 30, 
2007. Only in four districts, Kocaeli, Manisa, Trabzon and İzmir, where there were either too many 
candidates or where all candidates refused to be ranked in the first place that the primaries took 
place. 
738 It should be added that the Executive Committee’s power over the parliamentarians’ political 
future did not necessarily translate itself into actual gains in policy making, especially if it 
concerned a man of religion or a Nur student. The latter was among those who fervently opposed the 
coalition with the RPP and later on became one of the 14 NSP parliamentarians who refused to put 
his candidacy in 1977 elections following the Amnesty crisis.  
739 “Görev istenmez verilir”. Erbakan’s recent “coup” within the Felicity Party against a young 
leader, Numan Kurtulmuş, who had refused to act under his authority, has been justified with the 
exact same words. Kurtulmuş and his friends would later (November 2010) establish a new party 
claiming to have a left-Islamist outlook: The Voice of the People Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi). 
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6.3.2 Reproduction of Organizational and Ideational Institutions at the 
Local Level 
This subsection examines how and why the NSM local activists embraced 
such organizational and ideational institutions that weakened them in their 
interactions with the party leaders. As Offerlé’s review of the question of oligarchic 
tendencies in organizations demonstrates, centralization of power at the hands of a 
small group of leaders is not a “faith” of political parties in general and the Islamist 
movements in particular. It depends on the distribution of available political, social 
and symbolic resources among the leaders and the activists and between these two 
groups.740 “The resources that the leaders have in their disposal are likely to 
become devalued and their authority may be challenged.”741 Similarly, the activists 
may increase their political experience, economic and political capital in time, 
depending on environmental factors around the movement and individuals. They 
could then challenge the party elites and/or leave the party, as would be the case for 
the NSM in 2002. Consequently, it is imperative to study why and how the local 
leaders and activists contributed to the maintenance of a highly centralized system 
at a particular juncture at the NSM history. Through such an analysis, focusing on 
the local level of politics, one would shed light upon how the pro-coalitionists elites 
defeated their elite rivals in the early 1970s and later consolidated their dominance 
within the NSM without falling into the trap of structural determinism and 
ideational essentialism. 
Inquiring the oligarchic tendencies within party organizations, Panebianco 
asks the following question echoing the problematic of the present subsection:  
“What is it that makes the leader-follower exchange so unequal as to assure the 
leaders not only participation but also …widest possible freedom of movement?”742 
While this subsection agrees with Panebianco’s answer to this question, that is “a 
low substitutability of organizational incentives,”743 for the individual activists, it 
also provides correctives both to the question and the answer: the NSM case shows 
that the production and stability of a centralized decision-making structure is a 
question of not only vertical exchange relations between the party leadership and 
                                                            
740 Offerlé,  53-56. 
741 Ibid., 56.  
742 Panebianco, 31. 
743 Ibid. 
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the individual activists but also horizontal exchange relationships at the local level. 
It is argued that the NSM local activists did not passively embrace the centralized 
decision making structure that empowered the party leadership, because, 
individually, they heavily depended on the redistribution of the incentives by the 
party center. They themselves contributed to and reproduced the centralized 
decision making structure and the NSM ideational elements that supported this 
structure in order to sustain the movement at the local level to carry out activist and 
electoral mobilization efforts.  
Based on the fieldwork research in Kayseri but also interviews with party 
activists and elites from other districts, this subsection will study, first, the 
horizontal interactions that reproduced the intraparty institutions at the local level. 
Second, it will tackle the vertical exchange relations as a factor in the expansion of 
leadership prerogatives drawing on Panebianco’s insight. 
To begin with, at the local level, the organizational and ideational elements 
of the NSM prevented intraparty competition and helped to generate, aggregate and 
channel individual resources to sustain the movement. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
the majority of the NSM activists were young men with limited social, economic 
and political capital in both relative and absolute terms.  The NSM organizational 
and ideational institutions prevented the waste of their already scarce resources in 
an intraparty competition against each other. The transfer of decisional powers to 
the center helped them to bring together their resources to work against their rivals 
in the electoral arena and to recruit further activists and gain sympathizers. 
Everyone would contribute to the electoral and mobilization efforts for “Allah’s 
blessings” and in the name and for the benefit of the nation, through providing 
various forms of resources. Most would give their time, labor and energy travelling 
from one village to another, organizing meetings and conferences, doing paperwork 
and engaging in face-to-face recruitment within the social networks that they 
belonged ranging from business circles to their villages of origin.744 Moreover, few 
                                                            
744 Electoral campaigns carried with scarce resources bonded them with each other and with the 
NSM cause further: “This is much more enjoyable and sincere than a service carried out with 
money. You stop by on the side of the road, you buy a bread and some tomatoes, ate them drinking 
water from the spring. And you think: why am I here, I am not a candidate, I do not get anything. 
But [I am here] for Allah’s sake. As Erbakan says, the country need to progress materially and 
morally.” Interview with KayNS10, Kayseri, August 15, 2006. 
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formal and informal elites/founders of the party also contributed materially.745 They 
lent their cars to the service of the party and made substantial money donations to 
be spent for electoral campaign and daily expenses of the party such as telephone, 
rent, heating and office supplies etc.  
In addition, repudiation of intraparty competition had a self-reinforcing 
character. It helped to expand the NSM networks and to reproduce the symbolic 
boundaries that separated the activists from the rest. Since the potential NSM 
activists were quite critical of the intraparty competition within the JP, which had 
excluded them from local and national politics in the first place, the centralized 
structure and identity frames facilitated the participation of the new activists. Once 
the activists entered the NSM, the consistency of the practice with the identity 
frames helped further to differentiate themselves from others and reinforced their 
collective bonds. Consequently, it can be argued that the NSM activists did not only 
passively accept the party’s organizational structure and ideational elements 
because they were resource-poor vis-à-vis the leadership, but also actively 
reproduced them in order to sustain collective action at the local level. 
Nevertheless, Panebianco’s emphasis on vertical exchange relationship 
between the party leadership and the local activists to explain the degree of freedom 
of action party leaders also holds true. Without such a relationship that materially 
and symbolically connected the local networks with the political arena, the 
collective action at the local level would have remained purposeless. Panebianco 
categorizes the incentives that organizations redistribute to its activists and 
members into collective (incentives related to the party goals) and selective ones 
(material and status incentives).746 While he also makes a distinction between 
“believers” (seekers of collective incentives) and “careerists” (seekers of material 
and status incentives) without attributing any normative judgment, he, however, 
emphasizes that these are analytical distinctions. Most activists have access to or 
seek out both types of incentives, though in varying degrees and extents.747 
Panebianco, then, argues that if the party activists lacked  “alternative sources of 
                                                            
745 Considering the fact that most NSM activists were self-employed small-shop owners, their labor 
and time should also be counted as indirect material contributions. However, since contributors of 
material goods also provided their time and labor, this material aspect of rank and file input were not 
necessarily visible. 
746 Panebianco, 24.  
747 Ibid., 25-30. 
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remuneration” (selective incentives) and/or if “the party is a “community of fate,” 
“a community defined by a specific identity that has no equivalent in the external 
market” (collective incentives), then one should expect them to continue to remain 
within the collectivity as activists.748 They would not thus opt for voicing their 
discontent or leaving the party.749  
As far as the distribution of collective incentives is concerned, the 
leadership is expected to act in their choice of political strategies, policies, allies, 
and the like in accordance with the declared party goals. If they fail to do so the 
boundaries between the party and its rivals may be blurred or the efficiency frames 
may no longer resonate among the activists. The NSM elites did not have such 
concerns until the NSP entered into the parliament as during the electoral campaign 
and party building period their practices and discourses were geared towards future. 
However, once in the parliament, the elites had to walk a tight rope to protect their 
legitimacy and organizational stability in the face of changing environmental 
conditions. Specifically, the party had to act upon immediate challenges; the phase 
of future promises had passed. On the one hand, the party goals, or collective action 
frames and identity become realistic and plausible only if they are “accompanied by 
an indication of the means to be used” to reach them.750 On the other hand, the 
party leaders could choose only those paths, or strategies, which would not 
endanger the stability, or survival of the organization itself within the environments 
the party operates. This, in turn, means that the leadership should often “align” the 
strategies with the declared goals of the party. Thus, the strategies need to be 
framed and perceived as “intermediate steps” towards the ultimate ends.751 
 In the case of the NSM in the early 1970s, all party elites acted carefully 
not to appear as competing against each other, and as mentioned above, tried to 
enforce the NSM motto to prevent intraparty competitions at the local level. They 
thus tried to be embodiments of a new generation of politicians. However, as the 
question of coalition with the RPP appeared on the horizon and the two opponent 
groups of party elites were crystallized over the issue, the pro-coalitionists aligned 
                                                            
748 Ibid., 31. 
749 For a discussion on the options of “voice” and “exit” for organizational members see Albert O. 
Hirschmann, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970) 
750 Panebianco, 41. 
751 Ibid., 16-17. 
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their arguments and strategies with the party frames and identity much more 
successfully than their opponents. They were thus able to frame the coalition 
government as a step towards the fulfillment of the NSM ends and compatible with 
the NSM identity. 
The pro-coalitionists had a) put the survival of the NSM into focus; b) 
invoked the responsibility that fell upon the shoulders of the NSM members to 
bring an end to the government crisis in the name of the “Muslim nation”; c) 
framed the coalition with the RPP as a sign of altruism in the face of attacks from 
the right wing networks; and d) reflected a strong confidence in the capabilities of 
the NSM activists in governing the country on an equal footing with the RPP. The 
local activists, in turn, except may be for those who had been entrenched in pre-
NSM organizations752, had a) endured the difficulties of party closure, 
reestablishment of the party, and electoral campaign, b) materially, symbolically 
and exclusively invested in the party activities, c) emotionally and behaviorally put 
distance between themselves and other members of the right wing networks753 and 
agreed to the compatibility of the NSM diagnostic elements with that of the RPP754 
and finally d) been empowered by the NSM action frames and identity that 
portrayed the activists as embodiments of historical qualities of the Muslim and 
Turkish nation capable of bringing not only moral but also material development.  
 Consequently, the local activists perceived the pro-coalitionist arguments 
and proposed strategies as well aligned with the NSM goals and identity. Most 
important, compared to the anti-coalitionist attitude, that refused to take 
responsibility and advised “wait and see” strategy, the pro-active position adopted 
by the pro-coalitionist reinforced the activists’ attachment to the NSM goals and 
                                                            
752 It should be noted that it is very probable that among those who had double memberships (in the 
NSM and another Islamist organization such as the Nur students), some, if not most, should have 
disengaged from their previous institutions. Further research is needed in districts where the Nur 
student candidates had won the elections under the NSP banner but than lost some of their votes in 
the following elections when the Nur students withdrew their candidacies.  
753 It should be added that notwithstanding the growing gap with the right wing networks, some 
activists also kept their emotional distance with the RPP. However, even these activists would 
remain loyal to the party despite the coalition, though may be changing their level and type of 
involvement. Such discontented influential local activists were called to Ankara following the 
establishment of coalition for face-to-face talks. Interview with KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 
2007. 
754 As shall be remembered these similarities enabled the NSM activists to show that they were not 
“reactionaries.” As a matter of fact, following the local elections of 1973, even before the RPP-NSP 
government was formed, the local NSM activists established a coalition with the RPP in the 
municipal council against the JP.  
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collective identity, thus to the party. After all, as Panebianco puts it, “[o]ne cannot 
identify with a “cause” if there are not at least credible proposals as to the paths to 
be taken for their realization.”755 
As for the issue of selective incentives, the NSM altruism and solidarity had 
also its limits. The NSM activists, particularly its local elites, were not immune to 
the attraction of moral and material rewards and sanctions that party politics could 
provide. As the NSP began immersing into the political arena, first through the 
general elections of 1973 and then following its entry to the parliament selective 
incentives became both visible and substantial. The local NSM elites, who had long 
been denied access to such political goods as parliamentary candidacies (or seats), 
positions in (and candidacies for) local Assemblies, jobs in the public agencies, 
bank credits, government contracts, executive seats in the local branch of a 
parliamentary party756, respect from local state officials and party executives, first, 
were promised and then, did enjoy these benefits of party politics.757  
Given that the NSP was a new and small party, both material and status 
incentives it could distribute were quite limited. For instance, a rank and file 
activist, a small workshop-owner, who wanted to buy raw “corner iron” from 
Karabük Iron and Steel Factory, discovered that while his turn in the waiting list 
still had to come, a prominent NSM activist had already bought his need of iron 
thanks to his status.758 However, this does not exclude the fact that some rank and 
file, could, or they thought that they could, acquire help from or through the local 
elites, in case of a financial, bureaucratic or health problem. Be that as it may, given 
the restrictions of the party center in redistributing selective incentives, they had to 
rely more on collective incentives to ensure the loyalty of the activists. 
                                                            
755 Panebianco, 41. 
756 On issues relating to material and status incentives, the local elites were careful not to mention 
material ones. Information regarding such issues either slipped accidentally or provided by some 
other local elite or activist. As for the status incentives, such as official and/or party seats almost all 
activists denied previous knowledge of their own pending candidacies, affirming the fact that such 
seats were in fact political goods. Even through being a candidate an activist’s religiosity, good 
personal and business ethics would be recognized. Even in case of defeat at the polls,  he would 
have a secure place in the local administration, establish ties with the central elites and increase his 
social capital in the local networks.  
757 While most local party leaders in Kayseri had access to one or more of these political goods, 
most local party leaders emphasized the respect and status they had gained through the NSM 
activism. Since, everyone had seen what these religious men with good morals and education were 
capable of, the religious men were treated much more respectfully compared to the period when 
they were insulted as “takunyacı.”  
758 Interview with KayNS11, Kayseri, September 17, 2007. 
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Consequently, the ideational elements of the party had to acquire a new function 
during this period: dissimulating the distribution of selective incentives, whose 
“excessive visibility could compromise the image of the party as an organization 
dedicated to a “cause…”759 
Finally, before discussing shortly how the pro-coalition elites took 
advantage of the party institutions to advance their cause, a snapshot from local 
party politics in Kayseri between 1972-1973,760 which illustrates not only how the 
Executive Committee dominated the formation of the local executive committee 
and selection of the parliamentary candidates, but also the interplay of collective 
and selective incentives.761 In 1972, most of the founders of the NOP had first 
refrained from engaging in the new party building activities. Those Executive 
Committee members who had connections with Kayseri, together with some local 
“brave” ex-NOP activists, had convinced the director of the local Advanced 
Institute of Islam (“the Director”) to reorganize the NSM networks and to become 
the party’s leading candidate in the district. Few months later, however, the 
Executive Committee called the NOP’s behind the scenes local founder in Kayseri, 
who was then residing for business in Adana.762 As a longtime material and 
symbolic contributor to the NSM, unlike the Director, a member of a “native” 
Kayseri family, and having strong ties with various members of the Executive 
Committee763, he took over the local administration from the official 
entrepreneurial committee and created his own team bringing back to the scene the 
ex-local leaders. Since both men had heavily invested in the party (“the Director” 
had been pressured to quit his prestigious and well paying job to lead the party 
activities) a bitter dispute over the ordering of the party list ensued. The dispute 
between the supporters of the two candidates came to an end when the Executive 
Committee, as a punishment, imposed a new candidate, Cemal Cebeci, a well now 
                                                            
759 Panebianco, 24. Panebianco uses the term ideology. During the 1970s, the ideational elements 
were not yet openly used to “dignify and rationalize” individual achievements in the name of 
advancing party’s goals. They were nevertheless implied in the conversations with the national party 
elites. Panebianco, 25 
760 Similar incidents happened in 1973 local elections and in 1977 general elections. 
761 As these mechanisms, processes and events were narrated by almost all the interviewees involved 
in the local party activities with only slight differences stemming from where they stood in power 
games, no specific references to interviewees is provided here. 
762 It seems that the director of the Institute was too headstrong and short of material and symbolic 
resources to carry out an electoral campaign. Not only he was a “peasant,” not a native, but also his 
only revenue was the compensation he got when he resigned from his job to become a candidate.  
763 His brother was one of the official national founders of the NOP. 
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man of religion both in Kayseri and in Ankara. It seems the party center forced the 
disputing candidates to convince him to put his candidacy, as he was unwilling to 
engage in politics. Cebeci shared certain similarities with the Director. He was not a 
native of a Kayseri but a “peasant” from a subdistrict of Kayseri (Develi) and an 
ex-director of the local Prayer Leader and Preacher School (he was at the time 
working in the State Department of Planning). Through his appointment, the 
Executive Committee calmed down the supporters of the Director, who had been 
outraged by the injustice inflicted upon him.764 The Executive Committee also 
seemingly punished its own candidate as well who seemed too eager for the first 
rank. However, at the end it punished the outspoken Director even more placing 
him on the third rank and his rival on the second. In so doing, the NSP national 
executives reemphasized altruism and solidarity within the NSM through their 
actions.765 While they put emphasis on the goals of the movement, not individual 
incentives, they also showed the boundaries of unaccepted behavior to their very 
own “client(s)”.766 
6.3.3 Gaining over the NSM: the Triumph of the Pro-coalitionists 
This subsection discusses how the pro-coalitionist elites, or the Erbakan 
group, used the existing party dynamics first to establish a coalition with the RPP 
and then to maintain the activist support during the second phase of the anti-
coalitionist attack, that is the question of the Amnesty, during and following the 
coalition. In both cases, the pro-coalition elites were able to exert control over the 
“zones of uncertainty:” they relied on their real and perceived political 
“competences” first as the Chairman and members of the Chairman Council and 
then as heads of the Parliamentary Group and members of the cabinet; thanks to 
their position(s), they developed contacts with the party’s environment, controlled 
                                                            
764 Cemal Cebeci was a man of religion and was among those who fervently opposed the coalition 
with the RPP. Most of the interviewees, though respected him highly, were relieved to see him go, 
as they did not believe he was cut for being parliamentarian (or politics): he was mainly a man of 
religion.   
765 The NSM newspaper even published a news about how the three candidates were working 
together as brothers in arms for the electoral campaign. “MSP Kayseri’de büyük bir hızla gelişiyor,” 
Milli Gazete, September 12, 1973.  
766 In 1987, local Kayseri executives showed first signs of their future “emancipation” from the grip 
of the NSM elites.  Led by their chair, local leaders warned the Executive Committee about their 
previous mistakes on insisting upon “their own men,” which had cost them votes in both 1973 and 
1977 general elections. This time, the Committee would accept the local branch’s ordering of 
candidates. Kayseri would fail to send a representative because of the national threshold.  
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the party finances, communicated their ideas and information to the party activists, 
and manipulated certain written and unwritten rules to their advantage. Needless to 
say, their previously active role in the recruitment of the local activists and 
parliamentarians facilitated their job.767 
First, during the three months before the public coalition talks with the RPP 
started, the pro-coalitionists took advantage of their position within the Chairman 
Council. Since, Erbakan group had not yet been crystallized as pro-coalitionists 
when rumors, ideas and/or scenarios of possible coalition alternatives, including an 
RPP-NSP coalition had begun to circulate; the Executive Committee members (the 
Nur students as well), did not hesitate to assign the Chairman and his council the 
task of leading talks with other political parties.768 From October 29, 1973, when 
Erbakan first met Ecevit, to January 9, 1974769, when the Parliamentary Group 
approved the coalition with the RPP, all public and behind the scenes negotiations 
with other political parties were carried out by the members of the Chairman 
Council.  
As the Erbakan group transformed into pro-coalitionists, the group around 
Erbakan took advantage of this transfer of power through establishing direct 
communication lines within and outside the party.770 During their extra- and intra-
party interactions they did not necessarily inform the Executive Committee about 
the developments. Specifically, first, during the two joint meetings of local party 
chairmen, the Parliamentary Group and the Executive Committee in October 23 
and November 5 (few days before and after the RPP’s first official offer); the 
Erbakan group observed that relatively few local elites categorically opposed a 
coalition with the RPP.771 Most left the issue to the trusted hands of the Executive 
Committee.772 
                                                            
767 For a detailed discussion on “zones of uncertainty,” which are vital activity areas of a political 
party, see Panebianco, 33-36. 
768 “MSP CHP’den teklif bekliyor,” Milliyet, October 23, 1973. 
769 By this date, the anti-coalitionist members of the Parliamentary Group and the Executive 
Committee gave up and were involved in coalition negotiations. Sevilgen, MSP’de, 79. 
770 Since their relations with extra-party actors had already been discussed here the focus is on 
intraparty interactions. 
771 It seems the local leaders demanded convincing arguments to be able to defend their position to 
their constituencies and political opponents at their local networks. 
772 While the anti-coalitionists argue that those local chairmen who spoke during the meetings 
opposed the coalition, two surveys published in the daily Milliyet and Asiltürk’s statement published 
in Milli Gazete demonstrate that the pro-coalitionist believed that the local elites would follow the 
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Second, following the Executive Committee meeting of November 21, 
where the Council members had revealed their pro-coalition tendencies and the 
Executive Committee members ranked the RPP coalition as the least desirable 
strategy; until January 9, 1974, the Chairman summoned the Executive Committee 
only once, to discuss the result of local elections. When the Executive Committee 
met in January 10, public negotiations with the RPP were well underway. The 
Executive Committee simply approved the ongoing process. In contrast, having 
faced a strong opposition within the Executive Committee, the Erbakan group of 
the Council and their handful of allies within the Executive Committee and the 
Parliamentary Group organized seven meetings (as Parliamentary Group meetings) 
from 12 December to January 9.They were encouraged by how the 
parliamentarians, unlike the Executive Committee members, upgraded the option of 
coalition above early general elections in the Parliamentary Group meeting of 
November 27.773   In the last meeting of January 9, when most anti-coalitionist 
elites in the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Group were in pilgrimage, 
the Erbakan group finally got the approval vote for engaging in writing a coalition 
protocol with the RPP.774  
The anti-coalitionists claimed that it was the Executive Committee’s 
prerogative to approve such an engagement.775 However, there was not much they 
could do. Legally, the Parliamentary Group was legally entitled to take binding 
decisions on matters of motion of confidence. Politically, the rest of the Committee 
members had already shifted their allegiance to the pro-coalitionists who had 
obtained both the parliamentarians and local activists’ backing. Symbolically, since 
the talks with the RPP had already begun on January 11 and there were not at all 
                                                                                                                                                                     
suit of the Executive Committee. See, Sevilgen, MSP’de, 60; “Ecevit  Erbakan Görüşmesi Bugün,” 
Milli Gazete, October 30, 1973; “MSP örgütü ne düşünüyor?” Milliyet, October 23, 1973; “MSP İl 
başkanları ne diyor?” Milliyet, November 11, 1973. It should be noted that Milliyet could not talk 
with all local chairmen. Plus, some of the latter have changed their positions from anti-coalition to 
pro-coalition, as was the case in Kayseri. Finally, the headings of the Milliyet do not reflect the 
content of the news piece, which unlike the subtitles show the activists would support whatever the 
Executive Committee decided.  
773 Sevilgen, MSP’de, 73-80. 
774 38 individuals attended the meeting. There were 35 parliamentarians (among them probably 
some senators) and three non-parliamentary and nine parliamentary Executive Committee members. 
Thus, out of 26 Executive Committee members only 12 were present. Four of the latter cast a no 
vote. Sevilgen, MSP’de, 79-80. 
775 For the two petitions written to the Chairman, see Sevilgen, MSP’de, 80-85. 
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uproars in the local branches776, any move against Erbakan and his group on the 
part of the anti-coalitionists would appear as a divisive act and their motives would 
be questioned.777 It should be added that, Hüsrev Altınbaşak, the leader of the most 
powerful Nur student group facing Yeni Asya, specifically requested from the Nur 
students within the NSM “not to divide the Muslims” at this particular juncture.778 
Finally, during the Second General Congress of the party, on November 17, 
1974, just few days after the end of the coalition, the pro-coalitionists maintained 
their seats against their rivals.779 The anti-coalitionists had gained some ground 
against their rivals throughout the coalition, as they had vehemently opposed to the 
inclusion of the left-wing prisoners to the pending Amnesty Law. To say the least, 
they were able to convince 22 parliamentarians to vote for the opposition’s version 
of the Law that excluded the left.  
However, the pro-coalitionists, relying on above discussed organizational 
and ideational properties managed to defeat the anti-coalitionists list in the 
congress. It is pertinent to show how as they continued to prevail over their various 
intra-party opponents until today. Accordingly, since the Council members 
controlled intraparty information channels, before the congress, the Erbakan group 
could learn and potentially take measures against the activities of the opponent 
leaders and local activists.780 The opposition leaders would thus produce an 
alternative Executive Committee list almost at the last minute and present it to the 
delegates during the Congress.781 During such a short period, not only the internal 
opposition would not find the opportunity to deepen their communication with the 
delegates but also at the symbolic level their relative secrecy would create 
                                                            
776 Sevilgen complained that just because the NSP leaders had sought a coalition with the RPP, most 
of the local executives, even those who had been enemies of the RPP and left-wing views, came to 
sympathize with the RPP and even supported the Amnesty for the left-wing activists. Sevilgen, 
MSP’de, 265. 
777 Tevfik Paksu, echoing the anti-coalitionists the researcher interviewed, wrote that he agreed to 
the coalition just not to divide the party. 
778 Interview with Hüsamettin Akmumcu, Isparta, August 15, 2007. 
779 The anti-coalitionists would make their final move in the Third General Congress of the party in 
October 24, 1976. Their faith would be the same and 14 prominent members of this group would be 
indirectly led to quit the party. For this period see Sevilgen, MSP’de, 209-222; 231-245. 
780 In fact two interviewees explained how they informed the Chairman Council members regarding 
the preparation of the opposition. Interviews with KayNS10, Kayseri, August 15, 2006 and 
KayNS4, Kayseri, September 20, 2006. 
781 Sevilgen, MSP’de, 162-163;   
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suspicions about their “real intentions.”782 Under the light of the NSM collective 
identity based on altruism and solidarity, their actions would appear as disloyal, 
divisive and ambitious. The incumbent elites, in turn, would not miss the 
opportunity to equate their opposition to “Byzantine conspiracies” (Bizans 
entrikası).783 
Be that as it may, almost all anti-coalitionist leaders of the NSM and those 
interviewed Kayseri NSM members who had left active party work for various 
reasons (ranging from the Amnesty issue to personal disputes), remained within the 
NSM networks. As one interview recounts, Cemal Cebeci, a fierce opponent of 
Erbakan had said: “This cause cannot be achieved with Erbakan [at the leadership], 
but it cannot survive either without Erbakan.”784 This statement, more than 
anything, under the appearance of personalizing politics, reveals actually the power 
and success of the NSM organization and ideational elements in building a new 
Islamist network, identity and goals and producing political goods, which kept 
these dissidents in the party networks despite the continuing rule of “Erbakan” and 
his group. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Focusing on the emergence of the RPP-NSP coalition, a snapshot from 
everyday political engagements of the NSM, the chapter sought to answer to 
interrelated questions: a) why did the NSM as a pragmatic Islamist movement 
differed from other Islamists movements which vehemently opposed this coalition? 
; b) how does an Islamist movement make its decisions with regard to policy, 
strategy and allies in the political arena which then appears as the acts of a unified 
body?  
This chapter proposed, first, that macro-political factors unfold at the 
movement level through horizontal and vertical intra-movement power relations, 
which are in turn marked by organizational and ideational institutions. Second, 
                                                            
782 As one interviewee succinctly puts it opposition to the party leadership in a congress was all 
about preparation beforehand. Interview with KayNS17, Kayseri, September 6, 2006. 
783 Interview with RNelder1, May 15, 2008. Incidentally, “Byzantian conspiracies” has been a 
popular term in the political arena, indicating “dirty and obscure games.” It was based on the belief 
that Byzantium came to an end due to such internal games of power.  
784 Interview with KayNS8, September 14, 2006. 
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micro-level properties of the elites and activists play a role not only in their 
interpretation of the macro-level constraints and opportunities but also in their use, 
maintenance and reproduction of meso-level institutions.  Third, it is through a 
longitudinal look that one can discern the characteristics of movement level factors 
and the pre- and post-NSM identities and interests of the movement members.  
Drawing upon this perspective, it is argued that the NSM was organized as a 
political party and as such was constrained by rules and power relations of the 
competitive electoral field and the parliamentary politics. However, the divergent 
structural position of two groups of NSM elites vis-à-vis the movement’s 
environment and the latent power struggle between the groups that dated back to 
early days of the mobilization led to their opposing interpretations of the existing 
opportunities and constraints. The pro-coalitionist group prevailed over their rivals. 
They had gained the support of the majority of the activists, capitalized on highly 
centralized decision making system and, thanks to their exclusive commitment and 
investment to the NSM, better aligned their arguments with the movement’s 
ideational products. Their rivals contested the organizational and ideational features 
of the movement halfheartedly; to avoid exposing themselves further as power-
seekers. The activists, aside occasional complains, reproduced them since having 
limited resources they needed these institutions a) to sustain mobilization at the 
local level and b) to access the collective and selective political goods generated at 
the national level. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Focusing on the Nizam/Selamet Movement from mid-1960s through the 
1970s, this essay sought an answer to the question of how and why there are 
variations in the political engagement patterns of the “moderate” Islamist 
movements, which agree to play “the game in town.” The dissertation also aimed at 
highlighting a relatively less studied period of Islamist activism, which set the stage 
for major Islamist mobilizations of the 1980s and 1990s and produced the most 
powerful political actors of today: the Justice and Development Party and the 
Fethullah Gülen Movement. This conclusion presents an overview of the research 
findings and a  discussion on their implications for future research. 
7.1 An Overview 
Unlike its contemporaries and its predecessors, which engaged in and with 
the political arena, directly, through existing right wing political parties and, 
indirectly, through grassroots mobilization and organization, the NSM established a 
political party, entered institutional politics and successfully became one of the 
major players of the political field. 
 In an attempt to understand why the NSM differed from its contemporaries 
and its predecessors, the essay studied in separate chapters the emergence of its 
entrepreneurs, the networks from which it recruited its activists, the formation of its 
symbolic boundaries and finally its routine political practices around its coalition-
making with the RPP. These aspects of the movement, which corresponded to both 
form and content of its political engagement patterns and which displayed 
concurrent and sequential phases of its organizational and symbolic 
institutionalization and consolidation, aimed at answering the research question 
through three interrelated steps. 
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First, studying each aspect or stage of movement activity separately in 
relation to its surrounding environments revealed that macro perspectives, 
particularly center-periphery approach, prove to be inadequate to explain why the 
entrepreneurs of an Islamist movement emerge in the first place, why the incipient 
movement establish or seek to establish a particular organization type, determine its 
primary area of movement activity, how it produces its ideational elements and 
finally how the movement, as a collective actor act and interact with and react to 
the institutions and actors of the political field. Through rendering the center and 
the periphery homogenous and ahistorical, though in different ways depending on 
emphasis on cultural or socio-economic cleavages, these perspectives proved to be 
unable even to ask these questions.  
Second, opening the black box of an Islamist movement and studying it 
from various angles descending and ascending the ladder of abstraction reveals the 
multi-variant, complex and intertwined nature of macro-, meso- and micro-level 
factors that are at play in the making of both the movement and its political 
practices. The NSM case has shown that each stage of the movement activity 
constituted an aspect of the movement that differentiated it from its counterparts. 
These, in turn, were produced through various and changing configurations of 
existing opportunities and constraints at the national and local levels of politics 
(macro factors), the structure and dynamics of the existing or movement generated 
intra- and extra-movement networks, and organizations (meso-level factors) and the 
micro-properties of the movement elites and activists.   
Finally, studying these features and phases of the NSM not only 
synchronically but also diachronically in each chapter demonstrated that the 
outcomes of movement activity at one phase affect the others. The factors that 
produce a group of Islamist movement entrepreneurs, the properties of the activists 
that a movement could recruit, the chosen organization type, the collective action 
frames and identity that the activists produce determine the available intra-
movement symbolic and material resources. They, in turn, interact with 
environmental factors to influence each other and the choice of policies, strategies 
and allies in everyday politics. 
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As far as the specific question of why and how the NSM showed variances 
in its political engagement patterns, that is in its primary area of movement activity, 
goals, identity, policies, choice of strategies and allies; this essay claims that as a 
whole, the NSM’s differences reflected above all the field within which the NSM 
was born: the political field as an autonomous area of action and interaction.  
Specifically, on the one hand, the NSM entrepreneurs were crystallized 
within the political field. Having failed to find an outlet to influence polity, they 
were constrained to establish a party of their own to tap into state controlled 
resources they had been progressively denied. They sought their potential activists 
in the political field as well; first trying to mobilize the JP dominated right wing 
networks at the local level. The potential activists, however, were found not in the 
periphery per se, but in the “periphery of the periphery,” or those young men at the 
beginning of their social and professional carreers. The existing local political 
structure had marginalized them providing with no or limited access to the ties that 
connected the center and the periphery.  
 On the other hand, the NSM ideational products and the “mundane” 
political practices, that is the content of their political activities, were marked by the 
organizational form the movement adopted (a political party) and the constraints 
and opportunities that players and doxa of the national level of party politics 
presented. The latter interacted with both the micro-properties of the NSM actors 
and the obstacles and advantages that “Muslimness” of the right wing networks 
presented. The outcome was a set of cultural products and practices that not only 
rendered the NSM a distinct political and Islamist player but also articulated both 
the NSM amd its members to the political arena. 
The NSM’s double character that stemmed from being both a social 
movement and a party that differentiated it form its counterparts reflected not only 
the scarcity of resources its elites and activists commanded but also the complex 
nature of the political field. In a political arena where elections, free and 
competitive, but meta-rules and players of the game restrictive and occasionally 
extremely repressive, in order to open a space for itself and sustain its mobilization, 
the NSM needed to oscillate between its two “personalities.” As a social movement 
it needed to produce and maintain those collective action frames and identity that 
 271 
 
made the NSM a challenge to other players of the game and to the regime. It was 
through these ideational elements that the NSM created strong intra-movement 
bonds and sharply differentiated itself from other Islamists and political players. 
Moreover, having such social movement qualities as solidarity, altruism, identity 
work, network building and contentious politics enabled the NSM to survive in 
“abeyance” and resist state pressure and even to capitalize on it to open new 
political parties when the old ones were closed. In order to remain in the game as a 
political party, it needed to reproduce, on the one hand, the democratic credentials 
of the regime and its own through acting responsibly, for instance establishing 
alliances even with its archenemies. On the other hand, it needed reproduce the 
regime’s and its own authoritarian features as well, redrawing the red lines of the 
polity which pushed the Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, and left-wing players out of 
the institutional politics. 
7.2 Implications for Further Research 
The findings of the research on the mechanism and dynamics of both 
Islamist movement making and political participation patterns may contribute to 
further research in the following areas.  
To begin with, studying the NSM case revealed a certain research lacuna 
that could not be covered in this essay but can be carried out later separately. First, 
the peculiarities of the Yeni Asya’s idetational and organizational institutions need 
to be studied further in detail from the 1960s through the 1990s. This would help to 
trace the continuties and ruptures both within these institutions and the movements’ 
political engagement patterns. It would also help to understand the divergences and 
divisions within the greater Nur student movement as well. 
From the 1980s through the 2000s Yeni Asya experienced a relative decline 
having failed to enlarge its networks and to increase its financial and symbolic 
assets with the same rate as the Fethullah Gülen movement. Gülen movement had 
previously been a Nur student branch from İzmir among many other branches and 
had, at least nominally, accepted Yeni Asya’s authority. While it showed signs of 
further autonomy by the mid-1970s, it was in the early 1980s that the movement 
declared its “independence” through refusing to side by the now defunct JP (now 
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organized under Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path Party)785 together with Yeni Asya 
and then through supporting (or remaining silent to) the military coup. Following 
the coup of 1980, despite the marginalization of the JP networks786 Yeni Asya 
elders had decided to continue their alliance with “the JP”. Moreover, unlike their 
previous attitude during the military intervention of 1971, they had openly 
condemned the coup. Gülen movement further severed ties from the Nur elders 
during the February 28 process, when once again, unlike Yeni Asya, avoided to 
defy military and civil authorities. By the 2000s, Gülen movement became a 
transnational movement controlling billion dollars worth global network of 
highschools, universities, charities, hospitals, publication companies, endowments, 
newspapers, tv stations organized in countries from France to Mongolia, from the 
United States to Uganda.787 Today it is the major supporter and ally of the Justice 
Development Party788 (the JDP), and help the government to dismantle the formal 
and informal institutions that had so far guaranteed military’s political power.  
This short review of political engagement patterns of two movements points 
towards quite intriguing continuities and ruptures between Yeni Asya and Gülen 
movements and within each movement. For instance while, during the 1980s and 
1990s, Yeni Asya broke away from its pattern of allying with the largest 
mainstream right wing party and establishing good relations with the military, it 
was the Gülen movement which continued now decades old Nur tradition of 
“caution” (tedbir) to protect the grassroots activities. Why and how the Yeni Asya 
leaders took such “a risk” this time but not the Gülen movement?  Why and how 
Gülen movement decided to take “a risk” and support the JDP in its quest for 
democratic reforms today789, at this particular juncture in history? What were the 
                                                            
785 Like other political party leaders of the pre-1980 period, Demirel was also banned from politics 
until 1987. 
786 The new mainstream right wing party, the Trueland Party (Anavatan Partisi) which united once 
again all colors of the right wing as the JP had done back in the 1960s, came to power with a 
majority in 1983. 
787 The Nur student (previously controlled by Yeni Asya, now their control is divided between the 
splinter Yeni Nesil as well) networks abroad are limited to few European and Central Asian 
countries. 
788 Today ex-Yeni Asya leaders and networks support the JDP as well.  
789 It should be added that Gülen movement involvement in the “democratic cleansing” operation 
has been a subject of controversy within the political arena. Recently, the movement has been 
accused with “infiltrating” the state institutions such as the judiciary and the police forces and 
abusing the process to get rid of its political opponents. The movement in return argues that such 
accusations reflect the fear of those who have been losing their privileged status together with the 
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changes that “total institution” and formal organizations went through within Yeni 
Asya networks? Which aspects of the informal Nur student institutions that enabled 
the Gülen movement to become one of the most resourceful national and global 
religious movements? Which ones they needed to discard, develop and/or reshape 
along the process of enlargement and transnationalization? What are differences 
and similarities in their respective collective identities?  
  Second, the research findings on the Naqshbandi brotherhoods suggest that 
since the 1980s their networks and institutions may have underwent considerable 
changes related to several political, economic and technological macro 
developments and not yet studied certain meso and micro level factors. Not only 
the relationship between the master and his disciple but also between the 
brotherhoods and the politics seem to have changed. Since the 1980s, the 
Naqshbandi leaders have openly declared their political party preferences, 
established publication houses, TV channels and engaged in various business 
ventures. Thus, in many ways they have resembled the Nur student movements. 
However, unlike the Nur students, they seem to have failed in enlarging their 
networks and establishing nationwide informal and formal organizations. Further 
study on the development of the Naqshbandi networks during 1980s and the 1990s 
would provide further insight not only into the relationship between the political 
and religious fields of actions, but also into the variations among the religious 
movements. 
A third such potential area of novel research involves studying Islamist 
mobilizations in regions with deep ethnic and religious cleavages from the 1960s 
through the 1990s.790 Particularly, the “Kurdish question” is a major issue which 
has not only influenced the doxa of the political field since the inception of the 
Republic but also, so far, has directly influenced the lives of millions in the country 
and elsewhere through the political violence that revolved around the question. The 
Kurdish dimension (not only as a political question but also as Kurdish people who 
are the subjects and objects of various political, social, economic and cultural 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“ancien regime” and that the movement members have the right to become state employees as other 
citizens.   
790 There are two studies carried in metropolitan areas in the 1990s and 2000s where lines dividing 
social classes are more apparent. See White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey; Tuğal, Passive 
Revolution. 
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phenomena within Turkey and elsewhere in neighboring countries) could not be 
incorporated into the scope of this research for at least two major reasons. First, at 
the beginning of the research, as Hamit Bozarslan has put it, the region was still 
quite dangerous to carry out a research that covered both the Islamist and the 
Kurdish questions. These were the most sensitive issues of the period that could 
have directly put the researcher in harms way. Not only there were still “deep state 
forces” semi-autonomously operating in the Kurdish majority regions, but also 
Hizbullah, an Islamist Kurdish underground organization known by its executions 
of its political opponents and intellectuals, was still very active despite several 
arrests in the early 2000s.791 Second, the researcher did not have the resources to 
conduct research in more than one locality. It was Kayseri, rather than, say, 
Diyarbakır or Batman, that displayed greater “harmony” with the NSM center in 
terms of its ideational elements, activists’ properties and more than cordial 
relations. Despite its relative success throughout the years, the NSM’s mobilization 
within Kurdish majority regions and the NSM’s articulation of the regional interests 
into the political center has always been filled with tension. The NSM elites, more 
than once, easily sacrificed their Kurdish  activists, supporters and voters in the 
East to broaden their activist networks and increase their votes in Central Anatolia, 
to enter the Assembly or to become the part of a coalition government.  
Two future areas of research thus present themselves to incorporate the 
Kurdish dimension into the study of Islamist political engagement patterns. One 
involves studying the nature of formal and informal power relations, institutions 
and stakes of the political game at the local level to understand how ethnic factors 
have “realized” themselves within the context of NSM mobilizations from the 
1970s through the 1990s, a period when a new generation of Kurdish movement 
has grown. Such a study would highlight a) how and why the NSM (re)negotiated, 
(re)framed and (re)produced its collective identity and mobilization frames in the 
region and articulated the interests and demands of its Kurdish activists to the 
political center; and b) how and why the Kurds responded to the NSM despite its 
apparent emphasis on Turkishness at the national level, negotiated and reproduced 
                                                            
791 One should also add  PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) induced 
violence. 
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their individual and other salient collective identities, interests and demands within 
the movement. 
As far as the Kurdish question is concerned the other area of study that 
needs to be undertaken is based on certain findings of the fieldwork research that 
could not be incorporated into the essay and that needs to be tackled with further 
research. These findings concern the two Islamist movements that have engaged in 
systematic political violence: IBDA-C792 and above-mentioned Hizbullah793. These 
are the two major Islamist movements which had so far adopted violence as a 
political strategy in Turkey. Both are what the literature on Islamist movements 
considers “radical” Islamist movements that may or may not have connections to 
the global network of Al-Qaeda. Today the majority of their networks are in 
disarray following the arrests and deaths of their leaders and activists. Since they 
have rarely been subject to scholarly study,794 (given the difficulty of fieldwork 
research), very little is known as to their origins and developments. During the 
fieldwork research, the interviews and primary and secondary sources revealed that 
IBDA-C and Hizbullah have their origins in the NSM (i.e within the autonoumous 
Akıncı youth organization, but also in relation to Büyük Doğu intellectual tradition) 
and Nur students respectively. In other words, they were the byproducts of the 
“moderate” movements that have been studied in this essay. Both the NSM and the 
Nur students have historically been peaceful Islamist movements, which 
systematically shunned from violence except occasional instances of street violence 
that members of their networks were involved. Another initial finding on these 
radical movements is that their respective entrepreneurs, though emerging and 
operating at different levels of politics, originating from different socio-economic, 
cultural and political environments and mainstream movements and finally 
engaging in very different types of political violence and at different periods in 
their lifespan795 had following properties in common. The entrepreneurs of both 
                                                            
792 İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar-Cephesi (Islamic Great East Raiders-Front) 
793 The party of God. Because of the secrecy and horrors (tortures, buried bodies, use of acid against 
girls wearing skirts) surrounding Hizbullah, interviews revealed less information on this movement 
than IBDA-C. However, the existence of few journalistic studies and Grand National Assembly 
reports on Hizbullah enabled to highlight differences and similarities between the two movements. 
794 The only study that can be deemed scholarly is on Hizbullah, written by an experienced 
journalist-researcher specializing on Islamist movements. See Ruşen Çakır, Derin Hizbullah: 
İslamcı Şiddetin Geleceği (İstanbul: Metis Yayınevi, 2011). 
795 IBDA-C has engaged in violent politics later in its life span. They mostly planted bombs in urban 
areas. In contrast, Hizbullah, having developed in a violence ridden atmosphere, engaged in violence 
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movements emerged a) amidst an already well organized moderate Islamist 
movement and opposed not only the state but also and primarily initially the 
movement center; b) between 1979-1983; c) around literary activities (IBDA-C 
around the magazine Akıncı Güç in İstanbul and Hizbullah around Vahdet, İlim and 
Menzil Bookstores in Diyarbakır). While both movements’ leaders were of Kurdish 
ethnicity, or at least Kurdish being their native language and the movements 
themselves had “universalist” (Pan-Islamist) frames and identity and populated 
with activist of both Turkish and Kurdish origin. They  demanded equal treatment 
and rights for the Kurds and Turks as Muslim citizens and claimed that only in an 
Islamic state such equality can be provided. Nevertheless, the interviewees from 
different movements in Ankara, İstanbul and Kayseri,  have quite often accused 
Hizbullah and IBDA-C with Kurdish nationalism. 
The initial findings suggest that the emergence and development of these 
two groups towards political violence should be studied in relation to 1) the habitus 
of its activists and leaders, 2) the dynamics and institutions of the movement in 
which IBDA-C and Hizbullah entrepreneurs crystallized; not solely in relation to 
the larger political environment and state policies. Finally, the development of these 
movements needs to be studied from the “Kurdish question” perspective rather than 
as an “Islamist question”:  how the factors related to Kurdish issue unfolded in the 
micro-histories of the movement activists, the “parent” movement 
organizations/networks and in the political field interactively. 
Then, there are two broader research areas that the findings of the 
dissertation may contribute. Through including in the analysis, the origins and 
development of Islamist organizational and ideational peculiarities and the 
interaction between the two at various levels; the research on the “moderation” of 
Islamist movements would render its observations more accurate and its analyses 
more persuasive. The organizational and ideational institutions present collective 
and selective incentives and shape the way in which the movement activist invest in 
the movement. As such they bear an influence on how a movement in general, and 
its elites and activists in particular, behave on certain policy questions and 
strategies. It can be hypothesized that the more diverse the social and political 
                                                                                                                                                                     
quite early and adopted various forms. Their targets and thus violent acts cover a large range: 
individuals, state forces, PKK.  
 277 
 
institutions, and identities in which a movement and its activists invest (or allowed 
to invest) respectively, the more flexible they become in adapting to changes in 
their environment. In the case of the NSM elites, for instance, as they increasingly 
exclusively invested in their movement throughout the years, established strong 
bonds among each other during their shared ordeals under the oppression of two 
different coups in 1980 and in 1997 and finally gained complete autonomy even 
from their activists, they proved to be reluctant or slow to “moderate” even when 
they faced the challenge of young elites and when the polity was relatively 
liberalized. Despite the risk of serious loss of networks of activists and voters, the 
NSM elites, maintained the same decision-making structures and ideational 
elements. They thus contributed to the establishment of the JDP and recently, also 
The Voice of the People Party.   
Finally, the research suggests that in studying the democratization of the 
polity, or the relative openness of the political arena, the internal structures of the 
existing political parties play as important role as the changes in the electoral arena 
and in political freedoms. In other words, the political parties, to the extent that the 
states maintain their centralized nature and avoid decentralization of material and 
symbolic resources of the country; notwithstanding recent discussions on their 
“fall” in the eyes of the electorate and the overemphasis on the role of the civil 
society organizations; are potentially major outlets for political engagement for 
those who want and need to tap into these resources. In the analysis of the 
emergence of various social movements in the political arena, elucidating the 
relative openness or closeness of the political parties would increase one’s 
understanding of the stakes which lead the movement entrepreneurs and activists in 
engaging in contentious politics.  
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APPENDIX A 
A CHRONOLOGY (1960 – 1980) 
Table 1 
May 27, 1960 Intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri) 
May 30, 1960 24th Government of the Republic. Military cabinet chaired by Cemal Gürsel
June 1960  
The junta leaders sign the provisional 
constitution and forms the National 
Union Committee (the NUC) 
November 1960 The NUC oust its radicals including Alparslan Türkeş, the future NAP leader 
January 5, 1961 25th Government of the Republic. Military cabinet chaired by Cemal Gürsel
January-February 1961 
The ban on political party activities is 
partially lifted. Around 20 parties are 
registered with the authorities 
May 27, 1961 Constitutive Assembly approves the Constitution of 1961 
July 9, 1961 The new constitution is accepted in the referandum. 38% voted no 
September 16, 1961 
Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan's 
death penalties are executed. They were 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister 
of Finance of the latest DP government 
September 17, 1961 
The Prime Minister and DP Chairman 
Adnan Menderes' death penalty is 
executed. 
October 15, 1961 
First general elections after the military 
intervention. Senate and Assembly 
elections are held together 
October 1961 Ali Fuat Başgil is forced not put his candidacy for the post of the President 
October 26, 1961 
The Assembly elects Cemal Gürsel, the 
leader of the military intervention as the 
President of the Republic 
November 20, 1961 
26th Government of the Republic. The 
RPP-JP military imposed coalition 
cabinet chaired by İsmet İnönü 
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February 22, 1962 Colonel Talat Aydemir' first coup attempt  
May 10, 1962 The Grand National Assembly grants a pardon to Colonel Talat Aydemir  
June 25, 1962 
27th Government of the Republic. 
Coalition of the RPP, the NTP and the 
RPNP, chaired by İsmet İnönü 
October 16, 1962 Partial Amnesty Law for the ex-DP members, reduction of their sentences  
March 22, 1963 
Conditional release of Celal Bayar, the 
third President of the Republic, from the 
Kayseri prison, where he was serving life 
sentence.  
May 20, 1963 Colonel Talat Aydemir's second coup attempt 
December 25, 1963-February 20, 1965 
28th Government of the Republic. A 
minority government of the RPP, chaired 
by İsmet İnönü 
June 1964 Colonel Talat Aydemir's death penalty is executed 
November 27-29, 1964 
The JP's Second General Congress. 
Süleyman Demirel won the 
Chairmanship against Saadettin Bilgiç 
February 20, 1965 
29th Government of the Republic. A 
caretaker government chaired by Suat 
Hayri Ürgüplü 
September 20, 1965 
Supreme Court's Criminal General 
Council decide that such Nur students 
activities as reading or disseminating 
books are punishable by the Article 163 
of the Panel Law 
October 10, 1965 
General Elections. The JP's electoral 
victory. The socialist Labor Party of 
Turkey enters the parliament with 15 
parliamentarians. 
October 27, 1965 
30th Government of the Republic. The 
JP Government chaired by Süleyman 
Demirel 
March 26, 1966 
Ex-Commander of the TAF, Cevdet 
Sunay is elected President of the 
Republic 
July 1966 
Disputes in the political arena and within 
the JP over the pending Amnesty Law of 
1966 the questions of the political (DP) 
prisoners and the 163/1 
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August 2, 1966 
Associations of the graduates of religious 
education institutions (high schools, 
Islam institutes and Theology faculties) 
protest the government and demand 
improvements in the status and education 
of the schools  
August 3, 1966 
The Grand National Assembly passes the 
Amnesty Law (no 780). The political 
prisoners (DP) were granted Amnesty 
but the ban on their political activities 
continued. The Amnesty did not cover 
163/1 but 163/2, 163/3 and 163/4 (thus 
majority of the prisoner Nur students). 
The military school students who 
supported Talat Aydemir are exempt 
from the Amnesty 
September 6, 1966 
The new president of the Supreme Court, 
İmran Öktem devote half of his speech to 
the Nur students and reminds the 
Supreme Court's decision of September 
1965 
October 4, 1966 
Demirel government discharges İbrahim 
Elmalı from the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs 
October 5, 1966 Various right wing associations protest the government over the Elmalı Affair 
October 8, 1966 Protests against the government over the Elmalı Affair in Kayseri 
October 10-11, 1966 Nationwide protests against the government over the Elmalı Affair 
October 15, 1966 The daily Yeni Istanbul publishes a supplementary issue on İbrahim Elmalı 
October 17, 1966 Tne Union Party, the party of the Alevis religious minority, is established 
27-29 November, 1966 
The JP's Third General Congress. 
Demirel wins the chairmanship for the 
second time. 
December 15, 1966 
Serdengeçti, the famous Islamist 
columnist and a JP parliamentarian faces 
disciplinary action for his vote in the 
Amnesty Law against the party discipline
December 26, 1966 
Osman Turan and Ali Fuat Başgil 
mobilize on behalf of Serdengeçti and 
directly targets the liberals. They 
reiterate the points of contention they 
have with the liberals: Elmalı Affair and 
the Amnesty issue 
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December 1966- January 1967 
Islamist party entrepreneurs within the 
Assembly and the Senate and within the 
Nur circles in Ankara begin their 
meetings over the new party initiative 
January 2, 1967 
The prospect of the new party is 
mentioned for the first time by an insider. 
Serdengeçti strategically says it is too 
early for a new party 
January 4, 1967 Serdengeçti is expelled from the JP 
January 1967 
Famous Islamist columnist and the editor 
of various Islamist newspapers Mehmet 
Şevket Eygi and Islamist columnist 
Serdengeçti engage in a long fight 
through their respective columns 
February 3, 1967 
In his daily, Bugün, Eygi explains 
Serdengeçti's attacks with his opposition 
to the new party initiative 
February 22, 1967 
The elites of the small right wing parties 
meet to discuss the prospects of a new 
right wing party 
April 1, 1967 
Saadettin Bilgiç, who agreed to support 
the liberals on the Amnesty Law is in the 
cabinet 
April 18, 1967 Ali Fuat Başgil, the new party initiative's first choice of leader passes away 
June 5, 1967 
Osman Turan, who was the party 
innovators' second choice of leader table 
a motion of no confidence for the 
government 
June 7, 1967 Osman Turan's motion is rejected by the JP parliamentarians 
June 8, 1967 Serdengeçti writes the new party will not be ready for the 1968 local elections 
July  18, 1967 Another failed attempt of unification among the small right wing parties 
August 9, 1967 
News of the Nationalists' Meeting in 
Bursa. Erbakan is among the guest 
speakers 
August 11, 1967 Osman Turan is sent to the Disciplinary Committee of the JP 
August 12, 1967 
Local JP executives closer to the 
mukaddesatçı-nationalist group protest 
the central administration through 
petitions. The protesting districts are 
Kayseri, Trabzon, Konya, Zonguldak, 
İstanbul, Erzurum, Samsun, Ordu, 
Antalya 
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September 1, 1967 
The Nationalists' meeting final 
declaration is called the National Vision, 
the name that the NSM would adopt by 
the mid-1970s for the movement 
September 2, 1967 
Protests regarding the quota that the 
government wants impose on the number 
of Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools 
based on population 
September 17-21, 1967 
Kayseri-Sivas events. Following a 
football game in Kayseri, violent clashes 
between the fans of two teams develop 
into a fight between Kayseri and Sivas 
people. One person dies, seriously 
injured citizens and houses of people of 
Kayseri origin are burned down in Sivas. 
September- October, 1967 
The TLP organizes the East Meetings 
(Doğu Mitingleri) to demand democratic 
and cultural rights for the Kurds  
October 30, 1967 JP expels Osman Turan 
November 5, 1967 
Osman Turan writes about 
"resurrection," or diriliş of the Muslims 
citing the poet and columnist Sezai 
Karakoç 
November 12, 1967 
Şule Yüksel Şenler, as a new woman 
Preacher and a Nur student, attracts 
hundreds to her seminars on veiling 
February 25, 1968 
The first Rise Up (Şahlanış) meeting 
against communism. It includes not only 
the mukaddesatçı-nationalists but also 
the Kemalists.Tension between the left 
wing activists, who commemorate 
Vietnam in Taksim and the rightwing 
activists. 
March 3, 1968 The Second Rise Up meeting 
March 27-28, 1968 "Nationalist Associations" are meeting in Bursa for consultation 
March 28, 1968 
Federation of the Religious employees 
denies the existence of "reactionary" 
activity in the country and says "there is 
fast and conscious development" 
March 30, 1968 Third Rise Up Meeting in Ankara 
March 1968 Necmettin Erbakan is a guest writer in MTTB magazine, Milli Gençlik Dergisi 
April 6, 1968 
Necmettin Erbakan resigns from his post 
at the TOBB (head of the Industry 
Department) 
April 8, 1968 İbrahim Elmalı becomes the vice-chairman of the NP 
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April 10, 1968 
Erbakan announces his candidacy for a 
seat (Konya) in the Senate from the JP 
ranks 
April 11, 1968 
The JP announces its candidates for 
senate seats. Erbakan is not in the list, 
that is he got his first veto from the JP. 
Elmalı becomes the NP's senate 
candidate from Konya 
April 12-15, 1968 
The boycott for the Theology Faculty 
student Hatice Babacan's right to veil, the 
first veil boycott in the Republican 
history, takes place at the Theology 
Faculty of Ankara University. Though 
supported by all Islamist groups, it was 
essentially organized through a 
cooperation of the Ankara and İstanbul 
Nur student branches and thanks to the 
efforts of a young Nur student who was a 
student of the faculty. Hatice Babacan is 
the aunt of Ali Babacan, currently deputy 
prime minister in the JDP cabinet 
April 17, 1968 Erbakan's first candidacy for the TOBB chairmanship 
April 21, 1968 Erbakan is invited to MTTB's "the Great Turkey Night" as a speaker 
May 18-19, 1968 
The TOBB elections. Erbakan loses the 
chairmanship but enters the executive 
committee and becomes the General 
Secretary of the Union 
June 2, 1968 
Senate and local elections. The JP is 
successful and small right wing parties 
do not fare well in the local elections. 
Eygi mentions the "collective morning 
prayers" for the first time in the daily 
Bugün  
June 28, 1968 
One of the largest "collective morning 
prayers" takes place in Beyazıt Camii, 
Istanbul. Bugün claims 10 thousand 
people attended. 
June - August 1968  "Collective morning prayers" take place all over the country, including Kayseri 
July 17-25, 1968 
Left wing activists protests against the 
6th American fleet and fight with the 
police 
July 24, 1968 
In Konya right wing groups protests 
against the left protests against the 
American fleet and attacks restaurants 
selling alcoholic beverages and the 
police  
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August 19, 1968 Türkeş declares that his commandos are against the communists 
October 15, 1968 Students of Prayer Leader and Preacher School protest in Kayseri 
November 4, 1968 Demirel says no one in the country has power to bring a theocratic regime 
November 14, 1968 
The court abolishes the Federation of the 
Religious employees with around 60 
thousand members 
November 29, 1968 
The JP's fourth General Congress. 
Demirel wins the chairmanship for the 
third time. 
February 10, 1969 
RPNP acquires its new name in the 
General Congress in Adana: Nationalist 
Action Party 
February 16, 1969 
The "Bloody Sunday". The right wing 
attacks the left wing activists during a 
left wing protest against the American 
6th fleet. Hundreds are wounded and two 
deaths. Two days before such 
associations as the MTTB and 
Association for Fighting Against 
communism organize "Respect to the 
Flag" meeting. A day before daily Bugün 
calls for "jihad" against the communists. 
March- April 1969 
The public debate and protests around 
the draft law of "Protection of the 
Constitutional Order. Left and Kurdish 
activists and the Nur students were 
among the most vocal protestors. The 
government will eventually withdraw its 
own proposal 
April 3-4, 1969 
News and rumors regarding a "party of 
Religion" reappear in the press and 
denied by Süleyman Arif Emre 
April 1969 
Şule Yükesel Şenler continues her 
seminars on veiling all around the 
country throughout the month 
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May 4, 1969 
In the funeral of President of Supreme 
Court İmran Öktem. The Imam, refuses 
to carry out the religious ritual. The 
mosque crowd protest Öktem who had 
said "people created the God." İsmet 
İnönü insists on finding an İmam who 
would carry the duty. A bureaucrat 
present in the funeral does the prayer. 
İsmet walks towards the crowd to go out 
of the mosque courtyard with the help of 
a general who draws his gun to protect 
him.  
May 8, 1969 
The members of the high courts, students 
and others walked in Ankara protesting 
the funeral incident 
May 14, 1969 
An Amnesty for political prisoners, even 
though voted by the RPP and passed the 
Assembly, is defeated at the senate with 
the encouragement of Demirel group 
May 25, 1969 Erbakan elected as the Chairman of the TOBB 
May 27, 1969 
Government does not recognize the 
elected chairman and orders the previous 
one to remain in the duty 
May - August, 1969 
The TOBB mobilization. Erbakan visits 
various Anatolian towns, political parties 
and associations 
June 15-16, 1969 
Left labor unions mobilize against the 
new Labor Law that made it difficult for 
workers to change unions. During the 
protests that thousands attended there 
were clashes with police forces. A 
martial law followed the events in 
Istanbul and in Kocaeli. 
June 19, 1969 The Ministry of Commerce takes over the TOBB's allocation of resources 
July 8, 1969 The TÖS incident takes place in Kayseri 
July 20,1969 Humans land the moon for the first time in history.  
August 5, 1969 Enver Batur takes over the office of the Chairman at the TOBB 
August 6, 1969 Erbakan comes to the TOBB and reclaims his office 
August 7, 1969 
Batur, having deployed an interlocutory 
court order, calls the police and a 
locksmith. Erbakan resists, then he 
declares his candidacy for an Assembly 
seat from Konya 
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August 15, 1969 Erbakan goes to Konya and visits the local JP branch 
August 17, 1969 Erbakan is vetoed by the JP's leaders 
September 3, 1969 
Erbakan declares his independent 
candidacy from Konya for the Assembly 
and launch the Movement of 
Independents 
October 12, 1969 
General Elections. The JP acquires 
majority in the parliament. From the 
candidates of the Movement of 
Independents, only Erbakan enters the 
Assembly. Hüsamettin Akmumcu and 
Hüseyin Abbas are elected from the 
ranks of the JP 
November 3, 1969 The second JP government chaired by Demirel  
November 5, 1969 
Saadettin Bilgiç and other opponents of 
the liberals are not included in the 
cabinet. 
December 6, 1969 
Erbakan meets with NP and RPNP 
leaders. Türkeş denies the gossips of the 
new party. An NP elite says the new 
party's name will be National Salvation 
Party  
December 9, 1969 The council of state reaches a decision over the TOBB Affair in Erbakan's favor 
December 26, 1969 Erbakan announces the news of the new party 
January 2, 1970 As a result of the court order, Erbakan says he will takeover the TOBB 
January 4, 1970 The TOBB General Assembly elects Medeni Berk as the chairman 
January 26, 1970 The establishment of the National Order Party 
January 9- February 15, 1970 
The peak of the liberal- conservative-
nationalist (now supported by the ex-DP 
members) struggle. Demirel group sent 4 
opponents to the disciplinary committee 
for expulsion. 72 opponents sign 
memorandum. Demirel refuses to take it 
into consideration. They in turn cast a 
vote of non confidence for the budget 
and force Demirel to resign. 26 intraparty 
opponents, including Bilgiç are expelled 
from the party. The rest would resign 
from the JP following the fifth congress. 
February 8, 1970 
The NOP Foundational Convention 
(since there are no branches the NOP 
could not organize a Congress)  
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February 1970 - March 1971 The NOP opening ceremonies 
February-May 1970 
Various types of right and left wing 
mobilizations against each other or the 
government 
May 13, 1970  
The Advanced Institute of Islam in 
Kayseri has been temporarily closed 
following a student boycott 
June 1970 
The remaining intraparty opponents try 
to prove the corruption charges against 
Demirel with no avail 
October 21, 1970 The JP's Fifth General Congress 
December 18, 1970 Bilgiç Group establishes the Democratic Party 
January 24, 1971 The NOP's First General Congress takes place in Ankara 
February 10, 1971 
The prosecutors of the Republic open an 
investigation on the NOP and its "anti-
constitutional" activities 
March 4, 1971 
The ex-student leaders in various 
collective actions, for instance in protests 
against the 6th American fleet, now as 
leaders of the Marxist-Leninst Türkiye 
Halkın Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO), or the 
People's Liberation Army of Turkey, 
kidnaps four American soldiers.The three 
leaders Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and 
Hüseyin İnan are caught shortly 
afterwards and brought to trial. 
March 9, 1971 
The date of the abortive coup plan of 
miliary officers sympathetic to left 
movements 
March 10, 1971 
The Chief prosecutor of the Republic 
applies to the Constitutional Court to 
open a case against the NOP 
March 12, 1971 Military memorandum of 1971. Demirel resigns 
March 21, 1971 
Ecevit resigns from the post of General 
Secretary of the RPP protesting İnönü 
group's decision not to openly oppose the 
military intervention  
March 26, 1971 
The first technocrat government of Nihat 
Erim. The President of the Republic 
asked the parties to support the 
government unconditionally.  
April 2, 1971 
Big businesses establish the TÜSİAD 
(Turkish Industry and Business 
Association)  
April 8, 1971 The trial of the NOP begins 
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April 1971 -  
Various associations including the 
İdealists (ultranationalists), the DEV-
GENC  (abbreviation of the 
Revolutionary Youth) and Devrimci 
Doğu Kültür Ocakları (Revolutionary 
Culture Hearts of the East, Kurdish 
activists) are closed down by the 
military. The military commanders, as 
heads of the martial rule, continue to 
arrest various right (and Islamist) and left 
wing activists from legal, illegal  and 
informal organizations throughout the 
country.  The arrests continue throughout 
the year and includes intellectuals, 
writers, journalists and academicians. In 
İstanbul right wing activists, particularly 
the Nur students fair better (though their 
newspaper İttihad is banned)  than their 
counterparts in Anatolia, particularly 
Hüsrev Altınbaşak, the leader of the 
Scribes. He would stay in prison until the 
Amnesty of 1974. Faik Türün, the 
commander of Istanbul, eventually 
establish good relations with Yeni Asya 
Nur students and primarily targets the 
left activists 
May 1971 
The Risale-i Nur students in various 
localities are being arrested. In İzmir 
Bekir Berk, the famous lawyer of the 
movement and local leaders are 
ımprisoned for around six months 
without being charged. They were all 
eventually acquited. 
May 20, 1971 
The Constitutional Court bans the NOP. 
The party leaders and members are not 
banned from politics. Erbakan leaves the 
country for Switzerland 
June 29, 1971 
A ban on opium poppy production, a US 
demand, is introduced to go full efect by 
1972 
July 20, 1971 
The Constitutional Court bans the LPT. 
The party and its leaders are charged 
with communist activities and Kurdish 
separatism. Most of the party leaders are 
sentenced to prison terms up to 15 years. 
September 21, 1971 
The Grand National Assembly ammends 
the Constitution of 1961 and brings 
restrictions on civil and political rights 
and liberties 
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October 9, 1971 Deniz Gezmiş and his friends are sentenced to death 
December 11, 1971 The second technocrat government of Nihat Erim 
March 10, 1972 
The Grand National Assembly approves 
the death sentences for Gezmiş, İnan and 
Aslan. The RPP votes against the death 
sentences. 
March 23, 1972 The president of the Republic approves the death sentences. 
March 27, 1972 
Mahir Çayan and his friends from 
Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi 
(THKP-C), People's Liberation Party-
Front of Turkey kidnap english and 
canadian technicians to force the 
government to release Gezmiş and 
others. All except one is killed by the 
state forces. 
April 6, 1972 
Following the RPP's appeal the 
Constitutional Court vacate the death 
sentences.  
April 24, 1972 
The Grand National Assembly revoted 
and approved the death sentences for the 
second time. The right wing parties' 
insistance on the death sentence has been 
intepreted as a revenge from the 
"progressive forces" for Menderes and 
two friends. 
May 6, 1972 Deniz Gezmiş and his friends' sentences are executed 
May 6-14, 1972 
At the RPP extraordinary congress of 
May 6 Bülent Ecevit the young General 
Secretary of the Party acquires more vote 
of confidence than veteran İsmet İnönü. 
The latter resigns in May 8 and Ecevit, 
who forcefully and openly opposed the 
coup of 1971 becomes the party 
chairman on May 14. 
May 18, 1973 Erbakan says "Ecevit is not a communist" 
May 22, 1972 Caretaker government chaired by Ferit Sadi Melen 
October 11, 1972 The NSP is established. Süleyman Arif Emre becomes the chairman 
February 15, 1973 
The GNA passes the law for the 
establishment of State Security Courts 
with special powers 
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March 1973 
Struggle over the election of the 
President of the Republıc. Faruk Gürler, 
the Commander of the TAF resigns and 
becomes a senator hoping to be elected 
President by the GNA. The RPP and 
other right wing parties refused to vote 
yet for another Commander of the TAF. 
April 6, 1973 
Fahri Korutürk, a senator and an army 
officer who had been made to retire 
during the coup of 1960, was elected the 
President of the Republic 
April 15, 1973 
Caretaker government chaired by Naim 
Talu. Following the elections, he would 
continue to govern during the 
government crisis until the end of 
January 1974 
September 26, 1973 Martial Law that has been enforced since March 1973 in 11 districts is lifted 
October 14, 1973 
General elections. The NSP enters the 
parliament as a key party. Ecevit's RPP 
acquires the majority of the votes but 
does not have enough seat to form a 
government. The government crisis of 
three months starts. 
October 19, 1973 First rumours regarding and NSP-RPP coalition appears 
October 21, 1973 Erbakan becomes the NSP chairman 
October 26, 1973 President gives the duty to form a government to Ecevit 
October 29-30, 1973 
Ecevit's first round of party visits to 
establish a government remains 
inconclusive. Two hours long meeting 
between Ecevit and Erbakan. The NSP 
delays its response 
October 30, 1973 
Before providing an answer to Ecevit, 
Erbakan invites Demirel to form a 
coalition  
November 3, 1973 The NSP GEC and local party chairmen meeting  
November 5, 1973 The NSP rejects the RPP's offer. 
November 12, 1973 President gives the duty to form a government to Demirel 
November 15-18, 1973 
While the NSP accepts the JP's offer to 
form a coalition, the DkP rejects it. 
Demirel resigns from the duty. On the 
16th the NSP newspaper publishes an 
article commenting on how to interpret 
the Epistles of the Nur movement  
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November 20, 1973 
Second Erbakan-Ecevit meeting takes 
place. Possible government options are 
discussed. The NSP makes positive but 
non-committal statements regarding the 
RPP. 
November 21, 1973 
The NSP General Executive Committee 
meets to discuss the government options 
and Ecevit-Erbakan meeting 
December 9, 1973 
Local elections. Victory for the RPP. 
Among the right wing polititcal parties 
only the JP is successful.  
December 12, 1973 
The last meeting of the NSP General 
Executive Committee before January 9 
when they simply approved the coalition 
decision. The committee members 
discuss the election results. On 15th their 
statement reads they would support a 
government that would not lead to 
communism.  
December 16, 1973 - January 9, 1974 
President of the Republic Naim Talu tries 
and fails to convince the parties in the 
Assembly to form a "national coalition." 
December 18, 1973 
Following another meeting with Ecevit, 
the NSP parliamentary group meets to 
discuss options 
December 19, 1973 
The NSP parliamentary group meets to 
disccuss the intra-Assembly elections for 
the Speaker of the Grand National 
Assembly and committees. Reportedly 
they have more meetings until the 
coalition decison at the expense of the 
GEC 
December 22, 1973 
The lawyers and jurists within the NSP 
form a commission to write an Amnesty 
proposal. 
December 25, 1973 İsmet İnönü passes away 
December 31, 1973 Erbakan and Ecevit meet  
January 7, 1974 
The NSP announces its Amnesty 
proposal. Expressing one's thoughts and 
beliefs should not be considered a crime. 
Therefore those who have not involved 
in violence will be included in the 
Amnesty. The question of the Articles 
141-142 that punish left wıng activists 
and intelellectuals with no violent 
activities will stay unclear up until 
March. 
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January 9, 1974 
The NSP General Executive Committee 
meets at a time when anti-coalitionists 
are away in pilgrimage and approves the 
coalition with the RPP 
January 10, 1974 
Erbakan and Ecevits meet for the last 
time before the announcement of the 
agreement 
January 14, 1974 The NSP and the RPP announce their historical decision to establish a coalition
January 20, 1974 
Some right wing parliamentarians 
introduce a bill to make Friday  a 
holiday. The NSP interprets the bill as a 
move to divide the NSP and the coalition 
January 26, 1974 The NSP and RPP sign the coalition protocol 
January 27, 1974 
The coalition government begins 
working together to shape a joint 
Amnesty law proposal 
February 28, 1974 
The two parties start working on the 
Amnesty Law. Yeni Asya and other 
nationally distributed newspapers close 
to the JP, such as Tercüman, begin their 
attacks against the NSP for including the 
Articles 142-143, thus the communists 
and left activists in the Amnesty 
proposal. During the process (until the 
vote in the Assembly on 2nd April) the 
NSP would respond through introducing 
various symbolically loaded policies 
March 5, 1974 
The minister of Internal Affairs, 
Oğuzhan Asiltürk says one should be an 
enemy of alcholic beverages not those 
who drink them 
March 10- 15, 1974 
Milli Gazete and other national 
newspapers discuss the Minister of 
Justice Şevket Kazan's "crusade" against 
obscenity in the press. On January 12 
Kazan sends a circular note to public 
prosecutors to enforce the existing law 
March 13-20, 1974 
The NSM undertakes a mobilization to 
remove a statue it deems obsecene. The 
statue was put on Karaköy square in 
İstanbul to celebrate the 50th anniversary 
of the Republic. On March 20 the statue 
is removed.  
March 17, 1974 
Erbakan gives notice to the State Radio 
Television following a movie the NSP 
has found obscene 
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March 28, 1974 
The NSP parliamentary group takes a 
binding decision to vote yes for the joint 
Amnesty proposal 
April 2, 1974 The Assembly votes the articles of the government's proposal.  
April 10, 1974 The Assembly votes and accepts the entire proposal and sends it to the senate 
April 16, 1974 The Assembly restores the political rights of the ex-DP leaders 
April 18, 1974 
The JP blocks the government proposal: 
Articles 141 and 142 are left outside the 
Amnesty 
April 27, 1974 
The Senate accepts the entire Amnesty 
Law, except those articles that cover  
prisoners or convicts under 141 and 142. 
The law will go back to the Assembly 
May 1, 1974 
The introduction of the law that regulates 
the state financial  help to political 
parties based on the percentage of the 
votes they get in the general elections 
May 6, 1974 
Ankara NSP district covenes its 
congress: Hüsamettin Akmumcu, a Nur 
student leader gives the first signs of 
defection  
May 7, 1974 
Parliamentary Group of the NSP 
discusses the question of workers in 
Europe: how can they vote for elections 
that take place in Turkey?  
May 15, 1974 
The Amnesty Law is promulgated 
without 141 and 142. The intraparty 
opponent elites convinced some other 
NSM parliamentarians to vote with them 
for the change (exclusion of the clauses) 
that the opposition parties proposed 
May 17, 1974- June 1, 1974 Crisis within the NSM and the coalition government. Ecevit considers resigning 
May 25, 1974 
The NSP organizes a meeting for the 
local party chairmen to discuss the latest 
developments. Erbakan seeks to ensure 
their support 
May 27, 1974 
Milli Gazete mentions and condems the 
gossips of a new "national front" 
coalition of right wing parties. 
May 30, 1974 
The Assembly approves the budget. 
Various industrial investments that the 
NSM promised to its activists and 
constituents, such as machine tools and 
airplane industry, are earmarked in the 
budget.  
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June 1, 1974 
The RPP appeals to the Constitutional 
Court to abolish the Article 5 of the 
Amnesty Law, which means to include 
the Articles 141 and 142 in the Amnesty. 
The NSM leaders support the RPP's 
decision 
June 8, 1974 Constitutional Court restricts the juridical power of the State Security Courts 
June 14, 1974 The tension with Greece over Cyprus begins to increase 
June 18, 1974 
The NSP Parliamentary Group votes 
together to reject the motion of no 
confidence against the Ministry of 
Education, Mehmet Üstündağ. Since the 
latter was a particularly despised figure 
among the right wing, particularly the 
Nur students the vote of the anti-
coalitionist Nur student parliamentarians 
restored confidence both in the party and 
the coalition. 
July 2, 1974 
Constitutional Court abolishes the Article 
5 of the Amnesty on the grounds of 
equality. The left wing activists start 
leaving the prisons as their right wing 
counterparts 
July 1974 The government lifts the ban on the opium poppy production 
July 15, 1974 Military intervention in Cyprus 
Juy 20, 1974 - August 29, 1974 
Turkey intervenes and then invades half 
of  Cyprus. the US puts an embargo on 
Turkey on February 5, 1975 
August 30- September 10, 1974 
Tension between the RPP and the NSP 
rises following the Cyrpus intervention. 
The RPP, particularly Ecevit wants to 
convert his popularity gained through the 
victory in Cyprus to votes. The RPP 
wants to come to power alone having 
exprienced distrust with the NSP both 
before and during the Cyprus Affair. On 
the 10th of September the RPP anounces 
its doubts regarding the future of the 
coalition.  
September 14, 1974 
NSP members of the cabinet refuse to 
sign the decree that would allow Ecevit 
to visit Scandinavia. This is a response to 
Ecevit who refused to give the power of 
procuration to Erbakan, the deputy prime 
minister. Ecevit wanted to give his place 
to a cabinet member from the RPP 
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September 18, 1974 Ecevit gave his resignation to the President of the Republic 
September 30, 1974 President gives the duty to form a government to Demirel 
October 2, 1974 Erbakan accepts Demirel's offer of coalition partnership 
October 4, 1974 Demirel resigns from the duty as the DkP refuses the JP's offer 
November 7, 1974 
RPP's attempts to establish a minority 
government fails having been refused by 
all the parties in the Assembly. 
November 11, 1974 
President asks the unaffiliated senator 
Sadi Irmak to form a "national" above-
parties government 
November 14, 1974 RPP demands early elections and refuses to support Irmak, so does the NSP 
November 17, 1974 
Irmak cabinet fails to get a vote of 
confidence. However, the cabinet 
governs the country in practice until the 
establishment of the First National Front 
government in March 31, 1975 
November 17, 1974 
The NSP convenes its Second General 
Congress in Ankara. The intraparty 
opponents of Erbakan group fail to beat 
or influence the list (the candidates for 
the General Executive Committee) of 
Erbakan group. 
December 6, 1974 
The JP engages in its four months long 
struggle to convince the right wing 
parties, particularly the DP, to form a 
right wing coalition 
January 1975- September 12, 1980 
The tension and street violence begin and 
steadily augment until early 1980 as 
social cleavages deepen and economy 
enters into a crisis following the Arab-
Israeli War of 1973. Organized political 
violence which brings together various 
paramilitary groups", deep state forces" 
and ordinary citizens also takes its toll 
particularly in Kurdish and Alevi 
populated provinces such as Maraş. 
February 1975 
Even though the JP's attempt to form a 
right wing government has not succeeded 
yet, the right wing parties, the JP, the 
NAP, the RelP and the NSP act together 
in the parliament and the senate and call 
themselves the National Front 
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March 31, 1975 
Nine parliamentarians, among them 
Saadettin Bilgiç, leaves the DP and helpd 
the National Front government to get the 
vote of confidence.  
July 28, 1975 
The US puts military embargo on Turkey 
for using American equipment and 
weapons in Cyprus intervention 
January 1976 
Akıncı Association is established by 
young NSP activists. Soon after there 
were Akıncı Associations for high school 
students, state employees, workers. An 
association for high school theachers 
with close ties to Akıncılar is also 
established: Mefkureci Öğretmenler 
Derneği (İdeationalist Teachers 
Association) 
October 12, 1975 Partial Senate elections 
October 24, 1976 
NSP's Third General Congress. Two 
additional lists of General Executive 
Committee candidates circulate, however 
two powerful leaders that opponents 
claimed to represent them, deny their 
knowledge of these lists. Erbakan defeats 
his opponents. As the general elections 
approach and the intraparty opponents 
are eliminated from high level decision 
making structures, the opponents lose 
leverage against the Erbakan group 
April 19, 1977 
13 parliamentarians, leaders of the anti-
coalition and "anti-Amnesty for the 
communists" group refuse candidateship 
in the upcoming elections 
June 5, 1977 
General Elections. The NSP protecst its 
votes but its share of the overall votes 
thus its parliamentary seats drop. The 
RPP gets the highest votes but not 
enough seats to form a majority 
government. 
June 14, 1977 The president gives the duty to form a government to Ecevit. 
July 3, 1977 The RPP government fails to get a vote of confidence 
July 21, 1977 the Second National Front government, including the JP, the NSP, the NAP   
December 11, 1977 
Local elections. As in previous local 
elections the NSP fails to attract enough 
votes. 
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January 5, 1978 
The RPP transfers parliamentarians and 
establishes a new government. Each of 
the transferred parliamentarians acquire a 
seat in the new cabinet 
October 15, 1978 
NSP's Fourth General Congress. Three 
names from the list of opponents (now a 
relatively new group led by Korkut Özal 
who are unhappy with Erbakan's steadly 
increasing power) manage to enter the 
General Executive Committee  
April 1979 The NSP and the Akıncı youth organize the Sakarya Meeting 
November, 1979 The NSP and the Akıncı youth organize the Kayseri Meeting 
September 7, 1980 The NSP and the Akıncıs organize the Kudüs Meeting in Konya.  
September12, 1980 
The coup d'etat of 1980. Military takes 
over the government and imposes a ban 
on all political parties and their leaders. 
By 1983, not only new parties but also 
old parties under different names appear. 
Then NSM's new party name is the 
Welfare Party. In 1987, the political 
leaders, including Erbakan, come back to 
the political field when a referendum lifts 
the political ban.  
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration 
Group 
and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation 
before and after 
engagement 
Interview 
Date 
(DD.MM.YY
YY) 
Place of 
Interview
Interview 
Type 
National Leaders and Elites of the Nizam/Selamet Movement 
Ayhan, Cevat Activist and 
parliamentary candidate 
in the 1970s,  WP and 
VP Sakarya deputy. Still 
active. 
__ 
Mechanical 
Engineer 
07.02.2007 Ankara face-to-
face 
Asiltürk, 
Oğuzhan 
Local entrepreneur in 
Kars, executive 
committee and cabinet 
member, NSP Ankara 
deputy and WP Malatya 
Deputy. Still active. 
__ 
Civil Engineer and 
businessman. (he 
was doing 
constructions in Kars 
during the party 
building period). 
05.10.2007 
09.10.2007 
Ankara face-to-
face 
Cebeci, 
Cemal 
Kayseri deputy 
__  
Religious scholar, 
Prayer Leader and 
Preacher School 
Director, education 
expert at the State 
Department of 
Planning. Later 
worked in charity 
organizations. 
10.10.2006 Ankara face-to-
face 
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration 
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
Aksay, Hasan Entrepreneur and official 
founder of the NOP, 
executive committee and 
cabinet member, NSP 
İstanbul and Adana deputy __ 
Theology graduate, 
teacher and hight 
school director. JP 
Adana deputy.   
Owner of Milli 
Gazete. (in post-
1980 period, 
businessman) 
22.11.2006 
01.02.2007 
04.02.2009  
İstanbul face-to-
face (2) 
telephone 
Emre, Süleyman 
Arif 
Entrepreneur and official 
founder of the NOP and the 
NSP, first chairman of the 
NSP, executive committee 
and cabinet member. NSP 
and WP İstanbul deputy 
and cabinet member 
__ 
Lawyer, FP's and 
NTP's founder, NTP 
Adıyaman deputy. 
30.01.2007 
02.02.2007 
10.03.2009 
İstanbul face-to-
face (2) 
telephone 
Utku, Turhan Activist and NSP Çorum 
deputy 
__ 
Civil Engineer, 
Agricultural 
Engineer. By 1977, 
engineer and 
businessman 
01.11.2006 
08.11.2006  
İstanbul face-to-
face 
Müftüoğlu, 
İsmail 
Local party entrepreneur in 
Sakarya, executive 
committee and cabinet 
member. NSP Sakarya 
deputy. Still active 
__ 
Teacher, Lawyer. 
(post-1980 period, 
lawyer) 
12.11.2007 
14.04.2008 
İstanbul face-to-
face 
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY) 
Place of 
Interview 
Inter
view 
Type 
Kazan, Şevket Local party entrepreneur in 
Kartal, İstanbul. Executive 
committee and cabinet 
member. NSP and WP 
Kocaeli deputy. Still active 
__ 
Voluntary/honorary 
Preacher, store 
owner, trader, 
lawyer.  
06.08.2007 
07.08.2007 
08.08.2007 
Ankara face-
to-
face 
Independent Intellectuals 
Bekaroğlu, 
Mehmet 
independent intellectual and 
activist 
__ 
Student of 
Medicine, 
Psychiatrist, 
University  
Professor, WP's 
Rize deputy, 
Deputy chairman of 
the VPP 
 16.05.2007 Ankara face-
to-
face 
Özdenören, 
Rasim 
Writer and a bureaucrat at 
the State Planning 
Organization __ 
Writer, bureaucrat 
at the State 
Planning 
Organization 
April 2004 (first 
interview before 
the actual 
fieldwork started, 
no specific date has 
been recorded) 
Ankara face-
to-
face 
Local Elites and Activists of the Nizam/Selamet movement (Kayseri and Konya) 
__ Unofficial local founder of the NSP 
and parliamentrary candidate in 1973 KayNS1 
Teacher, later trader 01.02.2009 İstanbul face-
to-
face 
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration 
Group 
and 
individual 
Identifier
Occupation 
before and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY) 
Place of 
Intervie
w 
Interview 
Type 
__ Local founder of the NOP 
and the NSP.  Executive 
member 
KayNS2 
Shopowner, later 
factory owner 
16.08.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Executive member of the 
NSP, also in MTTB and 
Büyük Doğu circles 
KayNS3 
Civil engineer, 
contractor, later 
trader 
07.08.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist in the NOP and 
executive in the NSP KayNS4 
Skilled craftsman 
at a state factory 
20.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist in the NOP. KayNS5 Skilled craftsman and shopowner 
27.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist KonNS6 Skilled craftsman, small shopowner 
01.12. 2008 Konya telephone 
interview 
__ Activist and a parliamentary 
candidate in 1973 KayNS7 
Lawyer 06.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
written 
answers 
__ Executive member in the 
NSP and parliamentary 
candidate in 1973 KayNS8 
Accountant, first 
state employee, 
then a manager in 
the private sector 
14.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist 
KayNS9 
Civil engineer, 
small factory 
owner 
25.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Executive member in the 
NSP KayNS10 
Civil engineer, 
contractor, later 
trader 
15.08.2006 
17.08.2006 
Kayseri face-to-face 
   
T
able 2 – cont’d  
319 
 320 
 
NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration 
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation before 
and after engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY) 
Place of 
Intervie
w 
Interview 
Type 
__ Activist in the NOP and a 
local founder of the NSP  KayNS11 
Skilled craftsman at a 
state factory, later 
small workshop and 
shopowner  
17.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist 
KayNS12 
Skilled craftsman, 
worker at a public 
institution, later small 
workshop owner 
12.09.2006 
26.09.2007 
Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist in the NOP and the 
NSP, previously in the RPNP KayNS13 
Skilled craftsman, 
shopowner, trader 
17.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist KonNS14 Skilled craftsman, small shopowner 
04.11.2008 Konya telephone 
interview 
__ Activist  
KayNS15 
Civil engineer, state 
employee, later 
business owner, trader, 
contractor 
20.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist 
KayNS16 
High school student, 
student of mechanical 
engineering, later 
employee of a state 
factory and contractor 
08.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ A local founder of the NOP 
and the NSP, executive 
member and a parliamentary 
candidate in 1973 and 1977 
KayNS17 
Skilled craftsman, civil 
engineer, contractor, 
medium business 
owner 
06.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and 
engagement during the 
years under 
consideration
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation 
before and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY
) 
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
__  Executive member KayNS18 Civil engineer, contractor 
11.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist and executive 
member KayNS19 
Technical 
draftsman, small 
business owner 
28.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
National Elites and Leaders of the Justice Party 
Sezgin, İsmet General executive 
committee and cabinet 
member. Aydın deputy in 
several Assembly terms.  
__ 
Originally a bank 
employee and 
economist. 
13.06.2007 Ankara face-to-face 
Bilgiç, 
Saadettin 
General executive 
committee and cabinet 
member. Founder of the 
DkP. Isparta deputy in 
several Assembly terms 
__ 
Medical doctor, 
also landowner 
14.08.2007 Isparta face-to-face 
Doğan, Kemal General executive 
committee member, 
Kayseri deputy, also a 
local Kayseri elite. 
__ 
Manager of a large 
factory, newspaper 
writer, later 
businessman 
26.07.2006 Ankara face-to-face 
Local Elites and Activists of the Justice Party (Kayseri and Konya) 
__  Executive member, also 
in the TOBB  KayJP1 
Medium business 
owner 
17.03.2009 Kayseri telephone 
interview 
__ Activist, also in the 
TOBB KayJP2 
Medium-large 
business owner 
03.02.2009 Kayseri telephone 
interview 
   
T
able 2 – cont’d  
321 
 322 
 
NAME Further Description of 
activities and 
engagement during the 
years under 
consideration
Group 
and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation 
before and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
__ Subdistrict executive 
committee member in 
Talas KayJP3 
Small shopowner, 
food supply 
contractor with a 
state institution 
08.09.2006 Talas/Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist, also in the TOBB KonJP4 Medium-large business owner 
17.03.2009 Konya telephone 
interview 
__ DP activist, JP executive 
member KayJP5 
Small-medium 
business owner 
28.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ DP activist, JP executive 
member, also in the 
TOBB. By 1969 joins the 
National Action Party 
KayJP6 
Small-medium 
business owner 
17.03.2009 Kayseri telephone 
interview 
__ Activist, also in TOBB KonJP7 Medium-large business owner 
04.02.2009 Konya telephone 
interview 
__ DP activist, JP executive 
member KayJP8 
Small-medium 
business owner, 
contractor, trader 
30.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__  DP Activist, JP executive 
member, also in TOBB KayJP9 
Journalist 19.07.2006 
15.06.2007 
Ankara face-to-face 
__ DP activist, JP executive 
member, also a leader in 
the TOBB KayJP10 
Medium business 
owner, contractor 
working with a state 
institution 
 31.01.2009 
18.03.2009 
Kayseri telephone 
interview 
__ DP activist, JP executive  
member KayJP11 
Medium business 
owner, investor 
01.10.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
T
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and 
engagement during the 
years under 
consideration
Group 
and 
individual 
Identifier 
 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY) 
Place of 
Interview
Interview 
Type 
__ DP activist, JP 
parliamentary candidate, 
also a local journalist 
KayJP12 
Journalist 19.07.2006 
24.07.2006 
Ankara face-to-face 
Elites and Activists of the National Action Party (Kayseri) 
__ Executive member KayNAP1 Journalist 11.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist KayNAP2 Student 11.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist in Kayseri and 
İstanbul KayNAP3
High school student 
and student of law 
04.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Executive committe 
member, also a leader of 
the Nationalists' 
Association 
KayNAP4
Lawyer, poet, 
literary critique 
14.08.2006 
22.08.2006 
24.08.2006  
Kayseri face-to-face 
Elites and Activists of the Republican People's Party (Kayseri) 
__ Activist  KayRPP1 undisclosed 07.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face interview 
Bahçecioğlu, 
Niyazi  
Kayseri Mayor from 1973 
to 1980, and 1989-1994 __ 
Civil engineer, 
contractor 
18.9.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
interview 
__ Activist 
KayRPP2 
Student of 
management and 
finance, later 
worked in the 
mayorship 
07.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face 
interview  
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and 
engagement during the 
years under 
consideration
Group 
and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation 
before and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
__ Activist KayRPP3 undisclosed 07.09.2007 Kayseri face-to-face interview 
Leaders and activists of Akıncı Movement (National level and Kayseri) 
Bulut, Mehmet 
Ali 
National leader. 
Chairman. JDP founder 
and Maraş deputy  
__ 
Lawyer 10.08.2007 Ankara face-to-face 
Çavuşoğlu, 
Tevfik Rıza 
First and last chairman 
of the Akıncı 
Association from 
Kayseri. 
__ 
Student, civil 
engineer (later 
businessman) 
23.08.2006 
28.08.2006 
20.09.2006 
Kayseri  face-to-face 
__  Activist 
KayAkın 
Student, athlete   
later medium 
business owner 
24.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
__ Activist in Ankara and 
İstanbul Akın2 
Journalist 24.01.2007 
31.01.2007 
Istanbul face-to-face 
Tezel, Mehmet National leader, 
executive member.  __ 
Mechanical 
engineer 
03.09.2007 Ankara face-to-face 
Yarbay, 
Ersönmez 
National leader, 
executive member. JDP 
unofficial founder,VP 
and JDP Ankara 
Deputy.WP, VP and JDP 
Ankara branch chairman.
__ 
Student, 
bureaucrat in 
public 
administration 
10.08.2007 
03.09.2007 
Ankara face-to-face 
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and 
engagement during the 
years under 
consideration
Group 
and 
individual 
Identifier 
 
Occupation 
before and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
__ Activist  and a lawyer.  
Akın3 
Lawyer 30.09.2006 undisclosed 
for 
unanimity 
face-to-face 
Local elites and members of Büyük Doğu and MTTB circles (Kayseri) 
__ Member MTTB KayBDMT
TB1 
University student 
(undisclosed for 
unanimity) 
15.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
_ Member MTTB, local 
BD elite KayBDMT
TB2 
Student 
(undisclosed for 
unanimity), later 
employee at the 
municipality 
23.08.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
Karatepe, Şükrü  WP Kayseri mayor 
between 1994-1998, 
local MTTB leader in 
Kayseri __ 
Student of law, 
later university 
professor of 
political science 
and public 
administration 
03.08.2007 
09.08.2007 
Ankara face-to-face 
__ also in MTTB circles 
Local JDP elite KayBDMTTB3 
 
Medical 
profession 
(specifics are 
undisclosed) 
08.08.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
(not 
recorded) 
__ member MTTB, JDP KayBDMT
TB4 
Student of finance and 
accounting, later takes 
over family business 
10.08.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
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NAME Further Description 
of activities and 
engagement during 
the years under 
consideration
Group 
and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation 
before and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY) 
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
__ also in MTTB circles 
KayBDMT
TB5 
Student of 
mechanical 
engineering, later 
takes over family 
business trader, 
shop owner 
15.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
Yıldız, Bekir  executive member in 
MTTB. Mayor of 
Kocasinan (a 
downtown quarter) 
KayBDMT
TB6 
Student in civil 
engineering, later 
31.08.2006 Kayseri face-to-face 
Milli Mücadele Birliği (Kayseri) 
___ activist  KayMMB1 Student (specifics 
undisclosed for 
unanimity) 
06.10.2006 Istanbul face-to-face 
Risale-i Nur Elders and elites (non-Yeni Asya) (Anatolia) 
Akmumcu, 
Hüsamettin 
Risale-i Nur elder in 
the Scribe branch, one 
of the Said Nursi's 
lawyers. JP and NOP 
Isparta deputy, NSP 
Ankara deputy 
__ 
Lawyer 15.08.2007 Isparta face-to-face 
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NAME Further Description of 
ctivities and engagement 
uring the years under 
onsideration 
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
Deligöz, 
Muzaffer 
Activist in Ankara and 
briefly in İstanbul, later 
chairman of the NSP in 
Bolu 
__ 
Student of theology 
and law. Works at 
the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs 
01.07.2007 
02.07.2007 
19.07.2007 
24.07.2007 
Istanbul face-to-
face 
__ Risale-i Nur elder from 
Antep and Maraş, member 
of a local notable family, 
unofficial founder of the 
NOP and the NSP 
RNelder1 
Signboard maker 
before entry to the 
Nur circles and 
bookstore owner 
when engaged in the 
NSM entreprise 
26.11.2007 
15.05.2008 
Istanbul face-to-
face 
__ Activist in the Scribes 
movement in Ankara 
RNactivist 
Student of Arabic 
and Persian, at the 
same time works as 
a state employee 
19.08.2008 
23.08.2008 
Istanbul face-to-
face 
__ A"royal student," the elder 
of a non-Yeni Asya Risale-
i Nur branch in Anatolia RNelder2 
Preacher and works 
at the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs, 
owns a publishing 
house 
11.08.2007 Ankara telephone 
interview 
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY) 
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
National Yeni Asya Risale-i Nur Elders and Elite Activists (Istanbul) 
__ A young elite, activist in the 
1970s 
NatYA1 
Student at a Prayer 
leader and Preacher 
school, later 
theology student. 
Works at the 
movements 
publishing 
businesses and 
newspapers 
07.12.2006 
14.12.2006 
Istanbul face-to-face
Güleç, Mehmet 
Nuri (Fırıncı 
Ağabey)  
A young activist in the 
1950s, a leader in the 1970s, 
today an elder of Yeni Nesil 
__ 
Works in the family 
business (bakeshop), 
later “endowed” 
06.10.2006 
31.10.2006 
14.11.2006  
Istanbul  face-to-face
__ A young elite, activist in the 
1970s NatYA2 
Student of 
mechanical 
engineering 
21.11.2006 
05.12.2006 
13.02.2007 
Istanbul face-to-face
__ Activist in the 1970s in an 
Anatolian town, today an 
elite of the movement NatYA3 
Student of 
mechanical 
engineering, later 
university professor 
16.12.2006 Istanbul face-to-face
Kutlular, 
Mehmet 
(Kutlular 
Ağabey) 
A young activist in the 
1960s and a leader in the 
1970s, today an elder of 
Yeni Asya 
__ 
Unemployed, later 
„endowed“ 
16.11.2006 Istanbul face-to-face
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration 
Group 
and 
individual 
Identifier
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview
Interview 
Type 
Mustafa Sungur 
(Sungur 
Ağabey) 
A "royal student," an elder 
respected by both Anatolian 
and İstanbul branches, now 
the elder of  Yeni Nesil 
__ 
Village school 
teacher, later small 
trade and 
„endowed“ 
19.12.2006 (?) a 
suddenly arranged 
meeting, might be 
a confusion of the 
date  
Istanbul face-to-face
__  Activist in the 1970s, a 
theolegian 
NatYA4 
Student of Prayer 
Leader and Preacher 
School, later 
theology student 
and works at the 
publishing 
businesses of the 
movement 
13.02.2007 Istanbul face-to-face 
Şenler, Şule 
Yüksel  
Activist during the 
Kirazlımescit period, sister 
of a prominent young Nur 
student, a JP activist. 
__ 
Columnist, 
preacher, novelist, 
one the first veil 
activist, later 
entered various 
Islamist and 
religious circles, 
including the NSM 
and certain sufi 
brotherhoods. 
23.12.2006 Istanbul face-to-face 
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
__  Activist in the 1970s 
NatYA5 
High school 
student, later 
student of law and 
lawyer. Worked in 
the movement’s 
publishing business  
12.12.2006 Istanbul face-to-face
__  Activist in the late 1970s, a 
close relative of a royal 
student in Central Anatolia 
NatYA6 
Born to a prominent 
Nur student family, 
nephew of a royal 
student.  Journalist, 
works in the 
movement 
publishing 
businesses 
04.12.2006 
16.12. 2006 
Ankara       
Istanbul 
face-to-face 
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY) 
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
Local Yeni Asya Elders and Activists (Kayseri) 
__ A current elder, activist  in 
the 1970s in a Kurdish 
majority district KayYA1 
Student of informal 
medrese, later 
student of theology 
faculty. Later, 
“endowed.” 
30.04.2009 Kayseri face-to-face
__ Very young contemporary 
activist staying in a local 
Medrese-i Nuriye for girls 
KayYA2 
Student in distance 
learning, plans to 
endow herself 
02.05.2009 Kayseri face-to-face
__ A second layer Nur student 
KayYA3 
University student, 
later university 
professor 
(undisclosed for 
unanimity) 
21.09.2006 Kayseri face-to-face
__ Contemporary local female 
elder. Wife of a Nur elite 
originating from an Eastern 
town. 
KayYA4 
Housewife, 
homemaker, 
endowed. 
30.04.2009 
01.05.2009 
02.05.2009  
Kayseri face-to-face
__ Activist in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, today a local 
Nur elite 
KayYA5 
Skilled craftsman, 
medium business 
owner 
02.05.2009 Kayseri face-to-face
__ Very young contemporary 
activist staying in a local 
Medrese-i Nuriye for girls KayYA6 
Student of a Kur'an 
course training to 
become a Kur'an 
teacher, plans to endow 
herself. 
02.05.2009 Kayserl face-to-face
Table 2 – cont’d  
331 
 332 
 
NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
__ Activist in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, today an elder KayYA7 
Small wholesale 
trader 
02.05.2009 Kayseri face-to-face
__ Activist in the 1970s 
KayYA8 
Small trade, later 
medium busines 
sowner 
04.05.2009 Kayseri telephone 
interview 
__ An elder sent to Kayseri by 
the late 1960s to supervise 
and enlarge the movement 
activities  
KayYA9 
Employee at the 
postal office, later 
“endowed.” 
04.05.2009 undisclosed  telephone 
interview 
__ activist in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, today a local 
Nur elite 
KayYA10 
Emloyed in his 
relative's shop. 
30.04.2009 Kayseri face-to-face
__ Local elder ,a major 
financial contributor and 
entrepreneur of the Risale-i  
Nur movementfrom 1960s 
onwards. Family members 
are prominent local Nur 
students. An elite of the JP 
in a subdistrict and major 
local  interlocutor between 
the JP and the   movement 
KayYA11 
Trader 28.09.2006 
01.10.2006 
Kayseri face-to-face
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NAME Further Description of 
activities and engagement 
during the years under 
consideration 
Group and 
individual 
Identifier 
Occupation before 
and after 
engagement 
Interview Date 
(DD.MM.YYYY)
Place of 
Interview 
Interview 
Type 
__ Young activist in Kayseri in 
the 1970s, head of the JP's 
youth organization, today a 
local Nur elite 
KayYA12 
Skilled craftsman, 
today businessowner 
04.05.2009 undisclosed  telephone 
interview 
__ Activist in the 1970s, today a 
local Nur elite KayYA13 
High school student, 
later student of 
education faculty and 
teacher. “endowed” 
04.05.2009 Kayseri telephone 
interview 
__ Activist in the 1970s, today a 
local Nur elite KayYA14 
Tailor (paid 
employee), later small 
businessowner 
05.05.2009 Kayseri telephone 
interview 
Table 2 – cont’d  
333 
 334 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL IN ENGLISH AND IN TURKISH   
The interviews were semi-structured and the questions did not necessarily follow the 
same order. In addition, questions have slightly changed, or shortened according to the 
interviewees’ movement affiliation, age, profession, locality etc.  The interviewer tried 
to start with the personal questions, having discovered that they relaxed the interviewee. 
Personal questions helped to show that the interview was not an exam and there is no 
right answer and that the researcher tries to understand the experiences, practices and 
views of the interviewee.  
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 C-1:  Görüşme Soruları (Interview Questions) 
I. Kişisel Bilgiler ve Tarih   
 
1. Nerede doğdunuz? Doğum tarihiniz? 
2. Mesleğiniz nedir? (Hala çalışıyorsa: ne iş yapıyorsunuz?) Daha once başka işlerde 
çalıştıysanız biraz bahsedebilir misiniz? Parti (veya harekete) ilgi duyup 
aktivitelerine katılmaya başladığınız zamanlarda çalışıyor muydunuz? Öyle ise 
biraz o zamanki işinizden hayatınızdan biraz bahsedebilir misiniz? (Risale-i Nur 
Talebeleri için: Risaleleri ilk tanıdığınızda ne yapıyordunuz? Çalışıyor muydunuz? 
Öğrenci miydiniz?) 
3. Çocukluğunuzu ve ailenizi anlatır mıydınız?  
• Aileniz nereli? Nerede yaşıyorlar? 
• Meslekleri nedir?  
• Aileniz ekonomik durumu nasıldı? Yaşam şartlarınız nasıldı? 
4. 1950, 1960 veya 1970lerde ekomomik gelirinizi ve yaşam koşullarınızı nasıl tarif 
edersiniz? Bugünkü koşullarınızla karşılaştırır mıydınız? O yıllarda (veya bugün) 
bakmanız gereken yakınlarınız var mıydı? 
 
II. Eğitim, dini, sosyal ve kültürel etkinlikler  
 
1. Hangi okullara gittiniz?  
• Nerede? Ne zaman? 
• Resmi, gayri-resmi eğitim?  
• Özel okul, devlet okulu? 
• Özel dersler? 
• Meslek eğitimi, meslek içi eğitim? 
• Gittiğiniz okulların isimleri? 
2. Dini eğitim aldınız mı veya dini okullara gittiniz mi?  
• Nerede, ne zaman, nasıl? 
• Geleneksel medrese eğitimi, aile büyükleri, sufi eğitimi, Risale-i Nur, kişisel çaba.  
3. Tarikat ehli misiniz? Hiç bir hocaefendiye intisap ettiniz mi veya sohbetlerini 
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dinlediniz mi? İntisabınız nasıl oldu, anlatır mısınız?  
• Ailenizde başka tarikat ehli var mı? Tarikat ehli olmak hayatınızda bir değişiklik 
yarattı mı, sizi etkiledi mi, nasıl?  
• (Eğer tarikat ehli olmadıysa veya hiç sohbetlere devam etmedi ise) Neden? 
4. (Eğer Nur talebesi değil ise) Hiç Risale-i Nur sohbetlerine katıldınız mı veya 
Risaleleri okudunuz mu? Açıklar mısınız?  
5. (Eğer Nur talebesi ise) Risalelerle ilk nasıl tanıştınız? Nerede? Ne zaman? 
Ayrıntılarıyla anlatır mısınız? 
6. Siz veya ailenizin herhangi bir üyesi dini eğitiminizi alırken herhangi bir zorluk 
yaşadınız mı?  
7. Okulda (veya daha sonra çalışırken) dindarlığınız veya dini yaşamınızla ilgili 
herhangi bir sosyal veya idari zorluk yaşadınız mı veya kolaylık gördünüz mü? 
Ayrıntılarını aktarır mıydınız? 
8. Gençliğinizde, aktif yıllarınızda, ve bugün hangi yayınları takip ettiniz? Bugün 
hangilerini takip ediyorsunuz? En sevdiğiniz yazarlar kimlerdi? 
9. Sizi çok etkilemiş veya halen etkileyen bir kitap, yazar, düşünür vs. var mı? Sizi 
nasıl ve neden etkilediğini düşünüyorsunuz? 
10. Hiç dergi, gazete v.b bir yayına sahip oldunuz mu? Bu tip bir yayında yazdınız mı, 
veya herhangi bir yayını yönettiniz mi? Cevabınız evet ise, hikayenizi ve yayının 
hikayesini anlatır mısınız?  
 
III. Siyasi Alan ve Siyasi Etkinlikler 
 
1. Ailenizde siyasete ilgi duyulur muydu? Siz çocukken ailenizde siyaset konuşulur 
muydu?   Belirgin hatıralarınız var mı? 
• (Eğer yaşı tutuyorsa) Tek parti dönemini ve çok partili sisteme geçişi hatırlıyor 
musunuz? Ailenizde tek parti dönem ve çok partili sisteme geçis nasıl yaşandı 
ve karşılandı? 
2. Aileniz hangi partiye teveccüh gösterdi? Ailenizin bu seçimlerini nasıl açıkladığını 
hatırlıyor musunuz? Sizin açıklamanız nedir?  
3. Harekete/partiye vb. girmeden önceki ve aktif olduğunuz dönemdeki dünya 
görüşünüzü nasıl tanımlarsınız? Bugün nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz? Görüşlerinizde bir 
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değişiklik oldu mu?  
4. İlk katıldığınız dini/entellektüel/siyasi grup/oluşum/organizasyon hangisiydi? 
Ortaya çıkmasına, kuruluşuna veya organizasyonuna katkıda bulunduğunuz bir 
dini, entellektüel veya siyasi oluşum var mı? Bu oluşuma katılmanızın veya katkıda 
bulunmanızın hikayesini anlatır mıydınız?  
5. 1960lardaki “toplu namazlar” hakkında ne düşünüyordunuz, bugün ne 
düşünüyorsunuz? Genel olarak İslamcı harekete (mobilizasyona) yardımcı oldu 
mu?  
6. Katıldığınız ve aktif olduğunuz başka dernek, siyasi parti veya grup oldu mu? 
Aktivitelerinizden ve bu oluşum/organizasyonun etkinliklerınden bahsedebilir 
misiniz?  
7. (Kayseri için) Oturmalara katılıyor musunuz veya katılır mıydınız? Oturmalardaki 
arkadaşlarınız sizin dünya görüşünüzü paylaşır mıydı? Hepsi aynı parti veya 
harekette miydi?   
8. Neden X partisi? Neden Y veya Z.... değil?   
9. (Eğer görüşmeci siyasi bir partiye katılmamış veya oy vermiyorsa) Neden parti 
siyasetinden veya aktif siyasetten uzak kaldınız ve/veya siyasi partilerle 
ilgilenmiyorsunuz?   
10. Hareketiniz, partiniz veya derneğiniz aracılığıyla veya bu kurumlar içerisinde ne tip 
etkinlikler organize ettiniz, düzenlediniz?  Sizce amaçlarına ulaştılar mı?  
11. Parti, hareket veya organizasyonunuzda görev ve sorumluklarınız nelerdi? (Hala 
aktif ise bugün ne gibi sorumluluk ve görevleriniz var?) Bu sorumlulukları neden 
ve nasıl yüklendiniz? Görev paylaşımı konusunda kararlar nasıl alınıyordu?   
12.  (Siyasi parti üyeleri için) Acaba aday seçimi (parlamento, senato, il idaresi meclisi, 
belediye meclisi, belediye başkanlığı) kararları nasıl alınıyordu? Adaylarda nelere 
dikkat edilirdi?  
13. Hiç milletvekili (veya belediye meclisi, il idaresi meclisi) adayı olmayı düşündünüz 
mü veya oldunuz mu? (Olumlu veya olumsuz) Kararınızı  nasıl aldığınızı, ve 
nedenlerini anlatır mıydınız?  
• Nasıl aday olunur? 
14. Hiç seçim çalışmalarında yer aldınız mı? 1973 ve 1977 seçimlerindeki seçim 
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kampanyası etknliklerinizden bahseder miydiniz?  
15. (Eğer seçilmiş ise) Milletvekili olarak (veya belediye meclisi üyesi olarak) 
deneyimlerinizi, görevlerinizi ve zorlukları anlatır mısınız?  
16. O yıllarda (ve daha sonraki yıllarda) dava arkadaşlarınız kabul ettiğiniz ama 
düşünce ve görüşlerinde farklılık olduğunu düşündüğünüz hatta yolunuzu 
ayırdığınız kişiler, hareketler ve kurumlar oldu mu? Ayrıntılarıyla anlatır mıydınız? 
17. Aile, arkadaş çevreniz veya akrabalarınız hiç hareket veya siyasi parti 
etkinlikleriniz nedeniyle şikayetçi oldular mı?   
• Faaliyetleriniz sırasında ve faaliyetlerinizden dolayı kovuşturmaya uğradınız mı? 
Suçlandınız mı? Tutuklu kaldınız veya mahkumiyet aldınız mı? Güvenlik güçleri 
tarafından izlendiniz veya taciz edildiniz mi? Cevabınız evet ise bunun kişisel, 
siyasi sosyal veya hareketinizle ilgili sonuçları oldu mu? Oldu ise bunlar nelerdi?   
 
IV. Milli Nizam ve Milli Selamet Partileri 
 
1. Milli Nizam Partisi kurulmadan once Adalet Partisi ve diğer sağ partiler 
Anadolu’da epeyce eleştiriliyordu. Sizin görüşleriniz nasıldı? Bu eleştirilere 
katılıyor muydunuz?   
2. Milli Nizam’ın kurulmasını desteklediniz mi? Kurulmasında yer aldınız mı? 
Neden? Nasıl katıldınız, desteklediniz veya karşı çıktınız?  Ayrıntılarıyla anlatır 
mısınız? 
3. Milli Nizam’ın kapatılması hakkında ne düşündünüz, kapatılınca ne yaptınız?  
4. Milli Selamet Partisi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi koalisyonu hakkında görüşleriniz 
nelerdi? Bu görüşleriniz doğrultusunda ne yaptınız? Neden bu şekilde düşündünüz?   
5. Ceza yasasının 141 ve 142 maddelerinin 163. Maddeye (bu maddelerden hüküm 
giyenlerin veya tutuklananların) ek olarak planlanan Af Yasasına dahil edilmesi 
hakkında ne düşündünüz?   
• İsmail Cem’in TRT’ye atanması  ve Mustafa Üstündağ’ın Eğitim Bakanı olmasını 
nasıl karşıladınız?   
6. (Kayseri için) Koalisyon sırasında diğer parti mensupları ile ilişkileriniz nasıldı? 
7. (Nizam/Selamet hareketi mensupları için) Üçüncü Kogrelde Gündüz Sevilgen ve 
arkadaşlarının ve Dördüncü Kongrede Korkut Özal ve arkadaşlarının Genel İdare 
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Kurulu listelerine destek verdiniz mi? Neden ve nasıl? 
8. Koalisyona karşı çıkanların partiden ayrılması hakkında ne düşündünüz? 
9. MSP-CHP koalisyonun ne gibi zaaf ve başarıları (ülke, İslamcı hareket ve parti 
için) olduğunu düşündünüz (bugün dönüp baktığınızda ne düşünüyorsunuz)?   
10. Milliyetçi Cephe hükümetlerini onayladınız mı? Desteklediniz mi? Neden ve 
Nasıl? Bu koalisyonun ne gibi zaaf ve başarıları (ülke, İslamcı hareket ve parti için) 
olduğunu düşündünüz (bugün dönüp baktığınızda ne düşünüyorsunuz)?  
• (Kayseri için) Koalisyon sırasında diğer parti mensupları ile ilişkileriniz nasıldı? 
• (Kayseri Nizam/ Selamet mensupları için) Koalisyon sırasında, Kayseri’de sağ 
partiler arasında belediye seçimleri için ortak aday belirlenmeye çalışılmış. Sizce 
neden bu ittifak başarılamadı? 
11. Hem MSP hem Milliyetçi Cephe koalisyonları döneminde siz kendinizin, yerel 
parti örgütünün ve/veya hareketinizin dilek, istek, ihtiyaç ve/veya çıkarlarını parti 
merkezine nasıl aktarıyordunuz? Onlar nasıl karşılık veriyordu? Size gelen 
vatandaşların dilek, istek ve çıkarlarını merkeze nasıl iletiyordunuz?  
 
V. İslamcı Hareketler Üzerine 
 
1. Parlamento yolu ve siyasi parti aracılığıyla siyaset İslamcı hareketi sizce genel 
olarak nasıl etkiledi?   
2. Başka yerlerdeki İslamcı hareketleri tanıyor musunuz, biliyor musunuz?   
Müslüman Kardeşler deneyimini kendi deneyimizle ve hareketinizle karşılaştırır 
mısınız? İran İslam Devrimini nasıl karşıladınız? Bu deneyim hakkında genel 
olarak ne düşünüyorsunuz?   
3. Türkiye’deki çeşitli gençlik hareketlerini birbirleriyle karşılaştırır mısınız? İslamcı 
gençlik hareketiyle diğerlerinin benzerlik ve farklılıkları nelerdir?    
• Milli Türk Talebe Birliği’nin İslamcı gençlik hareketindeki yeri nedir?  
• Akıncılarla genç Nur talebelerini karşılaştırır mıydınız?   
 
VI.  Türkiye Üzerine (Dün ve Bugün) 
 
1. Siyasete (harekete, grubunuza vb.) ilk girdiğinizden bu yana Türkiye’de sizce 
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değişmeyen ve çözüm bulunması gereken sorunlar hangileri?  O yıllardan bu yana 
bu sorunlar hakkındaki görüşleriniz ve çözüm önerileriniz değişti mi?   
2. “Kürt sorunu” veya “Doğu Sorunu” olarak adlandırılan konu hakkındaki 
düşünceleriniz nedir? 1960 ve 1970lerde bu konuda neler düşünüyordunuz? Bu 
konu etrafında şekillenen sorunların sizce nedeni ve çözümü nedir?   
3. Ermeni Soykrımı vardır veya yoktur şeklindeki tartışmalar konusunda 
düşünceleriniz nedir? Sizce bu gibi konular özgürce tartışılmalı mı?   
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C-2: Interview Questions 
I. Personal Trajectory and0 Information  
1. What are your birthplace and date of birth?  
2. What is your profession? (if he is still active: Where do you work today?) Could 
you tell me more about your previous jobs, if there are any? Were you working 
when you first developed your interest and entered in party/movement activities? If 
so, could you tell me more about your work and life during that period? For the 
Risale-i Nur students: when you first met the Risale-i Nur what were you doing? 
Were you working, were you a student? (The Nur students use the expression: 
“Risaleleri tanımak,” or meeting the Risales.)  
3. Could you tell me about your childhood and family: 
• Where are your parents from? Where do they live? 
• What were their professions?  
• How was your economic situation? How would you describe your living 
conditions back then? 
4. How would you describe your level of income and living conditions during the 
(1950s, 1960s or 1970s). How would you compare to your living standard today?  
• Do (did) you have dependent family members you need(ed) to take care of? 
 
II. Education, religious, social and cultural activities 
 
1. What schools did you attend?  
• Where and when?  
• Formal, informal?  
• Public or private school? 
• Private courses? 
• Vocational (re)training? 
• The names of the schools 
2. Did you have a religious education or schooling? Where, how and when did you 
get your religious education?  
• Traditional medrese, family elders, brotherhood, personal efforts, school, Risale-i 
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Nur etc. 
3.  Are you from the people of the sufi brotherhood? Have you been attached to a sufi 
leader or listened to his conversations? If so, how did you attach? Do you have a 
family member who is also from the “people of the brotherhood.” How being a sufi 
disciple help/influence/change you? If you have not become a member, or listened 
to conversations, why not? Please elaborate. 
4. (If not a Nur student) Have you ever participated to a Risale-i Nur class or read the 
epistles? Please elaborate your answer. 
5. (If the interviewee is a Nur student) How did you first meet with the Risale-i Nur? 
Where? When? Could you elaborate ? 
6. Have you or your family members ever experienced difficulty in getting religious 
education? 
7. Have you ever experienced any social or administrative difficulty, or help, facility 
at school (or in later years at work) regarding your religiosity and/or religious life?  
Could you elaborate? 
8. What are the publications you followed during your youth, your activism years and 
today? Who were the writers you liked the most?  
9. Are there any particular book, author, and thinker etc. that influenced you (or still 
influences you) the most? Could you tell my why and in what ways they influenced 
you? 
10. Have you ever owned, managed, or written for, a periodical, newspaper etc? If yes, 
how did you engage in this activity? Could you tell me the story of this 
publication?  
 
III. On Political Field and political activities 
 
1. Were your parents interested in politics? Did they talk about politics when you 
were a child? Do you have distinct memories?  
• (If old enough) Do you remember the single party period, or the passage to 
multiparty politics? How were they received in your family?  
• Which party did your parents extended their favor (teveccüh göstermek)? Do you 
remember how your parents explained this choice? How do you explain their 
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choice yourself? 
2. How would you describe your worldview back in your activism days (and before) 
and today? Did you experience change in your views? 
3. What was the first religious/intellectual/political formation/group/organization in 
which you participated? Is there a religious, intellectual or political formation you 
contributed to its emergence/establishment/organization? Could you tell me the 
story of your participation/entrepreneurship etc.?  
4. What do/did you think about the collective morning prayers of the late 1960s? 
Were they helpful in the Islamist mobilization in general?  
5. Were there other associations, political parties, groups you joined and actively 
participated? Could you tell me more about your activities in particular and the 
activities of this organization in general?  
6. (For Kayseri) Do you participate (did you participate) in “oturma”? Were all your 
friends in oturma shared your worldview back then? Were they in the same 
movement/party? 
7. Why the Party X? Why not the Party Y, Z etc.? Please elaborate. 
8. (If the interviewee never supported or worked for a party) Why did you stay away 
from party politics? 
9. What types of activities were you organizing through and within your 
party/movement/association etc? Do you think they reached their purpose? 
• Conferences, seminars, protests, courses, study circles, etc. 
10. What were your duties and responsibilities in your party, movement or 
organization? (If still active, what are they now) How and why did you acquire 
them? How were such decisions on the division of labor were made? 
11.  (For the political party members) Could you tell me more about the process of 
decision-making regarding candidature selection (including parliament, senate and 
local governmental bodies)? What were your criteria in the selection? 
12. Have you ever become or thought about becoming a parliamentary candidate (or a 
candidate for municipal assembly, town assembly etc.)? Please elaborate. 
• How one would become a candidate for such offices?  
13. Have you ever actively worked in an electoral campaign? Could you give me the 
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details of your campaign activities for the 1973 and 1977 elections?  
14. (If elected to a public office) Could you tell me about your experiences, duties, and 
difficulties as a parliamentarian (member of the municipal assembly etc.)? 
15. During those years (and throughout the years to come) did you have “brothers in 
cause,” (individuals, movements, institutions) within and outside your movement; 
organization etc. with whom you disagreed over certain issues or even parted 
ways? Please elaborate. 
16. Did your family, friends, relatives ever complain about your movement/party 
activities? 
• Have you ever faced criminal charges, went to prison, followed or harassed by 
security forces during and because of your activities? If so, were there any personal, 
political, social, or movement related consequences?  What were these 
consequences? 
 
IV. On the National Order and National Salvation Parties 
 
1. Before the establishment of the NOP, there were some criticism directed to the JP 
and other right wing parties. Did you agree with them? What was your own 
interpretation?  
2. Did you support, or involve in the establishment of the NOP. Why, why not? How 
did you participate or oppose? Could you elaborate?  
3. How did you respond to the ban of the NOP? 
4. What were your views about the NSP-RPP coalition? Did you act upon your 
views? How and why? 
5. What were your views regarding the Draft Amnesty Law, which would include 
those convicted under Penal Law Articles 141 and 142, together with those 
convicted with Article 163? 
• What did you think about İsmail Cem (a well know social democrat)’s appointment 
as the head of the State Radio and Television? Similarly, what was your reaction 
when Mustafa Üstündağ (a social democrat politician considered extreme left 
among the right wing activists) became the Minister of Education? 
6. (For Kayseri) How were your relations with the members of other parties in town 
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during the coalition? 
7. (For the NSM members) Did you support the alternative General Executive lists in 
the Third (Gündüz Sevilgen and his friends) and Fourth (Korkut Özal and his 
friends) General Congresses? Why and how? 
8. What did you think about the resignation of the anti-coalitionists from the party? 
9. What, did you think back then, were the successes and failures of the RPP-NSP 
coalition for the country, the Islamist movement in general and the party? When 
you look back what do you think today? 
10. Did you support and approve the Nationalist Front governments? Why? What were 
the consequences (and successes and failures) of these governments for the 
country, Islamist movement in general and the party? 
• (For Kayseri) How were your relations with the members of other political parties 
in town during the Nationalist Front coalitions? 
• (For the NSM Kayseri activists) There were some attempts among the right wing 
parties in Kayseri to have a joint candidate for the municipal elections during the 
first Nationalist Front government. At the end why do you think they could not 
succeed to form an alliance? 
11. During the coalition periods with the RPP and in the Nationalist Front How would 
you convey your (individual, and local party or movement) wishes, demands, needs 
and/or interests to the party center? How would the party center would respond? 
How did you communicate the wishes, demands and interests of the citizens who 
came to you for help?  
 
V. On Islamist Movements 
 
1. How do you think political engagement through the parliament and political party 
influence the Islamist movement in general in Turkey? 
2. Are you familiar with the Islamist movements elsewhere? How would you compare 
(the experiences of) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to (those of) your movement or 
other movements in Turkey? What was your reaction to the Islamic revolution in 
Iran? What do you think about this experience in general?  
3. How would you compare different youth movements in Turkey? Differences and 
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similarities between the Islamist youth movements and the others?  
• What is the place of the Turkish National Student Union within the greater Islamist 
youth movement? 
• How would you compare the Raiders with the young Nur students?  
 
VI.  On Turkey (yesterday and today) 
 
1. Since your participation to your party (movement, organization, group), which, do 
you think, basic questions and problems persist in Turkey that needs to be solved? 
Have your ideas and proposals for solution of these problems changed since then? 
2. What do you think about the issue called “Kurdish question?” (also known as 
Eastern question?) What do you think are the reasons and solutions to the problems 
revolving around this issue? 
3. What do you think about the disputes over whether or not there was an Armenian 
genocide? Do you think we should be discussing on this question freely? 
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 Figure 1: Map of Turkey highlighting Kayseri district. 
Source: http://wikimapia.org/#lat=38.6958435&lon=35.4929048&z=6&l=0&m=w (highlighting by the author) 
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Name Translation Abbreviation Period of 
Activity 
Leaders 
Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi  
Republican People's 
Party  
RPP 1923-1981, 
1992- 
Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, 
Bülent Ecevit, Deniz 
Baykal, Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu 
Demokrat Parti   Democrat Party  DP 1946-1960 Adnan Menderes 
Millet Partisi  Nation Party  NP 1948-1954 Fevzi Çakmak, Hikmet 
Bayur, Enis Akaygen, 
Mustafa Kentli 
Millet Köylü Partisi  Nation Peasant Party  NPP 1954-1960 Osman Bölükbaşı 
Hürriyet Partisi Freedom Party  FP 1955-1958 Ekrem Hayri 
Üstündağ, Fevzi Lütfi 
Karaosmanoğlu 
Cumhuriyetçi Köylü 
Millet Partisi  
Republican Peasant 
Nation Party  
RPNP  1961-1965, 
(by 1969 
NAP) 
Osman Bölükbaşı, 
Hasan Dinçer, Ahmet 
Oğuz, Alparslan 
Türkeş 
Türkiye İşçi Partisi Labour Party of Turkey LPT 1961-1971, 
1975-1980 
Avni Erakalın, Kemal 
Türkler, Mehmet Ali 
Aybar, Mehmet Ali 
Aslan, Şaban Yıldız, 
Behice Boran 
Yeni Turkiye Partisi  New Turkey Party  NTP 1961-1973 Ekrem Alican, İrfan 
Aksu 
Adalet Partisi   Justice Party  JP 1961-1981 Ragıp Gümüşpala, 
Süleyman Demirel 
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Name Translation Abbreviation Period of Activity Leaders 
Millet Partisi  Nation Party  NP 1962-1977 Osman Bölükbaşı 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi  Nationalist Action 
Party  
NAP 1965-1980 Alparslan Türkeş 
Birlik Partisi  Union Party  UP 1966-1981 Hasan Tahsin Berkman, Hüseyin 
Balan, Mustafa Timisi 
Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi Republican Reliance 
Party  
RelP   1967-1981 Turhan Feyzioğlu 
Demokratik Parti  Democratic Party  DkP  1970- 1980 Ferruh Bozbeyli - Faruk Sükan 
Milli Nizam Partisi  National Order Party  NOP 1970-1971 Necmettin Erbakan 
Milli Selamet Partisi  National Salvation 
Party  
NSP 1972-1981 Süleyman Arif Emre, Necmettin 
Erbakan 
Nizam Partisi Order Party   OP 1977-1980 Hüsamettin Akmumcu 
Refah Partisi  Welfare Party  WP 1983-1998 Ali Türkmen, Necmettin Erbakan 
Fazilet Partisi  Virtue Party  VP 1997-2001 İsmail Alptekin, Recai Kutan 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi  Justice and 
Development Party  
JDP 2001- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
Saadet Partisi  Felicity Party  FP 2001-  Recai Kutan, Mustafa Kamalak 
Halkın Sesi Partisi  Voice of the People 
Party  
VPP 2011- Numan Kurtulmuş 
T
able 3 – cont’d 
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Name of the Movement Translation Type Organization 
type 
Ideational 
Orientation 
Date 
Akıncılar Raiders Politico-cultural Formal Islamist 1975-1980 
Büyük Doğu Great East Politico-cultural Informal Islamist 1964- 
Işıkcılar Disciples of Ligtht New Religious 
Movement 
Informal Islamist 1960's- 
Komandolar Commandos Politico-cultural Informal Ultra-
Nationalist 
1967-1971 
Milli Mücadele Birliği Union of National 
Struggle 
Politico-cultural Formal Islamist 1967-1980 
Risale-i Nur Talebeleri Students of Epistles of 
Light 
New Religious 
Movement 
Informal Islamist 1926- 
Süleymancılar Disciples of Süleyman New Religious 
Movement 
Informal Islamist 1950's- 
Ülkücü Gençlik Idealist Youth Politico-cultural Formal Ultra-
Nationalist 
1971- 
Yazıcılar Scribes Students of Epistles of 
Light 
Informal/formal Islamist 1960- 
Yeni Asya (Kirazlımescit) New Asia Students of Epistles of 
Light 
Informal/formal Islamist 1963-               
(1963-1970 
Kirazlımescit)
T
able 4- N
ationw
ide O
rganized Social M
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Name Translation 
 
Diyanet İşleri Görevlileri Dernekleri Associations for the Employees of the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
İlahiyat Fakültesi Mezunları Derneği Association for the Graduates of Theology Faculty 
Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği Association for Fighting Against Communism 
Milli Türk Talebe Birliği  Turkish National Student Union 
Milliyetçi Öğretmenler Derneği Nationalist Teachers’ Association. 
Milliyetçiler Derneği  Nationalists’ Association 
Türkiye İmam Hatip Okulu Mezunları Derneği 
Federasyonu 
Turkey Federation of the Associations of the Graduates of Prayer Leader 
and Preacher Schools 
Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği - TOBB Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey 
Yeşilay Cemiyeti Green-Crescent Association 
Yüksek İslam Enstitü Mezunları Cemiyeti Association for the Graduates of Advanced Institute of Islam 
T
able 5- N
ationw
ide O
rganized M
ajor R
ight W
ing 
C
ivil O
rganizations during the 1960s and 1970s 
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Name Translation 
İmam Hatip Okulu Mezunlar Derneği  Association for the Graduates of Prayer Leader and Preacher school  
İslam Enstitüsü Talebe Derneği Association for the Students of Advanced Institute for Islam  
Berber ve Kuaförler Derneği  Association of Barbers and Coiffeurs  
Esnaf Birlikleri Derneği Association of Craftsmen Guilds 
Demirciler Derneği Association of Iron-workers 
Din Görevlileri Derneği Association of Religious Employees 
Sobacilar Derneği Association of Stove-Makers 
Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu Derneği  Association of Taşcıoğlu Hafızokulu 
Marangozlar Derneği Association of Wood-workers 
Otelciler Derneği Associations of  Hotel-keepers 
Bakırcılar Derneği Associations of Copper-workers  
Ayakkabıcılar Derneği Associations of Shoemakers  
Sanayi Odasi Chamber of Industry  
Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifi Craftsman’s Cooperative  
Büyük Doğu Klübü Great East Club 
Kayseri Ticaret Odasi Kayseri Chamber of Commerce  
Milliyetçi Öğretmenler Derneği Nationalist Teachers’ Association of Kayseri  
Milliyetçi Öğretmenler Sendikası Nationalist Teachers’ Syndicate 
İmam-Hatip ve İlâhiyat Tedrisatı Yardım Derneği  Philantropic Association for Prayer Leader and Preacher and Theology Schooling  
Türkiye Tekstil, Örme ve Giyim Sanayii İsçileri Sendikası TEKSIF Kayseri (Turkish abbreviation for Textile, Tricotage, and Clothing Industry Workers’ Syndicate of Turkey) 
Türk Kültür Derneği Turkish Cultural Association  
Türk Ocağı Turkish Hearth  
T
able 6- R
ight W
ing D
om
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rganizations in 
K
ayseri in the 1960s and 1970s  
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APPENDIX F 
POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HÜSAMETTİN AKMUMCU  
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Notary of Public document approving that Said Nursi granted Power of Attorney to 
Hüsamettin Akmumcu. Source: Hüsamettin Akmumcu’s personal archive. 
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APPENDIX G 
SELECTED NEWS ITEMS AND HEADLINES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: A day before the “Bloody Sunday,” Bugün headline says: “It is time to strangle 
the reds.” Source: Bugün, February 15, 1969. 
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Figure 4: The front cover page of the daily Yeni İstanbul supplement on İbrahim 
Elmalı. The blue caption reads that those who remain silent against injustice are “the 
mute Satan,” a hadith, whose originality is a matter of dispute among the scholars. 
Source: Yeni İstanbul, October 15, 1966 
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Figure 5: Yeni İstanbul gives the news of the “Elmalı Affair” protests in İstanbul and 
Kayseri as its headline. Source: Yeni İstanbul, October 9, 1966. 
 
  
 359 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Bugün informs its readers that “35.000 Muslims” participated to the collective 
Morning Prayer in Sultanahmet in İstanbul as a response to those who called for a 
“socialist Turkey.” Source: Bugün, July 29, 1968. 
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Figure 7: Şule Yüksel Şenler is at a conference, which took place in the (very crowded) 
conference room of the National Turkish Student Union (the MTTB) in İstanbul. 
Source: Bugün, April 9, 1969. 
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Figure 8: A young Yeni Asya elite, columnist at Yeni Asya, Safa Mürsel gives a talk in 
Isparta and Eskişehir. In Eskişehir he was hosted by the JP’s local youth branch (which 
was probably populated by the young Nur students). He said that the JP’s 
understanding of nationalism is one that unites all [types] of nationalists. Source: Yeni 
Asya, March 15, 1978. 
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Figure 9: Yeni Asya (back then Kirazlımescit) movement mobilizes against the draft law of 
“Protection of the Constitutional Order” of the JP: “The resistance of the People still 
continues.” Source: İttihad, March 25, 1969. 
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Figure 10: Shortly after the military intervention of March 12, 1971, Yeni Asya’s 
headline reads “Leading provacateurs are being arrested.” They were “provoking 
innocent youth” to fight with them. On the right, Yeni Asya published the memorandum 
no. 19 of the Martial Law Commandership of İstanbul, which lists the “Communists” to 
be arrested. The list includes names ranging from university scholars such as Bahri Savcı 
and Uğur Mumcu to Union Leader Kemal Türkler and writer Yaşar Kemal. Among them 
Türkler and Mumcu were assasinated in 1980 and in 1993, respectively. While their 
murders remained to be solved, it is a widely held view that the perpetrators were “deep 
state forces.” Among those prosecuted within the context of the Ergenekon Affair today, 
reportedly there are also some of the remnants of these “forces.” Source: Yeni Asya, May 
19, 1971. 
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Figure 11: Necmettin Erbakan applies to the JP to become a candidate for the Senate 
from Konya. Source: Yeni İstanbul, April 10, 1968. 
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Figure 12: “…and the Freemasons won again.” Bugün reports how police 
forces took control of the TOBB. On the upper right corner Erbakan, though 
being the real winner, loses the boxing game against his opponent. On the 
lower right, Erbakan announces his application to the JP to become a 
parliamentary candidate, the same day with the police intervention. Source: 
Bugün, August 9, 1969. 
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Figure 13: Yeni Asya (then Kirazlımescit) movement informs its readers regarding the 
TÖS incident. The green upper headline reads: “We won’t let the Communists live.” The 
headline says: “People of Kayseri reared up against the reds.” Source: İttihad, July 15, 
1969. 
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Figure 14: This photo, which was previously, published also by conservative-nationalist 
daily Tercüman shows Korkut Özal, the NSP’s Minister of Agriculture of the RPP-NSP 
and Nationalist Front coalitions, making a toast at a state diner in Germany. As a very 
pious Naqshbandi, Özal would not drink an alcoholic beverage. However, whatever he 
drinks is not visible, and the gesture is open to the speculation of the NSP’s opponents. 
Incidentally, these were the years when both the NSM and Yeni Asya were trying to 
organize in Germany competing over the attention of the immigrant workers. Source: 
Yeni Asya, May 1, 1977. 
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Figure 15: Following the signature of the coalition protocol the NSM 
newspaper published this caricature. It shows the symbols of the NSP (its 
emblem, a key) and the RPP (rather Ecevit’s favorite peace symbols, a 
dove with an olive branch). The tip of the NSP’s key can also be read as 
“Allah” in Arabic in its Kufic form. Source: Milli Gazete, January 12, 1974. 
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Figure 16: Both Erbakan (the headline) and Ecevit (lower right) promises brotherhood 
following the establishment of the coalition. Erbakan promises a new law for freedom of 
thought. Source: Milli Gazete, February 16, 1974. 
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Figure 17: Demirel speaks at the JP’s 5th General Congress. His main opponents are no 
longer in the party. The caption reads “I ask you, is there an issue that we did not address. 
Give me just one example [if you can]” and “Those who know anything about me but not 
provide evidence are dishonorable people,” respectively. He responds to corruption 
allegations advanced by his opponents. Source: Milliyet Yıllığı 1970, 43. (Originally, 
“Demirel Tekrar Başkan,” Milliyet, October 24, 1970). 
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Figure 18: Yeni Asya supports the JP in 1969 and struggles against the split of right wing 
votes. The advertisement of the supplement published against the NAP and its leader 
Türkeş. The main argument against them is the fact that Türkeş had been a member of 
the  military junta that staged the military intervention of May 27, 1960. Source: Yeni 
Asya, September 16, 1969. 
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Figure 19: NSM pro-coalitionist elites try to balance the movement’s collective identity 
and the party’s coalition responsibilities. Headline informs the readers that the “statue of 
shame” in Kadıköy has been removed. On the left corner and bottom, a column and a 
news item on the pending draft of the Law of Amnesty. On the right, there is news of a 
motor factory that is planned to be established in Konya. Source: Milli Gazete, March 20, 
1974. 
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APPENDIX H 
PARTY OPENING CEREMONIES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: The NOP flier for the local party opening ceremony in Sivas. Source: 
Milli Kütüphane, Non-book materials, 1970 AFİŞ 332. 
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Figure 21: The NSM poster for the NOP opening ceremony for the Istanbul district 
branch. At the bottom the poster indicates that “ladies” will be separately accomodated. 
Source: The National Library, Non-book materials, 1970 AFİŞ 332. 
 
